Soon after the corps had crossed a small portion of it carried the enemy's works in front of the tête de pont, and captured four pieces of artillery.

The cavalry moved to the right of the second corps, and found the enemy occupying a strong line of works extending across the New Market and Central roads leading to Richmond, the right resting on Four-mile creek.

His cavalry videttes posted in front of Ruffin's house on the New Market road were discovered by the second United States cavalry, and driven back on their infantry line of battle, composed of two divisions. The high ground in advance of Ruffin's house thus gained was immediately occupied by the first division as a line of battle, and the second division placed on its right, covering the road from Malvern Hill to Richmond.

Immediately upon the formation of our line, the enemy advanced to the attack and drove the cavalry back over the ridge, on the face of which it quickly lay down in line of battle at a distance of about fifteen yards from the crest. When the enemy's line reached this crest, a fire from our repeating carbines was opened upon it, whereupon it gave way in disorder, and was followed over the plain beyond by the cavalry, which captured about 250 prisoners, and two battle flags, besides killing and wounding very many,

This counter attack against infantry was made by the first and second cavalry divisions simultaneously, and our line re-established. During the engagement, which is called the battle of Darbytown, General Kautz was in support of Gregg on the right of the line.

The enemy, deceived by the long front presented by the second corps and cavalry, was undoubtedly impressed with the idea that nearly all of our forces had been moved to the north side of the James, and at once transferred a large body of his troops from the lines at Petersburg to our front at New Market; as I understood, this transfer by the enemy was the object which the Lieutenant General wished to attain, in order that the mine explosion of Petersburg might, to a greater certainty, result in the capture of the city.

On the afternoon of the 28th the second corps withdrew to a line near the head of the bridge, and the cavalry was drawn back to a position on its right. In order to deceive the enemy still more, I sent during the night one of my divisions to the opposite side of the James, first covering the bridge with moss and grass to prevent the tramp of the horses being heard, and at daylight marched it back again on foot in full view of the enemy, creating the impression that a large and continuous movement to the north side was still going on.

On the 29th nothing occurred during the day on either side, except a skirmish by some of General Kautz's command, in the vicinity of Malvern Hill; but, after dark, the 2d corps was hastily and quietly withdrawn to the south side, to take part in the engagement which was expected to follow the mine explosion. I was directed to follow, and withdrew by brigades from my right, successively passing them over the bridge. This movement was one involving great anxiety, as, when the 2d corps moved, the space at the mouth of the bridge occupied by me was so circumscribed that an offensive movement in force by the enemy must have resulted in the annihilation of my whole command.

Shortly after daylight on the 30th the recrossing had been effected, and by 10 o'clock my advance division was well over to the left of our army in front of Petersburg; but as the mine attack had failed, it was not necessary to carry out the part assigned to the cavalry.

The movement to the north side of the James for the accomplishment of our part of the plan connected with the mine explosion was well executed, and every point made; but it was attended with such anxiety and sleeplessness as to prostrate almost every officer and man in the command.

On the 1st of August I was relieved from the personal command of the cavalry corps, and ordered to the valley of the Shenandoah. Torbert's and Wilson's divisions were directed to join me there.

It will be seen by the foregoing narrative that the idea advanced by me at the commencement of the campaign, viz, "that our cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and our infantry the enemy's infantry," was carried into effect immediately after the battle of the Wilderness.

The result was constant success and the almost total annihilation of the rebel cavalry. We marched when and where we pleased; were always the attacking party, and always successful.

During the period herein embraced, I am led to believe, on information derived from the most reliable sources, that the enemy's cavalry was superior to ours in numbers; but the esprit of our men increased every day, while that of the enemy diminished.

In these marches, and in others afterwards performed in connection with the valley and Appomattox campaigns, we were obliged to live to a great extent on the country. Forage had to be thus obtained for our horses, and provisions for our men, consequently many hardships were necessarily brought on the people, but no outrages were tolerated.

