over, the tax that was adopted by the national administration as a good revenue producer was the very tax that hit the West hardest. Since the conversion of grain into whisky so concentrated its value that it could be transported profitably regardless of river navigation, the Federal government was now levying a tax upon this scant prosperity by the excise tax on distilled spirits. This, it was argued, was sufficient to show the unequal position Kentucky was being made to assume in the American union by the hostile East.

This was the state of mind prevailing in the West, when in Europe there burst forth the pent-up fury and despair of centuries in the French Revolution, starting a train of events destined to shake the American nation to its center and involve it in a second war with Great Britain twenty years later. Beginning in 1789, in an orderly fashion, it grew more radical with the lapse of time, stirring up on all sides the fears and plots of disquieted monarchs. By 1793, France was in war with five of the most powerful nations in Europe. The sympathy which had been held out to the French by the Americans in 1789, was not to be forgotten by France in 1793. The principles of the American Revolution had played their part in bringing on the French Revolution. Jefferson and Franklin had been great admirers of the French from colonial days and had built up a strong French feeling in America. While the colonies had been struggling for freedom from Great Britain, France had from mingled motives aided the Americans with her fleet and with money. In 1778, treaties of amity and commerce and alliance were concluded. In her great danger France now expected to find a powerful ally in the United States. Citizen Genet was sent as minister to the American government with instructions to enlist its aid in the European struggle.

He arrived in Charleston in 1793, and immediately began preparations for an expedition against the Spaniards in the Floridas and Louisiana. He then proceeded through the interior of the country to Philadelphia, the capital. Everywhere along the way he was received by the people with enthusiasm, born of the gratitude they had ever held to France since her aid had been given in the war for American independence. While Genet was building up this popular support, Washington and his cabinet were wrestling with the problem of the position the United States should occupy in the European war that was threatening to involve the whole world. Before Genet reached Philadelphia, the Washington administration declared that in the struggle between France and the other European nations the American government would remain neutral.

Genet was incensed and disappointed. Here he had met defeat for the most important part of his mission. Despite treaties of alliance with France, the United States had now announced its intentions to treat the French in the same manner as the British. Genet could not understand the motives of the Washington administration which would thus abandon France in her greatest need; neither did he believe in the light of the reception he had received from the people that the Federal government properly represented the will of the people. But, if the United States. would not meet its treaty obligations, he believed it would at least repay the money which France had loaned to the struggling colonies. With this money he expected to carry on expeditions from the United States against the Spaniards in the Floridas and in Louisiana and against the British in Canada. On account of the fact that the debt was not yet due, he was doomed to failure in this particular also.

Impatience with the Washington administration and deep sympathy for Genet and France were evident on all sides. Many Americans were as bitterly disappointed at the declaration of neutrality as was Genet. In discussions preceding the determination of the American policy Jefferson

1 Fish, American Diplomacy, 95, 96.

and Madison were inclined to favor the French, although all were agreed that neutrality was the proper position for the United States to assume.2 Party spirit was fast arising despite Washington's attempts to ignore and crush it by including in his cabinet such opposites as Hamilton and Jefferson. Among other lines of demarkation that were beginning to divide the people, sympathy for France and the democracy she was asserting were becoming prominent characteristics of those who had come to side with Jefferson; while the more conservative followers of Hamilton were accused of sympathizing with England. Villification of Washington speedily arose and became the settled policy of a majority of the American newspapers. As important elements in the same movement, there sprang up, with Philadelphia as a center, Democratic societies, patterned directly after the powerful and violent Jacobin clubs of France, and designed to weld together the rising forces of discontent.

