West, discussed the situation with Secretary Knox of the War Department, and John Brown, the Kentucky representative. The desire of the Kentuckians that virtual authority be relinquished by the management of the military affairs in the West manifestly could not be satisfied. A compromise was made by which a Board of War was to be appointed, which should have the power to call out the local militia for warfare against the Indians, and to act in conjunction with regular troops. This board was composed of Shelby, Logan, Scott, Innes and Brown, an excellent combination of civilians and soldiers.32 To be commander of the United States Army of the West, Governor Arthur St. Clair was appointed over the protests of Brown and many other Kentuckians.

The Kentucky War Board soon began to make use of its authority, which amounted in fact to a right to do those very things the Federal authorities knew the Kentuckians would do whether they were allowed to or not. It ordered an invasion of the territories of the Wabash tribes, whom Kentucky had long contended with and whom Hamtramck's recent expedition had affected little more than to exasperate. In this action there was the evident desire and expectation of showing the Federal Government what the militia under Kentucky management could do in comparison with Harmar's defeat. This expedition was agreed to by Knox, who saw in it a division against the Kickapoos and other Wabash tribes, while St. Clair was preparing for a major campaign. In May, 1791, a call was made for volunteers, and eight hundred mounted men were soon ready, under the command of Scott and Wilkinson, to march up the Wabash. Reports of the expedition had caused many of the Indians to escape; but there was considerable skirmishing, in which a few dozen Indians were killed and a somewhat larger number made prisoners. After burning the villages, Scott retreated southward and crossed the Ohio at Louisville, having been gone about a month, and having lost not a single man at the hands of the enemy.3 33 Kentucky was greatly elated over this success, and the wish was expressed that the weather had permitted terror and desolation to be carried to the very head of the Wabash.

Having succeeded in their first war move, the Kentucky board decided to send another expedition into the Wabash country. Wilkinson was given the command, and with over five hundred mounted Kentuckians, he set out on August 1, (1791), from Fort Washington, after having received on the preceding instructions from St. Clair. He marched northwest to the Eel River region, burned several villages, one of which had one hundred and twenty houses, cut down four hundred and thirty acres of corn, and otherwise harried the Indian country.34

These more or less desultory forays of Scott and Wilkinson were mere details of the main campaign, which St. Clair was preparing. The National Government, after Harmar's defeat, seemed determined to crush the Indians and force a peace with them that would secure much of the Northwest country for settlement. Congress ordered the enlisting of two thousand men for six months' service at the ridiculously small pay of $2.10 a month. The result was that a worthless class of people was attracted into the ranks; and this at a very slow rate. St. Clair was also instructed to build forts as he progressed in order to secure the country permanently, and to supply them with garrisons. It was the expectation of the Government that three thousand troops would be ready at Fort Washington early in July.

But the Ken

A call was made on Kentucky for a thousand men. tuckians were by no means enthusiastic. They had developed a strong aversion against the leadership of Federal commanders; and St. Clair

32 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 22, 273.

33 Winsor, Westward Movement, 424; Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 22. 34 Ibid., 23; Winsor, Westward Movement, 427.

was especially unpopular among them. They were also not in favor of this large-scale campaign; but rather trusted in the quick forays, such as Scott and Wilkinson had been making. The result was that no volunteers came forward. Christopher Greenup expressed to the Kentucky War Board the opinion that the attempt to enforce a draft would be a failure. as the Virginia militia law had been repealed in Kentucky, and the Federal Government had enacted none. For these reasons, he believed, the people who were ordered out, could not be punished for disobedience, and "if they cannot it will be in vain to attempt a Draught." 35

The preparations at Fort Washington went on slowly. The levies from the upper Ohio regions were late in arriving, and the collecting of munitions and provisions suffered delay. As the raw troops arrived, they were sent to Fort Hamilton, which was begun in September, and to which St. Clair moved his headquarters. But the time that should have been given to training, had almost elapsed; as the expedition was already long behind the schedule. The start was finally begun in early October.

