them to the judge (Giudice Regio). The second decides pecuniary causes not exceeding six ducats in amount (about one pound sterling). Larger sums, up to twenty ducats, are decided by the royal judge; likewise without appeal. He, in fine, cannot decide in cases exceeding 200 ducats. It belongs to the judge royal, who has at his command one or more brigades of gens d'armes, to watch over the political opinions of the circuit; besides authority to condemn, in correctional cases, to the extent of a year's imprisonment. Crimes are tried at the criminal courts stationed at the chief towns of all the provinces. Besides the judge royal there were formerly in each of the provinces, two or more instructor judges, whose office it was to direct how the process should be conducted and trace out crimes, previous to the criminal courts taking cognisance of them; but they have now been abolished as involving a heavy charge on the finances without being of any evident utility. The civil courts established in every province of the kingdom, try causes involving sums above 200 ducats; from these there is an appeal to the grand civil court placed in each of the great divisions of the kingdom, that is, in Aquila for the Abruzzo, in Naples for Terra di Lavora, in Catanzaro for the Calabrias, in Lecce for Puglia; in Palermo, Messina, and Catania for Sicily. There is no appeal from the sentences that are pronounced by the criminal courts and by the grand civil courts; but they may be revised in the supreme court of cassation, an after recourse for the violation of the law. In confirmation of what has been said of the influence which the government exercises upon political opinions by means of the judiciary magistracy, it is well to reflect that the procurator general, or the public prosecutor in the criminal courts, is the centre into which are thrown all the affairs that concern politics and the public tranquillity of the province. He is in direct communication with the minister of the general police; all informations and charges come into his hands, so that the public spirit and the opinions of individuals through him come under the cognizance of the government. Hence his opinion in criminal trials, in what is called requisitory, has the utmost weight in the minds of the judges, who recognise in him one who possesses the confidence of the government. In fine, besides the courts in which law prevails over arbitrary power in consequence of the publicity of the pleadings, and which are the best part of the administration, there are two other courts, both of them atrocious and scandalous, namely, the high police, for opinions, and the military commission, for attempts at insurrection. The former, the heir of the holy office (of the Inquisition), is dark and impenetrable. Like the sword that hung suspended over the head of Damocles, it poisons all the joys that can embellish the citizen's domestic peace. Invisible, like the hand that wrote the sentence of Belshazzar, it strikes without the possibility of foreseeing the blow, or of escaping the consequences. The intendant, or political head of the province, invested with the powers of the ancient proconsuls, is its infallible judge, without appeal. It is true, indeed, that the sentences he pronounces do not exceed the limits of imprisonment, but they are not on that account the less atrocious and fatal. The arrests fulminated by the measures of the police are very frequent. Thrown into a prison, the wretch who is its victim sees those inexorable gates shut upon him, without knowing why they are shut, or when they will open to him again. There might at least be such a form of justice, as should admit of defence. From the insidious g-h interrogatories to which he is subjected, the accused has hardly a gleam of light to help him to discover, amid the darkness, what the fault is that he is charged with. Meanwhile, torn from his family, his home, and his business, to the grievous damage of his interests, of his reputation, and of his health, amid the inconveniences, the hubbub, and the noxious vapours of an unhealthy prison, the gentleman (for it is always the better sort of people that are made the butts of insolent dunces) is compelled to wait there upon the clemency of his persecutors. Months, and sometimes years pass away, and hundreds of victims look forward in vain to being restored to their desolate families. Orders for domiciliary visits go forth also from the police tribunals, or are issued at the caprice of the intendants. In the silence of night, a band of gens d'armes knocks at the door of the honest proprietor, or man of letters, and enters in the king's name, for the purpose of impudently inspecting the secrets of families. The hand of the police inspector opens desks, rummages shelves, and unfolds family letters and bonds, perhaps of considerable value, visits the most secret recesses of the house, and carries off with him every thing that he thinks likely to supply proofs of a political crime, and often such objects of value as seals, rings with some suspected cipher, and so forth, which seldom find their way again to the owner's hands. The police is the Argus and the Briareus of fable, a monster with a hundred eyes and a hundred arms. The supplente giudiciario and the sindaco in the communes, watch the opinions of individuals. The judge royal, with his subalterns and gens d'armes, watches over the circuit. The sub-intendant watches over the district. Besides the satellites whom each of these puts in movement, and those who depend on the procurator general, others directly dependent on the intendant, on the provincial commandant, and on the police commissary resident in each capital city of a province, and on the police inspector resident at each head office of a district, swarm about every where. If the astuteness of such people, accustomed as they are minutely to watch whatever the citizens are about, does not succeed in detecting some blot that calls down misfortune on the head of the person who is watched, and the favour of the government on the person who watches him, there is often no want of officious