The corps of Banks and Frémont were in the valley of the Shenandoah, between Winchester and Middletown, the bulk of the forces being in the vicinity of the latter place. One division of McDowell's corps was at Manassas Junction, with its advance thrown forward to Catlett's station. The other division was posted in the vicinity of Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg. When I first assumed command of these forces the troops under Jackson had retired from the valley of the Shenandoah and were in rapid march toward Richmond, so that at that time there was no force of the enemy of any consequence within a week's march of any of the troops assigned to my command. It was the wish of the government that I should cover the city of Washington from any attacks from the direction of Richmond, make such dispositions as were necessary to assure the safety of the valley of the Shenandoah, and at the same time so to operate upon the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville as to draw off, if possible, a considerable force of the enemy from Richmond, and thus relieve the operations against that city of the army of the Potomac. The first object I had in view was to concentrate, as far as possible, all the movable forces under my command, and to establish them in such positions as best to effect the objects set forth. It seemed to me that the security of the Shenandoah valley was not best attained by posting troops within the valley itself, but that the necessary results could be better accomplished, and the other objects with which I was charged best promoted, by concentrating these forces at some point or points from which, if any attempts were made to enter the valley of the Shenandoah from Richmond, I should be able, by rapid marching, to interpose between such force and the main body of the enemy, and cut off its retreat. I felt confident, and this confidence was justified by subsequent results, that no considerable force of the enemy would attempt to enter the valley of the Shenandoah while the forces under my command were so posted as to be able without difficulty to intercept its retreat and fall upon its rear. I accordingly sent orders to Major General Sigel, commanding the 1st corps, to move forward from Middletown, cross the Shenandoah at Front Royal, and pursuing the west side of the Blue Ridge, to take post at Sperryville, by passing through Luray gap. At the same time I directed Major General Banks, crossing the Shenandoah at the same point, to move forward and take post between six and ten miles east of Sperryville. General McDowell was ordered to move Ricketts's division of his corps from Manassas Junction to Waterloo bridge, the point where the turnpike from Warrenton to Sperryville crosses the upper Rappahannock. King's division of the same corps it was thought best to leave at Fredericksburg, to cover the crossing of the Rappahannock at that point, and to protect the railroad thence to Aquia creek, and the public buildings which had been erected at the latter place. While I yielded to this wish of the War Department, the wide separation of this division from the main body of the army, and the ease with which the enemy would be able to interpose between them, engaged my earnest attention and gave me very serious uneasiness. While these movements were in progress, commenced the series of battles which preceded and attended the retreat of General McClellan from the Chickahominy toward Harrison's landing. When first General McClellan began to intimate by his despatches that he designed making this movement towards James river, I suggested to the President of the United States the impolicy of such a movement, and the serious consequences which would be likely to result from it, and urged upon him that he should send orders to General McClellan that if he were unable to maintain his position upon the Chickahominy, and were pressed by superior forces of the enemy, to mass his whole force on the north side of that stream, even at the risk of losing much materiel of war, and endeavor to make his way in the direction of Hanover Court House; but in no event to retreat with his army further to the south than the White House, on York river. I stated to the President that the retreat to James river was carrying General McClellan away from any re-enforcements that could possibly be sent him within a reasonable time, and was absolutely depriving him of any substantial aid from the forces under my command; that by this movement the whole army of the enemy would be interposed between his army and mine, and that they would then be at liberty to strike in either direction, as they might consider it most advantageous; that this move to James river would leave entirely unprotected, except in so far as the small force under my command was able to protect it, the whole region in front of Washington, and that it would then, therefore, be impossible to send any of the forces under my command to re-enforce General McClellan without rendering it certain that the enemy, even in the worst case for themselves, would have the privilege and power of exchanging Richmond for Washington city; that to them the loss of Richmond would be trifling, while the loss of Washington to us would be conclusive, or nearly so, in its results upon this war. I was so deeply impressed with these views that I repeatedly and earnestly urged them upon the President and the Secretary of War. After General McClellan had taken up his position at Harrison's landing, I addressed to him a letter, stating my position and the distribution of the troops under my command, and requesting, in all earnestness and good faith, to write me fully and freely his views, and to suggest to me any measures which he thought desirable to enable me to co-operate with him, or to render any assistance in my power in the operations of the army under his command. I stated to him that I had no object except to assist his operations, and that I would undertake any labor and run any risk for that purpose. I therefore desired him to feel no hesitation in communicating freely with me, as he might rest assured that every suggestion that he would make would meet all respect and consideration at my hands, and that so far as it was in my power to do so I would carry out his wishes with all energy, and with all the means at my command. In reply to this communication, I received a letter from General McClellan, very general in terms, and proposing nothing toward the