certain industry to combine or form the trust is reached. (2) The exact cost of production at the current rate of wages and price of material is ascertained. (3) Prices are fixed so as to yield a minimum profit. (4) An increase of price, resulting in an excess of profit, is equitably divided between the trust and its employes.

In estimating cost, all labor, material, transportation, commissions, etc., are carefully considered; manufacturers guilty of cutting prices are fined; compensation against loss by manufacturers is guaranteed; a 'fighting" fund is maintained with which to fight independent manufacturers; expense of management is met by quarterly levies; a wage and conciliation board is formed, in which the laborers have an equal right with employers.

This wage and conciliation board has absolute power to settle all disputes which cannot be arranged in different factories; if an agreement cannot be reached an arbitrator must be called in; until the dispute is settled the workmen accept the employers' terms under protest; when a decision is reached it is retroactive; strikes and lockouts are impossible.

Mr. Griffin says of the wage arrangement and general working of this trade combination :

The first arrangement of the selling prices carries with it a wage bonus for the workmen, in proportion to the amount of the average advance. Generally speaking, the first advance on the selling price carries with it a bonus of 10 per cent. on the wages, but this varies with the proportion of the wages included in the cost of production; sometimes it is only 5 per cent. bonus. Much depends upon the materials used. If these are metal, the proportion of wages is small and the specific value of material large; if the materials used are clays, the wages are large and the value of the material small. Five per cent. bonus on the

wages in the latter case may be even more than 10 per cent. in the former. Whatever it may be, the first bonus is a fixture as long as the alliance exists. Any additional advance in the selling prices must be made by the consent of the whole board and carries with it a bonus on the wages. Generally, it is a 5-per-cent. bonus on a 10per-cent. advance; this, however, is subject to a sliding scale. . e., in the event of a reduction being necessary in the selling prices, from any reason whatsover, the bonuses are reduced, proportionately, until the first bonus is reached. This cannot be

taken off from the wages in any trade under

interfered with. So far, no bonus has been

an alliance. In any trade subject to accidental conditions, such as the rise and fall in the metal markets, manufacturers may alter their selling prices in any way that the bonus being interfered with. Only indoes not disturb their actual profits, without crease or decrease of actual profits can affect the bonus.

The employers, having formed a union trades unionism in every way. They emamongst themselves, give their support to ploy none but unionists so that the workmen must form an union if none exists. On the other hand, the workmen refuse to work for any but associated employers.

If,

therefore, any member of an alliance leaves it or is expelled for any just reason, his workmen must leave his employment. While such a dispute lasts, the cost is shared equally between the two associations.

It will therefore be seen that workmen secure as their share of the bargain a good union, a minimum wage, a bonus or bonuses according to the extra profits obtained (the first is a fixture), and a wage board on which they have equal representation.

No excessive profits, which would hinder trade, are possible, as the consent of the workmen to any advance must be obtained.

Experience has shown that the workmen are careful not to demand bonuses. For example, in the bedstead trade, the men have refused to receive any further bonus whatever, because they believe that they are now being paid all that they can safely claim. Another safeguard against undue profits is that the trades are left open to everyone. There are no restrictions upon any person entering, beyond a reasonable and proportionate entrance fee to the alli

ance.