graphed to Richmond that the total Confederate loss was four hundred and fifty; that of the Yankees thirty-three hundred. THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE. On the 19th of March a yet more important engagement was to occur. It was Johnston's purpose to cripple Sherman, if possible, before he could effect a junction with Schofield; and, accordingly, he brought what troops he had in hand by a forced march into position at Bentonville, intending to fling them upon Sherman's left wing, commanded by Slocum. About nine o'clock in the morning the fight commenced. On the right, Bate's and Cleburne's division charged and carried two lines of breastworks, driving the enemy two miles. Hill, commanding Lee's corps, and Loring, commanding Stewart's corps, did similarly on the left. The Confederates fought gallantly. Three guns were taken from the enemy, and his whole line pushed back. A mile in rear the enemy rallied upon fresh troops, but was forced back slowly, until six o'clock P. M., when, receiving more troops, he apparently assumed the offensive, which movement was resisted without difficulty until dark. severe one. During the night the enemy threw up heavy intrenchments, and the next morning General Johnston did not think it advisable to renew the attack. The engagement had been a very The total loss of the Confederates was about twenty-five hundred. Although they had achieved a success, Johnston appears to have been well convinced that he had not force sufficient to cope with Sherman and resist his junction with Schofield. On the night of the 20th the enemy abandoned their works and moved towards Goldsboro'. General Johnston then withdrew towards Raleigh. In the mean time, Schofield, from Newbern, had entered and occupied Goldsboro', and Terry, from Wilmington, had secured Cox's bridge crossing, and laid a pontoon bridge across the Neuse River. Sherman was thus in the position he had planned more than two months ago in Savannah; he had brought up every part of the combination in perfect order; and so far had achieved a success at once brilliant and com plete. On the 22d of March he published in Goldsboro' a con gratulatory address to his troops. He said: "After a march of the most extraordinary character, nearly five hundred miles over swamps and rivers deemed impassable to others, at th most inclement season of the year, and drawing our chief sup plies from a poor and wasted country, we reach our destination in good health and condition." We must leave Sherman at Goldsboro'-the proper termination of his campaign in the Carolinas. The position was critical enough for the Confederates. Between Sherman's army, augmented by the corps of Schofield and Terry, and the army of Grant, the Confederacy was in danger of being crushed. The two armies were separated by only one hundred and fifty miles, and a railroad, which could be rapidly put in order, connected them. No sooner had Sherman disposed his army in camp at Goldsboro' than he hastened to City Point, Virginia, for an interview with General Grant and President Lincoln. The results of that conference were soon to be known to the Confederacy, and meant any thing else than that "peace negotiation" inte which some lively imagi nations in Richmond construed this collection of distinguished persons. CHAPTER XXIII. The date of distrust in the Southern mind.-Observatior. of Gereral Lec.-A pect liar moral condition of the Confederacy.-Want of confidence in President Davis administration.-Impatience of the prolongation of the war.-Davis' unpopularity. --Weak attempts in Congress at a counter-revolution.-General Lee made coinmander-in chief.-The title a nominal one.--The Virginia delegation and the President.--Mr. Seddon's resignation.--President Davis' defiance to Congress.--Tho Davis-Johnston imbroglio.--Senator Wigfall's speeches.--Johnston's restoration. --President Davis' opinion of homœopathy.-Sullen and indifferent disposition of the Southern people.--How they might have accomplished their independence.Review of the military situation.--Analysis of the peace feeling in the North.-How it was likely to be developed by a long war.--The Union not the enemy's sine qua non.-Two contingencies that limited the war.-The worthless title of Yankee invasion.-"Cob-web" occupation of the Confederacy.-Note: an address in the Richmond newspapers.-The two fatal facts in the condition of the Confederacy.-THE FORTRESS MONROE COMMISSION.-How it was brought about.--The Yankee ultimatum.--Official narrative of the Confederate commissioners.--A new attempt to rally the spirit of the South.--The meeting at the African church in Richmond. -President Davis' boasts.-His noble allusion to history.--Ilow the cause of the Confederacy was in danger.-PROPOSITION TO ARM THE SLAVES OF THE SOUTH.— Indicative of a desperate condition of the public mind.-General Lee's opinion.— The slaveholding interest.-Its selfishness and insolence.-A weak conclusion of the matter." Catching at straws" in the Confederate Congress.-Character of this body. IN the winter of 1864-5, intelligent minds in the Confedracy became, for the first time, impressed with the idea that its victory and independence were no longer certain conclusions, and conceived a painful distrust as to the issues of the war. General Lee, a man who used few words, and had the faculty of going directly to the point of a discussion, and putting sagacious judgments in plain phrases, once said of the conduct of the people of the Confederacy in the war, that "they were only half in earnest." But this remark, unlike most of Lec's judgments, was only half true. No one can doubt that the Confederates had been thoroughly and terribly in earnest in the first periods of the war; and if, in its later periods, they appeared to lack earnestness, the truth was they did not lack it so much as they did confidence in their rulers, and a dispo |