CHAPTER XXIII

THE SPANISH COLONIZATION SCHEME-THE EIGHTH AND NINTH CONVENTIONS

The action taken by the last convention had not enhanced Wilkinson's reputation and standing with the Spanish officers. Again he had failed to break Kentucky away from the United States. Seeing the necessity of checking as far as possible his waning influence with Spain, he lost no time in carrying on his machinations in Kentucky by taking advantage of every opportunity and by creating them when possible. He made long and elaborate reports and suggestions to Miro, seeking to show that his importance in Kentucky was as great as ever, and that there remained many opportunities and methods of yet detaching the District.1 In February (1789) he informed Miro that he had not urged his full plans in the late convention, but had only worked for a separation from Virginia and an appeal to Congress on the Mississippi River navigation, which would show that it had "neither the will nor the power to satisfy their hopes." The outcome of his subtle maneuvers must have time to show itself, he declared. "I determined therefore to wait for the effects," he told Miro, "which will result from the disappointment from those hopes, and on which I rely to unite the country into one opinion." 2 He cautions Miro to see to it that their weapon, the Mississippi River question, was not lost in negotiations with the United States. He declared that to grant the navigation of that river to the American Government would put an end forever to Spanish influence in the West.3

He maintained that Kentucky was destined to separate sooner or later and enter into a Spanish connection. As to the precise time and the exact condition that would precipitate the action, he did not inform Miro; but he suggested different possibilities. In an eventuality the Mississippi River question would be the fundamental condition producing the specific problem. The operation of the taxation laws of the United States would force Kentucky out of the Union, if it were not anticipated by some other problem. "The people here," he said, "not having the means of paying those taxes, will resist them, and the authority of the new government will be set at naught, which will produce a civil war, and result in the separation of the West from the East." 4

Although he had passed the peak point in the possibilities of his plotting in the last convention, still he was not left without great influence. A spectator in the last convention told how he had gone there, very apprehensive as to what might take place. "Like a spy I went there," he declared. "I kept a jealous eye over an eminent officer in particular, but when I beheld what he had done, even at the risk of his life and fortune, with the Spanish Governor in order to pave the way for the

1 Wilkinson had certain confidential messengers who carried his dispatches to New Orleans in canoes down the river. As an example, Joshua Barbee was such a messenger in March, 1788. Letter from Barbee to Innes, January 4, 1807. Innes MSS., 19, 59.

2 Gayarré, History of Louisiana, III, 228, 229.

1789.

Wilkinson to Miro, February 12,

8 Gayarré, History of Louisiana, III, 223-240.

Letter of February 12, 1789.

4

Ibid., 229, 230.

navigation of the Mississippi (sic), when I considered that actions speak louder than words, I then concluded that he was not only an able friend but a hero in our cause." 5 Wilkinson had great faith in the power of money over the leaders of Kentucky thought. Judging that such a power must be as great over others as it was over himself, he declared the best way to hasten the separation of the West from the Union was by "granting every sort of commercial privileges to the masses in the western region, and showering pensions on their leaders."6 His greatest trouble seemed to be with the leaders. He believed he could inflame the people against the United States sufficiently well by a proper handling of the Mississippi River; but he had not yet been able to discover a leader in the District who would cooperate fully with him in the critical moment. And, without the full support of leaders at the opportune time, Kentucky could never be led out of the Union, however much he believed the people might want it. The late convention had afforded him a painful illustration.

In September, 1789, assuming that every man had his price, he made out a list of the leaders in the District, giving his idea of their general sentiments and setting down the price for which they could be bought. It is impossible to determine whether he really believed the men he mentioned could actually be bribed, or whether this was another of his cunning moves to maintain his own position in the councils of the Spaniards and doubly secure his own pension. Harry Innes, Benjamin Sebastian, John Brown, Caleb Wallace and Joshua Fowler, he declared, "are my confidential friends and support my plans." He believed they were worth $1,000 each. Benjamin Logan, Isaac Shelby and James Garrard “favor separation from the United States and a friendly connection with Spain." Eight hundred dollars apiece would be sufficient for them. William Wood, Henry Lee, Robert Johnston and Richard Taylor, being of less importance, should have an allotment of $500 each. "These favor separation from Virginia, but do not carry their views any further." General Lawson was marked down for $1,000; and George Nicholas was considered to be worth $2,000. As for the latter, "He has not entered into our concerns. He is one of the wealthiest gentlemen in the country, of great ability, and it will be a great point to win him over to our political views. I have been his friend for some time and I think he will concur." Thomas Marshall should be given $1,000; but Humphrey Marshall was "a villain without principles, very artful, and could be very troublesome" he should have only $600. He also named the following, with their prices: Alexander Scott Bullitt, $1,000; George Muter, $1,200; and Green Clay, Samuel Taylor and Robert Caldwell, $500 each. Speaking generally of those who had not been specifically classified as to views, Wilkinson said: "Some of these have British leanings; some favor the interests of Congress; some are for separation from Virginia; others are opposed to it. All are working without union or concert; but they are our enemies, and hence it is necessary to win them over." 7

But Spain was not without competition in her conspiracies in the fruitful Western fields. Wilkinson had referred in his communications to Miro to certain dangers that were arising against Spanish interests from English sources. Master of intrigue that he was, he was able to turn this to his own advantage in his dealings with the Spaniards. During the fall of 1788, when the Spanish conspiracy was at its height and when Wilkinson expected to put it successfully through the seventh con

Kentucky Gazette, December 13, 1788.

