ever there are objects of great importance to de- the introduction of steam into ships of war, the fend, (large cities and Navy yards for instance,) first notice of a declaration of war might be the such as would invite an attack in great force, that appearance of a hostile fleet of steamers, which, our batteries should be so placed, when practicable, taking our forts by surprise, would pass rapidly by that no part of the waters on which these objects them and appear before our cities ready for destrucare situated and in which an enemy's fleet may tion and pillage. And how shall we guard against anchor, should be out of reach of our shot and shells. this saine operation by naval means? Only by This facility, then, of running by our batteries is keeping this immense defensive fleet constantly of little consequence, if a position of ultimate secu- stationed at the mouth of the river, in peace or rity cannot be attained. war, always ready and always in position even.

If, after forcing the entrance of a harbor, the enemy finds himself when inside, wherever he may seek for safety, equally exposed to cannonade; instead of attempting to destroy cities, or levy contributions, he will probably think it a piece of good luck if he can make his way out without leaving half his vessels behind him. Under such circumstances he will probably not make the attempt to enter at all.

I have supposed that there was but one mouth of the river to defend; but would it not be necessary to station a force superior to the enemy's at each of the large passes? Suppose, for instance, that the enemy came with 20 ships and we had but 10 at the South-west pass and 10 at the Northeast, (or an equivalent in steam-batteries,) might he not by detaching 2 or 3 of his ships to threaten an attack upon one pass concentrate the rest upon But there are cases where our cities are situated our defences at the other, with the chances, by his some distance up navigable rivers, or on bays or superiority at that point, of overpowering them and harbors of great extent, to which this principle forcing his way up the river? We should be comwould not be fully applicable. In these cases, al-pelled then to provide each pass with a force supethough it may not be possible to provide batteries rior to the enemy's, or to abandon the passes and in sufficient numbers or in such positions as to com- station our Naval defences above their point of dimand all the space in which an enemy's fleet might vision. Rather than resort to either of these exanchor, it is always possible to arrange them in the pensive and unsatisfactory means, it would be better immediate vicinity of the city, naval depot, or at once to abandon the mouth of the river and its whatever they are designed to protect, so as to pre-course up as far as Forts Jackson and St. Philip, vent such a fleet from taking a position within cannonading distance. Having succeeded then in entering our harbor, he could effect nothing further without resorting to a land attack, and in compelling him to do this we have effected a great object, since the operation of disembarking troops and artillery requires considerable time, sufficient probably to enable us to muster our means of land defence. New Orleans is one of the cases I have alluded to above, and I will now consider the particular means requisite for her defence from an attack by the Mississippi; and in the first place, it would evidently be desirable to exclude an enemy entirely from the river; or if this cannot be done, to arrest him at the lowest practicable point.

(the lowest point at which batteries are practicable.) The occupation of this portion of the river, by the enemy, would not be attended with serious danger to New Orleans; and if, as we always ought, we preserved the Naval superiority in the gulf, he would not like to trust himself in this portion of the river long, since we could soon concentrate a superior force at the mouth, and thus place him between our own fleet on one side and our forts on the other.

Forts Jackson and St. Philip, situated opposite to each other at the lowest point at which permanent defences are practicable, are the principal defences upon which we rely to prevent the passage of an enemy's fleet to New Orleans. These forts, well situated, secure against a land attack and containing a heavy armament, may be considered as competent to contend with any fleet which even the British Navy could bring against New Orleans. But it is urged that a fleet of steam-vessels, capa

The nature of the banks of the river is such that it is impossible to erect batteries at the mouth; we are therefore compelled to abandon a portion of the river, or to resort to the expedient of providing a fleet of ships, or steam-vessels, superior to the ene-ble of running 10 miles an hour against the current, my's anticipated force, or an equivalent of floating taking advantage of fogs or darkness, and willing batteries. to risk losing a few of its number, would easily run by.-The remedy I have alluded to of commanding the whole space he would have to pass over to reach the object of his attack is evidently

But what limit shall we fix to the effort which a great Naval power, (Great Britain for instance,) might make against the wealthy city of New Orleans-the key of the great valley of the Missis-impracticable here; we could not cover the banks sippi? Shall we say 20, 30, 50, 60 or 100 vessels as the maximum she might bring to the attack, and shall we provide an equivalent fleet to be constantly stationed at the mouth of the river? It has been urged as an objection to fortifications, that since

of the river from forts Jackson to New Orleans, (a distance of 75 miles,) with batteries. But are there no means of preventing this rapid passage? of retaining him under the fire of our batteries long enough to take away his disposition to proceed

further? The means proposed by the Board of En-Orleans and our Gulf frontier, but of the immense gineers as a part of their system of defence in such commerce whose sole channel is the Gulf-Stream; cases are simple, efficacious and not at all costly. They consist simply in stretching across the river, from fort to fort, one or two chains of heavy, very heavy timber rafts, united by strong iron cables and retained in position by anchors up and down the stream. There seems no doubt whatever of the adequacy of this arrangement to effect the object intended.

and incidental to this, the fortification of Key West and the Tortugas, and the establishment at these points of depots of coal and other supplies for our steam and sailing-vessels, of an efficient yard of Naval construction at Pensacola, and of a Naval yard and depot, for steam-vessels, at Memphis, or some other point on the Mississippi.

