REPEAL OF THE IRON-CLAD QATH.

257 the Fourteenth Amendment into the Constitution. They made its adoption a condition for the restoration of Federal relations to states that were held under the arbitrary rule of semi-military governments.. The third section of that amendment is clearly a bill of attainder, although in form a declaration of qualification for members of Congress, Presidential electors, and state and Federal officers. The second section is of the same character. It grants, or attempts to grant, power to the state to proscribe by ex post facto laws certain classes of citizens, and to deprive them of their elective franchise.

This amendment introduced into the organic law a principle so abhorrent to liberty and justice, that from time immemorial it had been regarded by the American people and their ancestors as one of the vilest which could be resorted to, under the worst forms of tyranny. It was thought that no free people could submit to it under any circumstances. But there it stands. It is to-day a monument to the satanic malice of the radical party. It is a warning to succeeding generations of the excesses of partisan lust. It is the highest glory that any party can claim, that it opposed with all its might, this amendment that is so obnoxious to every other feature of our government. It is to the glory of Mr. Speaker Randall and the Democrats who followed him, that he led them successfully in an encounter against the infamous Force bill which was intended to crystallize into acts of hate these codes of spite. The scope of this amendment has been curtailed by the recent partial repeal of the iron-clad oath. After long and repeated efforts to that end in Congress, this much was secured. It is one of the writer's gratifications that the fight he commenced almost single-handed years ago against that attainder oath, he carried on and on, until in the very last Congress he forced a repeal of some of its worst tests, under a suspension of the rules and by a two-thirds vote. But an account of those efforts will be given in another place.

The iron-clad oath was the worst and the most wide-reaching of all the unconstitutional proscriptions in the South. Property might be and was often seized and confiscated; but still there was left the talent and ability to replace the rapine. But in the case of the oath, the proscription lasted for all time. It excluded almost the whole talent and worth of nearly one-half the people of the Union. It forbade them any honorable participation in their own government. Was it any wonder that the Democratic party did all that it could to prevent such terrible outrages and violations of natural and constitutional rights? Yet, on the pretense of patriotic defense of the law and of cherished principles of government, the party of such tyrannical measures had, and still has, the unblushing audacity to charge that the Northern Democrats aided and sympathized with secession. Had it not been for the Democratic party there would not be to-day a Union of states. There would be only the unity of a government by the party of ostracism and tyranny.

CHAPTER XIII.

FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING THE CIVIL WAR.

GREAT BRITAIN RECOGNIZES THE CONFEDERACY-BELLIGERENT RIGHTS CONCEDED -JUDGE BLACK'S CIRCULAR LETTER-MR. BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION VINDICATING NATIONAL JURISDICTION-MR. SEWARD SPEAKING FOR PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ADMINISTRATION-APPREHENSIONS—A FEATHER IN THE SCALE-THE SWITZERLAND CASE-EARLY TREATIES WITH EUROPE RECOGNIZING OUR INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN STATES-THE SPANISH AMERICAN STATES-FREEDOM OF THE STATES-MEDIEVAL RULES OF MARITIME LAW-PIRACY-CONTRABAND OF WAR-TREATIES AS TO CONTRABAND-THE MARCY PROPOSITIONS-THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1856 AND ITS DECLARATION-THE UNITED STATES AMENDMENT OF THE DECLARATION-THE AUTHOR'S RESOLUTIONS AND SPEECH - THE DEMOCRACY OF THE SEA-EARL RUSSELL'S PROPOSITION-MR. SEWARD'S DILEMMA AND RESPONSE THE CONFEDERATE RIGHTS AS BELLIGERENTS-CANADA REBELLION IN 1838-OUR BLOCKADE MUST BE RESPECTED-OUR NAVAL ARMAMENT-- MR. SEWARD AS A STATESMAN.

HE most important question in regard to our foreign relations during the civil war period, was that of the status of the seceded states. This question received early attention. It was discussed not only

T

by the Federal and Confederate Cabinets, but also by the Cabinets of the leading European nations. By a tacit understanding with the other powers, England took the leading part in determining this and all other questions of an international character growing out of our war. The result was, that as early in the struggle as May 13, 1861, the Confederacy was recognized by Her Britannic Majesty, in a proclamation of neutrality, as a belligerent power. To prevent such a recognition, Mr. Black, Secretary of State in the administration of President Buchanan, had, on Feb. 28, 1861, addressed a circular letter to each of our ministers at the European courts. In this letter Mr. Black stated that it was not improbable "that persons claiming to represent the states which had attempted to throw off their Federal obligations, would seek a recognition of their independence" by the governments to which the ministers to whom the letter was addressed

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were accredited. "In the event," he said, "of such an effort being made, you are expected by the President to use such means as may in your judgment be proper and necessary to prevent its success." He called attention to the reasons set forth in the President's message, then recently addressed to the Congress, showing that the states had no constitutional power to secede from the Union; and that the Southern States had no sufficient grounds "to justify the revolutionary act of severing the bond" which connected them. with their sister states. "This government," he said, "has not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction within the territory of these states, and does not desire to do so." For this reason, said the secretary, "it must be very evident that it is the right of this government to ask of all foreign powers that the latter shall take no steps which may tend to encourage the revolutionary movement of the seceding states, or increase the danger of disaffection in those which still remain loyal." Attention was called to the facts that Mr. Lincoln had been elected as the candidate of the Republican or anti-slavery party; that the preceding discussion had been confined almost entirely to topics connected, directly or indirectly, with negro slavery; and that the electoral votes of the Northern states (excepting three in New Jersey) had been cast for the anti-slavery candidate, while the sentiment of the South was the other way. Our ministers were to hold out the hope that entire harmony would soon be restored. They were to point out to foreign governments that any acknowledgment by them of the so-called Confederate States would tend to disturb the friendly relations, diplomatic and commercial, then existing between those governments and the United States, and prove adverse to their own interests. Thus early did the administration of President Buchanan take the important step of instructing our representatives abroad to use their best efforts against any recognition of the Confederate States. No uncertain grounds were taken. The secession movement was characterized as unjustifiable and revolutionary. National jurisdiction was asserted. The consequences of foreign recognition were plainly stated. It was still hoped that the seceding states would, in a short time, submit their grievances, if any, to peaceful arbitration. Yet this Administration was afterward denounced because it did not, at that time, destroy this hope by resorting to the sword at once.

