way the mode in which the ancients stated the problem, and the lines. on which they proceeded in search of its solution. From the earliest appearance of the term morýμn in Greek speculation, it carried with it the idea of fixity and indestructibility. To the Greek mind, knowledge was something which did not admit of degree. A great part of the work done by the predecessors of Plato had for its result the demonstration that knowledge in the Greek signification of the term could not be based solely on the information supplied by the senses. By their attacks on the trustworthiness of the perceptions of the senses, the Physicists and Eleates and Plato himself stored up results which formed in later times half the stock-in-trade of the Sceptics and New Academics. But all these earlier schools, and Aristotle after them, held that the intellect was capable of purging the impressions of sense from their impurities, and of arriving at certain and irrefragable truth. On the other hand the critical efforts of the Sophists, the Megarians, the Eristics, and even the Cyrenaics', tended to prove that the intellect could supply no sounder or surer foundation for knowledge than the senses. It remained for Pyrrho of Elis to combine in one comprehensive and orderly scheme the somewhat confused criticism of the earlier and the later schools, and to boldly pronounce that no such thing as oтun, knowledge, is attainable by human faculties, but that we must act upon pauvóueva, which give a confused and false picture of the realities lying behind them. Nothing in the whole history of philosophy is more striking than the small vitality which the theories of knowledge constructed by Plato and Aristotle possessed in ancient times. Other parts of their systems continued to exert influence, but the sublime theory of ideas as conceived by Plato, and the elaborate fabric of human knowledge as reared by Aristotle, became practically obsolete within a generation or two of the death of their authors. After the time of Zeno nearly all who maintained that certitude was within human reach appealed to the theory which he advanced. From this time forward all the disputants in the debate tacitly assumed that, if knowledge is to be found anywhere, it can be found only in experience. Nothing at all like the modern idea of 'intuition' was recognised as a possible source of knowledge. Again, none of the disputants questioned the existence of a real world of things lying behind the phenomena of which we are conscious. These 1 See my n. on Ac. II. 79. 2 Even the arguments of Sextus against the Physici question rather our knowledge of the real world than its existence. Only here and there in a few casual remarks of ancient writers is it hinted that the im two assumptions greatly limit the scope of the ancient discussion as compared with the modern. The problem was this: given a world of 'things in themselves' existing independently of human consciousness, given also the impressions of sense as the sole ultimate source of information concerning that world, to what extent can these impressions be trusted? The Epicureans boldly said that every impression of sense is true and trustworthy, and did not shrink from some of the most absurd consequences to which this principle led them, though they tried to escape from others by feeble quibbling'. Zeno, on the other hand, began by acknowledging that the impressions of sense must be divided into two classes, the true and the false, and proceeded to give a definition of a true impression. A true impression, he said, enables the healthy mind to seize on' the object, and to feel certain that the object has been rightly apprehended. This irresistible conviction is the sole test of truth. Knowledge, which is certain and admits of no degrees, must be built up on these 'irresistible impressions.' After the time. of Zeno, the whole controversy concerning the possibility of certitude turned as on a pivot upon the Stoic definition of the individual 'irresistible impression' (karaληTTIKη paνтασía). It was assumed that (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία). if the definition could be invalidated, the edifice of knowledge crumbled away from its base. The sceptic school of Pyrrho practically died out with Timon of Phlius, and was only revived after Cicero's death. But the mantle of Pyrrho really fell on Arcesilas, the founder of the New Academic school. He spent his life in combating the definition of the unit of knowledge given by the Stoics, and his scepticism was practically indistinguishable from that of Pyrrho. His position was modified by Carneades, whose negative criticism was as brilliant as that of Arcesilas, but who introduced positive teaching in the shape of what may be called a calculus of probabilities. While Arcesilas held that the moment we begin to examine any impression of sense, we shall find that the arguments for and against its trustworthiness exactly balance each other, Carneades thought that the scale would generally incline decisively in one direction or the other, so that although certitude is unattainable, various degrees of probability are within our reach. pressions of sense may be without any external cause. 1 See my n. on Ac. II. 79. 2 Unless we accept the conclusion of Haas, De philosophorum Scepticorum successionibus, Würzburg 1875, p. 16, that Aenesidemus was contemporary with Antiochus of Ascalon. That some kind of titular succession was kept up from Timon to Aenesidemus seems to follow from Diog. Laert. Ix. 68, 69 and 115, 116. The whole subject is discussed (with perhaps too much acuteness) by Haas. Pyrrho and Arcesilas had maintained that all we can do is to act upon phenomena without attempting to determine their truth or falsehood. Carneades, equally holding that certainty is a chimera, contended that reason could lead up to sundry approximations to certainty, which were the proper bases for action. The question whether action was possible without certainty was much talked of by the disputants, but the debate on this topic amounted in essence to nothing but assertion and denial. The dogmatists affirmed that if the sceptics were consistent they would be reduced to inaction of every description. The dogmatic position may be here stated in the words of Hume'. 