Page images
PDF
EPUB

The President's
Answer.

"Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add, that whilst it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter as a portion of the public property of the United States, against hostile attacks, from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defense can be construed into a menace against the city of Charleston. With great personal regard I remain, yours very respectfully,

"JAMES BUCHANAN. "To Hon. Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, James L. Orr."

The Commissioners replied to this in the following strongly personal communication:

[blocks in formation]

The Commissioners'
Rejoinder.

a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possess the power, to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I therefore deeply regret that in your opinion the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible. We expressed no such opinion; and the language which you quote as ours, is altered in its sense by the omission of a most important part of the sentence. | What we did say was, 'But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossi ble.' Place that 'assurance,' as contained in our letter, in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it.

"Again, professing to quote our language, you say: Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders,' &c. We expressed no such opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which you have quoted was applied solely and entirely to our assurances obtained here, and based, as you well know, upon your own declaration--a declaration which, at that time, it was impossible for the authorities of South Carolina to have known. But, without following this letter into all its details, we propose only to meet the chief points of the argument.

"Some weeks ago the State of South Carolina de

"In reference to the declaration with which your reply commences, that your position as President of the United States was already defined in the message to Congress of the 2d instant;' that you possess no power to change the relations heretofore existing between South Carolina and the United States,' 'much less to acknowledge the independence of that State,' and that consequently you could meet us only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an entire willingness to communicate to Congress any proposition we might have to make-clared her intention, in the existing condition of pubwe deem it only necessary to say that the State of South Carolina having, in the exercise of that great right of self-government which underlies all our political organizations, declared herself sovereign and independent, we, as her representatives, felt no special solicitude as to the character in which you might recognize us. Satisfied that the State had simply exercised her unquestionable right, we were prepared, in order to reach substantial good, to waive the formal considerations which your constitutional scruples might have prevented you from extending. We came here, therefore, expecting to be received as you did receive us, and perfectly content with that entire willingness, of which you assured us, to submit any proposition to Congress which we might have to make upon the subject of the independence of the State. The willingness was ample recognition of the condition of public affairs, which rendered our presence necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty both to the State which we represent, and to ourselves, to correct several important misconceptions of our letter, into which you have fallen. "You say:

lic affairs, to secede from the United States. She
called a Convention of her people to put her decla-
ration in force. The Convention met and passed
the Ordinance of Secession. All this you antici-
pated, and your course of action was thoroughly
considered in your Annual Message. You de-
clared you had no right, and would not attempt,
to coerce a Seceding State, but that you were
bound by your constitutional oath, and would de-
fend the property of the United States within the
borders of South Carolina if
The Commissioners
Rejoinder.

It was my earnest desire that such

an attempt was made to take it
by force. Seeing very early
that this question of property was a difficult and
delicate one, you manifested a desire to settle it
without collision. You did not reinforce the garri-
son in the harbor of Charleston. You removed a
distinguished and veteran officer from the command
of Fort Moultrie because he attempted to increase
his supply of ammunition. You refused to send ad-
ditional troops to the same garrison when applied
for by the officers appointed to succeed him. You
accepted the resignation of the oldest and most emi.
nent member of your Cabinet, rather than allow the

The Commissioners'
Rejoinder.

THE COMMISSIONERS' REJOINDER.

[ocr errors]

re

147

The Commissioners'
Rejoinder.