6 Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 131. Wilkinson, himself, had been receiving a pension from Spain since 1787. He continued to receive it until at least 1807. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, III, 283, 284.

7 W. R. Shepherd, "Wilkinson and the Beginnings of the Spanish Conspiracy" in American Historical Review, IX, 764-766.

vention, a British emissary in the person of a Dr. John Connolly ap peared in Louisville.8 During this same general period a letter consisting of some "Desultory Reflections by a Gentleman of Kentucky" found. its way to Lord Dorchester in Canada. It held out an alluring situation. for the British to take advantage of. The West, it declared, was so situated that it could never remain in the American Union without great detriment to its welfare. It must, therefore, sooner or later separate from the Atlantic States. The writer then declared "Great Britain ought to prepare for the occasion, and she should employ the interval in forming confidential connections with men of enterprise, capacity and popular influence resident of the Western Waters."9 The author of this letter could easily have been Wilkinson, for it was to his advantage to have as many avenues of approach as well as escape as possible in his dealings with the Spaniards.

Connolly came to Louisville ostensibly to look after some interests in land lying around the Falls of the Ohio, but his real purpose was to take advantage of the unsettled conditions in Kentucky which had been described in the "Desultory Reflections." 10 He soon got into communication with some of the leaders in the District, but was able to make little or no headway.11 His proposition was to secure for the Kentuckians the free navigation of the Mississippi through the use of troops in Canada and the British fleet in the Gulf of Mexico. Great Britain was of all foreign countries most bitterly hated in Kentucky. She, it was believed, was responsible for stirring up the continuous Indian raids and depredations. It was thus a difficult task to set going a British plot here. Harry Innes wrote Washington in December, 1788, that he was informed the British had sent agents to the District. He added that he was on the watch for them: "From the abhorrence & detestation which I have to a British connection, other than that of friends & allies, I was induced to keep a lookout & scrutinize the conduct of all strangers." Connolly, he declared, had "touched the key to Fomentation and offered assistance to enable the Inhabitants of the Western Country to seize on the City of New Orleans, and secure the navigation of the Mississippi." He intimated that he also had other information of great importance, but feared to entrust it to the ordinary methods of communication.12 However, he would say that he would not object to using the British as "friends & allies," but the connection should go no further.

Until Connolly should see Wilkinson, the possibilities of his plot would not be exhausted. It seems the latter made special efforts to get into communication with Connolly, as he no doubt considered that he had pre-empted Kentucky for his own special plotting ground. But Wilkinson also believed there was no situation that was not worth investigating, with the possibility of turning it to his advantage. And, as has been stated, it is by no means beyond a probability that he was instrumental in arousing hopes in the British of a Kentucky plot. He had a conference with Connolly and pumped him of everything concerning the British desires and intentions. After gaining all the information he desired, he got rid of him through a ruse, according to Wilkinson's account. He hired a hunter to assault Connolly. The hunter was to let it be known that he believed Connolly to be a British agent and that as such he should

8 Brown, Political Beginnings of Kentucky, 182-192.

• Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 297. Lord Dorchester sent this letter to Lord Sydney, April 11, 1789.

10 Connolly had owned a tract of land where Louisville_now stands; but it was confiscated during the Revolution because he joined the Tory ranks.

11 Harry Innes wrote Washington December 18, 1788, concerning Connolly, "His conduct has alarmed my fears. He had some confidential conferences with influential characters." Writings of George Washington, IX, 473, 474.

12 Letter dated December 18, 1788. Innes MSS., 26.

fare badly for the part the British had been playing in the Indian warfare. Connolly became so frightened that he begged Wilkinson to afford him protection until he could escape from the District.13 Wilkinson wrote an account of this to Miro, showing how he had saved the interests of Spain in Kentucky by nipping in the bud this British plot. He also was able to use this incident as a reminder to Miro what might happen if Spain allowed her interests in Kentucky to die; there might be nothing less than the descent of an irresistible force of Kentuckians and British on New Orleans.14

For apparent reasons there could never be great danger from British machinations in Kentucky. Nevertheless hopes and fears were aroused from this source. In April, 1789, Lord Dorchester declared he was informed that secret arrangements existed among Kentuckians "to declare independence of the Federal Union, take possession of New Orleans. and look to Great Britain for such assistance as might enable them to accomplish these designs." 15

Thomas Marshall wrote Washington in February, 1789, that "It appears plain to me that the offers of Lord Dorchester, as well as those of Spain, are founded on a supposition that it is a fact that we are about to separate from the Union; else, why are these offers not made to Congress? We shall, I fear, never be safe from the machinations of our enemies, as well internal as external, until we have a separate State, and are admitted into the Union as a federal member." 16

