Argument for Fleming. specifically provided for to exercise a liberal discretion, except to oblige us personally for the payment of money." Weed was an "assentent," and deposited his bonds, getting in return a certificate of interest in the embryo Milwaukie and St. Paul Railway Company. The La Crosse and Milwaukie was sold under the decree of foreclosure. The agents, &c., purchased it, and it was now reorganized as the St. Paul and Minnesota Railway Company; the managers of that company being put, on confirmation of the sale, into possession of the road. All this, as it was to be collected from Fleming's petition and the documents annexed to it, was prior to his purchase of the bonds from Weed. In fact, the date of his purchase, as stated by him (September 26, 1863), was after the marshal's sale and the confirmation by the District Court. Being dissatisfied with the sale as made by the marshal and confirmed by the District Court, Fleming petitioned the Circuit Court for the order as already mentioned. That court refused the order. Mr. Carpenter, counsel of Fleming, now moved this court for a mandamus to the judges of the Circuit Court, commanding them to make such a rule on the marshal as had been prayed for and refused. The application to this court set forth that the marshal had sold, or pretended to sell, property belonging to another road, and not decreed to be sold, and that the District Court had pretended to confirm the same; but alleged that the District Court had no jurisdiction over the cause for any purpose whatever, the cause having been transferred to the Circuit Court; that the pretended confirmation of the sale was void; that the sale remained, therefore, in law unconfirmed; and that no steps could be taken to complete the foreclosure of the mortgage and protect the rights of the petitioner as a holder of bonds secured by the mortgage, except by having said sale reported, as it ought to be, to the Circuit Court. Mr. Coudrey, as amicus curiæ, submitted a brief, suggest Opinion of the court. ing that no proper interest was shown in Fleming to have what he asked for even if he had merits in fact; and arguing that, for various reasons which he set forth, no merits could exist; a matter, however, this last one, which the court, disposing of the case in limine, did not touch. Mr. Justice MILLER delivered its opinion. The petitioner does not show that he has such an interest in the matter as would justify the court to permit him to interfere. He describes himself as equitable owner of certain bonds made by the La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company. These bonds were secured by a mortgage; and it was in a suit brought to foreclose that mortgage that the sale was had of which he complains. The owner of these bonds, while the foreclosure proceedings were in progress, was Weed, who had deposited them with the agents of a company, which proposed to use them in buying the said road, at the sale under the decree of foreclosure. These agents were invested by Weed with an absolute and full power to use the bonds in any manner, so that no money was required of Weed towards the purchase. The sale was made, and the road purchased as proposed. These bonds were used in the purchase. The sale was confirmed by the District Court and the purchasers placed in possession. Long after all this was done, as the petitioner alleges, by purchase from Weed he became the equitable owner of the bonds. Who was the legal owner, and what were the relative rights of the equitable and legal owners, or how any one could be the owner when the bond had been cancelled or absorbed in paying for the road, we are not informed. We deem it sufficient to say that the petitioner, who had no interest in the matter at the time of the sale and confirmation, shows no right now to disturb what the parties who were interested have acquiesced in. MOTION OVERRULED. * See supra, p. 609, Minnesota Company v. St. Paul Company. INDEX. ACCRETION. Accretion by alluvion upon a street reduced by a lake boundary to less than half its regular width, belongs to the original proprietor of the lot, in whom, subject to the public easement, the fee of the half next the lake remains. Banks v. Ogden, 57. ACTION. RIGHT TO COMMENCE ASSUMPSIT. Where the purchaser of a claim for a patent agrees that, as soon as the patent is issued, he will give his notes, payable at a future date, the fact that no patent has issued until after the day when the last note, if given, would have been payable, is no defence to assumpsit for not having given the notes; the patent having finally issued in form. Read v. Bowman, 591. ADMIRALTY. I. JURISDICTION. 1. Property captured on land by the officers and crews of a naval force of the United States, is not "maritime prize;" even though, like cotton, it may have been a proper subject of capture generally, as an element of strength to the enemy. Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 404. II. PRACTICE. 2. A libel in prize need not allege for what cause a vessel has been seized, or has become prize of war; as, ex. gr., whether for an attempted breach of blockade or as enemy property. It is enough if it allege the capture generally as prize of war. The Andromeda, 481. 3. Libels in rem may be prosecuted in any district of the United States where the property is found. The Slavers (Reindeer), 384. 4. Stipulators in admiralty, who have entered into stipulations to procure the discharge of a vessel attached under a libel for collision, cannot be made liable for more than the amount assumed in their stipulation as the amount which the offending vessel is worth, with costs as stipulated for. The Ann Caroline, 538. III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 5. The ordinary and settled rule of navigation, that when two vessels are approaching each other on opposite tacks, both having the wind free, the one on the larboard side shall give way and pass to the right, is ADMIRALTY (continued). subject to modification when one is to the windward of the other, and ahead of or above her in a narrow channel, so that an observance of it might probably produce a collision. Ib. 6. The true damage incurred by a party whose vessel has been sunk by collision being the value of his vessel, that sum (without interest) was given in a proceeding in rem, where the value of the offending vessel was fixed in stipulations that had been entered into to procure her discharge at that identical sum. Ib. 7. As a general rule, there is no obligation on a sailing vessel proceeding on her voyage to shorten sail or lie to because the night is so dark that an approaching vessel cannot be seen. The Morning Light, 550. 8. A collision resulting from the darkness of the night, and without the fault of either party, is an "inevitable accident." Ib. ADVERSE POSSESSION. Where parties enter upon land and take possession without title or claim or color of title, such occupation is subservient to the paramount title, not adverse to it. Harvey v. Tyler, 328. AGENCY. See Bank Deposit. ALLUVION. Accretion by alluvion upon a street reduced by a lake boundary to less than half its regular width, belongs to the original proprietor of the lot; in whom, subject to the public casement, the fee of the half next the lake remains. Banks v. Ogden, 57. APPEALS. See Jurisdiction, 2, 3, 8, 9; Practice, 1, 2, 7. Appeals from decrees in cases of California surveys, in the name of the United States, acting for intervenors, under the act of June 14, 1860, commonly called the Survey Act, discouraged as being liable to abuse; since, on the one hand, the party wronged by the appeal gets no costs from the Government; while, on the other, the Government is made to pay the expenses of a suit promoted under its name by persons who may be litigious intervenors merely. United States v. Billing, 444. ASSIGNEES FOR CREDITORS. It is the duty of assignees for the benefit of creditors, who have once accepted the trust, not only to appear, but so far as the nature of the transaction, and the facts and circumstances of the case will admit or warrant, to defend the suit. And if a Federal court is already seized of the question of the validity of the trust, they should set up such pending proceeding against any attempt by parties in a State court to bring a decision of the case within its cognizance. If, when the Federal court has acquired previous jurisdiction, they submit with a mere appearance, and without any opposition to the jurisdiction of the State court, and pass over to a receiver appointed by it the assets of the trust, they will be held personally liable for them all in the Federal court. Chittenden et al. v. Brewster, 191. BANK DEPOSIT. Money collected by one bank for another, placed by the collecting bank BANKRUPT ACT OF 1841. The limitation of the eighth section of the bankrupt act of 1841 does not BLOCKADE. See Rebellion, 5. I. MAINTENANCE OF. 1. A blockade may be made effectual by batteries on shore as well as by II. ON CONTINUANCE OF. 2. The occupation of a city by a blockading belligerent does not termi- 4. The fact that the master and mate saw, as they swear, no blockading 5. Nor will continual entries in the log-book, supported by testimony of |