garrison to be strengthened. | lated the pledged faith of the You compelled an officer, sta- Government, and that unless the tioned at Fort Sumter, to return pledge was instantly redeemed, immediately to the arsenal forty muskets which he he was dishonered, denial was impossible; you had taken to arm his men. You expressed not to one, did not deny it. You do not deny it now, but you but to many, of the most distinguished of our public seem to escape from its obligation on the grounds, characters, whose testimony will be placed upon the first, that we terminated all negotiation by demandrecord whenever it is necessary, your anxiety for a ing, as a preliminary, the withdrawal of the United peaceful termination of this controversy, and your States troops from the harbor of Charleston; and, willingness not to disturb the military status of the second, that the authorities of South Carolina, inforts, if Commissioners should be sent to the Gov- stead of asking explanation, and giving you the opernment, whose communications you promised to portunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of submit to Congress. You received and acted on as- other property of the United States. We will exsurances from the highest official authorities of amine both. South Carolina, that no attempt would be made to disturb your possession of the forts and property of the United States, if you would not disturb their existing condition until the Commissioners had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had failed. You took from the members of the House of Representatives a written memorandum that no such attempt should be made, 'provided that no inforcements should be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present.' And, although you attach no force to the acceptance of such a paper-although you considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen'-as an obligation on one side, without corresponding obligation on the other-it must be remembered (if we were rightly informed) that you were pledged, if you ever did send reinforcements, to return it to those from whom you had received it, before you executed your resolution. You sent orders to your officers, commanding them strictly to follow a line of conduct in conformity with such an understanding. Besides all this, you had received formal and official notice from the Governor of South Carolina that we had been appointed Commissioners, and were on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition under which we came; our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointed for an interview. We arrived at Washington on Wednesday, at 3 o'clock, and you appointed an interview with us at 1 the next day. Early on that day, (Thursday,) the news was received here of the movement of Major Anderson. That news was communicated to you immediately, and you postponed our meeting until 24 o'clock on Friday, in order that you might consult your Cabinet. On Friday we saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem your pledge. You could not deny it. With the facts we have stated, and in the face of the crowning and conclusive fact that your Secretary of War had resigned his seat in the Cabinet, upon the publicly avowed ground that the action of Major Anderson had vio

"In the first place, we deny positively that we have ever in any way made any such demand. Our letter is in your possession; it will stand by this on record. In it we informed you of the objects of our mission. We say that it would have been our duty to have assured you of our readiness to commence negotiations, with the most earnest and anxious desire to settle all questions between us amicably and to our mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assurance impossible. We stated the events, and we said that until some satisfactory explanation of these events was given us, we could not proceed; and then, having made this request for explanation, we added: And in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible," &c. 'Under present circumstances!' What circumstances? Why, clearly, the occupation of Fort Sumter and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson, in the face of your pledges and without explanation or practical disavowal. And there is nothing in the letter which would, or could, have prevented you from declining to withdraw the troops, and offering the restoration of the status to which you were pledged, if such has been your desire; it would have been wiser and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and this opinion we urged upon you, but we demanded nothing but such an explanation of the events of the last twenty-four hours as would restore our confidence in the spirit with which the negotiations should be conducted. In relation to this withdrawal of the troops from the harbor, we are compelled, however, to notice one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say: 'This I cannot do. This I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being.'

"In reply to this statement, we are compelled to

The Commissioners'

Rejoinder.

The Commissioners'
Rejoinder.

