Statement of the case. be reversed, and the cause remanded to the court below, with directions to proceed on the same in conformity with this opinion; but liberty is given to the defendants to require proof before the court of the issuing of executions and return unsatisfied, as averred in the bill of complaint.* DECREE, ETC., ACCORDINGLY. CAMPBELL V. READ. A question involving the construction of a statute regulating intestacies within the District of Columbia, is not a question of law of "such extensive interest and operation," as that if the matter involved is not of the value of $1000 or upwards, this court will assume jurisdiction under the act of Congress of April 2d, 1816. THE act of Congress of April 2d, 1816,† regulating appeals and writs of error from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia to this court, limits them to cases in which the matter in dispute is of the value of $1000 or upwards. It provides, however, that if "any questions of law of such extensive interest and operation as to render the final decision of them by the Supreme Court desirable" are involved in the alleged errors of the Circuit Court, the case may be heard here, even though the matter in dispute is of less value than $1000; and any judge of the court, if he is of opinion that the questions are of such a character, may allow the writ or appeal accordingly. With this statute in force, Campbell, by will, left legacies to his widow and several illegitimate children; but, after paying them all, a fund of $141 remained in the hands of the executor undisposed of; there being no residuary legatee named in the will, and no parents, &c., legitimate children, *Levy v. Arredondo, 12 Peters, 218; Marine Insurance Company ". Hodgson, 6 Cranch, 206; Mandeville v. Burt, 8 Peters, 256–7. 3 Stat. at Large, 261. Opinion of the court. or collateral relations, who had the right to claim it as next of kin in preference to the widow. 66 The widow accordingly claimed it under statute. Her claim was opposed by the executor in virtue of an act regulating such matters in the District, and which declares that every bequest of personal estate to the wife of a testator shall be construed to be intended in bar of her share of the per sonal estate, unless it be otherwise expressed in the will."* Her right depended, therefore, upon a construction of this statute, and the point before this court was, whether this question was a question of law of such extensive interest and operation as to render the final decision of it, in a case like the present one, by this court, desirable. Under the impression that it might be, or under some misunderstanding, an allocatur had been allowed in vacation by one of the justices of this court. The printed copy of the record showed no certificate that the papers it contained were a transcript of the record, though counsel put nothing on that ground, which was supposed to be an accident only. Mr. Eames, for the appellant, argued that the question was of such a character as the act of Congress contemplated. It concerned the whole subject of testaments and intestacies in a large and important territory, constantly increasing in population and wealth, the seat of the Federal Government itself. The amount here, indeed, was not large, but the principle, and therefore the "question of law," was the same as if the amount was millions. Mr. Stone, contra. At a subsequent day, the CHIEF JUSTICE announced briefly the court's opinion, that independently of the record's not showing a proper certificate,—this itself being a sufficient ground for dismissal,—the amount in controversy was insignificant, and that the court was satisfied, on an inspection of the papers, that the allocatur was inadvertently * Act of Maryland, 1798; Dorsey's Laws, 406. Statement of the case. sanctioned. There was, he said, no principle involved of such extensive application as to bring the case within the act of Congress giving jurisdiction on a judge's allocatur when the amount in controversy is less than $1000. Notwithstanding the allocatur, therefore, the case was DISMISSED. BANK TAX CASE. A tax laid by a State on banks, "on a valuation equal to the amount of their capital stock paid in, or secured to be paid in," is a tax on the property of the institution; and when that property consists of stocks of the Federal Government, the law laying the tax is void. A STATUTE of the State of New York, passed in 1857, making some modifications of previous acts of 1823, 1825, and 1830, enacted that the capital stock of the banks of the State should be assessed at its actual value, and taxed in the same manner as other personal and real estate of the country." After the passage of this act, several of the banks became owners of large amounts of the bonds of the United States, in regard to which Congress enacts* that "whether held by individuals or corporations, they shall be exempt from taxation by or under State authority." On a question between several banks of New York, formed under the general banking law of 1838 in that State, and the tax commissioners of New York, this court decided, in March, 1863 (Bank of Commerce v. New York City, reported in 2 Black, 620), tha the tax referred to was a tax upon the stock; and that being so, it was by the settled law of this court illegally imposed. In April, 1863, just after this decision, the legislature of New York passed another statute,† which enacted that "all banks, banking associations, &c., shall be liable to taxation on a valuation equal to the amount of their capital stock paid in or secured to be paid in, and their surplus earnings, &c., in the manner now provided by law," &c. On a tax laid, under *Act of February 25, 1862. Act of 29th April, 1863. Argument in support of the tax. this act, by the commissioners, upon the different banks of New York City, some of which had invested their whole capital in the securities of the Federal Government, and others of which had largely done so, the question was whether this second act did or did not also impose a tax upon these stocks. The Court of Appeals of New York decided that it did not; and from this decision the case came here. It is proper to say that by the general banking law of New York, under which all these banks were created, it is enacted that the legislature may at any time alter or repeal the act. Between twenty and thirty banks being now here as plaintiffs in error, and the question being one of magnitude both in amount and in principle,* as many of the corporations as wished to be heard were heard, though the principle involved was much the same in the case of each. Messrs. Devlin, Brady, and Kernan, for the tax commissioners: These corporations are created by the State, and endowed by it with valuable franchises. That the corporations should pay the State for these is obvious. To make them pay is the purpose of the act. The tax is imposed upon corporations directly and specifically. It is not imposed upon their property. The thing is the same in substance as though the State required the corporation to pay annually into the State treasury a specified sum for the privileges and franchises granted. It is to be paid irrespective of the character of the securities held by the bank. Instead, for example, of requiring a specified sum to be paid annually, the law requires the corporation to pay to the State annually an amount equal to the tax which would be levied, for State purposes, on a valuation equal to the amount" of the nominal capital stock of the bank. This is more just than to exact a fixed. sum annually. The reference in the statute to "a valuation equal to the amount of their capital stock, paid in or secured 66 * It was stated by one of the counsel in the case, Mr. Marshall Spring Bidwell, that to the banks of New York City alone the tax made a difference of $1,500,000. Argument in support of the tax. to be paid in, and their surplus earnings," is only for the purpose of fixing the amount which the corporations are annually to pay for their franchises. It has no regard to the actual capital owned by the bank, or to the securities, or the value of the securities held by it. Concede, for the sake of argument, that the burden imposed by the act of 1863 upon the banks indirectly affects the United States securities by diminishing the inducements to the banks to invest in them, how does this render the act invalid? The State was under no obligation to create these corporations to aid directly or indirectly the Federal Government in exercising its powers. Without violating the Constitution of the United States, the State might, by the original act creating them, have required these banks to make State stocks or mortgages the basis of and security for the redemption of the notes they were authorized to issue, and to invest all their capital and funds in these securities, to the exclusion of United States stocks. The State is not bound to continue the existence of the banks because they aid the Federal Government. They are created by power of the State, and by the express provisions of their charter exist only during its pleasure. They were created for the benefit of the people of the State, and whenever, in the judgment of the legislature, the good of the State requires it, they may be abolished, notwithstanding they were beneficial to the Federal Government in the exercise of its power to borrow money. Hence, while the State cannot tax the bonds issued by the United States held by these institutions, it can compel them to contribute to State burdens, as the price of their existence, the same amount as though they did not hold such bonds. The fact, if it be so, that this action of the State will tend to prevent these institutions from investing in United States bonds, does not render the same unconstitutional any more than their non-creation would be a failure by the State to perform its constitutional duty, or the repeal of their charters would be a violation of the constitution. Being the creatures of State power, the State may legitimately so create and burden them that they shall subserve |