the old Confederation in a dying gasp, should not enter into any business. that might well be taken care of by the new government. On February 29, Brown started his proceedings by presenting the whole situation in Kentucky, to Congress in a long speech. The question thus set going was in March stifled in a committee, and for over two months Brown was unable to get definite action. On July 2, the committee of the whole recommended the passage of an act assenting to Kentucky's separation from Virginia and the admission of the new state into the Union. One month later such an act was on the verge of passing, when a report reached Philadelphia that New Hampshire had ratified the federal constitution, making the ninth state, and, thus, putting an end to the old Confederation. Further action was dropped. On the following day, the whole question was ended in the adoption of a recommendation to the new government that it admit Kentucky into the new Union.8 The decadence of Congress and the near approach of the new federal government cannot be held wholly responsible for the failure of Kentucky to get permission for statehood. Brown in his unfailing efforts to advance the statehood question was balked by that Eastern hostility to the West and its growing influence, that had so effectively played into the hands of certain leaders in Kentucky who had been urging that there should be an end to forbearance and that some decided action should be taken. A sectionalism between North and South was also rearing itself in this question. Brown said he was baffled by the group of Northern representatives who argued that to admit Kentucky would be to give the South a greater influence, and that either Vermont or Maine should enter the Union to offset Kentucky. This idea of balancing the sections was contained in a verse that went the rounds of the day: "Kentucky to the Union given, And neither South nor North prevails." 10 Balked as it seemed at every turn, the Kentuckians in the summer of 1788 began to make preparations for the assemblying of their sixth convention, which was widely believed would be the last. Thoughts on the contents of a constitution were beginning to be exchanged, greatly aided by the contributions appearing in the Kentucky Gazette. An organization that was playing an important part in formulating ideas into constitutional provisions was a group of men who were organized during the latter part of December of 1786 and came to be known as the Danville Political Club. This club was so closely identified in its membership with the successive conventions, that it can almost be called a secret caucus of those assemblies. Men who became its members formed more than one-fourth of the representatives to the first convenion [1785]; seven out of twenty-six in the second convention [1785]; and ten out of thirty-eight in the fifth convention [1787]. Among its members were Harry Innes, Christopher Greenup, John Brown, Thomas Todd, George Muter, Samuel McDowell and Benjamin Sebastian. Its membership was exclusive; not all who asked admittance were received.11 It was a training school for the future statesmen of Kentucky. Its method of debate was for two members to open the discussion on each side, and then the floor was free to all who cared to speak.12 Its mem8 Brown, Political Beginnings of Kentucky, 112-120, 139-144. 9 Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 170. 10 J. Schouler, History of the United States of America [New York], 1908, Revised Edition, I, 164. 11 Thomas Speed, The Political Club, Danville, Kentucky, 1786-1790 [Louisville, 1894], 100, 101. All the minutes extant are found here. 12 Ibid, 105. bers were required to be above reproach. According to its constitution, "The club shall have power to enquire into any irregularity of its members, and if it shall appear on inquiry that any member has behaved himself beneath the character of a gentleman, or shall misbehave at any meeting," he should be expelled or punished otherwise as the club should direct.13 Besides its discussions on constitutional questions, it frequently entered into other considerations. It discussed the culture of Tobacco in the district and decided that such agriculture would not be beneficial to the citizens. It decided that intermarriage with Indians would not be desirable, and seriously discussed the question of polygamy in a free country. The club followed closely the problems that were besetting the district. The first question it debated was "Whether the immediate navigation of the Mississippi River will contribute to the interest of this District or not." Its decision was in the negative.14 This decision is rather remarkable, unless the word immediate is given particular significance, and then the club's action shows dignity and conservatism. However, under this interpretation, its decision was radical in a later discussion, for in 1787 it discussed and decided in the affirmative the question "Whether it will be to the advantage of this District immediately to separate from the government of Virginia and become an independent State or not?" 15 It also debated the terms of the First Enabling Act and voted that they should be accepted.16 The members of the club reached out in their vision of the West and its political arrangements. They discussed and decided affirmatively the query, "Would it be to the interest and future policy of this District, should a separation from the State of Virginia take place, to admit the inhabitants of Cumberland to unite with them in government?" 17 But the sustaining interest of the club was its frequent considerations of the fundamental principles of government. Major Beatty passed through Danville in 1787 and made the following note on the club in his diary: "Very much disturbed by a Political Club which met in the next house where we slept and kept us awake until 12 or I o'clock. This club is very commendable in a new country. It is composed of members. of the most respectable people in and about Danville, who meet every Saturday night to discuss politics. Some pretty good speeches and some tolerably good arguments made use of last night. The dispute was: One side insisted that an Act of Assembly was not law when it did not perfectly agree with the Constitution of the State. It was opposed by the other party and a very long debate took place." 