I do not believe war to be simply that lines should engage each other in battle, as that is but the duello part-a part which would be kept up so long as those who live at home in peace and plenty could find the best youth of the country to enlist in their cause, (I say the best, for the bravest are always the best,) and therefore do not regret the system of living on the enemy's country. These men and women did not care how many were killed or maimed, so long as war did not come to their doors, but as soon as it did come in the shape of loss of property, they earnestly prayed for its termination.

As war is a punishment, and death the maximum punishment, if we can, by reducing its advocates to poverty, end it quicker, we are on the side of humanity. In the foregoing brief sketch I have been unable to give in detail the operations of the cavalry, and will have to trust to the subordinate reports to make up the deficiency. In consequence of our constant activity, we were obliged to turn over our wounded and prisoners whenever and wherever opportunity offered, and oftentimes without receipts; I am also, therefore, unable to furnish an accurate list of either my casualties, or prisoners captured from the enemy. I think my casualites, from May 5th to August 1st, will number between 5,000 and 6,000 men; and the captures in prisoners will exceed 2,000.

We sent to the War Department from the 5th of May, 1864, to the 9th of April, 1865, the day on which the army of northern Virginia surrendered, 205 battle flags, captured in open field fighting; it is nearly as many as all the armies of the United States, combined, sent there during the rebellion. The number of field pieces captured in the same period was between 160 and 170; all in open field fighting.

These captures of flags, colors, and artillery were made during the campaign, the operations of which I have just related; the Shenandoah campaign, the march from Winchester to Petersburg, and the Appomattox campaign.

To the 6th and 19th corps, General Crook's command, which, with Merritt's and Custer's divisions of cavalry, composed the army of the Shenandoah, and to the 5th and 6th corps, which operated with me on the Appomattox campaign, a proportionate share of these captures belong.

It will be seen by this report that we led the advance of the army to the Wilderness; that on the Richmond raid we marked out its line of march to the North Anna, where we found it on our return; that we again led its advance to Hanovertown, and thence to Cold Harbor; that we removed the enemy's cavalry from the south side of the Chickahominy by the Trevillian raid, and thereby materially assisted the army in its successful march to the James river and Petersburg, where it remained until we made the campaign in the valley; marched back to Petersburg, and again took its advance and led it to victory.

In all the operations the percentage of cavalry casualties was as great as that

of the infantry, and the question which had existed "Who ever saw a dead cavalry-man?" was set at rest.

To Generals D. McM. Gregg, Torbert, Wilson, Merritt, Custer, Diven, J.. Irwin Gregg, McIntosh, Chapman, Davies, and Gibbs, to the gallant officers and men of their commands, and to the officers of my staff, I return my sincere thanks. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN, Major General United States Army.

Brevet Major General JOHN A. RAWLINS,

Chief of Staff, Headquarters Armies of the U. S., Washington, D. C.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH, FROM AUGUST 4, 1864, TO FEBRUARY 27, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF,

New Orleans, La., February 3, 1866.

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the campaign in the valley of the Shenandoah, commencing August 4, 1864:

On the evening of the 1st of August I was relieved from the command of the cavalry corps of the army of the Potomac, to take command of the army of the Shenandoah, and, on arriving at Washington on the 4th instant, I received directions from Major General H. W. Halleck, chief of the staff, to proceed without delay to Monocacy Junction, on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and report in person to the Lieutenant General. At Monocacy the Lieutenant General turned over to me the instructions which he had previously given to Major General Hunter, commanding the department of West Virginia, a copy of which is herewith attached.

The army of the Shenandoah at this time consisted of the 6th corps, very much reduced in numbers, one division of the 19th corps, two small infantry divisions under command of General Crook, afterwards designated as the army of West Virginia, a small division of cavalry under General Averill, which was at that time in pursuit of General McCausland, near Moorefield-McCausland having made a raid into Pennsylvania and burned the town of Chambersburg. There was also one small division of cavalry, then arriving at Washington, from my old corps.