The Indians were bold and cunning. During the year they had attacked and wiped out the settlement at Big Bottom, about forty miles up the Muskingum from Marietta; and had even dared to attack the town of Cincinnati under the very walls of Fort Washington. Alexander McKee, a British agent, had assembled the various tribes in July and advised them to make peace with the Americans only upon the terms consistent with their honor and interest.

With St. Clair's forces slowly laboring along through the wilderness at the rate of five or six miles a day, the Indians kept themselves well informed as to their movements. On the 13th (of October) a halt was made for the erection of another fort, which was named in honor of Jefferson. Difficulties beset St. Clair on every side. He himself was too sick and infirm to properly direct affairs, and General Richard Butler, his second in command, was little better. The six-months men, whose enlistments dated from various times, were thinning every day as the term of their service expired. The Kentuckians, who had been forced into the service, were sullen and disobedient, and kept up a steady stream of desertions. Finally on the last day of October, when deep in the Indian country sixty Kentuckians deserted in a body. Such defections could not go without attention; St. Clair dispatched one of his two regiments of regulars under Hamtramck to keep the deserters from at least interfering with his baggage and provision train. To add to these unfortunate happenings, St. Clair in direct disregard of Washington's anxious orders and warnings to guard against surprise, advanced with practically no scouting service. The thought seemed not to have entered his mind that he might be attacked,

On the 3rd of November, he reached a small tributary of the Wabash, and pitched his camp for the night. His force had now been reduced to about fourteeen hundred men, due to desertions and to his unfortunate diversion of the regiment of regulars under Hamtramck. The great majority of the Kentuckians who had begun the march had by this time quit.36 The following morning, before sunrise, an undetermined number of Indians suddenly attacked an out-lying group of militia, driving them in upon the main forces. Support was immediately organized, but the Indian fire became so general from every direction that soon utter confusion reigned. The Indians carried on an incessant fire from behind the trees and dense growth that surrounded the camp. St. Clair showed great bravery in passing up and down the lines urging his men to the attack. His forces fought at times with conspicuous bravery, delivering

35 Innes MSS., Vol. 19, No. 123. To Innes, Shelby, and Logan, June 22, 1791. 36 Only two hundred and fifty remained out of the thousand drafted. Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 273, 274.

Vol. I-29

a heavy fire from flint-lock and cannon; but their fire was ineffective as the enemy was well protected behind trees and logs, and the smoke of battle soon made accurate aim impossible. The Indians took special pains to pick off every cannoneer, and as the battle line swayed back and forth, they at times held possession of the cannon. The Americans delivered bayonet charges against the Indians when they appeared in the open, which sent them scurrying back to cover only to renew their deadly fire.

St. Clair soon seeing that the day was lost ordered his troops to cut their way out of the deadly circle for the purpose of beginning a retreat. The attack was so spirited that the Indians momentarily stood non-plussed, and the move was a success. The retreat now became a rout. The Indians followed for about four miles, and then returned to the battle-field to pillage and scalp. St. Clair reached Fort Jefferson the same day, a distance that had required ten days on the outward march.

The defeat was crushing and complete. Out of the fourteen hundred troops engaged, almost half were killed and only a very few remained unhurt. General Butler and Colonel Oldham, who led the Kentucky militia, were among the slain. General St. Clair had horses repeatedly shot from under him, and his clothing was pierced in eight different places, without his body being touched. The effect of this disastrous defeat was profound. When St. Clair's messenger reached Washington with the official report the President went into a spasm of rage and fury. He paced up and down the room bitterly criticizing St. Clair and blaming him for not properly protecting his force by scouts. "He went off with that last solemn warning thrown into his ears," exclaimed the President; "and yet to suffer that army to be cut to pieces, hacked, butchered, tomahawked, by a surprise, the very thing I guarded him against! O God. O God, he's worse than a murderer! How can he answer to his country." 37

In January of the following year Wilkinson with a hundred and fifty mounted men went to the scene of St. Clair's defeat, and gathered up the remains of the dead and buried them. The sight was still gruesome, as the Indians after their scalping and plundering had left the field to wild animals and the elements.