Conditions in the West were ripe for the rapid spread of these societies to that region. During the summer of 1793 John Bradford was instrumental in organizing a Democratic society in Lexington. On August twenty-second, citizens of the town and from the surrounding regions held a preliminary meeting and resolved to found a Democratic society "embracing the laudable objects of the Philadelphia Democratic Society." A committee was appointed to draw up articles of organization. Six days later a meeting was held at which the organization was completed. John Breckinridge was elected chairman, and Thomas Todd and Thomas Bodley, clerks. A circular letter was prepared and distributed throughout the state calling on the people to organize like societies in every county.4 This society became at once the articulate voice of Lexington. It erected liberty poles on occasions, wore the tricolored cockades, and used all the other trappings and customs that were becoming characteristic of these societies. Before the end of the year (1783) at least two other societies had been organized, one at Paris and one at Georgetown."

As has been indicated the main purpose of these societies was to attack the Washington administration in its foreign policy-as well as domestic. But in Kentucky the immediate purpose was to forge a weapon to be used as circumstances should allow, for securing the navigation of the Mississippi River. Exasperation on this question was fast developing into desperation. If Kentucky products succeeded in slipping by New Madrid, it was sure to be stopped somewhere before reaching New Orleans, and a tariff of 15% ad valorem imposed on unloading for purposes of examination and a 6% additional duty exacted for reloading.8

The order of business at every meeting of the societies included a discussion of the Mississippi question. This is a characteristic entry in the minutes of the Lexington Democratic Society, "Society went into committee of the whole on the subject of the Navigation of the Mississippi."9 Discussion within the walls of the club was by no means the uttermost extent given to this all-absorbing question. At intervals the indignation of the club was expressed in an outburst of resolutions, which were directed more often to the people of Kentucky and the West than to Congress

2 Fish, American Diplomacy, 100. The nations which had declared war on France at this time were England, Prussia, Austria, Holland, and Spain. 3 Innes MSS., Vol. 19, No. 65. Bradford in a letter to Harry Innes, Oct. 30, 1808, said he was the first one to propose the society for Lexington. 4 Kentucky Gazette, Aug. 24, 31, 1793.

5 Ranck, History of Lexington, 181.

Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 23, 277. The society at Paris (Bourbon County), was organized Oct. 15, 1793. Kentucky Gazette, Nov. 2, 1793.

Innes MSS., Vol. 19, No. 65. So stated by Bradford in his letter to Innes, Oct. 30, 1808.

8 F. A. Ogg, The Opening of the Mississippi (New York, 1904), 449, 450.

9 Innes MSS., Vol. 19, Nos. 89, 90. The minutes of some of the meetings of the Lexington society are found here.

and the President. By this method foundations were being laid for building up the West into a power whose demands would sometime be heeded by either the national government or by Spain direct.

On December 13, 1793, the Democratic Society of Kentucky (the name used by the Lexington branch) formulated an address on the grievances of the West and particularly on the navigation of the Mississippi, directed it "To the People West of the Alleghanies," and printed it in broadside form for distribution throughout the western country. They declared that the use of the outlet of the Mississippi was a God-given right which must now be secured forever not only for themselves but for their children. Now was the time to act; and if they were to be worthy of their offspring they would delay no longer. The national government had done nothing; and gave no promise of anything better for the future. "Repeated memorials were presented to Congress upon the subject, but they were treated with a neglect bordering on contempt." The people had been patient and long-suffering. When the new federal government succeeded the old Confederation they had hoped that it would secure their rights. On the contrary, "Six years have passed away, and our right is not yet obtained. * * * In the meanwhile, our brethren on the Eastern waters possess every advantage which nature or compact can give them. Nay we do not know that even one firm attempt to obtain it has been made." Furthermore they believed that this neglect to obtain for the West this right was due to the desire of the East to retard Western development and thereby discourage their people from migrating thither.10 No plan of direct action was suggested, beyond the call for the formation of Democratic societies in every community, whereby the people could be drawn together to act in unison on any future policy that might later be declared.

The tone of this address showed a wounded pride engendered by the failure of the national government to recognize the importance of the West in that it had not secured the navigation of the Mississippi or even deigned to tell the West whether it had actually tried. This address also held out the veiled threat that the West might sometime look to herself for further action regardless of the federal government.