informers, who, from motives of private rancour or mercenary advantage, carry accusations to the intendant's office, and these are always favourably received. Let it not be said that this is a defect in the morality of the people and not of the government, for if the latter were not to be content with anonymous delations, or, without abating from severity towards well-founded accusations, were to punish those that were calumnious, the social plague would not be so bad. But the accusations are received in secret, and although they are often found to be false, they are usually attributed to an excess of zeal for the public tranquillity, never to evil intentions. An ambiguous expression caught up, in times of political agitation in whatsoever part of Europe, from the mouth of a liberal, is often the first link in a chain of persecution by the police, directed against the friends of the imprudent person, particularly if among his letters some should be found not quite clear in point of meaning, and which might admit of a sinister interpretation. In this manner the social ties are relaxed; a spirit of misanthropy and isolation obtains the mastery in the better part of society, distrust consumes the germs of associations, and offers a plausible pretext for dissimulation. An arrest at the instance of the police, or a domiciliary visit, spreads terror throughout all the families that are connected with the person that has been arrested, all fearing lest the tempest should discharge itself upon them. Should it so happen that after a long and painful imprisonment he recovers his freedom, still the effects of the disgrace into which he has fallen with the government, make themselves felt most bitterly. The eye of the police pursues the unfortunate man who, as if he were infected with some contagious disease, perceives that his presence brings uneasiness with it. Although public opinion is in favour of all those who are subjected to such abuses of power, and in the secret hearts of men police persecutions excite esteem and respect, yet terror counsels them to conceal generous sentiments, for the manifestation of these would cost the incautious an infinite series of embarrassments and vexations. Still further to increase uncertainty, distrust, and despondency in the liberal party, care is taken to spread insulting doubts of the sincerity of the opinions professed by the warmest patriots. It is whispered in the ears of the pusillanimous that they are spies; and these whispers originate with the police. To it, too, may often be attributed partial attempts at revolution; it certainly takes care to provoke these for the purpose of discovering those warm partisans who have contrived to escape the crafty eye of spies, and to sound the leanings of the people, in order that, on knowing them, it may proceed to take violent measures and inflict chastisements. The revolution of the city of Aquila in 1841, if not originally excited, was marvellously seconded by the police. During the period immediately preceding such a crisis, to all appearance nothing is suspected, nothing is perceived, so that the liberal party may advance securely to its object. The authorities, ordinarily so active, so energetic, and sharp, seem to be sunk in a lethargic sleep, only to re-assume their energy in the bloody trials that follow the catastrophe. All this proceeds from the notion that an amount of force which is useless for the purpose of breaking the chain, may weaken the prisoner and make him relapse into a state of greater languor and exhaustion. Meanwhile, the condemnation of from two to three hundred persons to death, the galleys, or long imprisonment, rids society of the most impatient youths. This system of incitement to insurrection, well enough known to the Italians, deceives the foreigner, who is incapable of conceiving the perfidy of the agents of police in Italy. In the chief cities particularly, nothing is more common than to hear in the public places people talking freely against oppression, censuring the acts of the government, and sneering at persons in the employment of the police. Nothing is more natural to foreigners, who have been born in free countries, than to conceive the false idea that freedom of speech is no crime, and that the governments of Italy, although absolute, are mild and paternal. These are not aware that those who speak so keenly, and show themselves such fervid advocates of a better state of society, are agents of the police, who of set purpose scatter about inflammatory words, in order to excite the passions of the less prudent, and to obtain in reply some expressions of a wish for liberty, some sarcasm against the government, some glance at better times, so that they may run off to the ministry and carefully lodge accusations there. The central police has a register of all names of the subjects, with running remarks on their respective characters, on the opinions that they cherish, and the influence that they exercise. The informations on the educated classes of each com mune are transmitted from the supplente giudiziario to the judges royal, and from them to the procurator general; from the sindachi to the intendants; and from the military chiefs to the commandant of the province; and each of these supreme inquisitors communicates with the central police, through the medium of the ministry of justice, that for home affairs, and that for war. The common people are considered as dependent on the parish priests, and hence remarks bearing on the lower classes, are transmitted from them to the respective bishops, and from them to the ministry for religious worship, which communicates them to that of police. In this manner the ministry of police has placed before its eyes an exact picture of the individual opinions of the whole kingdom. The excessive rigour that is adopted, and the state of violence which is made to press more and more upon the people, proves irrefragably that the police, in calculating its hopes and its fears, finds the latter better founded than the former. Besides the secret tribunal of police, there is also that for state offences, called the military