Washington had considerable difficulty in choosing a successor to St. Clair. After some time he decided upon "Mad Anthony" Wayne, whom he considered more daring than cautious. Wayne took up his first headquarters near Pittsburg, where he set about systematically training the raw levies that were being raised in different parts of the country. As they were of the same class that had made up St. Clair's army, Wayne determined that much training would be necessary before they should be ready for service. The British had noted with considerable trepidation Wayne's appointment, knowing his nature and remembering his record. in the Revolution. They had the fear, not wholly idle, that he might carry the war against the posts occupied by the British in the Northwest and thereby precipitate a general war between the two countries.

The Federal Government, although preparing for a vigorous campaign against the Indians if absolute necessity demanded it, was intent on making peace if possible. In the spring of 1792, Colonel John Hardin accompanied by Major Alexander Trueman was sent out to arrange a treaty. But they had not gone far into the hostile country, before they fell upon some Indians who savagely murdered these messengers of peace despite the

37 For the St. Clair campaign see Winsor, Westward Movement, 427-430; McMaster, History of the People of the United States, II, 68 pages; Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 23, 273, 274; Roosevelt, Winning of the West (Works of Theodore Roosevelt), IV, 41-74; St. Clair Papers, II, 286, passim., American State Papers, Indian Affairs, passim.

fact that they had made their intentions known and had displayed a white flag.38 In the face of this treachery, the attempt was not given up to conclude a peace. In the following fall (1792), Rufus Putnam succeeded in making a treaty with the Wabash and Illinois tribes. In May of 1793 further attempts were made to conclude a peace with all the Northwest tribes and the Six Nations. But Brant, the Iroquois chief, with his British advisers, counselled the Indians against such a course. The attitude of the British as shown in the character of their influence over the Indians, was making the situation very dangerous, with little possibility of war being averted. Lord Dorchester, the Governor of Canada, made his celebrated speech to the Indians, in which he, while speaking of the boundary, said: "Children, since my return I find no appearance of a boundary remains; and from the manner in which the people of the United States push on and act and talk ** I shall not be surprised if we are not at war with them in the course of the present year; and if so a line must then be drawn by the warriors." He declared they had "acted in the most peaceable manner and borne the language and conduct of the people of the United States with patience; but I believe our patience is almost exhausted." 39 In the face of such advice, peace was impossible.

*

But still the United States was not of one mind in making war. The West yet had its distrust and criticism of the Federal commanders, and many of the Easterners were willing to let the West fight its own wars without further impoverishing the already depleted treasury. Oliver Wolcott had declared "These western people are a violent and unjust race in many respects, unrestrained by law and consideration of public policy." 40

In May, 1793, Wayne moved his headquarters down the Ohio to Fort Washington and established his camp nearby. He brought with him twenty-five hundred regulars who had gone through with valuable training during the past winter. In fact, before accepting the command Wayne had made it a point that he be given time for properly training his forces. As it now seemed possible that the march might be made against the hostile tribes before winter, a requisition was made on Governor Shelby for a thousand mounted riflemen. The Kentuckians were still actuated with very little enthusiasm for this expedition, and so it was impossible to fill the quota with volunteers. A draft produced the required number, which marched for Fort Washington, reaching there in October. But as the season had advanced too far for a campaign that year, the Kentuckians were dismissed until the following spring.