The infantry portion of these troops had been lying in bivouac in the vicinity of Monocacy Junction and Frederick city, but had been ordered to march the day I reported, with directions to concentrate at Halltown, four miles in front of Harper's Ferry. After my interview with the Lieutenant General I hastened to Harper's Ferry to make preparations for an immediate advance against the enemy, who then occupied Martinsburg, Williamsport, and Shepherdstown, sending occasional raiding parties as far as Hagerstown, Maryland. The concentration of my command at Halltown alarmed the enemy, and caused him to concentrate at or near Martinsburg, drawing in all his parties from the north side of the Potomac. The indications were that he had intended another raid into Maryland, prompted perhaps by the slight success he had gained over General Crook's command at Kearnstown a short time before.

The city of Martinsburg, at which the enemy concentrated, is on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, at the northern terminus of the Valley pike-abroad macadamized road running up the valley through Winchester, and terminating at Staunton. The Shenandoah valley is a continuation of the Cumberland valley, south of the Potomac, and is bounded on the east by the Blue Ridge, and on the west by the eastern slope of the Alleghany mountains; the general direction of these chains being southwest.

The valley at Martinsburg is about sixty miles broad; at Winchester forty to forty-five; and at Strasburg twenty-five to thirty miles, where an isolated chain called Massanutten mountains rises up, running parallel to the Blue Ridge, and terminates at Harrisonburg; here the valley again opens out fifty or sixty miles broad. This isolated chain divides the valley, for its continuance, into two valleys; the one next the Blue Ridge being called the Luray valley, the one west of it the Strasburg or main valley. The Blue Ridge has many passes through it called gaps. The principal ones, and those which have good wagon roads, are Snicker's, Ashby's, Manassas, Chester, Thoroughfare, Swift Run, Brown's, Rock-fish, and two or three others from the latter one up to Lynchburg. Many have macadamized roads through them, and, indeed, are not gaps, but small valleys through the main chain. The general bearing of all these roads is towards Gordonsville, and are excellent for troops to move upon from that point into the valley; in fact, the Blue Ridge can be crossed almost anywhere by infantry or cavalry.

The valley itself was rich in grain, cattle, sheep, hogs, and fruit, and was in such a prosperous condition that the rebel army could march down and up it, billeting on the inhabitants. Such in brief is the outline, and was the condition of the Shenandoah valley when I entered it August 4, 1864.

Great exertions were made to get the troops in readiness for an advance, and on the morning of August 10, General Torbert's division of cavalry having joined me from Washington, a forward movement was commenced. The enemy, while we were making our preparations, took position at Bunker Hill and vicinity, twelve miles south of Martinsburg, frequently pushing his scouting parties through Smithfield, and up to Charlestown. Torbert was ordered to move on the Berryville pike, through Berryville, and go into position near White Post; the 6th corps moved via the Charlestown and Summit Point road to Clifton; the 19th corps moved on the Berryville pike, to the left of the position of the 6th corps at Clifton; General Crook's command, via Kabletown, to the vicinity of Berryville, coming into position on the left of the 19th corps; and Colonel Lowell, with two small regiments of cavalry, was ordered to Summit Point; so that, on the night of August 10, the army occupied a position stretching from Clifton to Berryville, with cavalry at White Post and Summit Point. The enemy moved from vicinity of Bunker Hill, stretching his line from where the Winchester and Potomac railroad crosses Opequan creek, to where the Berryville and Winchester pike crosses the same stream, occupying the west bank. On the morning of August 11, the 6th corps was ordered to move from Clifton across the country to where the Berryville pike crosses Opequan creek, carry the crossing and hold it; the 19th corps was directed to move through Berryville, on the White Post road, for one mile, file to the right, by heads of regiments, at deploying distances, and carry and hold the crossing of Opequan creek at a ford about three-fourths of a mile from the left of the 6th corps; Crook's command was ordered to move out on the White Post road, one mile and a half beyond Berryville, file to the right, and secure the crossing of Opequan creek at a ford about one mile to the left of the 19th corps; Torbert was directed to move with Merritt's division of cavalry up the Milwood pike towards Winchester, attack any force he might find, and, if possible, ascertain the movements of the rebel army. Lowell was ordered to close in from Summit Point on the right of the 6th corps.