Wilkinson's prominence in Spanish counsels, the proceedings of the seventh Kentucky convention, and hints as to British plottings, all spread their effects and influence through the rest of the nation. Interest in these happenings was now spreading beyond the party strife in Kentucky, and was causing considerable concern. General St. Clair, governor of the Northwestern Territory, wrote to Isaac Dunn, a partner of Wilkinson, on December 5, 1788, that he was much grieved "to hear that there are strong dispositions on the part of the people of Kentucky to break off their connection with the United States, and that our friend Wilkinson is at the head of this affair. Such a consummation would involve the United States in the greatest difficulties, and would completely ruin this country. Should there be any foundation for these reports, for God's sake, make use of your influence to detach Wilkinson from that party." 17 St. Clair also wrote a few days later to John Jay that he had certain information that Kentucky in her last convention had come very near adopting a proposal "that the district of Kentucky should set up for itself, not only independent of Virginia, but of the United States also." 18 Kentuckians themselves entered into this larger aspect of the discussion. Both factions sought to justify themselves in the East. Thomas Marshall carried on a correspondence with Washington in which he kept the President posted on all that he believed was happening or being planned in the District. In February he wrote Washington a long account of the proceedings of the late convention, the situation in Kentucky, and the dangers arising from the Spanish con

13 He describes his dealings with Connolly in his letter to Miro, February 12, 1789. Gayarré, History of Louisiana, III, 223-240. Also see Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 301; and McMaster, History of the People of the United States, I, 522,

523.

14 Thomas Marshall to George Washington, February 12, 1789, in Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 250.

15 Lord Dorchester to Lord Sydney, April 11, 1789, in Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 295. 16 Marshall to Washington, February 12, 1789, in Butler, History of Kentucky, 521; also in Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 250.

17 Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 286.

18 St. Clair to Jay, December 13, 1788, in Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 286.

spiracy, and also a short account of the British activities.19 In January, 1789, the following account of the situation in Kentucky appeared in the Alexandria (Va.) Gazette: "By information received from Kentucky, we learn that many of the principal people are warmly in favor of a separation from the Union, and contend that it is injurious to the interest of that country to be connected with the Atlantic States. This idea, pregnant with so much mischief to America, is said to be much cherished by intelligence carried there by Brown, member of Congress, to this effect: That he had the strongest assurance from the Spanish Ambassador that on such a declaration Spain would cede to them the navigation of the Mississippi and give them every support." 20

As a part of Virginia, the District of Kentucky had been giving the Richmond authorities considerable concern and worry. Virginia was responsible for what her citizens or groups of her citizens might do. She was no less anxious to solve the situation than were the Kentuckians. But she wanted no Spanish intriguing nor violent separation. Her authority must be upheld; her laws must be respected throughout the commonwealth. In 1788 she announced in a law her determination to hold for high treason any persons who should set up an independent government within her limits or who should become officers of such a government.21 As the next step toward Kentucky statehood rested on Virginia, she passed in December, 1788, an act of agreement for separation, making the third enabling act. This act was very much like the preceding two. It declared the boundaries of the district should be those of the state; that land rights acquired under Virginia laws should be maintained according to those laws; that Kentucky assume a just proportion of the public and domestic debt of Virginia; that residents and non-residents be subject to equal taxation, and that a period of six years after statehood be given to complete land titles by way of land improvements; that Kentucky land warrants should not interfere with those issued by Virginia prior to September 1, 1790; that unlocated lands. "which stand appropriated" by Virginia for military service be under her control until Kentucky enters the Union, except that officers may have unlimited time to make their locations; and that the Ohio River remain free and open to the United States.22 Virginia called another convention for Kentucky to meet in the following July (1789) for the purpose of determining once more whether she would separate and whether on the terms offered. This call displaced the second session of the seventh convention. If she voted for statehood, then, Congress must agree before September 1, 1790, to admit her into the Union.23 The storm of the Spanish conspiracy having passed its greatest fury preceding and during the former convention, the campaign for this, the eighth assembly, was comparatively quiet. Wilkinson found no occasion to greatly inflame and arouse the popular mind; and Brown, brought into closer touch with the National forces, was fast on the road to a better feeling toward the National Government. As these agitating forces became more quiescent, the feeling against separation began to grow stronger. A petition was sent up to the Virginia Legislature praying that the enabling act be repealed, as her humble petitioners desired nothing more than to remain a part of Virginia. They wanted no new state. "which will be clothed with no national power and which will only serve as one of Pharaoh's lean kine to devour our liberty, whilst it can be of no security to our property." The petitioners declared that the General 19 See Marshall to Washington, February 12, 1789, in Green, Spanish Conspiracy,

250-253.

20 January 22, 1789, quoted in Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 239.

21 Ibid., 379.

22 Kentucky Gazette, February 14, 1789.

23 Brown, Political Beginnings of Kentucky, 218-220.

Vol. I-22