as they should be opposed to the will of those in power; political intolerance had been sanctified with the name of justice; civil liberty, of whatever kind, was reprobated as opposed to religion. The people, although intolerant of the grievances they suffered from the governments, and desirous though they were of ameliorations, showed themselves backward, particularly in the pontifical states, in uniting with the educated classes in the frequent efforts that have been made to shake off the yoke, or at least to constrain the oppressors to be less unnaturally severe. This obstacle is now removed. The report, be it true or exaggerated,— that I know not,—has been bruited in all quarters, in Italy as well as elsewhere, that the Pope not only condescends to, but shows himself propitious to the seconding of the wishes of those very persons whom his predecessors condemned and excommunicated. The people who had been quite prevented from making any progress by superstition, have again been made to move onwards; their hopes have been excited; that which was but a streamlet has become a river. Who can stop its course? It is in this sense that I am delighted, and regard the pontificate of Pius IX. as the dawn of a fine day. The people of Italy are now convinced that the predecessors of the present Pope endeavoured to divert them from a good way by calling it a bad one, and made it their object to promote their own advantage, not that of the people. They now know that the construction of railways, which the last pope rejected as an invention of the devil, is a most useful measure for the prosperity of commerce, the facilitating of social relations, and the spread of civilization. Should another pope come and teach the reverse, or should the present Pope even choose to contradict himself, Italian good sense will be convinced from this, of which history has never convinced it owing to the ignorance in which it has been kept, namely, that the popes are not infallible, and that they do not speak seven times a day with the Holy Ghost, as the Capuchins and the Franciscans have made men believe till now. Let me be forgiven for this preamble before entering upon an examination of the political and administrative machinery of the papal government; present circumstances have impelled me to it.

By usurping the temporal dominion over a part of Italy, the pontiffs have evidently set themselves in contradiction with the Gospel. Jesus Christ, in eulogizing his precursor John, contrasted the hardships of his solitary and sober life, with the voluptuous luxury of courts. In speaking to the apostles he renewed the contrast, making Christian humility a counterpart to the pride of kings. Speaking of himself, he said that his kingdom was not of this world. This last declaration of the Saviour, on the other hand, instead of persuading the bishops of Rome to confine themselves to spiritual, without intermeddling with temporal matters, has become on the contrary, by jesuitical interpretation, a most powerful weapon for the defence of their temporal dominion. It is usually said that Jesus Christ intended it in the sense that the right to reign on the earth did not come to him from this world, but from the Father, not at all that his kingdom was not in this world. Accordingly, the popes attribute this very right to themselves, extending it over all other monarchs; since, notwithstanding that the universal empire imagined by Gregory VII. must ever be held a dream and a delirium, this monstrous theory is upheld in the schools in Rome. Upon this principle, it may easily be comprehended, that the govern

ment of the popes must be absolute and despotic, all reluctancy on the part of their subjects to comply with their wills being considered as sinful, and the pretension to impose limits on their divine authority thought absurd. On this same principle, likewise, they must naturally commit the subaltern exercise of that authority almost exclusively to members of the clergy, so that no layman shall be called to participate in the apostolic rights. Accordingly, one main defect of the pontifical government is ignorance of the way to manage public affairs. As the heads of the public offices all belong to the clergy, and are all educated in the monasteries or colleges, in sacred learning, and without any knowledge of public right, of political economy, of statistics, &c., they are compelled to have recourse to others to assist them in the discharge of their functions in the judiciary or administrative departments. Hence knaves and hypocrites are wont to prevail with their counsels on the cardinals and the prelates, converting to their own advantage the influence these possess, and giving vent to their private passions. A second defect appears in the government being wanting in centralization and unity, there being no fixed rule for determining the respective attributions of the ministers. Hence it is that one minister, whenever he pleases, may step into the department of another; a thing that must often take place, if it be considered that such an irregularity, being a perennial source of gain to sycophants, there is no want of persons to urge and stimulate to these invasions.

A third defect lies in the ministers being independent of the pope, if not de jure, at least de facto; inasmuch as there never occurs a case of their being called to give an account of their doings, and far less of their being punished for them. But if we reflect on what has already been intimated, that the ministers are generally under the control for the most part of vicious persons, it will appear manifest that the people are the sport not only of the absolute pleasure of the sovereign, but of as many despots also as there are ministers and unprincipled persons by whom they are surrounded. A fourth defect, the most pernicious of all, lies in the maintenance of public order and the administration of justice being placed on no solid foundations. The administration of the police and that of justice, are confided to two prelates the consequence of which is that offenders, when they contrive to obtain for themselves the protection of a cardinal, escape the punishment due to their offences, and can elude the laws to the detriment of others in civil causes. Is it likely that cardinals who would think themselves degraded by submitting to the orders of other cardinals, will be humble enough to respect the injunctions of the Uditore santissimo (most holy auditor) or of the Governor of Rome, who are simple prelates? The mere enumeration of these defects may lead one to see that the pontifical government is a chaos, a labyrinth, in which law and justice cannot fail to be lost. Let us come now to the examination of the administrative boards in detail.

