critical a period. I am therefore happy that, whilst you have expressed your devotion to the laws and constitution of the Union, you have reminded the government of what is due to us as a State, and that power ought not to be assumed for the punishment of those whose object is to do what government ought long ago to have done for us." 27

This was an admirable statement of the feeling not only of Brown but of Shelby and many other Kentuckians. It was a clever use of an unusual opportunity. While Governor Shelby was too tactful to proclaim this to be his plan and object at the time; he later declared that it was nevertheless true and that it succeeded. In 1812, Shelby said: "I saw evidently that the whole scheme of La Chaise would fall to the ground without any interference, and that the present moment was a favorable one, while the apprehensions of the President were greatly excited, to express to him what I knew to be the general sentiments of the Kentucky people, relative to the navigation of the Mississippi and the Spanish Government. He added that he considered the ultimate settlement had been hastened by his course.28

*

There can be no doubt that the general opinion in Kentucky was that the Federal government was not fully exerting itself to solve the great Western problem; and in the light of this and as part of it, Shelby's course must be judged. It is also true that the Kentuckians were grossly mistaking the jealousy and hostility to the West frequently expressed by New Englanders and other Easterners, as the sentiments of Washington's Administration. As is known today, the Federal Government was doing all in its power to wrest its rights from Spain, but the Kentuckians honestly believed they were being neglected, and they must be judged in the light of this belief. Although Shelby's attitude most likely did not and could not hasten a settlement with Spain, it did bring about a better understanding between Kentucky and the Washington administration. And if the French enterprise in assuming the proportions it did aided in any way in the settlement, it was by way of Spain and not the United States. Its effects if any, were to hasten Spain in seeking an amicable settlement with the United States, for fear that otherwise the Kentuckians could not be restrained from marching on New Orleans and probably seizing the whole of Louisiana.

The purpose and methods of this French project were entirely different from the plots and intrigues of the Spanish as well as of the British. It was in fact not a conspiracy in any way against the United States, but was an attempt to help the United States solve a long-standing problem. A secondary consideration, to the French, however, in their main purpose was to humiliate their enemy, the Spaniards. The machinations of the other foreign nations in the West, previously and following, had reference to the detaching of American territory, of interfering with the integrity of the American possessions. Such was never a part of the French scheme. Participation in it on the part of Americans, then, could under no circumstances possess the elements of treason against their country; for by the Federal Constitution that crime was defined as consisting "Only in levying War against the United States," or "in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and Comfort."

At most it was only a breach of American neutrality, which at that time was undefined by American Law. It was simply taking sides in a war between friends and enemies on a question which appeared on its face to concern Kentuckians much more than their friends, the French. It was a situation in which much the same sentiments that had led 27 "Correspondence of Clark and Genet," 1041.

28 Letters from Shelby to Martin D. Hardin, July 1, 1812, quoted in Wilson, A Review, 36; W. H. English, Conquest of the Country Northwest of the River Ohio, 1778-1783, and Life of George Rogers Clark (Indianapolis, 1896).

LaFayette and others previously to help America, played a part. And such sentiments were not confined to the West alone. General Henry Lee, Governor of Virginia, in April 1793, asked Washington's opinion on Accepting a major general's commission in the French army.29 Washington refused to give any explicit advice, but let it be known that he, himself, would ponder long and well such a course before embarking on it.30

Not only from the nature of the project was it different from a conspiracy or intrigue, but also in the methods under which it was carried on. Genet had considered it to be so far from injurious to the interests of the United States that he gave the main outlines of it to one of the chief officers of the Federal administration at the very outset. George Rogers Clark, in its earliest stages, thought it should be kept a secret; but long before preparations for it had been completed, he declared that secrecy could no longer be maintained, and soon boldly threw off all appearances of secrecy by issuing his proclamation calling for troops. Clark could not therefore have thought that he was doing a treasonable or despicable thing, or even an unlawful thing. He tried to exercise all necessary care and circumspection, to the end of keeping the United States from being implicated or in any way compromised. In his offer to Genet of February (1793) Clark declared that "To save Congress from a rupture with Spain, on our accounts; we must first expatriate ourselves, and become French citizens. This is our intention." 31 In October, when he declared that he found it impossible to keep the project a secret any longer, he believed he should "have to be very circumspect in my conduct while in this country and guard against doing anything that would injure the U. States or giving offense to their Govt but in a few days after seting sail we shall be out of their Government, I shall then be at liberty to give full scope to the authority of the commission you did me the Honour to send." 32

The Neutrality law passed by Congress and becoming effective on June 5, 1794, declared any person entering the service of a foreign state or enlisting others, should on conviction be liable to a fine of $1,000 and three years imprisonment.33 Thus, not until after the French project had been definitely abandoned, were laws passed which explicitly defined and provided punishment for such proceedings.34

Finally, in reviewing the whole subject and passing judgment upon the character and quality of the acts of those chiefly concerned in it, due account must be taken of the fact that State Sovereignty had not yet been attuned to National Sovereignty; that the sense of nationality was still inchoate, not only in Kentucky and the West but everywhere throughout the Union.

