Cutts v. Brainerd. the rights he had in respect to the freight, as fully as if he had retained custody of the property itself. As to the $43.92 advanced and paid by the defendants toward the purchase of the goods, this was paid without request of the plaintiff, and by reason of the party of whom the plaintiff purchased, putting in, to make out a full car-load, more grain than the plaintiff sent money to pay for. As the defendants asserted their right to hold all the property until this sum, as well as the freight, should be paid, without designating any particular part or portion which they claimed to hold, either as their own property or by way of lien, and as the plaintiff took the whole upon his replevin, claiming and treating the whole as being his own property, we think this conduct of the parties was a ratification by the parties of the transaction as an authorized purchase by the plaintiff, and an authorized payment on his account by the defendants, and that the defendants' claim for such payment was put and treated as standing on the same ground, so far as claim and lien are concerned, as their claim and bill for freight. Judgment of county court is reversed, and the cause remanded. CUTTS, appellant, v. BRAINERD et al. (42 Vt. 566.) Common carriers—liability beyond route-special contract. Where goods were shipped over the line of common carriers, marked for a point beyond their line, and they gave a receipt therefor, wherein they agreed to forward and deliver the said goods, leaving the name of the consignee and the place of deposit blank, — Held, that the receipt constituted a special contract that the carriers would deliver the goods at the place of destination, even beyond their own route. ACTION of assumpsit, to recover the value of goods shipped over the defendants' road. The goods were delivered by the plaintiff to the defendants' agent at Burlington, who gave the following receipt therefor: VOL. I.-45 "Mark and Numbers: W. R. Lewis, Cutts v. Brainerd. "VERMONT CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Brooklyn, Iowa. 1 Box. weight 850. Numbered and marked as above, which the company promises to forward by its railroad, and deliver to or order, at its depot in he or they first paying freight for the same, at the rate customary per ton of 2,000 pounds. N. B. If merchandise be not called for on its arrival, it will be stored at the risk and expense of the owner. "G. S. APPLETON, for the corporation." The goods were never received by the consignee. The freight had been paid. The court directed a verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. Lawrence & Burnap, for plaintiff. E. J. Phelps & Dewey, Noble & Smith, for defendants. BARRETT, J. A majority of the court are of opinion that the receipt in this case, of itself, constitutes a contract between the parties, that the defendants, being common carriers, would carry said box to its destination - Brooklyn, Iowa-as per the marks thereon. As giving such character and effect to the paper, much importance is attached to the fact that the blanks were left unfilled. This effect given to the receipt renders it needless to consider the question, very much discussed in the argument, whether railroad companies, as common carriers, are, prima facie, bound to carry and deliver freight beyond the limits of their own respective roads, by the fact merely of receiving packages marked and destined to points beyond such limits. I concur with my associates to the extent that the liability of the defendants in this instance is fixed, as by a special contract, by said receipt. But, in my opinion, that receipt does not import or tend to show an undertaking on the part of the defendants to transport the box beyond the terminus of their road, in the line of transportation from Burlington to the place of its ultimate destination. I think it is a contract thus to transport it, and that, at such terminus, it would be the duty of the defendants to make delivery or disposition of the box for its transit onward, according to the established rules and usages of the business in that behalf at that point. Clapp v. City of Burlington. Pursuant to the opinion of the majority of the court, the judgment is reversed, and judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, for the sum stipulated. CLAPP, appellant, v. CITY OF BURLINGTON. (42 Vt. 579.) Taxation of stock in national banks. The owner of shares of the stock in a national bank should be taxed therefor, in the city or town where he resides, and not in the city or town where the bank is located. ACTION of assumpsit for money had and received, etc. The following is the agreed statement of facts: That the said city of Burlington had duly accepted the act of incorporation, and the acts in amendment thereof, and had organized under the same, prior to the year 1866; that on the first day of April, 1866, the plaintiff was a resident of said city; that in the same year he was set in the grand list of said city, by the assesors of said city, in the sum of $374.55; that said sum was made up and set in salu list, upon the following personal estate then owned by the plaintiff, to wit: Fifty-six shares of stock in the National Union Bank, Swanton, appraised at $2,730; two hundred and fifty shares in the Vermont National Bank, St. Albans, appraised at $24,375; other personal estate appraised at $10,150, and one poll of $2, making a grand list of $374.55; that of said list of $374.55, $271.05 was assessed upon said shares of stock and said banks, as