In the winter of 1793, Wayne moved his army to a point about eighty miles above Fort Washington and set up a post which he called Fort Greenville. Soon after this fort had been established as an outpost in the Indian country, a detachment of ninety regulars was surprised by a party of Indians and scattered, with about a dozen captured. As spring approached, Wayne made preparations for a general advance hoping to bring on a general engagement with the Indians. He was delayed for a long time on account of the late arrival of the necessary provisions. In July the mounted Kentuckians who had been dismissed for the winter arrived under their commander, General Charles Scott. Among the regular troops was Captain William Clark, a brother of George Rogers Clark, who was afterwards to lead the exploring expedition to the Pacific with Captain Lewis. Wilkinson also held a command.

38 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 23; Roosevelt, Winning of the West (Works of Theodore Roosevelt), IV, 76.

39 Roosevelt, Winning of the West (Works of Theodore Roosevelt), IV, 86; Fish, American Diplomacy, 83.

40 Winsor, Westward Movement, 435.

During the latter part of June the Indians made a determined attack upon Fort Recovery, which Wayne had recently built as an outpost on the very field where St. Clair had suffered his defeat. After considerable fighting they were beaten off by the garrison, consisting of about two hundred men. This defeat in which at least twenty-five had been killed, discouraged the Indians and tended to cause their forces to disintegrate. Wayne's mode of marching also gave them little comfort. His troops progressed with due caution against a surprise, protected by an adequate. scout service.

Wayne pushed on down the Maumee to the point where the Au Glaize empties into it, and there ran into the hostile Indian villages. The population fled without offering opposition. Wayne now secured his advantages by constructing Fort Defiance not far from a British fort on the rapids which had been recently set up there without the slightest regard for the rights of the United States. From his point of vantage, Wayne now sent a final offer of peace to the Indians. The warriors dressed in their war regalia showed no strong disposition to treat; and their request for Wayne to delay his march for ten days proved to him their desire not to treat but to gain an advantage.

Wayne discreetly declined to be drawn out thus, and ordered his troops to advance to within a few miles of the British fort. On August 20, with about three thousand regulars and militia Wayne gave battle to between fifteen hundred and two thousand Indian warriors composed of contingents from the various Northwestern tribes and of certain French, English and renegade Americans. The scene of the conflict had been in time past visited by a cyclone, which had torn and twisted the trees in great confusion over the ground. Wayne so deployed his troops as to make best use of the surroundings. He also made effective use of his cavalry, even on such unfavorable ground. The Indians were early thrown into confusion, and within forty minutes they were fleeing for the protection of the British fort. So quick was the action that only the first line troops succeeded in getting into the fight, and in fact less than a thousand of the Americans all told were engaged. Wayne lost thirtythree killed and about a hundred wounded; the Indian losses were at least two or three times as heavy. The Americans had won a signal victory at Fallen Timbers, as the battle came to be called.

Wayne followed the Indians almost to the gates of the British fort, which, however, offered no succor to the fleeing savages. He had no great amount of patience with the British who had had the audacity to set up this fort in American territory. In fact Secretary of War Knox had written Wayne that if in the course of his "operations against the Indian enemy, it should become necessary to dislodge the party at the rapids of the Miami [of the Lakes] you are hereby authorized, in the name of the President of the United States, to do it." 41 Backed up with such orders Wayne was in no mood to dally with the British. The day after the battle Major Campbell, who was in charge of the fort, sent a messenger to enquire what was meant by this carrying on the fight under the very shadows of his Majesty's flag. Wayne gave a spirited reply in which he declared that he thought the battle spoke for itself; and in turn, he enquired of Campbell why the British were building forts and otherwise encroaching on American territory. He closed his reply by demanding that the British surrender the post. Campbell answered with the explanation that he could do that only through orders from his superior and with the threat that if the Americans continued to insult the

41 Fish, American Diplomacy, 83, 84. On Wayne's Campaign, see Winsor, Westward Movement, 434-460; Roosevelt, Winning of the West (Works of Theodore Roosevelt), IV, 75-126; American State Papers, Indian Affairs, passim., Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 24, 280, 281.