The Lexington Democratic Society was the leading organization of its kind west of the Alleghanies. It made itself the mouthpiece for the whole West. It not only addressed communications to the citizens of the western regions, but it also sent now and then an address or resolutions to Congress, invariably dealing with the navigation of the Mississippi.11 In line with its desire to organize the West everywhere into Democratic societies, it carried on a correspondence with such clubs from western Pennsylvania to Tennessee. An interesting part of each meeting consisted in reading to the society the correspondence from other clubs.12 In answer to an invitation from the Washington County, Pennsylvania, Democratic Society to open a correspondence, the Lexington society resolved that it would gladly embrace the opportunity "assuring them of our strong desire & perfect willingness to open a correspondence with them, on the subject of our unredressed grievances & assuring them also, that being all equally fellow-sufferers we shall heartily co-operate with them.

*" 13

The Kentucky Democratic Society, as the Lexington society was often

10 Copies of this address may be found in various places. See State Papers, Miscellaneous. I, 929, 930. For one of the broadsides, see Breckinridge MSS. (1793). A MS. copy is in the Innes MSS., Vol. 19, No. 84. The address was signed by John Breckinridge, as chairman and Thomas Bodley and Thomas Todd as clerks.

11 A copy is in Breckinridge MSS. (1793).

12 Minutes in Innes MSS., Vol. 19, Nos. 89, 90.

13 Minutes Ibid., No. 92.

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called, was not proceeding blindly without a definite purpose in arousing the West. In the fall of 1793, it advanced a step beyond mere agitation. With a considerable number of societies now functioning in the West, it was able to enter into concrete action. The method of procedure was set forth in a resolution it adopted and sent to the other societies for ratification. It declared "That it will be proper to make an attempt in a peaceful manner, to go with an American bottom properly registered and cleared into the sea through the channel of the Mississippi; that we may either procure an immediate acknowledgment of our right from the Spaniards; or if they obstruct us in the enjoyment of that right, that we may be able to lay before the Federal Government, such unequivocal proof of their having done so, that they will be compelled to say, whether they will abandon or protect the inhabitants of the western country." 14

This mode of procedure shows conclusively the understanding the Kentuckians had of the way in which the United States Government was handling the Mississippi River question. They believed the national government was concerning itself very little with this serious western problem, and they harbored the suspicion that it might even doubt that there were really grievances to redress or a problem to solve. The feeling became widespread that the trouble was soon to be brought to a head by sending the test boat. James Seagrove, a United States agent to the Indians, declared to them that if the Spaniards "do not leave the passage of the Misisipi free to us, we shall not be long in obtaining it by force. The inhabitants of Kentucky are resolved that if Congress does not obtain this permission they will take it for themselves. They are to send a boat down to the sea by this river, and if the Spaniards take this boat, or detain it in its passage, they will go to find out who has done so." 15

The conditions of the times were so confused with cross-purposes and counter-moves, intrigues and international suspicions, that no policy or line of procedure could be pursued uninfluenced by the surging forces. The development of the Western Democratic societies was merely one part of a much more comprehensive movement which had been set into operation coeval with the rise of those clubs, and which bore such a close relationship to them. This was Genet's plan to enlist the discontented West in a project to bear down upon the Spanish possessions, wrest them from the control of Spain, and erect them into an independent state with commercial treaties with France and the United States or annex them to the former.16 The Mississippi was, of course, to be free throughout its length, and in this Genet expected to easily seduce Kentucky. He could also count on the vigorous sympathy for France and rancorous hatred of Spain. Within a short time after arriving at Philadelphia, Genet had met with so many reverses at the hands of the Washington administration that he had come to conclude that the American people and the national administration were not the same and that the former was the proper authority to treat with.17 He, therefore, had no hesitancy in dealing with the people directly, secretly as well as openly.

