Chap. VIII. Saxe Weimar, Sweden, Switzerland, Tuscany, Wurtemburg, Anhalt Dessau, Modena, New Granada, and Uruguay.

"The great exigency in our affairs will have passed away—for preservation or destruction of the American Union-before we could bring all these nations to unanimity on the subject, as you have submitted to M. Thouvenel. It is no time for propagandism, but for energetic action to arrest the worst of all national calamities. We therefore expect you now to renew the proposition in the form originally prescribed. But in doing this you will neither unnecessarily raise a question about the character in which this Government acts (being exclusive Sovereign), nor, on the other hand, in any way compromise that character in any degree. Whenever such a question occurs to hinder you, let it come up from the other party in the negotiation. It will be time then to stop and wait for such further instructions as the new exigency may require."

Mr. Dayton's view of the transaction in which he was engaged appears, after this copious explanation, to have been exactly the same as before. On the 5th of August we find him writing to Mr. Adams :

"You say you do not comprehend the drift of the last paragraph in Lord John's reply. I think I do, at least in part, and I shall not be surprised if the meaning, which he has purposely wrapped up in that general language, should in the end break off all negotiation. He may not refer to this language again, but unless you ask its meaning before the Treaty is negotiated, it will be used by them afterwards as an excuse for not carrying it into effect as respects the insurrectionists of the South. The paragraph states, the engagement of Great Britain will be prospective, and will not invalidate anything already done.' The comment after the Treaty, predicated upon this language, will be: We had declared before the Treaty that the Southern insurrectionists were a belligerent party, aud entitled to belligerent rights (among which is the right to issue letters of marque), and the Treaty was to be prospective only, and not to invalidate anything already done. That, in other words, it does not bind your disloyal citizens, recognized by us as a belligerent party.' I long ago wrote Mr. Seward that these Powers would, in my judgment, either refuse to negotiate, or, if they did negotiate, it would be with the understanding that it secured us no rights not already conceded, and charged them with no duties not heretofore acknowledged. It is advisable that we raise no question in advance in reference to this matter, but it is necessary that we know what they mean as we go along."

It is clear that the two European Powers, had they simply acceded to the Convention, as they were asked

to do, would have been pinned to an engagement which Chap. VIII. the American Government was prepared to construe in a sense very different from that wherein they naturally regarded it; and that this discrepancy was perfectly understood by the American negotiators, by whom the Convention was drawn, and by whom it was proposed. Understanding this, the envoys were instructed not to raise the question themselves, but to let it, if raised at all, come from the other side; and they appear to have obeyed their instructions. The French and English Governments, however, would have been gifted with little penetration had they not perceived the danger to which they were asked to expose themselves. They saw plainly that they had to choose between two courseseither to refuse to sign the Convention, or to declare plainly at the time of signing in what sense they apprehended it. They chose the latter alternative. "My anticipations," wrote Mr. Dayton, on the 22nd August, "are fully realized. Both Lord John Russell and M. Thouvenel refuse to negotiate for an accession by the United States to the Treaty of Paris of 1856, except on the distinct understanding that it is to have no bearing directly or indirectly on the question of our Southern or domestic difficulty; and to render the matter certain, they each propose to make a written Declaration, simultaneous with the execution of the Convention, of which I herewith send you a copy and translation."

The proposed Declarations were as follows:

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British Declaration.

1

In affixing his signature to the Convention of this day, between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares, by order of Her Majesty, that Her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing direct or indirect on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States."

Chap. VIII.

(Translation.)

French Declaration.

"In affixing his signature to the Convention concluded this day between France and the United States, the Undersigned declares, in execution of the orders of the Emperor, that the Government of His Majesty does not intend to undertake by the said Convention any engagement of a nature to implicate it directly or indirectly in the internal conflict now existing in the United States."

The Government of the United States refused to accept these Declarations, and the whole negotiation fell to the ground, and was never renewed.1 Lord Russell, however, on the 20th December, wrote to Lord Lyons: "You may speak to Mr. Seward about letters of marque. Should Great Britain and the

1 The despatches in which ench Government explained and vindicated its own course are:

United States to Great Britain-Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, 23rd August, 1861.

United States to France-Mr. Dayton to M. Thouvenel, 26th August, 1861; Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton, 10th September, 1861.

Great Britain to United States-Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, 28th August, 1861.

France to United States-M. Thouvenel to Mr. Dayton, 9th September,

1861.

