Page images
PDF
EPUB

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S THEORY OF THE WAR.

363

the country was refusing to recognize as unimpaired the dignity, equality, and rights of the late insurrectionary states.

The Democratic party was loyal to this resolution throughout the war. The hand-writing of Mr. Crittenden in that historic document is as familiar to the eye of the writer as if it were the face of an old friend. He was elected upon its principles in 1862, in the midst of the war and by a Republican district. Its principles were understood to be Mr. Lincoln's cautious shibboleth. It was because of its essential loyalty to the Union and Constitution that the Democratic party was anxious at all times during the war to propose or accept terms of compromise looking to the restoration of the Union. But it never did nor would consent to a disruption of the Union. The Democratic party did not support the war for the purpose of destroying slavery, nor with a view to obtain and retain control of the government. It would at any time have embraced the "Union as it was," and let slavery disappear, as it must necessarily have done, in the peaceful mode by which the advance of liberal ideas would have brought about emancipation.

Many good men, in and out of Congress, feared to trust the South with its rightful constitutional power when the Civil War terminated. It was feared that its power would be exercised to defeat, as far as possible, the results of the war. It might bring ruin to our financial system. It might lead to the repudiation of the national debts and the just claims of those who had given up their blood and treasure for the maintenance of the Union. This apprehension gave great strength to the Republican party during the protracted period of reconstruction. It was easy for the selfishness of partisanship to exaggerate the dangers that would ensue if a period of probation, or purgation, was not passed through by those who had "sought to destroy the Union." But there were men of undoubted loyalty who had no fear of any evil results from the immediate restoration of Federal relations. Suppose the South had been at once admitted to representation in Congress? Would that section have been able to destroy any legitimate object for which the national government had contended in the struggle? Certainly not. In such case, if the South had not accepted amnesty as freely and in as good faith as it was offered by the President of the United States, she would soon have found herself in a minority so small as to leave her nothing else to do than to honestly accept the results of the war. There would, if the South remained sullen, soon be, as practically there was during the early part of the war, but one party in the North.

Extreme partisanship always defeats itself. It ruled during the period of reconstruction following the close of armed hostilities. Had not the dominant party an overweening, and many of them a malicious desire to perpetuate their power, no such chaos would have come to mark that period. It is this partisanship that deserves to be pilloried by patriotic rebuke. It is not the sincere fears that gave it strength. There was indeed some apparent reason

for these fears in the course pursued in the South against the colored people. The emancipation of the slaves was one of the legitimate results of the war. What was the legitimate result of emancipation? Had not that great Southerner, John C. Calhoun, always said that with emancipation must come equality before the law-civil and even political rights? Was not the latter result hastened by the unwisdom of extremes? It was extremes on both sides that hastened the grant of the franchise to a class who were unprepared to exercise it. But it was only hastened, for eventually the South herself would concede the franchise when it would be more intelligently exercised.

One of the main difficulties of intelligent discussion in respect to the constitutional questions involved in secession and reconstruction, is the misuse of terms. Secession was not "war"; it was "insurrection." The effort for its suppression had to be made in the mode of civilized warfare, because of the force and extent of the resistance to be overcome; and because foreign governments recognized the South as a belligerent power. But these facts could not affect the true relation of the national government to the question, which was simply one of insurrection and the constitutional requirement for its suppression.

Before closing this chapter, the writer takes a patriotic pride in being able to say that throughout the whole period of civil war and reconstruction, in every debate in the National Legislature, in every act of the Executive, and in every decision of the Judicial branch of the government, there was ever an earnest protestation of submission to the Constitution of the United States. The worst excesses of partisanship did not dare to openly evade its mandates. Even the South, which had tried to dissever its Federal relations, again appealed, as it had the right to do, to the protection of that palladium of their government-THE CONSTITUTION.

CHAPTER XX.

RECONSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

- THADDEUS STEVENS AS A

RULE THE

DIALECTICS AND SOPHISTRIES OF THE RADICALS
LEADER - A MAN OF IRON HIS TALISMANIC POWER THE VICTORS'
SPOILS PERPETUATION OF REPUBLICAN
DEAD STATES
THE CONSTITUTION IGNORED-THE LAW OF NATIONS FOR THE SOUTH
BELLIGERENT RULES IN PEACE · PRIZE LAW FOR THE STATES-UNION ON
CONDITION OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE - THE RADICAL FALLACIES - THE FED-
ERAL GANGLION THE DOCTRINE OF CONQUEST O CONFISCATION
CONFEDERATE DEBTS INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF THE STATES
TIONAL RECONSTRUCTION.

AND

CONSTITU.