18 At various times it discussed, whether annual elections were better than less frequent ones, whether there should be one or two branches to a legislature, what ought to be the powers of a second branch, and whether the emission of a paper currency would be injurious to the District. This last question was decided in the affirmative. Besides devoting thought and discussion to isolated provisions of a constitution, the club at one time appointed a committee to draw up a constitution and a bill of rights which would be suitable for Kentucky.19 When the Federal Constitution was given out by the Philadelphia Convention, the Danville Political Club secured a copy and proceeded to discuss it in its meetings for four months. literally tore it to pieces, and patched it up with numerous amendments and suggestions. It recommended a bill of rights. Thus the leaders of affairs had been training themselves for constitution-making on dummies and other people's productions; while the great body of the peopel read in the Kentucky Gazette or heard discussed what the others wrote. The convention, called for July [1788], it was thought, would produce a constitution. But the campaign preceding this convention was not concerned wholly with the considerations as to what ought to go into the new constitution. The advisability of separating from Virginia had never yet been unanimously established. There was always enough opinion short of unanimity to keep a lively discussion going. A correspondent to the Kentucky Gazette, signing himself "A Virginian" stood out against separation, re-affirming all the old arguments and advancing new ones. He soon found himself in a minority in the battle of words that raged for some time. He was beset on all sides, some using arguments to meet him, while others dispensing with reason heaped on villification. In fact, this method of meeting an argument became all too prominent among most of the public men of the District.20 This condition led "A Farmer" to write the editor of the Kentucky Gazette to suggest that the paper was established to give the politicians a chance to enlighten the people on the question of separation, "but I fear what we farmers suspect is too true, namely, that our greatest politicians are not true patriots-when we wish them to answer our doubts respecting. matters of the greatest moment to us they set to quarrelling & abusing one another like a parcel of old women:-we must now submit to the separation right or wrong; but many of us would have been better satisfied, had they but told us the reasons why such measure was necessaryas we plow the ground from whence they get their bread, I think it is as little as they can do to give us all the information their pens and your press can afford, if it was merely to keep us in good humour." 21 He then proceeded to ask information on the probable contents of the new constitution. The political atmosphere in Kentucky was highly charged on the meeting of the sixth convention in Danville on July 28, 1788. Wilkinson's secret machinations and public influence had been having their effect; while the adoption of the Federal Constitution against almost the solid opposition of Kentuckians had not increased their love for their present political connections. But in the face of all these influences, came the intelligence on the eve of the meeting that Congress had refused to grant Kentucky admission into the Union. This intelligence was contained in a letter from Brown to Samuel McDowell, the president of the convention.22 Baffled for three years through five conventions, Kentucky received this news with despair. The convention now found that the only purpose for which it had assembled had been thwarted by Congress, and that legally it was now powerless. With the mood they were in, they had no thoughts of using the simplest remedy of adjourning sine die, and leaving the next step for statehood to be born of the future. At the same time Brown wrote concerning the action of Congress, he also wrote George Muter concerning certain advances Gardoqui, the Spanish minister, had made to him. He said "that if Kentucky will declare her independence and empower some proper person to negotiate with him, that he has authority and will engage to open the navigation of the Mississippi. * * *"" He added, however, that Gardoqui had stated "that this privilege can never be extended to them while part of the United States" on account of certain trade obligations. Brown said he had the permission of Gardoqui to mention these proceedings to a few friends in Kentucky.23 Here was a clever move made by the Spanish 20 Kentucky Gazette, October 13, 1787, passim. 21 Kentucky Gazette, February 2, 1788. 22 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 267. 23 Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 170. Letter dated July 10, 1788. representative in the most opportune time he could have hoped for. With the convention powerless legally to turn in any direction, the possibilities of the Gardoqui proposition, struck with great force. If Congress would not have Kentucky as a state in the Union, then she must be thrown largely on her own resources, and she would not turn aside without some investigation and consideration of so tempting an offer. This was also a propitious day for James Wilkinson. Events were steadily playing into his hands. Although the Gardoqui conversations with Brown were separate and apart from his intrigues with the authorities in Louisiana, they all led to the same conclusion. Kentucky was now at the parting of the ways; and Wilkinson was intent on seeing that she took the road that led to absolute independence from the American Union and to some kind of a connection with the Spaniards. Wilkinson had been preparing for just this day throughout the past year. On May 13 [1788] he wrote Miro concerning his preparations: "I will in the meantime, inquire into the prevailing opinions, and shall be able to ascertain the extent of the influence of the members elected. When this is done, after having previously come to an understanding with two or three individuals capable of assisting me, I shall disclose so much of our great scheme as may appear opportune, according to circumstances, and I have no doubt but that it will meet with a favorable reception; because although I have been communicative with no more than two individuals, I have sounded many, and whenever it has seemed expedient to me to make known your answer to my memorial it has caused the keenest