head City, and joined General Cox beyond Newbern on the 8th. General Cox had advanced to Wise's Forks, about one and a half miles below Southwest Creek, and the railway was in rapid progress.

The force in front of General Cox, which, from the best information at hand, was supposed to consist of Hoke's division and a small body of reserves, had fallen back behind Southwest Creek, and General Cox had sent two regiments, under Colonel Upham, Fifteenth Connecticut Volunteers, to secure the crossing of the creek on the Dover road. The enemy, having been re-enforced by a portion of the old Confederate Army of Tennessee, recrossed the creek some distance above the Dover road, came down in rear of Colonel Upham's position, and surprised and captured nearly his entire command, numbering about seven hundred men. The enemy then advanced, and endeavored to penetrate between Carter's and Palmer's divisions, respectively occupying the Dover road and the railway, but was checked by Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps, which was just arriving upon the field. There was no further engagement during the day beyond light skirmishing, and the loss on either side, with the exception of the prisoners captured with Colonel Upham, were insignificant.

It being evident that the enemy's force was at least equal to that of General Cox, and that reinforcements were reaching them as rapidly as they could be brought by rail, General Schofield directed General Cox to put his troops in position, intrench them securely, and await the arrival of General Couch.

On the 9th of March, the enemy pressed Schofield's line strongly, and felt for its flanks. Heavy skirmishing was kept up during the day, but no assault was made.

On the 10th, the enemy having been largely re-enforced, and doubtless learning of the approach of General Couch's column, made a heavy attack upon General Cox's left and centre, but was decisively repulsed, and with heavy loss. Both attacks were met mainly by Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps, a portion of which had been rapidly transferred from

the centre to the left to meet the attack there, and then returned to the centre in time to repel the attempt on that portion of the line. The enemy retreated in confusion from the field, leaving his killed and wounded, as well as a large number of arms and intrenching tools, and during the night fell back across the Neuse, and burned the bridge over that river. The loss of Schofield's army in this engagement was about three hundred killed and wounded.

On the 11th, without further opposition, General Couch arrived with his two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, and effected a junction with the forces under General Cox.

Having no pontoon train, Schofield was unable to cross the Neuse until the bridge could be repaired, or the pontoons, which had just arrived from the North, could be brought by railway from Morehead City. The crossing was effected without opposition on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned Kinston, and moved rapidly towards Smithfield to join the force under Johnston, who was then actively engaged in concentrating all his available force to oppose Schofield's advance from Fayetteville.

General Schofield showed equal energy in pushing his advance straight on its destination in spite of obstacles, and skill in resisting the attempt of the enemy to break up his concentration on Kinston. The junction at that place, in the presence of the enemy, though behind the Neuse, of two columns moving simultaneously from Wilmington and Newbern was not only justified but demanded, at once by the lack of transportation for a preparatory concentration at Newbern, and by the necessity for avoiding a moment's delay; but it was an operation of exceeding delicacy, and in the hands of a commander less skilful in his designs, less mature in judgment, less prompt in decision, or less complete in execution, might have produced the most unfavorable results. The manner in which it was accomplished proved the wisdom displayed by the lieutenant-general in the selection of General Schofield for this important command.

CHAPTER XXIX.

TO GOLDSBORO'.

THE 12th, 13th, and 14th of March were passed by Sherman's army at Fayetteville, in totally destroying the United States arsenal and the extensive machinery which had formerly belonged to the old United States armory at Harper's Ferry, and which had been removed thence after the attempted destruction of the works by fire in April, 1861, and used since that time in the manufacture and repair of arms for the Confederate troops. Every building was knocked down and burned, and every piece of machinery utterly broken up and ruined, by the First Regiment Michigan Engineers, under the immediate supervision of Colonel O. M. Poe, chief-engineer of the Military Division. Much valuable property of great use to an enemy was here destroyed, or cast into the river.

Up to this period, Sherman had perfectly succeeded in interposing his superior army between the scattered parts of the enemy. But the fragments that had left Columbia under Beauregard had been re-enforced by Cheatham's corps from the West and the garrison of Augusta, and ample time had been given to move them to Sherman's front and flank about Raleigh. Hardee had also succeeded in getting across Cape Fear River, and could therefore complete the junction with Hoke. These forces, when once united, would constitute an army, probably superior to Sherman's in cavalry and formidable enough in artillery and infantry to justify him in extreme caution in taking the last step necessary to complete the march. Sherman accordingly sent orders to Schofield to move immediately, with all his available force, directly on Goldsboro',

aiming to reach that placé nearly simultaneously with the main army on the 20th of March. While the work of destruction was going on at Fayetteville, two pontoon bridges were laid across Cape Fear River, one opposite the town, the other three miles below it.

General Kilpatrick was ordered to move up the plank-road to and beyond Averysboro'. He was to be followed by four divisions of Slocum's left wing, with as few wagons as possible; the rest of the train, under escort of the two remaining divisions of that wing, to take a shorter and more direct road to Goldsboro'. In like manner, General Howard was ordered to send his trains, under good escort, well to the right, toward Faison's Depot and Goldsboro', and to hold four divisions light, ready to go to the aid of the left wing if attacked while in motion.

The weather continued very bad, and the roads had become a mere quagmire. Almost every foot of them had to be corduroyed to admit the passage of wheels. Still, time was so important, that punctually, according to orders, the columns moved out from Cape Fear River on Wednesday, the 15th of March

General Sherman himself accompanied General Slocum, who, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved up the river or plank-road that day to Kyle's Landing, Kilpatrick skirmishing heavily with the enemy's rear-guard about three miles beyond, near Taylor's Hole Creek. At General Kilpatrick's request, General Slocum sent forward a brigade of infantry to hold a line of barricades.

Next morning, the 16th, the column advanced in the same order, and developed the enemy, with artillery, infantry, and cavalry, in an intrenched position in front of the point where the road branches off towards Goldsboro' through Bentonville.

Hardee, in retreating from Fayetteville, had halted in the narrow swampy neck between Cape Fear and South rivers, in the hope of holding Sherman there, in order to save time for the concentration of Johnston's armies at some point to his rear, such as Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsboro'. Hardee's force