T

HE author was not at first impressed with the genius and ability of Thaddeus Stevens. In the Thirty-sixth Congress, when Governor Pennington was elected Speaker after a prolonged struggle, this Pennsylvanian of Vermont birth did not appear to advantage. His only effort in that struggle was a motion of immaterial consequence about the deadlock. He then subsided into a seeming stolid mediocrity. But he was far removed from mediocrity. He had a will of audacious and intolerant quality. His humor was not like that of "Ben" Harden or "Tom" Corwin,- iridescent and genial. It smacked of Voltaire. It had lurid lights. The intensity of his hatred was only next to infernal; but he seldom indulged it. He never hated a fair opponent. He did hate, bitterly, some of his own party who would not follow his doctrine, and obliterate states in order to territorialize and terrorize them. He had Pluto's iron countenance; but he could unbend and be kindly. His neighbors of all classes and colors and of both sexes, in and about Lancaster County, remember him as almost genial, notwithstanding the inflexibility of his countenance and the determination of his character. He was, more even than Judge Howe or Mr. Sumner, the constructionist of the new order and the obstructionist to the rebuilding of the older order. In the House of Representatives, early in the first session of the Thirty-eighth Congress, on the 5th of December, 1865, he arose

6

to dictatorship. He commanded universal party obedience. That Congress had great parliamentary ability. It had its Washburnes, its Wilsons, its Binghams, its Shellabargers, and its Blaines. It had but one Thaddeus Stevens. This man was not superficial. He was profound. He knew that the times called either for retrogression from his war policies, or else organic and risky forwardness. He would not ask to carry out the Constitution. He would, at least, first amend it. How? Thus, for example: "Neither the United States, nor any state in the Union, shall ever assume or pay any part of the debt of the so-called Confederate States of America, or of any state, contracted to carry on war with the United States." On the same day that he offered this he proposed the following amendment to the Constitution : "Amend the ninth section of the first article by expunging so much thereof as says: No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state."" This was a cunning, tentative tender to his party. It was to be followed by almost inconceivable audacities of policy; for, on the same day, he moved another amendment to the Constitution. It was this: "Representatives shall be apportioned among the states which may be within the Union, according to their respective legal voters, and for this purpose none shall be named as legal voters who are not either native-born citizens or naturalized foreigners. Congress shall provide for ascertaining the number of said voters. A true census of the legal voters shall be taken at the same time with the regular census." Would he stop herc? By no means. On the same day he introduced the following amendment: "Article XIII. All national and state laws shall be equally applicable to every citizen, and no discrimination shall be made on account of race and color." All of these proposed amendments, except that which was intended to authorize the taxation of exports, have been incorporated into the Constitution, substantially, though in more guarded language. The failure to adopt the proposed amendment allowing a tax on exports did not prevent Congress, however, from imposing a tax on cotton, a product mostly raised for exportation. Sixty-seven millions of dollars of cotton taxes were collected.

The right to govern the insurgent states as territories, Mr. Stevens asserted as necessary. Many curious logical difficulties arose from the admission of that right. To deny the right of secession and to assert the right to suppress a rebellion in which the authorities in the states are involved, and at the same time to concede to the people of such states, upon surrendering their arms, the right to resume their position as citizens, with all the privileges of citizens, would seem to some minds to be at least impolitic. But, admitting that the United States Government has the right to maintain its authority against the authorities of a state, or a combination of state authorities, does it follow that the right to govern these states as territories must be conceded to the United States when no insurrection exists? The idea of holding, for a generation perhaps, any people, whether they

CAN CONGRESS GOVERN STATES?

367 be citizens of revolted states, or foreigners, under governments arbitrarily forced upon them by a power external to them, is repugnant to republican principles, to the spirit of liberty, and to sound policy. No such idea was suggested by Congress, or the Executive, when the people arose to defend and maintain the Union. But Mr. Stevens cared little for the motives that actuated the defenders of the Union who suppressed secession. That iron man of an iron state gave his reasons with colorless rhetoric for these amendHe seldom spoke at length; but on the 18th of December, 1865, he unfolded with no unmusical nor unpersuasive voice his audacious, sweeping, and vindictive policies. History demands its reproduction, for it presents the whole architectural design of radical reconstruction. He said to the listening House, taking the President's message for his text:

"A candid examination of the power and proper principle of reconstruction can be offensive to no one, and may possibly be profitable by exciting inquiry. One of the suggestions of the message which we are now considering has special reference to this. Perhaps it is the principle most interesting to the people at this time. The President assumes, what no one doubts, that the late rebel states have lost their constitutional relations to the Union, and are incapable of representation in Congress except by permission of the government. It matters but little, with this admission, whether you call them states out of the Union, and now conquered territories, or assert that because the Constitution forbids them to do what they did do, that they are therefore only dead as to all national and political action, and will remain so until the government shall breathe into them the breath of life anew, and permit them to occupy their former position. In other words, that they are not out of the Union, but are only dead carcasses lying within the Union. In either case it is very plain that it requires the action of Congress to enable them to form a state government, and send representatives to Congress. Nobody, I believe, pretends that with their old constitutions and frames of government they can be permitted to claim their old rights under the Constitution. They have torn their constitutional states to atoms, and built on their foundations fabrics of a totally different character. Dead men cannot raise themselves. Dead states cannot restore their own existence 'as it was.' Whose especial duty is it to do it? In whom does the Constitution place the power? Not in the judicial branch of the government, for it only adjudicates, and does not prescribe laws. Not in the executive, for it only executes, and cannot make laws. Not in the commander-in-chief of the armies, for he can only hold them under military rule until the sovereign legislative power of the conqueror shall give them law.

"There is fortunately no difficulty in solving the question. There are two provisions in the Constitution, under one of which the case must fall. The

« PreviousContinue »