CHAPTER XXXVI

KENTUCKY AND THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE

The period following the Spanish Treaty of 1795, which secured the navigation of the Mississippi for the West, was marked by the rapid economic development of Kentucky. There was no artificial limit to the amount of flour, pork, cider and tobacco that might be produced, for the river was free and the markets were extensive. The social and political development of the commonwealth had for a time been somewhat retarded in the agitation for reform; but the new constitution, which went into effect in 1800, set the state on the high-road of progress. The Alien and Sedition acts had created a sudden flurry, only to show that the people were, on most fundamental questions of politics and federal relations, a unit. The Resolutions of 1798 and of 1799 gave an outlet for the pent-up anger of a temporarily dissatisfied people; and although they came to nothing directly, still ultimately they led to a result, which was entirely pleasing to Kentuckians generally.

In 1800 the Jeffersonian democrats secured control of the National Government never again to relinquish it to the hated federalists.

So at the dawn of the Nineteenth Century, the outlook in Kentucky was bright and encouraging. She was a rapidly growing commonwealth, contented in the present and satisfied in her outlook on the "future.

James Morrison wrote John Breckinridge: "Times are greatly changed, and I am really happy to see it."1

But Kentucky was not a community living unto herself. The world around about her was vastly important. For almost a quarter of a century she had been taking notice of it. Spain and France, and even detested England, had played their part in Kentucky's aspirations and her hopes for their fulfillment; and especially the first and last had not disdained to use the hostile club, when subtle persuasion failed to produce results. As long as foreign nations had interests in the same things as Kentucky, there was always the danger of a break in any concord that might be established. But apparently as long as the Spanish Treaty of 1795 was respected, the major problems of Kentucky would remain settled.

Louisiana, however, was a large province, which reared itself as an impassable obstacle to all American expansions beyond the Mississippi from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico; and it had in its power the ultimate navigation of that great river to its mouth. The prospect was not only of interest to those Kentuckians who chose to look into the future, but it also was of concern to the nation that had first explored it and later possessed it. France in giving this vast domain to the decadent Spanish nation in 1763, did not give up the hope and actual expectation of sometime getting it back. This aspiration seems to have been born of the French people; for it continued unabated as a policy of the government. though it be an absolute or constitutional monarchy, republic, or reign of terror. Before the days of Genet and after, France coveted Louisiana

1 Breckinridge MSS. (1802). Dated February 27, 1802, from Lexington. Breckinridge was at this time a United States Senator.

and plotted for it. Her policy continued unvaried, whether the possessor, Spain, were friend or enemy. If a friend she was to be persuaded it was to her own interest to cede it to France; if an enemy, she should expect nothing less than that so rich a jewel would be seized.

After Napoleon took control in France, he soon came to have the same desire to secure Louisiana which his predecessor in power had displayed. His ideas of world conquest and dominion were forming, and in them Louisiana would play a part. With this arbiter of Europe, plans were made to be executed. Reluctant Spain was inveigled and forced into a deal by the astute Napoleon, in which she should give up the whole of Louisiana for a small principality in Italy, held by no right but that of conquest. True enough, Napoleon promised that he would secure the recognition by the European nations of Spain's right in Italy, and that he would never alienate Louisiana; but these were incidental to the main point which was that he had satisfied an old longing of the French people and had more especially welded a link in his world policy. This transfer was sealed by the secret treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800.

In bringing about this transfer, the French had with great effect played upon the fear the Spaniards had of the encroachments of the Americans on Louisiana. The French held up the forbidding picture of swarms of Kentucky frontiersmen, sweeping across the Mississippi, and seizing the country, with the Spaniards powerless to prevent it. It was then argued that the only way by which the rich Spanish provinces of Mexico and the Southwest could be saved ultimately from the voracious Americans, was to interpose the power of the strong French nation by ceding Louisiana. Talleyrand wrote on this point in 1798: "The Court of Madrid, ever blind to its own interests, and never docile to the lessons of experience, has again recently adopted a measure which cannot fail to produce the worst effects upon its political existence and on the preservation of its colonies. The United States has been put in possession of the forts situated along the Mississippi, which the Spaniards had occupied as posts essential to arrest the progress of the Americans in those countries." He then said that America must be given "the limits which nature seems to have traced for them,"-only the Atlantic seaboard and the mountains. Then coming directly to the point he declared that Spain should "Yield a small part of her immense domain to preserve the rest." He would have Spain to cede the Floridas and Louisiana" and from that moment the power of the United States is bounded by the limits which it may suit the interests and tranquillity of France and Spain to assign her." 2

Although the greatest secrecy was enjoined on all in making this treaty, the United States diplomatic agents in Europe were not long in sensing something unusual in the relations between France and Spain. As early as April, 1801, John Adams had gathered certain rumors of it in Berlin. The next year a copy of the treaty fell into our hands.