aforesaid; that N. B. Flanagan, then collector of taxes of said city, had in his hands, on the 1st day of February, 1868, rate-bills and warrants for the collection of city, highway and union school taxes, amounting to $400.73, which was assessed against the said plaintiff upon said list of $374.55, as follows, to wit: city tax, $280.87, highway tax, $74.91, and union school tax, $44.95; that afterward, on the 1st day of February, 1867, the plaintiff paid said taxes under protest, to said Flanagan, as such collector; that afterward and before the commencement of this suit, the said Flanagan, as such collector, paid over said taxes, as directed by said rate-bills and warrants. Clapp v. City of Burlington. It is further agreed, that the said National Union Bank, and the Bald Vermont National Bank, were, at the time when the said stock in said banks was set in the list, and said taxes assessed thereon against the plaintiff, as aforesaid, banking associations duly incorporated and organized under the laws of congress, and that said National Union Bank was located and doing business at Swanton, and the said Vermont National Bank was located and doing business at St. Albans, in said county of Franklin. But the plaintiff's stock in said bank was not, nor was any of it, set in the list in any other place than Burlington, in the year 1866, nor were any taxes thereon paid, for that year, except as above stated. Upon these facts the court rendered judgment pro forma for the defendant, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed. Bailey, Davis & Adams, for plaintiff, cited City of Utica v. Churchill et al., 33 N. Y. 162, 229, 243; Markoe v. Hartranfi, Am. Law Reg., vol. 5, 609, vol. 6, 487. E. R. Hard, for defendants. PIERPONT, C. J. The agreed statement of facts, upon which the judgment of the court below was based, presents the distinct question, Where, in this state, shall the owners of shares of the stock n the national banks located in this state be taxed, whether in the town or city where the owner resides, or in the town or city where the bank is located? Under the statutes of this state regulating the matter of taxation, etc., no question is made but that the place where the owner of such stock resides is the place where such stock shall be set to him in the grand list, and he be subject to taxation thereon; but it is insisted, on the part of the plaintiff, that the provisions of our statute, in this respect, are at variance with, and contrary to, the requirements of the act of congress, of June 3, 1864, creating the national banking system, and under which said national banks were organized The portion of said act which bears upon this question is contained in the proviso to the 41st section, and is as follows: "Provided, that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations held by any person or body corporate from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in assessment of taxes. imposed by or under Clapp v. City of Burlington. state authority, at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided, further, that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state, upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act, shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the scate where such association is located." There is nothing in the case to show that there was any violation of the foregoing provision in taxing the plaintiff for his stock in the banks referred to, unless it was in putting said stock in his list, and taxing him, in Burlington, where he resided, instead of the towns where the banks were located; and, in determining whether there was a violation of the law in this respect, it becomes necessary to inquire what congress meant by the words used in the passage above quoted, "at the place where such bank is located." The word "place" is a very indefinite term. It may refer to a very small or to a very large space, and must be construed with reference to the connection in which it is used, the subject-matter spoken of, and the object in view. It is manifest that it was the intention of congress, by this provision, to impose certain restrictions upon the state governments, in respect to the taxation of the owners of the shares in national banks, so as to prevent unjust and unequal taxation that it was anticipated might result from the action of state governments that were hostile to the system. This we think was the sole object of the provision; and, to this end, it is provided, among other things, that the stock shall be taxed by or under the authority of the state at the place where the bank is located, and not elsewhere. The purpose was, to prevent the same stock being taxed in two different states, as is sometimes done in respect to stock in the state banks, when the bank is located in one state, and stock therein owned by the inhabitants of another, both states taxing the stock. It was anticipated that the stock in the national banks might be so taxed; hence this provision confining the power to tax the stock to the state having jurisdiction at the place where the bank is located. We think that this reference to the place where the bank is located is for the sole purpose of determining what state shall have jurisdiction to tax fac owners of the stock therein for such stock, and, when this was done, the end in view was accomplished. We can hardly conceive it possible that it was the intention of congress to interfere with, or to regulate, the internal system that might be adopted by the |