29 Sparks, Writings of Washington, X, 343, 344. is no reason to suspect that he had not heard of the a week previously.

30 Sparks, Writings of Washington, X, 342, 345. 31 "Correspondence of Clark and Genet," 969. 5, 1793.

82 Ibid., 1008. Clark to Genet, Oct. 3, 1793. 33 Fish, American Diplomacy, 105, 106.

Dated April 29, 1793. There neutrality proclamation issued

Dated May 6, 1793.

Clark to French Minister, Feb.

34 Disunion Sentiment in Congress in 1794, by John Taylor Caroline, for James Madison; edited, with introduction by Gaillard Hunt; Washington, 1905; and The Northern Confederacy, According to the Plans of the "Essex Junto," 1796-1814, by Charles Raymond Brown, Princeton University press, 1915; also, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, by Ethelbert Dudley Warfield; G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1887.

CHAPTER XXXI

KENTUCKY AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON THE OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI

The failure of the French enterprise did not improve the feeling of the Kentuckians on their ever-present problem, the navigation of the Mississippi. As long as that project was still in existence there was the possibility of something happening to their advantage even though they should not bestir themselves. But now with this veiled hope or expectation gone, they became more insistent in their efforts and demands for a final settlement of the question.

The Democratic societies still continued to exercise a powerful influence, in organizing and voicing the discontent of the people. They had entered into the French enterprise with zeal, and after the project had been disbanded everywhere else, the French agents still continued their correspondence with the Lexington society. In early May (1794), over two months after Fouchet had officially abandoned the venture, and ordered others to do the same, this society issued an address "To the Inhabitants of Western America," in which the people were again reminded of their unredressed grievances, with emphasis on the Mississippi River navigation. It declared that the time was at hand to act, that “we ought to relinquish our claim to those blessings, proffered to us by nature, or endeavour to obtain them at every hazard." It then rekindled its anger against the selfish and grasping Easterners, who "have endeavored to deprive us of all that can be important to us as a people.” The address continued: "To you then, inhabitants of the west! is reserved the display of those virtues, once the pride and boast of America, uncontaminated with Atlantic luxury-beyond the reach of European influence, the pampered vultures of commercial countries have not found access to your retreat.

"A noble and just occasion presents itself, to assert your rightsand with your own, perhaps establish those of thousands of your fellow mortals.

"Reflect that you may be the glorious instruments in the hands of Providence, of relieving from the galling chains of slavery, your brethern of Louisiana. * * *" 1

This address showed that goodwill for France and actual considerations of aiding her in her undertaking still lived with the Democratic clubs. But shortly thereafter La Chaise informed the Lexington Democrats that "causes unforeseen had put a stop to the march of two thousand brave Kentuckians, who were about to go and put an end to the Spanish despotism on the Mississippi; where Frenchmen and Kentuckians, united under the banners of France, might have made one nation, the happiest in the world; so perfect was their sympathy." He also noted that he would bring the attention of the National Assembly to the efforts and goodwill of the Kentuckians, and suggested that they prepare an address to be delivered to it.2 The Democratic Society answered, express

1 Marshall, History of Kentucky, II, 113. John Breckinridge was most likely the author of this address.

2 Marshall, History of Kentucky, II, 120. It is quoted differently in Smith,

ing its deep regard for the French and lasting appreciation of their efforts to secure for them the freedom of the Mississippi; but it declared: "It appears to us that Notwithstanding we feel deeply interested in the course of freedom and the enjoyment of an unmolested Navigation of the Waters of our Country to the Ocean, from which we are deprived by injustice and despotism, Yet as Citizens of Kentucky and a part of the American Union, it would be improper at this period in our present situation to address the National Convention or Executive Council of France." 8

But Le Chaise was not willing to dismiss all further efforts or consideration on the final conquest of Louisiana. He still believed that France could depend on the Democratic societies, by agitating the Mississippi River question. On May 19, 1794, he wrote the Lexington society that he felt his mission had been a failure, but he still had faith and hopes in their support. Assuming the role of a crusader, he asked, "why should I not have the luck of that fanatic priest whose name, I have forgot, who preached in France and the other States of Europe for the Conquest of the Holy Land." "Louisiana & its wretched inhabitants," he added, “are assuredly more interesting than that barren Country. The Spaniards who defend the Mississippi are more worthy of contempt than the Ottomans." 4