commission. It has the commandant of the province for its president, and is composed of military officers who are appointed to try persons charged with attempts at insurrection, according to the military statute. The accused are allowed to choose an advocate for the defence, but great love of justice and generosity of feeling are required in an advocate who would take in hand so perilous a task. The odium of government is the ordinary consequence of such defences. For the most part the accused have an official defender assigned to them. The penalty of death by shooting is the ordinary sentence, which is executed on the expiration of twenty-four hours, without giving room for appeal. Such facility for the shedding of human blood, which makes all civilized Europe shudder, ought to kindle the greater indignation; but how much the greater is the inconsistency of the government which seems to have adopted principles of philosophical moderation with respect to the punishment of death. Although in this code it is made common to a fearful excess, yet already it seems abolished, not having been applied for some time, except in the case of some very rare offence fitted to produce unusual horror. But for despotic governments it is a worse crime to desire the diminution of their power than the dissolution of society, to which crimes have a natural tendency. The provincial commandant is the military authority appointed to put down all popular movements, and to maintain things as they are. The intendant is the administrative authority, and the procurator general the supreme authority, in the judicial branch. These are independent of each other in the exercise of their respective powers, but come into contact in the sole point of keeping an eye upon the public mind and the security of the throne. Each of them watches over the other two, so that the government has a threefold warranty for the execution of its will; although, indeed, as each of them enjoys a share of absolute power, none can require any spur to redoubled zeal in defence of a system of which they all form a part. The intendant acts as a spy on the thoughts, the procurator general dissects the heart, and the provincial commandant chains down the arms of society as it moves onward. Therefore there are a tribunal for opinions, special courts for conspiracies, and courts martial for insurrections. The municipal administration is directed by a syndic and the decurionato or communal council, In this varying in number, from ten to thirty, according to the population of the commune. council the affairs of the commune are discussed, and the resolutions adopted are transmitted by the syndic to the central administration of the province. A collector of the public revenues who corresponds directly with the receiver of the district; a cashier of the municipal revenues; two assistants to the syndic, with the names of First and Second Elect, are, besides the conciliatore and supplente giudiziario, the charges renewed in each commune every three years. The decurionato presents the candidates for each charge, and new members to supply the place of those of the municipal council who may happen to die within the three years. For each charge three individuals, taken from the list of the eligible inhabitants, are usually proposed. The proposed three, however, may be sent back by the intendant when the candidates do not enjoy the confidence of the government, and so a second, a third, and so on, until at length the person desired by the government is presented. It belongs also to the municipal council to propose the members for the district and provincial councils. These institutions have at first sight all the appearance of national representations, but if we consider them more closely, we find that they offer no, or very few advantages to the people. The persons who are called to form part of the provincial and district councils, besides that they must be proprietors with an income of not less than 300 and 200 ducats, respectively, must be such as enjoy the favour of the government, on which their election entirely depends; hence there is little probability of their being zealous for the public advantage. The district council meets every year at the head quarters of the sub-intendant. The provincial council meets in the capital of the province at the beginning of May, and continues its sittings during the course of the month. The president is directly chosen by the ministry from among the richest and most distinguished proprietors of the province. The attributions of the provincial council consist in setting forth the grievances of the provinces, in giving a formal expression to the demands suggested by the wants of society, in examining the state of the communal administrations, in discussing plans of public works, in bringing before the sindacato the conduct of public functionaries and censuring them when necessary, and, which most concerns the government, in partitioning the taxes and imposts among the communes. It is very clear that the idea that was to be embodied in this institution has been that of presenting a legal method of reforming abuses, promoting the weal and stimulating the progress of society towards a better state of things. The provincial council (the same may be said of the district council) is nothing but the right accorded to society of petitioning once a year. Now under a government sincerely desirous of promoting the good of the people this means might effect its object, but under a government at once despotic and hostile to all progress, it is not only rendered nugatory but is in many respects hurtful. The government, besides having made itself master of the election of the members, has given them no guarantee. The sittings are secret, and the results of the discussions remain concealed to the entire province. The way is closed on all sides upon the expression of public opinion, which is the sole defence of those magnanimous persons who would fain perform the duties incumbent on them in their difficult mission. Which of them would dare under such circumstances to open his mouth in complaining |