say, that your conversation with | but for the efforts of those who us left upon our minds the dis- put their trust in your honor. tinct impression that you did Believing that they were threatseriously contemplate the withdrawal of the troops ened by Fort Sumter especially, the people were with from Charleston harbor. And in support of this im- difficulty restrained from securing, without blood, pression, we would add, that we have the positive as- the possession of this important fortress. After many surance of gentlemen of the highest possible public and reiterated assurances, given on your behalf, reputation and the most unsullied integrity-men which we cannot believe unauthorized, they deterwhose name and fame, secured by long service and mined to forbear, and in good faith sent on their patriotic achievements, place their testimony be- Commissioners to negotiate with you. They meant yond cavil-that such suggestions had been made you no harm-wished you no ill. They thought of to and urged upon you by them, and had formed you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as the subject of more than one earnest discussion far as was consistent with duty, to spare you unwith you. And it was this knowledge that induced necessary and hostile collision. Scarcely had these us to urge upon you a policy, which had to recom- Commissioners left than Major Anderson waged mend it its own wisdom and the might of such war. No other words will describe his action. It authority. As to the second point, that the authorwas not a peaceful change from one fort to another; ities of South Carolina, instead of asking explana- it was a hostile act in the highest sense, and only tions, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate justified in the presence of a superior enemy, and yourself, took possession of other property of the in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, United States, we would observe:-1. That even if spiked his guns, burned his gun-carriagss, made this were so, it does not avail you for defence, for preparations for the destruction of his post, and the opportunity for decision was afforded you be- withdrew, under cover of the night, to a safer pofore these facts occurred. We arrived in Washing- sition. This was war. No man could have believed ton on Wednesday; the news from Major Anderson (without your assurance,) that any officer could reached here early on Thursday, and was imme- have taken such a step, 'not only without orders, diately communicated to you. All that day men of but against orders.' What the State did was in the highest consideration-men who had striven simple self-defence; for this act, with all its attendsuccessfully to lift you to your great office-who ing circumstances, was as much war as firing a had been your tried and true friends through the volley; and war being thus begun, until those troubles of your administration, sought you and en- commencing it explained their action and disavowed treated you to act-to act at once. They told you their intention, there was no room for delay; and that every hour complicated your position. They even at this moment, while we are writing, it is more only asked you to give the assurance that if the than probable, from the tenor of your letter, that facts were so that if the commander had acted reinforcements are hurrying on to the conflict, so without and against your orders, and in violation that when the first gun shall be fired, there will of your pledges-that you would restore the status have been on your part one continuous, consistent you had pledged your honor to maintain. You re- series of actions, commencing in a demonstration fused to decide. Your Secretary at War, your im- essentially warlike, supported by regular reinforcemediate and proper adviser in this whole matter, ments and terminating in defeat or victory. And all waited anxiously for your decision, until he felt that this without the slightest provocation; for, among delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve the many things which you have said, there is one hours passed, and two Cabinet meetings had ad- thing you cannot say you have waited anxiously journed, before you knew what the authorities of for news from the seat of war, in hopes that delay South Carolina had done; and your prompt decision would furnish some excuse for this precipitation. at any moment of that time would have avoided But this tangible evidence of a design to proceed the subsequent complications. But, if you had to a hostile act, on the part of the authorities of known the acts of the authorities of South Carolina, South Carolina,' which is the only justification of should that have prevented your keeping your Major Anderson you are forced to admit, has not faith? What was the condition of things? For the yet been alleged.' But you have decided, you have last sixty days you have had in Charleston harbor resolved to hold, by force, what you have obtained not force enough to hold the forts against an equal through our misplaced confidence; and by refusing enemy. Two of them were empty-one of those to disavow the action of Major Anderson, have contwo the most important in the harbor. It could verted his violation of orders into a legitimate act of have been taken at any time. You ought to know your executive authority. Be the issue what it better than any man that it would have been taken, may, of this we are assured, that, if Fort Moultrie

PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS.

149

The Commissioners'
Rejoinder.

has been recorded in history as a memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumter will live upon the succeeding page as an imperishable testimony of Carolina faith.

"By your course, you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of South Carolina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is the God of Justice as well as the God of Hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her hopefully, bravely, and thoroughly.

"Our mission being one for negotiation and peace,

[merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

and your note leaving us without hope of a with-uary 5th. It was regarded as equivalent to

[blocks in formation]

an opening of hostilities, and every hour was expected to bring news of an assault on Sumter. In view of such an event, the steamer Star of the West departed, secretly, from New York harbor on the evening of Saturday, January 5th, with a heavy store of provisions and 200 troops for Major Anderson, composed of men of tried patriotism and efficiency. The President, under the influence of the loyalty and vigor infused into his counsels by the new members of the Cabinet,

"To His Excellency, the President of the United seemed, for the moment, to awaken to his States."

full duty.