The government is composed, 1st, of a cardinal secretary of state; 2d, of a cardinal camerlingo; 3d, of a prelate treasurer-general; 4th, of a congregation (or board) of cardinals for waters and highways; 6th, of an uditore santissimo; 7th, of a congregation for schools and colleges, composed of cardinals; 8th, of a military congregation; 9th, of the governor of Rome. The Secretary of state is always the head of the faction that chooses the pope. This circum

stance is enough of itself to give the true idea of what a Secretary of state generally is. Ambition has already been to him the spur to his activity; intrigue has been the means of his success. Gratitude in the pontiff who has been elected, or the ascendancy acquired over his mind by the display of abilities, real or ephemeral, in defeating the opposite faction, gives him such power, that instead of being minister, he may be said to have a virtual share in the sovereignty. He publishes the laws in the pope's name, stating that he has received orders delivered viva voce to that effect. He has by right the disposal of all branches of the administration, without acquainting the respective ministers beforehand, in special cases; hence it happens that his arrangements are very often quite opposed to those that have emanated from other ministries. He has the monstrous right of derogating the laws with a simple note, called that of the Secretaryship of state, whether in the case of his being consulted by a tribunal, or even owing to his engagements to some private person who may have an interest in it. It frequently happens that civil causes, after being decided in courts of first and second resort, are definitively lost in the last court of appeal, the judges declaring that by virtue of a note of the Secretaryship, those articles on which the party at the bar rested his right, no longer existed for that particular case. Besides the monstrosity of the arbitrary act implied in derogating a law, to the loss of families for the most part poor, and in favour of the rich, who are the persons that have it in their power to draw to themselves the favours of the cardinal Secretary, he has in this infamous prerogative the injustice to attribute a retro-active force to the law! The Secretary of state has a similar prerogative also in regard to the sentences of death pronounced by the tribunals. Should he want to liberate a condemned person, it suffices that he pass near the place of punishment in his carriage, in diplomatic pomp, which is usually called in fiocchetto, in full puff, and the condemned person becomes ipso facto absolved from the sentence of death. I was in Rome at a time when the nephew of a cardinal was to be executed for a horrible crime. The report spread that the Secretary of state would come out in fiocchetto for the purpose of remitting his sentence, and the people tumultuously collected in a crowd on the street along which the culprit had to pass. The Cardinal Vicar happened accidentally to pass through that quarter in returning from the Vatican, and the people, mistaking his carriage for that of the Secretary of state, compelled it to fly by attacking it with stones, thrown with such force as to damage it. This occurrence proved a warning to the Secretary of state, who was already preparing to leave the palace, and the cardinal's nephew, as I have already related, even with his head on the block, turned his eyes full of hope, to see the desired Fiocchetti, underwent his fate, and public justice was satisfied. It happens not unfrequently that the Secretary of state opposes even the execution of the pope's rescripts; sometimes, it must be confessed, doing thereby an act of justice, from those rescripts being calculated to injure the rights of other persons, the pope being accustomed for the most part to grant them on the mere asseveration of the petitioner, without any investigation of the The confusion in the Secretary of state's office is increased by those who are employed in it, instead of having the affairs connected with the various branches of the service distributed under their proper heads, having the provinces parcelled out among them. Hence it happens

case.

that as they are not circumscribed within any precise limits, each acting independently of another, disposes of the same affairs that another may have already disposed of, seeing that various minutanti (the title given to the head functionaries) have charge of the affairs of one province. Sometimes there arrive in one province orders from the Secretary of State contradicting each other.

