$9. Analysis and Summary of subject-matter.

a. Academica Posteriora.

SS 1-14. Prooemium. Cic. Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae (1). Cic., after adroitly reminding Varro that the promised dedication of the De lingua Latina is too long delayed, turns the conversation towards philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves this subject untouched (2, 3). Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful purpose, and points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4-6). He greatly believes in philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to Greece for it, while he devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion, but demurs to the theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless. Latins may surely imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and orators. He gives reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and instancing the success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy (9-12). Varro putting the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the Old Academy for the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for the statement that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro refers to Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a proposal on the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference between Antiochus and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition of the principles of Antiochus (13, 14).

S$ 15-18. Part of Varro's exposition: Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy. Socrates rejected physics and made ethics supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets; his one doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of ignorance. Moral exhortation was his task (16). Plato added to and enriched the teaching of his master; from him sprang two schools which abandoned the negative position of Socrates and adopted definite tenets, yet remained in essential agreement with one another-the Peripatetic and the Academic (17, 18).

SS 19-23. Part II of Varro's exposition: Antiochus' Ethics. The threefold division of philosophy into ηθική, φυσική, λογική. Goodness implies obedience to nature; happiness the acquisition of natural advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and external. The bodily are described (19); then the mental, which fall into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of the acquired (20); then the external, which form with the bodily advantages a kind of exerciseground for virtue (21). The ethical standard is then succinctly stated, in which virtue has chief part, and is capable in itself of producing happiness, though not the greatest happiness possible, which requires the possession of all three classes of advantages (22). With this ethical standard, it is possible to give an intelligent account of action and duty (23).

§§ 24-29. Part III of Varro's exposition: Antiochus' Physics. All that is consists of force and matter, which are never actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate. When force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed entity (woɩóv Tɩ or quale)—(24). These formed entities are either primary or secondary. Air, fire, water, earth are primary; the two first having an active, the two last a passive function. Aristotle added a fifth primary substance (26). Underlying all formed entities is the formless matter; matter and space are infinitely subdivisible (27). Force or form acts on the formless matter and so produces the ordered universe,

outside which no matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes it eternal. This Reason has various names-Soul of the Universe, Mind, Wisdom, Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the same thing (28, 29).

§§ 30-32. Part IV of Varro's exposition: Antiochus' Logic. Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based knowledge on the senses, they did not place in the senses the criterion of truth, but in the mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true (30). The senses they thought heavy and clogged and unable to gain knowledge of such things as were either too small to come into the domain of sense, or so changing and fleeting that no part of their being remained constant or even the same, seeing that all parts were in a continuous flux. Knowledge based only on sense was therefore mere opinion (31). Real knowledge only came through the reasonings of the mind; hence they defined everything about which they argued, and also used etymology, from which they drew proofs. In these two processes consisted their dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric (32).

$$ 33-42. Part v of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old AcademicoPeripatetic school. Aristotle crushed the idéal of Plato; Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato abandoned ethics for physics; Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing but virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name good to nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes; some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value and called them preferred; to the second a negative value and called them rejected; to the third no value whatever-mere verbal alterations on the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms right action and sin belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate action (officium) and an inappro priate, which concerned things preferred and things rejected (37). He made all virtue reside in the reason, and considered not the practice but the mere possession of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic, he analysed sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40). Sensations (uisa) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a sensation he called it Knowledge; if otherwise, Ignorance (41). Perception, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor wrong, but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them of the reason, he thought could not co-exist with virtue and perfect wisdom (42).

He

§§ 43-end: Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the ancients to despair of knowledge (44). even abandoned the one tenet held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely (45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were carried on by Carneades (+6).

h. Academica Priora.

S$ 1-12. Prooemium. Lucullus, though an able and cultivated man, was absent from Rome on public service too long during his earlier years to attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great general. This was due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory (2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits as a commander and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till just before my consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I cannot now tell (3). He was not merely a general; he was also a philosopher, having learned much from Antiochus and read much for himself (4). Those enemies of Greek culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know philosophy, must be referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5). Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public duty; nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but enriched, by a repu tation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who hold that the interlocutors in these dialogues had no such knowledge as is attributed to them only prove that they can make their envy reach beyond the grave. Some critics do not approve the particular philosophy which I follow-the Academic. This is natural; but they must know that Academicism puts no stop to inquiry (7). My school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools are enslaved to authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the Catulus (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to defend the doctrines of Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to do, although the doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day before (10). He spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard discussions between Antiochus and Heraclitus Tyrius the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo. At that very time the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday came into the hands of Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book against his old teacher (11, 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the latter against Philo (12).

