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CHAPTER XVI.

ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE.

ON the 9th of June, his communication in the rear being secure and supplies ample, Sherman moved forward to Big Shanty.

Kenesaw Mountain lay before him, with a high range of hills, covered with chestnut-trees, trending off to the northeast, terminating in another peak, called Brushy Mountain. To the right was a smaller hill, called Pine Mountain, and beyond it, in the distance, Lost Mountain. All these, though links in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in that region. Pine Mountain forms the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountains the base of a triangle, perfectly covering the town of Marietta and the railway, back to the Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal-stations. Hardee's corps held the left of the enemy's line, resting on Lost Mountain, Polk's the centre, and Hood's the right, across the Marietta and Ackworth road. The enemy's line was fully two miles long-more than he had force to hold. General McPherson was ordered to move towards Marietta, his right on the railroad; General Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine Mountains, and General Schofield off towards Lost Mountain: General Garrard's cavalry on the left, General Stoneman's on the right; and General McCook looking to the rear and communications. The depot was at Big Shanty.

By the 11th of June Sherman's lines were close up, and he made dispositions to break the enemy's line between Kenesaw

and Pine Mountains. General Hooker was on its right and front, General Howard on its left and front, and General Palmer between it and the railroad. During a sharp cannonading from General Howard's right and General Hooker's left, Lieutenant-General Polk, of the Confederate army, was killed on the 14th, and Major-General Lovell succeeded to the command of his corps. On the morning of the 15th Pine Mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Generals Thomas and Schofield advanced, and found him again strongly intrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountains. At the same time General McPherson advanced his line, gaining substantial advantage on the left. Pushing the operations on the centre as vigorously as the nature of the ground would permit, Sherman had again ordered an assault on the centre, when, on the 17th, the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain, and the long line of breastworks connecting it with Kenesaw. Our troops continued to press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber, and across most difficult ravines, until, on the 19th, they found him again strongly posted and intrenched, his right wing, composed of Hood's corps, thrown back to cover Marietta, resting on the Marietta and Canton road; the centre on Kenesaw Mountain, held by Loring's corps; and the left, Hardee's corps, across the Lost Mountain and Marietta road, behind Nose's Creek, and covering the railroad back to the Chattahoochee.

From Kenesaw the enemy could look down upon the Union camps, and observe every movement, and his batteries thundered away, but did little harm, on account of the extreme height, the shot and shell passing harmlessly over the heads of the men. During the operations about Kenesaw the rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, rendering the narrow wooded roads mere mud gulleys, so that a general movement would have been impossible; but the men daily worked closer to their intrenched foe, and kept up an incessant picket firing to annoy him.

General McPherson was watching the enemy on Kenesaw and working his left forward; General Thomas swing

ing, as it were, on a grand left wheel, his left on Kenesaw connecting with General McPherson; and General Schofield all the time working to the south and east, along the old Sandtown road. On the 21st, Hood's corps was moved to the left of the Confederate lines, and his former position on the right filled by Wheeler's cavalry. On the 22d, General Hooker had advanced his line, with General Schofield on his right, when Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions of Hood's corps suddenly sallied forth, attacked Williams' division of Hooker's corps and a brigade of Hascall's division of General Schofield's army, and drove in their skirmish lines, but on reaching the line of battle received a terrible repulse and fell back, leaving dead, wounded, and many prisoners in our hands. Upon studying the ground, Sherman now considered that he had no alternative but to assault the enemy's lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers; and he perceived that the enemy, as well as his own officers, had settled down into a conviction that he would not assault fortified lines. All expected him to "outflank." An army, to be efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. Desiring, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind breastworks, Sherman resolved to attempt it on the left centre; reflecting that if he could thrust a strong head of column through at that point, by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and a half miles, it would reach the railway below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right and centre from its line of retreat, and then, by turning on either fragment, that fraction could be overwhelmed and destroyed. On the 24th of June, he ordered that an assault should be made at two points south of Kenesaw on the 27th, one near Little Kenesaw by McPherson, and the other about a mile further south by Thomas. On the 27th of June, the two assaults were made exactly at the time and in the manner prescribed in Sherman's orders, and both failed, costing us many valuable lives, among them those of Generals Harker and McCook-Colonel Rice, and others badly wounded; our

aggregate loss being nearly three thousand, while we inflicted comparatively little loss to the enemy, behind his well-formed breastworks. The losses in Hardee's and Loring's corps, by which the brunt of the assault was sustained, are reported by General Johnston at about five hundred and forty. In his official report, Sherman says: "Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly; and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them."

On the 1st of July, Sherman ordered General McPherson to be relieved by General Garrard's cavalry in front of Kenesaw, and rapidly to throw his whole army by the right to threaten Nickajack Creek and Turner's Ferry across the Chattahoochee; and he also pushed Stoneman's cavalry to the river below Turner's. General McPherson commenced his movement on the night of July 2d, and, at the same moment, Johnston, finding his left turned, and in danger of being cut off from Atlanta, abandoned his strong position at Kenesaw Mountain, and fell back to Smyrna Church, five miles from Marietta. The next morning General Thomas' whole line was moved forward to the railway, and turned south in pursuit towards the Chattahoochee. General Logan's corps, of General McPherson's army, was ordered back into Marietta by the main road, and General McPherson and General Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack and attack the enemy in flank and rear, and, if possible, to catch him in the confusion of crossing the Chattahoochee; but Johnston had covered his movement too well, by a strong tête-du-pont at the Chattahoochee and an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna Church, to admit of this.

Leaving a garrison in Marietta, and ordering General Logan to join his own army near the mouth of Nickajack, Sherman overtook General Thomas at Smyrna. On the 4th of July, Thomas pushed a strong skirmish line down the main road, capturing the entire line of the enemy's pits, and made strong

demonstrations along Nickajack Creek and about Turner's Ferry. This had the desired effect, and during the night Johnston fell back to the Chattahoochee, covering the crossings from Turner's Ferry to the railway bridge, and sending Wheeler's and Jackson's cavalry to the left bank to observe the river for twenty miles above and below. The next morning, Sherman advanced to the Chattahoochee, General Thomas' left flank resting on it near Price's Ferry, General McPherson's right at the mouth of the Nickajack, and General Schofield in reserve. Heavy skirmishing along the whole front, during the 5th, demonstrated the strength of the enemy's position, which could alone be turned by crossing the main Chattahoochee River, a rapid and deep stream, only passable at that stage of water by means of bridges, except at one or two very difficult fords.

Conceiving that this would be more easy of execution before the enemy had made more thorough preparation or regained full confidence, Sherman ordered General Schofield to cross from his position on the Sandtown road to Smyrna camp ground, and next to the Chattahoochee, near the mouth of Soap's Creek, and effect a lodgment on the east bank. This was most successfully and skilfully accomplished on the 7th of July, General Schofield capturing a gun, completely surprising the guard, laying a good pontoon bridge and a trestle bridge, and effecting a strong lodgment on high and commanding ground, with good roads leading to the east. At the same time, General Garrard, with his cavalry division, moved rapidly on Roswell, and destroyed the cloth factories which had supplied the rebel armies. General Garrard was then ordered to secure the shallow ford at Roswell, and hold it until he could be relieved by infantry; and, as Sherman contemplated transferring the Army of the Tennessee from the extreme right to the left, he ordered General Thomas to send a division of his infantry that was nearest to Roswell to hold the ford until General McPherson could send a corps from the neighborhood of Nickajack. General Newton's division was sent, and held the ford until the arrival of General Dodge's

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