The Cardinal Camerlingo may well be called the Proteus of fable. Looking at some of the functions allotted to him, it will appear that he may be considered as the minister of finance, for he is supreme head of the treasury, and has the supreme direction of the customs and of the mint. Seen from another point of view, one would take him to be minister for the home department, for he presides over the annona, the provision board, fine arts, industry, agriculture, and commerce. Under another point of view he seems director-general of the post-office, for he has the administration of that department. Viewed under another aspect, he appears as director-general of the waters, highways, and bridges, being supreme magistrate with respect to these. But none of these characters is exclusively his. There is a lord-treasurer placed over the treasury and the customs; and there is a president of the mint. These act independently of him. There is a lord-prefect of the annona and of the provision board, and a board for the museums, a board for the post-office, a congregation of cardinals for the waters and highways, and all these are independent of the Camerlingoship. From this it may be seen what contradictory regulations must emanate from the mutual confliction of these various powers! The cardinal Camerlingo assumes the supreme authority over the state on the death of the pontiff, and retains it until the election of a new one. He proceeds to verify the death of the sovereign, generally striking his forehead with a small silver hammer, and directing the notary to draw up the official report of his death. On leaving the palace the Swiss guard is declared to be loosed from its engagement with the defunct; he makes a new contract with it, and proceeds attended by it to his place of residence. The office is held for life. The Treasurer may really be called the minister of finance. He has the right of administering all the property that belongs to the state, and of disposing of it as he pleases; he creates debts; makes acquisitions; sells without rendering any account of his doings. The apostolical constitutions prohibit under the heaviest penalty the criminal attempt (l'attentato) of calling on the Treasurer to give an account of his transactions. Could he not be obliged at least to draw up an antecedent scheme of income and expenditure? No, he is under no restraint, as if it seemed to be the absolute pleasure of the sovereign that the public treasure should be dilapidated. Large contracts are entered into on a simple proposal, without any competition, with the sole view of benefitting some noble family. The collection of the public taxes is also secured by contract, and the amministratori camerali (as the provincial collectors are called) have a premium which is ordinarily three or four-fifths more than like employments were farmed out at under Napoleon; with this sole difference, that the provincial collections were then the only ones contracted for, and that to these are now added the communal collections, which the amministratore afterwards sub-farms to great advantage. The chief scourge of the financial system is

unquestionably the arbitrary power of the Treasurer, but it suffers no less loss from a want of unity which renders it in the highest degree expensive. Could not the separate administrations of salt and tobacco, of the customs, of the tax on consumption, of registers and stamps, of the lottery, of mortgages, and of the public debt, be united in one single board, and then divided into sections? The Treasurer cannot be removed but upon his being made a cardinal. On receiving his cardinal's hat, he lies under no obligation to do anything beyond going through the formality of leaving on his table the keys of the treasury, which, as may be readily conceived, is always found empty. There is a proverb in Italy in which the shrewd sense of the people has summed up the moral disorder of the men in power, namely, “ Chi piu ne fa é' Priore,” i. e. he who is the worst is Superior. This proverb, coined originally with the view of being applied to the monkish brotherhoods, in which the least deserving and the intriguing have the foremost place, if now applicable in all its truth to governments, may be emphatically applied to the pontifical, in which the crimes of malversation and peculation are rewarded with the dignity of cardinal. What wonder that the public debt has risen to such an extent that the interests alone amount to £558,333 sterling? Besides the yearly pension to each of the cardinals, who withal enjoy the richest benefices, there are endless pensions granted to ladies under the specious names of widows in peril (vedore periclitanti), to spies, and to all those that have sufficient astuteness to gain favour with a prelate or cardinal; intolerable burthens to a state, small in extent, badly administered, and on the brink of ruin from debt.

Among all the branches of the administration the most expensive to the state is that of the waters and highways. This congregation (or board), which is composed of cardinals, has a council under it composed of its engineers. There is a separate central board of directors for works connected with the national highways, which has its council of art and engineers of the first and second class, besides those for extraordinary service. There is an administrative council for the operations required by the streets of cities, with an engineer at head quarters, as well as engineers of the first and second class. There is withal a presidency of waters and banks, and an administrative council for the aqueducts in Rome, with engineers, a council of art, and other functionaries such as those above mentioned. Finally, there is a general board for the hydraulic operations of the government, with a council of art, engineers of the first and second class, inspectors, &c. Then in the provinces there are engineers, inspectors, and others of the first and second class, who attend to the execution of hydraulic operations and to the national highways. In Bologna there is a commission called del Reno, which exercises jurisdiction over the rivers and torrents of the four legations, to which there are attached many engineers, inspectors, and engineers of the first and second class. Hence it is evident that this branch of the administration absorbs

an immense part of the public treasure, not only from the superabundant number of the persons employed, but unquestionably too from their being much over paid. The inspectors have ninety scudi a month, engineers of the first class sixty-five, those of the second class forty-five. The head engineers and the members of councils have much higher pay. The total cost of this branch of the administration is more than double what it was under the kingdom of Italy, which