A threatening situation was now fast developing. A veritable bombshell was exploded when in October, 1802, Morales, the Spanish Intendant, in New Orleans, declared that city would no longer be allowed as a port of deposit for the Americans. The certain reasons for this order are not known. It was done perhaps through French instigation, as a measure preparing the way for Napoleon's forces to later take possession. Or it may have been done for just the opposite reason: viz., to show the Spanish resentment at losing Louisiana and by stirring up the warlike ardor of the westerners, to make it difficult for the French to possess it. Whatever may have been the reasons, it is certain they did not meet

2 Fish, American Diplomacy, 142, 143.

3 Kentucky Gazette, November 30, 1802. The order was dated October 16, 1802. A copy is also in Breckinridge MSS. (1802).

with the approval of the Spanish Governor of Louisiana, Salcedo, nor of the Spanish Minister at Washington. When finally apprised of the action the King of Spain, himself, disapproved, but the news of the royal disapproval was so long in reaching Louisiana, that the order was not revoked until the Americans were about to take possession according to treaty.

The Spanish Intendant was careful to provide for the wide publicity of his order. His proclamation ran: "And that the foregoing may be publicly known, and that nobody may plead ignorance, I order it to be published in the accustomed places, copies to be posted up in public, and that the necessary notice be given of it to the Department of Finance. Royal Custome House, and others that may be thought proper." But there was little need for the Intendant to feel that the information might not become sufficiently spread. The news of a policy of so tremendous consequences to Kentuckians could never have been suppressed. James Speed wrote a letter from New Orleans to Governor Garrard immediately upon the posting of the proclamation. In it he said: "It [the proclamation] can require no comment from me. If it does not amount to a declaration of war, with the worst consequences to individuals, none of us here understand it. The people of the Mississippi Territory will immediately feel its effects, and when to their indignation is joined that of our countrymen in the Spring, God knows how it may be possible to prevent hostilities. We all hope, however, that you will immediately concert with Mr. Jefferson to prevent the horrible consequences which we apprehend, and be assured that any measure you may adopt to prevent unnecessary bloodshed, and at the same time preserve the dignity of our country, will be warmly supported by a majority of our countrymen here.

* *

*" 4

This was a staggering blow at Kentucky's prosperity. The state faced an almost utter collapse of its commerce, which of necessity depended on the navigation of the Mississippi. But it should be noted that no hindrances were placed in the way of boats navigating the river to the sea without stopping. In this sense the river was still free. However, the most important right connected with this navigation was withheld: viz., to land goods for re-shipment on ocean going vessels. Presumable, if it were practicable, flatboats might transfer their cargoes out in the river; but in any instance, a duty of 6% was to be exacted.5

The action of the Intendant had come just in time for Governor Garrard to lay the information before the session of the Legislature, meeting in November, 1802. Kentucky was perturbed and greatly upset; but there was a complete absence of the uncontrollable impatience that had characterized her in former crises of a like nature. The Federal Government should be informed and memorialized on this new problem, but not in the terms that had been used in former memorials and resolutions on the Mississippi River question. Then the distrusted Federalists were in power; now their own chosen party held control of the National Government. It was but only natural that they should feel differently: It was not only the case of not wanting to embarrass the Jeffersonian Democrats, but also the fact that they honestly believed and with much reason that the solution of the question would be in the hands of those who sympathized with them and understood them and whom they could trust. The resolutions passed by the Legislature were, therefore, surprisingly moderate.

They were passed on December 1, and a copy follows:

"Resolved, That the proclamation of the Intendant of the port of New

4 Kentucky Gazette, December 7, 1802. This letter was laid before the Legislature in the November, 1802 session in connection with the governor's message. 5 Kentucky Gazette, December 7, 1802.

Orleans, of the 18th of October last, is a direct infraction of the treaty of friendship, limits and navigation, concluded in October 1795, between the United States and the King of Spain, in this particular * * * that by the said proclamation, American citizens are forbidden to deposit their merchandizes and effects in the port of New Orleans, without an equivalent establishment having been assigned to the United States, on another part of the banks of the Mississippi, conformably to the provision of the twenty-second article of the said treaty.

"Resolved, that the Governor be requested to forward the memorial to our senators and representatives in Congress, to be by them presented to the President of the United States, the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress.

"Having on a former occasion, when we represented the obstructions to the navigation of the river Mississippi, experienced the attention and justice of the General Government, in providing by a treaty with the Court of Spain, not only for the free navigation of that river, but for what, in our remote situation from the ocean was absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of it, a place of deposit for our produce, we deem it necessary barely to state to you, that by an infraction of that treaty, we are deprived of those advantages, in violation of the treaty between. the United States and the King of Spain, concluded at San Lorenzo el Real, in October, 1795. The Intendant of the port of New Orleans has by a proclamation of the 18th of October last, forbidden American citizens to deposit their merchandizes and effects in the said port, without having assigned to the United States an equivalent establishment on another part of the banks of the Mississippi.