satisfactions." The two men referred to as having been taken into his counsels were Harry Innes and Alexander S. Bullitt.24 In this same letter Wilkinson outlined the mode of procedure he would follow: "Thus, as soon as the new government should be organized and adopted by the people, they will proceed to elect a governor, the members of the legislative body and other officers, and I doubt not but they will name a political agent to treat of the affair in which we are engaged, and I think that all this will be done by the month of March next. In the meantime, I hope to receive your orders, which I will do my utmost to execute. I do not anticipate any obstacle from Congress, because, under the present federal compact, that body can neither dispose of men nor money, and the new government, should it establish itself, will have to encounter difficulties which will keep it weak for three or four years, before the expiration of which, I have good grounds to hope, that we shall have completed our negotiations, and shall have become too strong to be subjected to any force which may be sent against us.' All the different forces of intrigue and discontent were now bent in the same direction regardless of motives. What power was there to prevent the convention from going ahead and performing the work it had been elected to do, viz: to form a constitution? Congress had been given notice by the previous convention of the dangers that lurked, if statehood were not granted, when in its address it declared that "so great are our present sufferings which must grow with our growth and increase with our population that should we be unsuccessful in this application, we shall not consider ourselves in any manner answerable for the future conduct of our constituents." 25 Soon after this address was issued, Innes had written Brown that he would "discover a sentiment in the Address which plainly leads to this point that if our application is rejected we shall scarcely trouble Congress with a second deliberation on the subject. * Congress could not then plead her ignorance of our inten 24 Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 129, 130. Wilkinson makes this statement in his letter. 25 Kentucky Gazette, February 23, 1788. Vol. I-21 tions." 26 Brown, who was supposed to have the best understanding of affairs of the nation in the East, left the distinct impression with the convention that it was the implacable hostility of Congress and the East that had thwarted Kentucky's efforts. He unduly magnified this side of the question, to the virtual exclusion of a proper explanation of extenuating circumstances. He had a purpose in this. His desire was to create a frame of mind in the convention which would make it easy for him to have it proceed to the consideration and adoption of a constitution and a declaration of independence regardless of acts and compacts of Congress and Virginia. With Kentucky standing alone, she would be in a position of vantage, to demand speedy admission into the Union or to sever all ties with the national government and treat with Spain.27 The main question before the convention was whether it would go ahead and frame a constitution and declare its independence, or provide for some future action and adjourn.28 Wilkinson's plan fitted in distinctly with the formation of a constitution as the first step. This would be the first move in the direction of his Spanish connection. The debate centered on this question through long and stormy sessions. Wilkinson, Wallace, Innes, and Sebastian in varying degrees of the same purpose, wanted to proceed with the constitution for it meant the end of delay and the beginning of a bold and decisive course. All were not equally agreed as to where it would lead. The fight was opened by the introduction of "A resolution, declaring that the powers of this convention so far as depends on the acts of the Legislature of Virginia were annulled by the Resolutions of Congress, and resolving that it was the duty of this convention as the representatives of the people to proceed to frame a constitution of government for this. district, and to submit the same to their consideration with such advice relative thereto as emergency suggests. ***"'29 All the forces of regularity and conservatism in the convention rallied under the leadership of John Allen, Ebenezer Brooks and others to defeat this resolution. They too clearly saw the significance of this move. When the vote was taken the motion was lost. This was the first distinct setback to Wilkinson's plot to take Kentucky out of the Union. But Wilkinson's party was not yet willing to give up the fight for quick action. A motion was, then, introduced providing for each militia captain to take a poll of his company as to the best course to be pursued. The forces of opposition were also able to defeat this move.30 Although these two motions had been defeated by the "law and order” party, it did not indicate that all of those voting for the defeat of these measures were equally opposed to some action that pointed to quick and definite results. The final action of the convention was almost as radical and decisive as any course its previous efforts had been directed toward. The only degree of difference was not in the ultimate goal that might be reached, but only in the time when the start should be made and the 26 Innes MSS., letter dated December 7, 1787. The Fourth of July, the day following the dashing of Kentucky's hopes by Congress, was celebrated "with the greatest festivity" in Lexington. One of the toasts offered was: "May the Atlantic States be just, the Western States be free and both be happy." Kentucky Gazette, July 5, 1788. 27 Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 180-182. For a detailed discussion of Brown's dealings with Gardoqui, see Ibid, 149-179. A short sketch of the life of Brown may be found in Collins, History of Kentucky, II, 253. 28 In his letter to Muter, July 10, 1788, Brown said the main question was "Whether or not it will be more expedient to continue the connection with the State of Virginia or to declare their independence and proceed to frame a constitution of government." He believed the latter solution was generally expected. Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 170. 29 Brown, Political Beginnings of Kentucky, 175-182; Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 182, 183. 30 Green, Spanish Conspiracy, 197. |