§§ 13-18. Part I of Lucullus' exposition: false statements of the New Academics concerning the history of philosophy. Cicero seems to me to have acted like a seditious tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as supporters of scepticism (13). Those very philosophers, with the exception of Empedocles, appear to me, if anything, too dogmatic (14). Even if they were often in doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made during so many centuries by the investigations of so many men of ability? Arcesilas was a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti. Gracchus was a rebel against a good government (15). Has nothing really been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty though brilliant support (16). Now many dogmatists think that no argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument can add nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (17). Most however do allow of discussion with sceptics. Philo, in his innovations, was induced to state falsehoods, and incurred all the evils he wished to avoid; his rejection of Zeno's definition of the xaraληπтikǹ paνтαola really led him back to that utter scepticism from which he was fleeing. We then must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in to the sceptics (18).

S$ 19-29. Part 11 of Lucullus' exposition: inaction of every kind, physical and

mental, is the logical outcome of scepticism. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain the truth of every sensation; Epicurus must see to that. Obstacles which impede the action of the senses must always be removed; in practice we always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch! (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since they come through sense; these rise in complexity till we arrive at definitions and ideas (21). If these ideas may possibly be false, then logic, memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible (22). That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false? (23). How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her? There must be some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence must be given to the phenomena which impel us to action, otherwise action is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are by scepticism rendered useless; philosophy too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis (27). Hence the Academics have been urged to allow their dogma, that perception is impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the supposition that there can be any true perception (28). Antiochus declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if they had not even confidence in their one dogma (29).

§§ 30-36. Part III of Lucullus' exposition: nature has formed men for the attainment of certitude, and no substitute which the sceptics offer is of any use. With respect to physical science, we might urge that nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some sceptics say we cannot help it.' Others distinguish between the absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence. Let us deal with these rather than with the former (32). Now they on the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between true and false is possible (33). This is absurd; a thing cannot be known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing. How can a thing be said to be 'evidently white,' if the possibility remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be 'evident' at all if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There is no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known. Their 'probability' then is mere random guess-work (35). Even if they only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circumstances, we reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless (36).

S$ 37-40. Part IV of Lucullus' exposition (practically a repetition of Part 11): certitude is implied in the very fact of action. The distinction of an animal is to act. You must either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a firm assent to be given to some phenomena; he therefore who does away with assent does away with all action in life (38, 39).

§§ 40-42. Part v of Lucullus' exposition: statement of the method pursued by the Academics. The Academics have a regular method. They first give a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong arguments; (1) things which produce sensations such as might have been produced in the same form by other things, cannot be partly capable of being perceived, partly not capable; (2) sensations must be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to distinguish between them. Then they proceed: Sensations are some of them true, others false; the false cannot of course be real perceptions, while the true are always of a form which the false may assume. Now sensations which are indistinguishable from false sensations cannot be in some cases perceptions, in others not. There is therefore no sensation which is also a perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are indistinguishable from false, cannot be in some cases perceptions, in others not. The following two assertions

they strive to prove: (1) sensations are in some cases true, in others false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from no reality (41). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either class (42). [The word 'perception' is used to mean 'a certainly known sensation.']

§§ 43-45. Part VI of Lucullus' exposition: preliminary criticism of the Academic method. The sceptics ought not to define, for (1) a definition cannot be a definition of two things, (2) if the definition is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be capable of being thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes of reasoning their probabile is not enough. Reasoning can only proceed upon certain premisses. Again to say that there are false sensations is to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge therefore a difference, then you contradict yourselves and say there is none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate clearness of uisa, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).

§§ 46-53. Part VII of Lucullus' exposition. The Academics owe their popularity to the use of logical fallacies. The refusal of people to assent to the innate clearness of some phenomena (évápyeta) is due to two causes: (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which these phenomena are surrounded; (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom-sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom-sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom-sensations do command assent. Why, say the Academics, should the dogmatists not admit that these phantom-sensations command assent when they so closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48). Antiochus attacked these arguments as soritae, and therefore faulty (49). The admission of a certain amount of similarity between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false (50). We contend that these phantom-sensations lack that self-evidence which we require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we make light of the sensations we had while in it (51). But, say our opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our waking ones. This we deny (52). 'But,' say they, 'you allow that the wise man in madness withholds his assent.' This proves nothing, for he