The activity of the Lexington society was marked during the summer following the collapse of the French enterprise. It not only gave the last hope to the expiring French cause, but also continued through resolutions and addresses to rouse the people to a still higher pitch, and to impress the seriousness of the situation on Congress and the East. On May 24 (1794), "a numerous meeting of respectable citizens from different parts of Kentucky was held in Lexington" and after taking into consideration the degraded and deserted situation of that country, both as to its commerce and protection; and coolly deliberating thereon passed a series of thirteen resolutions. They began with the only question a Westerner could think of for first position and consideration, viz.: The navigation of the Mississippi. Although they had stated this grievance and their views thereon previously to a number of times not enumerated, they again declared that they were "entitled by nature and by stipulation, to the free and undisturbed navigation of the river Mississippi," and that from the day of American independence to the present day had been uniformly prevented by the Spaniards from enjoying the right. But the Spaniards were not the only ones who had been flouting the United States with impunity. Great Britain had come to be as great a sinner along this line as was Spain. And so wide-spread had the violations of the British become that the Eastern Americans had demanded a redress. If redress came, they declared that "Western America has a right to expect and demand, that nothing shall be considered as a satisfaction that does not completely remove their grievances; which have a stronger claim to satisfaction, both from their atrocity and continuance." The chief source of their discontent, however, was not confined to the audacity of foreign countries; it was rather to be seen in the inaction due to sectional partiality of their own Federal Administration. Indian dangers were

ever present, and on this point they resolved that the Western people had a right to demand adequate protection for their frontiers and that the present defenceless condition "is a grievance of the greatest magnitude."

But one of their most aggravating grievances against the National History of Kentucky, 323. A full and true copy may be found in Innes MSS., Vol. 9, No. 86.

Ibid., Vol. 19, No. 85.

Innes MSS., Vol. 19, No. 87.

administration was the apparent contempt it had been showing toward the West. The most conclusive evidence of this was to be seen in the fact that it had not been taken into the confidence of the nation in its dealings with Spain in opening the Mississippi. So little had been told them that they were not sure that any serious negotiations were going on at all. The Lexington Democrats resolved "That the general government, whose duty it was to have put us in possession of this right, have, either through design or mistaken policy, adopted no effectual measures for its attainment.

"That even the measures they have adopted, have been uniformly concealed from us, and veiled in mysterious secrecy.

"That civil liberty is prostituted, when the servants of the people are suffered to tell their masters, that communications which they may judge important, ought not to be intrusted to them.

"That we have a right to expect and demand, that Spain should be compelled immediately to acknowledge our rights, or that an end be put to all negotiations on that subject.'

5

The days of resolving and addressing were soon to be follewed by a more vigorous line of procedure. In this same set of resolutions, it was declared that the grievances enumerated were common to all the western peoples "and that we will unite with them in any measures that may be expedient for that purpose." In order to obtain "the sense of the inhabitants of the State at large, that no doubt may be entertained of their opinions and determinations on these important subjects; that we may be able when it shall be necessary to communicate as a state, with the other inhabitants of the Western Country" they recommended that each county appoint a committee of correspondence. These committees were to be vested with powers, which if exercised and supported by the people, would weld the state into a unit on the question of their grievances. Not only should the committee send and receive communications on these subjects of Western discontent, but it should also call county meetings "and when it may be judged expedient, to call upon the people to elect proper persons to represent them in Conventions, for the purpose of deliberating on the steps which will be most expedient for the attainment and security of our just rights. Such powers if carried to their logical conclusion could easily have led to almost revolutionary performances. That these were not idle resolutions born of the heat and stress of the Lexington meeting and destined to die with it is seen in the fact that the Bourbon Democratic Society endorsed the Lexington resolutions and took the first step of putting the plan of state organization into working by providing for two men from each militia company to compose the county committee. Meetings were called in other counties and efforts made to carry out the program, but on account of the general conservatism of the people, and also for reasons that will appear later, little beyond this was ever done." At the same time the Lexington society was attempting to arouse the people of the state, it also prepared an address to Congress and the President, reiterating its old demands and becoming more insistent for action of some sort that would let the Kentuckians know what to expect. The Western resolutions which had been passed to arouse the people of the state were incorporated into the address with comments designed to strengthen them. Great Britain was strongly denounced again and it was demanded that an ultimatum should go out to Spain requesting that

For full text of resolutions see "Correspondence of Clark and Genet," 10561058; Marshall, History of Kentucky, II, 121, 122. Kentucky Gazette, May 31, 1794. These resolutions on a printed handbill of the times may be found in Breckinridge MSS. (1794).

6 Kentucky Gazette, July 12, 1794.

7 Marshall, History of Kentucky, II, 122, 123.