[blocks in formation]

In the Senate, Monday, December 31st, Mr. | inform the Senate what disposition had been Powell, from the Special Committe of Thirteen, reported that it had not been able to agree upon any general plan of adjustment. Mr. Crittenden then asked that some day be set apart for the consideration of the joint resolution offered by him. The resolution was, thereupon, made the special order for Wednesday, when Mr. Douglas would have the floor. Mr. Wilson, (Republican) of Massachusetts, introduced a resolution of inquiry, that the Secretary of War be requested to

made of the arms made at the National Armories, if any had been sold, and, if so, at what prices and to whom, what number there were in the arsenals, and how they were protected. This was immediately objected to by Southern members, and was laid over under the rules. Mr. Benjamin, of Louisiana, having the floor, addressed the Senate on the state of the country. The audience was unusually large, and the interest manifested was intense, owing not more to the Senator's ability as a

speaker, than to the position which he was to assume, of an open advocacy of the secession programme. Hitherto Mr. Benjamin had been regarded as eminently conservative, and opposed to disunion; but the growing sentiment of his State for secession, and the futility of compromise, had impelled him to accept the Southern view, and to become its advocate. His speech would define the course of the "Conservatives," and, for that reason, commanded unusual consideration.

Mr. Benjamin commenced Benjamin's Speech. by referring to a speech made by him four years previously, in which he declared that the aggressions of the North would force the South to throw the sword in the balance. The prophecy was now fact. How will the country and Congress meet the issue? South Carolina, exercising her inalienable rights, had dissolved her relations with the Union. Mississippi would follow next week; then Alabama and Florida; a week after, Georgia; a little later, Louisiana; and, soon after her, Arkansas. What then shall be done? Shall South Carolina be acknowledged a free and independent State, or shall she be coerced by force? Mr. Benjamin proceeded to quote from Mr. Webster's speech in the Rhode Island case, to show that the Great Expounder of the Constitution considered a Convention of Delegates, duly elected and assembled, had full power to act on the question of Union, or secession from the Union. He also quoted from Mr. Madison's works, to prove that he held the same view. He read from the debate of the Convention which formed the Constitution, to show that the members of that Convention refused to make the Senate the judge of, or give the President the power to veto, the action of a State; that they refused to give Congress the power to negative State legislation, and that they specially refused to give any power to coerce States; yet, when the State Convention came to ratify the Constitution, the States were not sufficiently secure. It must be admitted that certain political rights are guaranteed the States. but when these rights are denied where is the remedy? Suppose that South Carolina should send two Senators here, and the majority should refuse to receive but one,

what power can compel that majority to re pair that wrong? Suppose that South Carolina should then withdraw from the Union; who could say it was a violation of the Constitution? Suppose, again, that a wrong is perpetrated which does not appear quite clear to the North but does appear clear to South Carolina-suppose she is denied ac cess to the Territories? Is she without any remedy under the Constitution? If there is none then she must be the judge of the wrong and the mode of redress. He read an extract from an address delivered by John Quincy Adams, in New York, in 1838, in which he said nations themselves must be the sole judge whether compacts are broken, and also saying "that when all fraternal feeling was gone between the States, then it was time to separate in peace and return to their original state." Suppose that South Carolina is wrong in believing that wrong has been done her, still that does not alter the issue whether we shall pern it her to withdraw or force her back. In reply to the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. I'volittle), he claimed that a citizen was bound to obey his State Government. The Republican Senators say that they will not coerce a State, but enforce the laws against individuals. But how can they punish an individual in a State for treason? Where are they to find the judge and jury to do so, when all the citizens in the State think that he has done right? They could not blockade a port without declaring war; they could not embargo one port without closing the other. He claimed that neither Congress nor the President had the power to go into a State with a military force without the intervention of the civil power-some civil process must precede the military force. He argued that they could not collect the revenue by force. Such threats were only a pretext to cover up the real question, which is no other than this: "Shall we acknowledge the independence of a seceding State or reduce her to subjection by war?" Mr. Benja min here read from Vattel to show that the hypocritical keeping of compacts was of no avail, and referred to the case of Rhadamiscus, who promised not to use steel against a captive, yet smothered him. He added: “And you, Senators of the Republican party, you

« PreviousContinue »