"The acceptance of such an explanation from one party," wrote Mr. Adams to Lord Russell, on the 23rd August, "would justify the idea that some advantage is, or may be suspected to be, intended to be taken by the other. The natural effect of such an accompaniment would seem to be to imply that the Government of the United States might be desirous at this time to take a part in the Declaration [of 1856], not from any high purpose or durable policy, but with the view of securing some small temporary object in the unhappy struggle which is going on at home. Such an inference would spoil all the value that might be attached to the act itself. The mere toleration of it would seem to be equivalent to a confession of their own weakness. Rather than that such a record should be made, it were a thousand times better that the Declaration remain unsigned for ever."

Mr. Dayton wrote to M. Thouvenel in a like strain, yet with an evident sense of relief at the turn which affairs had taken. It might have been supposed that the refusal of the explanation, rather than the acceptance of it, was calculated to suggest the inference which Mr. Adans repudiated so indignantly.

United States ever unhappily be at war with one Chap. VIII. another, Her Majesty will be ready to relinquish her prerogative and abolish privateering as between the two nations, provided the President would be ready to make a similar engagement on the part of the United States."1

I refrain from any comment on this negotiation. No Southern privateer, I believe, ever entered any port of Great Britain or France, or of their respective dependencies. The Congress of the United States passed, on the 3rd March, 1863, an Act authorizing the President, in any foreign or domestic war, to issue letters of marque, and make rules for the conduct of privateers and disposal of their prizes. But this Act, the operation of which was limited to three years, appears never to have been put in force.

The history of an unofficial application made to the Confederate States on the same subject is told in the two following despatches. It will be seen that the channel of communication was a private person, instructed by the British and French Consuls at Charleston, who had been themselves instructed by the Ministers of their respective Governments at Washington:

Sir,

Lord Lyons to Consul Bunch.

"Washington, July 5, 1861. "The course of events having invested the States assuming the title of the Confederate States of America with the character of belligerents, it has become necessary for Her Majesty's Government to obtain from the existing Government in those States securities concerning the proper treatment of neutrals.

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"I am authorized by Lord John Russell to confide the negotiation on this matter to you; and I have great satisfaction in doing so. In order to make you acquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government, I transmit to you a duplicate of a despatch to me in which they are fully stated.

1 Earl Russell to Lord Lyons, 20th December, 1861.

Chap. VIII.

"It is essential, under present circumstances, that you should act with great caution, in order to avoid raising the question of the recognition of the new Confederation by Great Britain. On this account, I think it unadvisable that you should go to Richmond, or place yourself in direct communication with the Central Authority which is established there.

"The most convenient course will, probably, be for you to take advantage of the intercourse which you naturally hold with Mr. Pickens, the Governor of the State of South Carolina. I cannot doubt that if you explain, verbally, to Mr. Pickens the views of Her Majesty's Government, he will have no difficulty in inducing the Government at Richmond to recognize, by an official act, the rights secured to neutrals by the second and third Articles of the Declaration of Paris, and to admit its own responsibility for the acts of privateers sailing under its letters of marque.

"The most perfect accord on this question exists between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Emperor of the French; and instructions corresponding to these are sent to-day by the Emperor's Minister here to the French Consul at Charleston. You will accordingly enter into the frankest communication with your French colleague on the subject, and will be careful to act in strict concert with him.

“I am, &c.

(Signed)

"LYONS."

Consul Bunch to Lord Lyons.

(Extract.)

"Charleston, August 16, 1861.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt, on the 19th ultimo, of your Lordship's despatch of the 5th July, together with its inclosure, viz, a despatch from Lord John Russell of the 17th May last, on the subject of the proposed adhesion of the Confederate States of America to the four Articles of the Declaration of Paris, and of the rights of neutrals in the contest now raging in this country. I proceed to reply to your Lordship's communication.

"In so doing, I begin by requesting your Lordship to convey to Lord John Russell the expression of my sincere gratitude for the honour which he has been pleased to confer upon me by selecting me as the organ of Her Majesty's Government in the negotiation to which your Lordship's despatch and its inclosure have reference. I beg leave also to offer to your Lordship my grateful acknowledgments for the kind manner in which you have placed the matter in my hands.

"Immediately upon receipt of your Lordship's despatch, I proceeded to put myself into communication with my French colleague, M. de Beligny, who, as I found, had received instructions from M. Mercier of a character precisely similar to those with which I was honoured. After the fullest and frankest interchange of our respective views, we deter