claims against him? If white subjects or citizens, owe labor and service, even by formal indentures, such obligations afford no valid excuse against the requisition of government to have them drafted into the militia to serve the country. The government does not compensate those who claim indemnity for the loss of such “labor and service." Whether the color of the debtor, or the length of time during which the obligation (to labor and service) has to run, or the evidence by which the existence of the obligation is proved, can make an essential difference between the different kinds of labor and service, remains to be seen. The question is, whether the soldier or seaman, serving his country in arms, can be deemed private property, as recognized in the constitution of the United States?

DOES THE WAR POWER OF SEIZURE SUPERSEDE THE CIVIL POWER OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PRIVATE PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE?

That the property of any citizen may, under certain circumstances, be seized in time of war, by military officers, for public purposes, is not questioned, just compensation being offered, or provided for; but the question has been asked, whether this power does not supersede the right of Congress, in war, to pass laws to take away what martial law leaves unappropriated?

This inquiry is conclusively answered by reference to the amendment of the constitution, above cited, which admits the existence of that power in CONGRESS;* but in addition to this, there are other clauses which devolve powers and duties on the legislature, giving them a large and important share in instituting, organizing, carrying on, regulating, and ending war; and these duties could not, under all circumstances, be discharged

* Amendments, Art. V. last clause.

in war, without exercising the right to take for public use the property of the subject. It would seem strange if private property could not be so taken, while it is undeniable that in war the government can call into the military service of the country every able-bodied citizen, and tax his property to any extent.

REFERENCES AS TO THE CONSTITUTION, SHOWING THE WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS.

The powers of the legislative department in relation to war are contained chiefly in the following sections in the constitution:

Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 11. Congress may institute war by declaring it against an enemy. The President alone cannot do so. Also, Congress may make laws concerning captures on land, as well as on water.

Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 12. Congress may raise and support armies: and provide and maintain a navy.

Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 14.

Congress may make laws for the government of land and naval forces.

Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 15. Congress may provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion.

Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 16: And may provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.

The preamble to the constitution declares the objects for which it was framed to be these: "to form a more perfect Union; establish justice; insure domestic tranquillity; provide for the common defence; promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." In Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 1,

the first power given to Congress is to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. And in the same article (the eighteenth clause) express power is given to Congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing and all other powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

SLAVE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE SAME LIABILITY AS OTHER PROPERTY TO BE APPROPRIATED FOR WAR PURPOSES.

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If the public welfare and common defence, in time of war, require that the claims of masters over their apprentices or slaves should be cancelled or abrogated, against their consent, and if a general law carrying into execution such abrogation, is, in the judgment of Congress, “a necessary and proper measure for accomplishing that object," there can be no question of the constitutional power and right of Congress to pass such laws. The only doubt is in relation to the right to compensation. If it should be said that the release of slaves from their servitude would be tantamount to impairing or destroying the obligation of contracts, it may be said, that though states have no right to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, Congress is at liberty to pass such laws. It will be readily perceived that the right to abrogate and cancel the obligations of apprentices and slaves does not rest solely upon the power of Congress to appropriate private property to public use; but it may be founded upon their power and obligation to accomplish one of the chief objects for which the Union was formed, viz., to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.

IMPORTANCE AND DANGER OF THIS POWER.

The powers conveyed in this 18th clause of Art. I., Sect. 8, are of vast importance and extent. It may be said that they are, in one sense, unlimited and discretionary. They are more than imperial. But it was intended by the framers of the constitution, or, what is of more importance, by the people who made and adopted it, that the powers of government in dealing with civil rights in time of peace, should be defined and limited; but the powers "to provide for the general welfare and the common defence" in time of war, should be unlimited. It is true that such powers may be temporarily abused; but the remedy is always in the hands of the people, who can unmake laws and select new repre ⚫sentatives and senators.

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF

CONGRESS.

It is not necessary here to define the extent to which congressional legislation may justly control and regulate the conduct of the army and navy in service; or where falls the dividing line between civil and martial law. But the power of Congress to pass laws on the subjects expressly placed in its charge by the terms of the constitution cannot be taken away from it, by reason of the fact that the President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, also has powers, equally constitutional, to act upon the same subject-matters. It does not follow that because Congress has power to abrogate the claims of Mormons or slaveholders, the Presi dent, as commander, may not also do the same thing.

These powers are not inconsistent, or conflicting. Congress may pass laws concerning captures on land

and on the water. If slaves are captured, and are treated as "captured property," Congress should determine what is to be done with them; and it will be the President's duty to see that these as well as other laws of the United States are executed.

CONGRESS HAS POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION TO ABOLISH SLAVERY.

Whenever, in the judgment of Congress, the common defence and public welfare, in time of war, require the removal of the condition of slavery, it is within the scope of their constitutional authority to pass laws for that purpose.

If such laws are deemed to take private prop erty for public use, or to destroy private property for public benefit, as has been shown, that may be done under the constitution, by providing just compensation; otherwise, no compensation can be required. It has been so long the habit of those who engage in public life to disclaim any intention to interfere with slavery in the States, that they have of late become accustomed to deny the right of Congress to do so. But the constitution contains no clause or sentence prohibiting the exercise by Congress of the plenary power of abrogating involuntary servi tude. The only prohibition contained in that instrument relating to persons held to labor and service, is in Art. IV, which provides that, "No person held to labor and service in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation "therein,” be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." Thus, if a slave or appren

• Constitution, Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 11.