The occupation of Key West and the Tortugas is highly important, not only from their great relative importance to us as depots of supplies for our fleets and as harbors of refuge for our merchant vessels, but it would be important, even if we never expected one of our own vessels to enter these harbors; since, situated as they are by the wayside of the only path through the Gulf, they would

Let a fleet arrive at whatever hour it might, it would find its passage obstructed by these rafts, and to attempt to force a passage, would be to expose itself to the concentrated fire of both the forts almost within point blank range. This is all we want, and to a contest of this kind we would invite any fleet that could be fitted out against us. These rafts can easily be arranged to allow the unquestionably, if undefended, be occupied by the passage of our own vessels.

enemy, by whom our commerce would be almost entirely cut off, and our Gulf frontier kept in perpetual alarm.

If, with these obstacles to overcome, it is still feared that a passage might be effected, batteries, such as I have already alluded to, about New Or- Having a large Naval force in the Gulf, it is not leans, in such positions as to prevent a hostile fleet at all likely that an enemy could fit out an expedifrom taking any position sufficiently near to bom- tion against New Orleans from any of the West bard the city might be constructed. It would take India Islands, of the magnitude which such an but a short time to construct them after the break-effort would require, without our receiving timely ing out of a war.

Considering also the immense inducements which New Orleans holds forth to the attacks of an enemy, it might even be prudent to establish a second line of defences similar to that at Forts Jackson and St. Philip at the English turn.

notice of it, and even if we suppose such an expedition to sail from the Bermudas, or Halifax, direct for New Orleans-as one steam-vessel would watch the entrance of the Gulf, they would probably be able to send intelligence of the appearance of such an expedition before it could arrive itself, and for still greater certainty, a few small, but fast running steamers might be stationed permanently at the mouth of the river to give intelligence to our forts and to the city of the appearance of a hostile expedition.

After the lesson given by the disastrous attack on New Orleans in 1815, it is hardly to be expected that an enemy will again attempt an invasion by the approaches from Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain, or by the similar approaches on the Western side of the river; particularly as circum- Armed steam-vessels of light draught would also stances which then highly favored such an attack be of high utility for the defence of Lake Borgnehave since undergone great changes. The West- of the anchorage behind the Chandeleur Islands, ern country, then but thinly inhabited and possess- and of our coasting trade with Mobile; and they ing no other communication with New Orleans than would be of peculiar value in preventing a repetithat of keel boats propelled by the current, has tion of such an attempt upon the city as was made since been filled with a hardy population, which, at during the last war. In illustration of this it need a few days notice, our fast running steamboats only be stated that an enemy's fleet could not apcould bring down in numbers sufficient to over-proach nearer the head of Lake Borgne than Cat, whelm any invader approaching by land. The or Ship Island, the former 25, and the latter 40 important passes of the Rigolets, Chef Menteur, miles distant, (Ship Island was the anchorage of Bayous Bienvenu and Dupré, and the Grand Pass the British fleet,) and any further approach must into Barataria Bay, then almost entirely undefend-be by boats, or small vessels prepared for the pured, have since been strongly fortified.

But, it will be asked, will steam-vessels, or steambatteries, take no part whatever in this system of defence? As a principal means of defence, I have endeavored to show, that it is not expedient, or even practicable, to rely on them, but as an auxiliary they will no doubt be found highly useful.

And in the first place, a strong force of steam and sailing-vessels in the Gulf I consider an essential element, not only to the protection of New

pose and not drawing more than 6 feet of water.
A boat expedition of this kind could not be at-
tempted if the lake was guarded by a number of
light armed steamers. The destruction of the small
fleet of gun boats provided for the Lake defence
was the first step taken by the British in 1815,
without which, even at that time, their expedition
was judged impracticable. Such a step could not
be taken in the present state of things, since our
steamers, if attacked by superior force, could re-

tire under the guns of Forts Wood and Pike, Bat- with us. To the fortifications which then existed tery Bienvenu, or Tower Dupré. however, (weak though they were and commanding more respect than they deserved,) we probably owe the safety of our large cities.