When and where his plan of conquest began is not certainly known. It was to a great extent a growth developing as circumstances suggested and permitted. On landing at Charleston, Genet set one part of it into operation, organizing at this time his aids who were to proceed against the two Floridas and later Louisiana itself.18 Plans for arousing Kentucky

14 Innes MSS., Vol. 19, No. 105. Also see Nos. 103, 104.

15 "Correspondence of Clark and Genet," in Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1896, I, 1055.

10 The Complete Annals of Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1903), 130, 131. 17 See Fish, American Diplomacy, 103.

18 See E. M. Coulter, "The Foreign Intrigues of Elijah Clarke and the 'TransOconee Republic,'" in Transactions of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association,

and the West against Spain's possessions were not developed until after Genet reached Philadelphia. Here suggestions from Americans awaited him, and, indeed, at times appear to have outrun him. George Rogers Clark anxiously offered his services and John Brown was a ready counselor. About twenty years afterwards, one of the participants declared that the plan for raising forces in Kentucky arose in a meeting held in New Orleans on April 20, 1793.19

Indeed, no lesser person than Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, was privy to Genet's main purpose. That his course adjudged from the accumulated experience and precedents of the following century and a quarter, was extraordinary cannot be doubted; but regarded in the light of his times and surrounding, it was not out of harmony with good policy and political sagacity. His relations were so close with the French minister that the latter was received in a conference on July 5, 1793, at which the whole plan was laid bare. Genet here unfolded his instructions to Andre Michaux regarding a mission to Kentucky and also read two addresses, one to the people of Louisiana and the other to the Canadians. In both he sought to arouse the people against their European rulers. He boldly told Jefferson that Kentuckians were anxious to enlist their support against the Spaniards, and that two generals there had offered to take New Orleans if they were furnished with £3,000. He declared that he refused to advance them the money, but was willing to send it later. When Louisiana should be conquered, it was to be erected into an independent state bound by commercial treaties to the United States and France. Genet made it plain to Jefferson that this information was given to him not as Secretary of State, but as a private individual. In the preceding April Jefferson had issued the celebrated neutrality proclamation, which directly prohibited the things which Genet was now proposing. Jefferson showed his undisguised attitude toward the part of the plan dealing with Kentucky by declaring to Genet "that his enticing officers and soldiers from Kentucky to go against Spain was really putting a halter around their necks; for they would surely be hung if they commenced hostilities against a nation at peace with the United States." He would thus not have the United States used as a base of operations against a nation with which the United States was at peace, although it might not be of the friendliest kind. He was, however, quick to assure Genet how little he was concerned at what might happen to the Spanish possessions in America provided the position of the United States were not compromised. He declared that leaving out the Kentucky part of the plan, he "did not care what insurrections should be excited in Louisiana." 20

Some two weeks previous to this conference, Genet had asked Jefferson to receive Michaux as a consul on the Western waters. Jefferson sensed the purpose of this at once and demurred. He stated that it was not customary for consuls to be stationed anywhere except on the seaboard, and that if the French were allowed such an officer in the West, other nations would demand the same right and as a result "we should have all our interior filled with foreign agents." Failing in this, Genet then asked Jefferson to give Michaux a letter of introduction to Governor Shelby. As he and Michaux had enjoyed an acquaintanceship for some time, made especially agreeable on account of their common interest in botany, Jefferson complied. In this he adroitly avoided being drawn into

19 Statement of DePauw in connection with the investigation of Harry Innes in 1808. "Correspondence of Clark and Genet," 1102-1106.

20 Complete Annals of Thomas Jefferson, 130, 131. This was a step in the development of the law of neutrality far advanced over European practice. Despite the fact that the law of Congress of June 5, 1794, interpreting and enforcing neutrality was yet to come, Jefferson here declared that the halter awaited those enlisting in the United States to fight Spain, even though they should make their rendezvous outside.