accomplishment of the purpose I had suggested to him. It became apparent that, considering the situation in which the army of the Potomac and the army of Virginia were placed in relation to each other, and the absolute necessity of harmonious and prompt co-operation between them, some military superior both of General McClellan and myself should be called to Washington and placed in command of all the operations in Virginia. In accordance with these views, Major General Halleck was called to Washington and placed in general command. Many circumstances, which it is not necessary here to set forth, induced me to express to the President, to the Secretary of War, and to General Halleck, my desire to be relieved from the command of the army of Virginia, and to be returned to the western country. My services, however, were considered necessary in the projected campaign, and my wishes were not complied with. I accordingly took the field in Virginia with grave forebodings of the result, but with a determination to carry out the plans of the government with all the energy and with all the ability of which I was master. Previous to taking the field, I issued the following orders, which set out very fully the policy which I considered advisable, and which at the time received the sanction of the government, and, so far as I know, the approval of the country: GENERAL ORDERS No. 5. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, Hereafter, as far as practicable, the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on. In all cases supplies for this purpose will be taken by the officers to whose department they properly belong, under the orders of the commanding officer of the troops for whose use they are intended. Vouchers will be given to the owners, stating on their face that they will be payable at the conclusion of the war, upon sufficient testimony being furnished that such owners have been loyal citizens of the United States since the date of the vouchers. Whenever it is known that supplies can be furnished in any district of the country where the troops are to operate, the use of trains for carrying subsistence will be dispensed with as far as possible. By command of Major General Pope: GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel, Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff. Official: .T. C. H. SMITH, Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp. GENERAL ORDERS HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF Virginia, Hereafter, in any operations of the cavalry forces in this command, no supply nor baggage trains of any description will be used, unless so stated specially in the order for the movement. Two days' cooked rations will be carried on the persons of the men, and all villages or neighborhoods through which they pass will be laid under contribution in the manner specified by General Orders No. 5, current series, from these headquarters, for the subsistence of men and horses. Movements of cavalry must always be made with celerity, and no delay in such movements will be excused hereafter on any pretext. Whenever the order for the movement of any portion of this army emanates from these headquarters, the time of marching and that to be consumed in the execution of the duty will be specifically designated, and no departure therefrom will be permitted to pass unnoticed without the gravest and most conclusive reasons. Commanding officers will be held responsible for strict and prompt compliance with every provision of this order. By command of Major General Pope : Official: GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel, Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff. T. C. H. SMITH, Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp. GENERAL ORDERS No. 7. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, The people of the valley of the Shenandoah, and throughout the region of operations of this army, living along the lines of railroad and telegraph, and along the routes of travel in rear of the United States forces, are notified that they will be held responsible for any injury done to the track, line or road, or for any attacks upon trains or straggling soldiers by bands of guerillas in their neighborhood. No privileges and immunities of warfare apply to lawless bands of individuals not forming part of the organized forces of the enemy, nor wearing the garb of soldiers, who, seeking and obtaining safety on pretext of being peaceful citizens, steal out in rear of the army, attack and murder straggling soldiers, molest trains of supplies, destroy railroads, telegraph lines and bridges, and commit outrages disgraceful to civilized people and revolting to humanity. Evil-disposed persons in rear of our armies, who do not themselves engage directly in these lawless acts, encourage them by refusing to interfere or give any information by which such acts can be prevented or the perpetrators punished. Safety of life and property of all persons living in the rear of our advancing armies depends upon the maintenance of peace and quiet among themselves, and of the unmolested movement through their midst of all pertaining to the military service. They are to understand distinctly that this security of travel is their only warrant of personal safety. It is, therefore, ordered that whenever a railroad, wagon-road, or telegraph is injured by parties of guerillas, the citizens living within five miles of the spot shall be turned out in mass to repair the damage, and shall, besides, pay the United States, in money or in property, to be levied by military force, the full amount of the pay and subsistence of the whole force necessary to coerce the performance of the work during the time occupied in completing it. If a soldier or a legitimate follower of the army be fired upon from any house, the house shall be razed to the ground, and the inhabitants sent prisoners to the headquarters of this army. If such an outrage occur at any place distant from settlements, the people within five miles around shall be held accountable and made to pay an indemnity sufficient for the case. Any persons detected in such outrages, either during the act or at any time afterward, shall be shot without awaiting civil process. No such acts can influence the result of this war, and they can only lead to heavy afflictions to the population to no purpose. It is therefore enjoined upon all persons, both for the security of their property and the safety of their own persons, that