Upon the 9th of March following, Mr. Seward, Secretary of State in President Lincoln's administration, addressed a circular letter to the same ministers. He called attention to Mr. Black's previous instructions. He reiterated them. He expressed the same hope of a speedy adjustment of our troubles, "by a firm, yet just and liberal bearing, co-operating with the deliberate and loyal action of the American people." Our ministers were to "truthfully urge" upon foreign governments that the "present disturbances " had "their origin only in popular passions, excited under novel circumstances of very transient character." In this vital matter, the Republican

Administration pursued throughout the war the policy of the last Democratic Administration. England, as stated, took the lead in ignoring all the friendly considerations urged by Mr. Seward and his predecessor against the recognition of the seceding states. Much had been expected from her supposed friendship for the United States and announced abhorrence of negro slavery. But this expectation was disappointed by Her Britannic Majesty. She announced by the proclamation that her government had assumed a neutral attitude in regard to our contest. Her Majesty's government thereby recognized the Confederate States as a belligerent power. This recognition gave great encouragement to the Confederates. It had a corresponding effect in prolonging the war, with its enormous outpouring of fraternal blood and com

mon treasure.

In perusing the diplomatic correspondence of this period, the reader can see prominent in its pages, a great apprehension of foreign intervention in our affairs. It seemed, at times, as if a feather would have cast the scales against us. Our form of government was not favored by those who created and directed the policies of the European nations. The mere existence of such a free and popular government was regarded as a standing menace to monarchical institutions. The advocates of these institutions had long been predicting, what they wished,—our downfall. There was, therefore, good reason to apprehend that nothing but discretion would restrain the anti-republican parties in England and other European powers from forcing their governments into ultra measures against the Union. It was discretion, more than regard for comity, that prevented intervention. In 1848, the republican movement which had long been fomenting in Europe had given a shock to monarchical institutions. This did not incline the ruling classes to look with disfavor on the dismemberment of our Union. Nevertheless, the supporters of monarchy must have seen the impolicy of giving countenance to the disruption of a great government by revolutionary measures. This consideration operated in our favor. It had a restraining influence on the powers which might have actively favored secession in the American Republic.

Fourteen years before our trouble there was secession in the Swiss Republic. There was an attempted intervention in its favor by the great European powers. At the opening of the Federal Tagsatzung (Swiss diet) on July 5, 1847, the presiding officer, Ulrich Ochsenbein, spoke in regard to the threatened recognition of the seceding cantons by England, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and other powers. He said on that trying occasion: "No foreign intervention in our domestic affairs should be tolerated. Switzerland never solicited any foreign power to guarantee the constitutional compact of her twenty-two cantons. The sovereignty of her government never has been questioned; it was her territory alone which the allied powers at Vienna declared inviolable. Should she be subjected to

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the intermeddlings of any foreign power, we would prove to the world that her arms are strong when raised in defense of our rights; and that in such a contest they would be powerfully supported by the sympathies of every people seeking to imitate our political institutions."

There was then grave reason in that Mountain Republic to apprehend such intervention as we feared in our Civil War. Two days before, the French Premier, Guizot, had sent a note to Count Bois le Compte, the French Ambassador in Switzerland. In it, he clearly indicated a design to favor the Swiss secessionists. The grounds on which the recognition of the seceding cantons was to be declared were so similar to those which might have been applied to us by any European power, that no apology is necessary for now presenting them. The position assumed by France, as stated by Guizot in his note, was this:

The Federal Congress of Switzerland has no right to submit a minority of cantons to the will of the majority, inasmuch as all treaties acknowledge Switzerland, not as a centralized power, but as a Confederacy of states, which have each reserved, as a check on the Federal Congress, their supreme right of state sovereignty." France, therefore, in conjunction with the other Allied Powers of Europe, protested against any interpretation of the Swiss compact that would, as M. Guizot stated the case, destroy the individuality of the cantons. Any other interpretation would lead to the total abrogation of the Federal Constitution of Switzerland. It would consequently invalidate the treaties made under its provisions. On this slender pretext the Allied Powers were in favor of aiding the Swiss secessionists to destroy the only republic in Europe. England had expressed a willingness to accept any government that the Allied Powers might approve. case, the London Times was vehemently in favor of foreign intervention. It extolled the Secession League. It denounced the Federal government. The Morning Post, true to its anti-republican policy, styled the Federal army of Switzerland, "the army of invasion." The brave little republic was not intimidated. It remained unmoved. It still stands, like its mountains a monument to patriotism and liberty.

Two years before, change of the Swiss Then, as in our own

Similar to that of the Swiss, would have been our defiance to the Powers of Europe, had foreign intervention come upon us. We did not court a greater conflict than that which seemed to engage all our strength. But surely, if the Helvetii could talk to Europe in the strain quoted, we need not have been apprehensive of intervention by the powers of that continent. They could have made the same case in regard to our seceding states that they made in favor of the seceding cantons. Indeed, it was always a matter of quiet surprise to the writer, that none of the powers suggested it. England did not do so, although she might have discovered a foundation for the theory that our government was "a Confederacy of States,