To conceive more fully the influence of such a force of steamers upon an attack from this quarter, let us imagine what would have been the consequence, had we, after the battle of New Orleans, possessed our three or four gun boats which the British had previously destroyed. The remnant of the British army, worn out by the fatigue of a night march down the banks of the Bayou-by cold and hunger, were compelled to regain their fleet, to make a voyage of 40 miles in open boats and in tempestuous weather. With 3 or 4 gun boats would not this Army have been almost at our mercy and had any considerable portion of it reached the ships in safety, the enemy would have had reason to consider it as the only piece of good luck which attended him in this unfortunate expedition.

For such auxiliary aid steam-vessels will undoubtedly be of high utility; that it is not expedient or practicable to make them the principal means of defence, it has been the object of this paper to prove.

But should another war occur with her we must be prepared to meet her in a different manner; and if we would not see our rich cities burnt and pillaged, our Navy yards destroyed and an enemy's flag floating in all our harbors, we must furnish them with defence adequate to the efforts which will not fail to be made against them.

WEEP FOR THE BEAUTIFUL.

BY E. B. HALE.

O weep for her whose life so quickly run;
Weep for the beautiful whose days are o'er;
Gone e'er the bud its blossoming had done,

Withered in silence to revive no more!
Death mark'd her for his own, and e'er the years
Sat heavy on her brow-or th' mantling blush
Had faded from her cheek-or trickling tears,
In silent flow, had damp'd the first warm gush
Of womanhood, her gentle spirit fled.

If there are any who still retain the idea, (a very common one,) that our cities and harbors can be adequately defended by the cruising of a fleet at sea, I will add a few words more on this subject. I have endeavored to show, that even for the de- O let us weep for her, who slumbers with the dead! fence by Naval means of the different passes of the Mississippi, distinct defensive armaments are necessary; how much more for the defence of wealthy cities situated at from 100 to 2,000 miles distant from each other.

This idea supposes that our harbors are entirely unfortified; under such circumstances, a few hours would be sufficient for 2 or 3 steam-ships to set on fire, or dictate terms to any of our large cities.

Let us suppose that a fleet of 20 or more vessels, (part, or all steam-ships,) sets out from the Bermudas to attack New York, and that by good luck our own fleet, of equal, or greater force, suceeeds in intercepting them. While the enemy still feigns an intention on New York, and thus keeps our fleet occupied in her defence, may not the enemy detach 2 or 3 steam-ships to Boston, or Philadelphia, and lay them under contribution? Or a still more effectual way would be, for the enemy to divide his fleet into small squadrons and threaten many points at once; while some might be intercepted, the greater number would undoubtedly attain their object. But such a mode of defence supposes that our Naval means are, at least, on something like equality with those of a supposed enemy. That this is not the case now, nor likely to be the case in any limited number of years, should Great Britain or France be that enemy, is obvious to every one.

During the last war the Navy of Great Britain had abundant occupation nearer home, and she

She is not dead. O no, she could not die!

Tho' cold her brow, and wan her pallid cheek, Tho' dimm'd and clos'd, th' soft expressive eye,

And seal'd the lips no more on Earth to speak. Weep not for her; let not the tear-drop flow;

The winding sheet but wraps her senseless clay,
The breathing tenement she left below,

And sped exulting to eternal day!
Then why, ah! why, these bursting streamlets shed,
She lives in Heaven now, Oh! no, she is not dead.

Yes, she is dead. That gentle voice no more
Will come as music to the list'ning ear;
Those blessed, blessed hours of joy are o'er,
To memory now, so sweetly, sadly dear!
The gentle wooing of her love-lit eye,-

The sunny smile-the voice-the mute caress-
And have they gone! How could she die,

And leave me thus, in grief and loneliness?
Yes, she has gone, I feel it, let me go

And weep these gushing tears, that will not cease to flow!

But no, she is not dead. I see her stand,

Close by the golden gate; how Heav'nly fair!
Cloth'd in the radiance of the spirit land.
Bright as the Seraphim that mingle there!
She will not leave me long-no, she will come,
And visit me in dreams, and by the way;
And woo my spirit to her Heav'nly home,
When life with all its grief, has pass'd away!
Ah! then, my soul, upon that happier shore,

could engage but a very small part in her warfare 'I know, I know we'll meet, thenceforth to part no more!

never thought to find the word stone-dead in legiti- | Yet 'Courage Fidelity'—' Love,' (they say,)
mate poetry.
Bear Man as on wings to his skies away.

The same, perhaps unconscious, imitation of
Shelley may be found in many other pieces, such as

and Byron's Newfoundland dog, "Boatswain," is there is much of affectation and interjections in it,