"We rely with confidence on your wisdom and justice, and pledge ourselves to support at the expense of our lives and fortunes, such measures as the honor, and interests of the United States may require." "

Jefferson acted immediately upon receipt of their resolutions. On December 22nd, he sent the Intendant's proclamation together with letters from Kentuckians on the subject to Congress. Unlike the Federalists, Jefferson did not delay so long as to arouse suspicions regarding his honesty and real desire to find a solution; unlike Washington, he allowed no situation to develop where a personal mission was necessary to prevent the possibility of a disaffection of the West. He at once acknowledged in a letter to Governor Garrard, the receipt of the resolutions and promised a speedy solution of the question. On January 18, 1803, he wrote again to keep the Kentucky governor informed, that negotiations had been entered into. He expressed the opinion that the action of the Intendant "was an act merely of the Intendant, unauthorized by his Government," and furthermore he stated that information "showing that this act of the Intendant was unauthorized has strengthened our expectation that it will be corrected." But "in order * * * to provide against the hazards which beset our interests and peace in that quarter, I have determined, with the approbation of the Senate, to send James Monroe to France to help settle the whole question with that country and with Spain in such a way as may effectually secure our rights and interests in the Mississippi." He added that Monroe would "depart immediately." 7

Jefferson's purpose was to buy New Orleans and the Floridas from the French and Spaniards if possible; but if this were impossible he would then consider other methods of obtaining them. In the meantime, he would not be stampeded into a war-a move which the Federalists were urging in the hope of embarrassing Jefferson and at the same time building up support for their discredited party in the West. The

6 Kentucky Gazette, December 7, 1802. 7 Kentucky Gazette, February 15, 1803.

President with great subtlety set about instilling into the French the fear that the United States would resist the transfer of Louisiana and that an alliance with England would be made for the certain purposes. On this point he wrote, "The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water mark. It seals the union of two nations, which in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." 8

Without the slightest intimation of hostility to the Federal Government or distrust of it, the Kentuckians immediately upon receipt of information on the closing of the river, turned to thoughts of war. To them the first solution that suggested itself was to boldly march upon New Orleans, seize the city, and unshackle the Western trade. Judge Samuel McDowell took a more moderate view of the situation in a letter to John Breckinridge, who was now United States Senator. He stated that the Spaniards had closed the port of New Orleans and that it "appears to us Western People an Evil. But how we are to help ourselves I know not. We could easily take Possession of New Orleans but how could we keep it. * * * But I am afraid the United States are too Weak to attempt anything by force, therefore I Suppose some other means must be used." 9 Another letter to Breckinridge about the same time declared that the closing of the port of New Orleans “has occasioned great alarm here. Most people calculate on war. I hope and believe no such event will happen." 10 Apart from the game of politics that the Federalists were playing in calling for war, there was a sentiment in Congress expressive of the West which demanded the same thing. Senator Ross of Pennsylvania wanted an army enlisted to go against New Orleans. The ardor of the Kentuckians was so great volunteer companies of militia were organized.

The narrow prejudices that certain element in the East had long held against the growing West cropped out again at this time. The mild resolutions that Kentucky had sent to Congress and to the President were completely distorted out of all of their meaning by the New York Herald; and its falsifications were widely copied by the other Eastern papers. It was represented that the Kentucky Legislature had sent a set of resolutions to the President demanding an immediate explanation of what steps had been taken to open the Mississippi, informing him that their patience was at an end, and warning him that this was their final plea. It was further stated that the Kentuckians had raised by subscription $500,000 and that 15,000 men had already enlisted, had armed themselves, had already been in camp three days, and were only awaiting the signal to storm the stronghold of the Spaniards." 11

There was much provocation in the Întendant action; however, Kentuckians were now perfectly contented to place their case in the hands of the National Government. The disruption of their commerce was by no means fancied. The proclamation came in time to cut off from market the wheat crop of 1802. The conditions were so uncertain that no price could be set. One of John Breckinridge's constituents wrote him in January, 1803, that "no price has yet been talked of for wheat, and the quantity on hand is immense." 12 Other instances were not lacking of the hardships of the times. A consignment of goods imported from Philadelphia was charged £10 duties for its importation through the Spanish Mississippi. One Kentuckian complained that the action of the 8 Fish, American Diplomacy, 144.

9 Breckinridge MSS. (1802). Dated December 15, 1802.

10 Ibid., John Allen to John Breckinridge, December 18, 1802.

11 Kentucky Gazette, March 29, 1803.

12 Breckinridge MSS. (1803). Benjamin Howard to Breckinridge, January 12, 1803, Lexington.