they act vigorously and cordially together to prevent the perpetration of such outrages. While it is the wish of the general commanding this army that all peaceably-disposed persons, who remain at their homes and pursue their accustomed avocations, shall be subjected to no improper burden of war, yet their own safety must of necessity depend upon the strict preservation of peace and order among themselves, and they are to understand that nothing will deter him from enforcing promptly, and to the full extent, every provision of this order. By command of Major General Pope: Official: GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel, Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff. GENERAL ORDERS Lieutenant Colonel SMITH, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, No. 11. Commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and detached commands, will proceed immediately to arrest all disloyal male citizens within their lines, or within their reach, in rear of their respective stations. Such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and will furnish sufficient security for its observance, shall be permitted to remain at their homes, and pursue in good faith their accustomed avocations. Those who refuse shall be conducted south, beyond the extreme pickets of this army, and be notified that if found again anywhere within our lines, or at any point in rear, they will be considered spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. If any person, having taken the oath of allegiance as above specified, be found to have violated it, he shall be shot, and his property seized and applied to the public use. All communication with any persons whatever living within the lines of the enemy is positively prohibited, except through the military authorities, and in the manner specified by military law; and any person concerned in writing or in carrying letters or messages in any other way, will be considered and treated as a spy within the lines of the United States army. By command of Major General Pope. Official: GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel, Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff. T. C. H. SMITH, Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp. The order requiring the troops to subsist upon the country in which their operations were conducted has, with a wilful disregard of its terms, been construed greatly to my discredit, as authorizing, indiscriminate robbery and plunder. Yet the terms of this order are so specific as to the manner and by whom all property or subsistence needed for the use of the army should be seized, and the order is co common in the history of warfare, that I have been amazed that it could be so misinterpreted and misunderstood. It is, therefore, submitted here for the calm examination of the government and of the public. I believed then, and beleive now, that the policy there laid down was wise and just, and was well calculated to secure efficient and rapid operations of the army; and in case of reverse, to leave the enemy without the means of subsisting in the country over which our army had passed, and over which any pursuit must be conducted. The long delay and embarrassment of the army under General Lee, in its subsequent movements towards Washington, occasioned largely by the want of supplies taken from the country under this order, fully justified its wisdom. It was determined before I left Washington to take the field in Virginia, that the union of the armies of Virginia and of the Potomac was absolutely essential both to the safety of the national capital and to the further successful prosecution of the operations against Richmond. The mission of the army under my command, therefore, was to cover, as far as possible, the front of Washington, and make secure the valley of the Shenandoah, and so to operate upon the enemy's lines of communication to the west and northwest as to force him to make such heavy detachments from his main force at Richmond as would enable the army of the Potomac to withdraw from its position at Harrison's landing, and to take shipping for Aquia creek or for Alexandria; and if, as was feared, the enemy should throw his whole force in the direction of Washington, it became my duty to resist his advance at all hazards, and so to delay and embarrass his movement as to gain all the time possible for the arrival of the army of the Potomac behind the Rappahannock. Meantime before the arrival of General Halleck, I instructed General King, at Fredericksburg, to send forward detachments of his cavalry to operate upon the line of the Virginia Central railroad, and as far as possible to embarrass and destroy communication between Richmond and the valley of the Shenandoah. Several cavalry expeditions which that officer dispatched for the purpose were completely successful, and succeeded in breaking up the railroad at several points upon several occasions. At the same time I directed Major General Banks to send forward an infantry brigade, with all his cavalry, to march rapidly upon Culpeper Court House, and after taking possession of that place, to push forward cavalry toward the Rapidan, in the direction of Gordonsville. On the 14th of July, after this movement was successfully accomplished, I directed General Banks to push forward during the night of that day, the whole of his cavalry force under Brigadier General Hatch from Culpeper, with orders to take possession of Gordonsville, and to destroy the railroad for ten or fifteen miles east of that place, with a portion of this force, while the remainder should be pushed forward in the direction of Charlottesville to destroy the railroad bridges and interrupt that line of communication as far as practicable. At that time there was no force of the enemy at Gordonsville or in the vicinity, and the whole operation, as ordered, was not only easily practicable, but would have been attended with serious consequences to the enemy; but to my surprise and dissatisfaction, I received, on the 17th of July, from General Banks, a report that General Hatch had taken with him infantry, artillery, and trains of wagons, and that, in consequence of bad roads, he had at that date only succeeded in going as far as Madison Court House. Meantime, on the 16th of July, the advance of Jackson's forces, under Ewell, had reached Gordonsville, and the proposed movement, as ordered, became impracticable. No satisfactory explanation has ever been made to me of the de |