My intention in securing these fords was to march on Winchester, at which point, from all my information on the 10th, I thought the enemy would make a stand. In this I was mistaken, as the results of Torbert's reconnoissance proved. Merritt found the enemy's cavalry covering the Millwood pike west of the Opequan, and, attacking it, drove it in the direction of Kearnstown, and discovered the enemy retreating up the valley pike.

As soon as this information was obtained, Torbert was ordered to move quickly,

via the toll-gate on the Front Royal pike, to Newtown, to strike the enemy's flank and harass him in his retreat, and Lowell to follow up through Winchester. Crook was turned to the left, and ordered to Stony Point, or Nineveh, while Emory and Wright were marching to the left, and went into camp between the Milwood and Front Royal pikes, Crook encamping at Stony Point. Torbert met some of the enemy's cavalry at the toll-gate on the Front Royal pike, drove it in the direction of Newtown, and behind Gordon's division of infantry which had been thrown out from Newtown to cover the flank of the main column in its retreat, and which had put itself behind rail barricades. A portion of Merritt's cavalry attacked this infantry and drove in its skirmish line, and although unable to dislodge the division, held all the ground gained. The rebel division during the night moved off. Next day Crook moved from Stony Point to Cedar creek, Emory followed, the cavalry moved to the same point, via Newtown and the valley pike, and the 6th corps followed the cavalry. On the night of the 12th Crook was in position at Cedar creek, on the left of the valley pike, Emory on the right of the pike, the 6th corps on the right of Emory, and the cavalry on the right and left flanks. A heavy skirmish line was thrown to the heights on the south side of Cedar creek, which had brisk skirmishing during the evening with the enemy's pickets, his (the enemy's) main force occupying the heights above and north of Strasburg. On the morning of the 13th the cavalry was ordered on a reconnoissance towards Strasburg, on the middle road, which road is two and a half miles to the west of the main pike.

Reports of a column of the enemy moving up from Culpeper Court House, and approaching Front Royal through Chester gap, having been received, caused me much anxiety, as any considerable force advanced through Front Royal, and down the Front Royal and Winchester pike towards Winchester, could be thrown in my rear; or, in case of my driving the enemy to Fisher's Hill, and taking position in his front, this same force could be moved along the base of Massanutten mountain on the road to Strasburg, with the same result.

As my effective line-of-battle strength at this time was about (18,000) eighteen thousand infantry, and (3,500) thirty-five hundred cavalry, I remained quiet during the day, except the activity on the skirmish line, to await further developments. In the evening the enemy retired with his main force to Fisher's Hill.

As the rumors of an advancing force from the direction of Culpeper kept increasing, on the morning of the 14th I sent a brigade of cavalry to Front Royal, to ascertain definitely, if possible, the truth of such reports, and at the same time crossed the 6th corps to the south side of Cedar creek, and occupied the heights above Strasburg. Considerable picket firing ensued. During the day I received from Colonel Chipman, of the Adjutant General's office, the following despatch, he having ridden in great haste from Washington, through Snicker's gap, escorted by a regiment of cavalry, to deliver the same. It at once explained the movement from Culpeper, and on the morning of the 15th the remaining two brigades of Merritt's division of cavalry were ordered to the crossing of the Shenandoah river near Front Royal, and the 6th corps withdrawn to the north side of Cedar creek, holding at Strasburg a strong skirmish line:

[By telegraph-received in cipher.]

Major General HALLECK:

CITY POINT, August 12, 1864—9 a. m.

Inform General Sheridan that it is now certain (2) two divisions of infantry have gone to Early, and some cavalry, and (20) twenty pieces of artillery. This movement commenced last Saturday night. He must be cautious, and act now on the defensive, until movements here force them to this-to send this way.