'A Pyrrhonian cannot expect that his philosophy will have any constant influence, or if it had that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease, and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle, and though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself and others into a momentary confusion by his profound reasonings, the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples and leave him the same in every point of action and speculation with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves with any philosophical arguments or researches.' The sceptics on the other hand maintained that there was no inconsistency in their acting and speaking like other men, provided it were understood that their speech or action was not to be taken as implying a belief in the correctness of impressions. They entrenched themselves in their impregnable position, which may also be described. by quoting Hume'. 'By what argument can it be proved that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects entirely different from them, though resembling them?... It is a question of fact whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects resembling them. How shall this question be determined? By experience surely as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is therefore without any foundation in reasoning.' 2 Essays, ed. Green and Grose II p. 1 Essays, ed. Green and Grose II p. 125. 131 Hume and many other writers since have pronounced these sceptical arguments to be unanswerable. Modern philosophers have in fact been able to supply to the question 'why should we believe any impression of sense to give a correct picture of the object which causes it?' no better answer than that of the Stoics 'because in some cases our minds feel convinced of the correctness of the impression, in others not.' b. Philo and Antiochus. The opinions of these philosophers will only here be discussed so far as they concern the main problem of the Academica'. Both Philo and Antiochus began their teaching as ardent defenders of the pure doctrine of Carneades. Both in their later days promoted, in different degrees, a reaction towards dogmatic doctrines. In the case of Antiochus this reaction was complete. So far as dialectic was concerned, he wholly attached himself to the Stoic school. In ethics and natural science he also accepted much from Zeno and Chrysippus, while declaring that these philosophers had borrowed their teaching from Plato and Aristotle and their immediate followers. In Philo's case the nature of the reaction is exceedingly difficult to trace. All the information about it which we possess consists of a few hints in the Academica and two or three passages in other writers. Philo it is certain at all times maintained in its full force the whole polemic conducted by Carneades against the Stoic definition of the 'irresistible impression".' Yet he contended that things are in their own nature knowable. But none of the sceptics or New Academics had ever asserted that our lack of sure knowledge is due to the nature of the objects of cognition. They referred it entirely to the defects in our faculties of perception. We want to be told, therefore, how Philo supposed it possible to arrive at a knowledge of things. Unfortunately no ancient authority has preserved for us any information on this point, and we are reduced to founding con 1 The most elaborate account of Philo of Larissa is to be found in C. F. Hermann's two papers de Philone Larissaeo,' Göttingen 1851 and 1855, but they are full of groundless fancies, as we shall have occasion to see; they are also often self-contradictory, and contain some positive blunders of serious importance. The best information about Antiochus is in Chappuis' pamphlet 'de Antiochi Ascalonitae vita et doctrina' (Paris 1854) which is in every way admirable. 2 As to Antiochus, see Ac. II. 69. 3 Full information on this subject will be found in my notes on Ac. I §§ 19–42. 4 Ac. II. 18. 5 Sext. Ρ. Η. 1, 235 ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ στωικῷ κριτηρίῳ, τούτεστι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν κατάληπτα. jectures on indirect evidence of a very shadowy kind. The theory of C. F. Hermann, that Philo returned to Plato's doctrine of the idea, is destitute of all probability'. Zeller thinks that Philo merely restated with greater emphasis the Carneadean theory of probability. This he concludes from a passage in the Academica which may refer to Philo especially, though that is far from certain. It is moreover difficult to see why Philo should have been described as the founder or one of the founders of a fourth Academy (in succession to the Academies of Plato, Arcesilas and Carneades') unless he gave utterance to some doctrine which was supposed to be novel. According to Cicero, when Antiochus first became acquainted with Philo's new views, he confidently appealed to a philosopher well acquainted with the history of the Academy, to say whether he had ever heard of such doctrines being preached by any professed adherent of the school. From another passage of Cicero it appears that Philo, while he asserted that the Academic school had been perfectly consistent from first to last, from the time of Plato to his own", and while he treated the supposed contrast between Old and New Academy as a delusion, yet endeavoured to minimise the effect of the destructive criticism advanced by Arcesilas and Carneades, and so to show that the history of the New Academy had been generally misunderstood'. Hence he was openly charged with lying, not only by Antiochus, but by Catulus the elder. That the 'lie' of Philo, about the nature of which there has been much discussion, must have consisted in an attempt to put a new complexion on the sceptical teaching of Arcesilas and Carneades, must be clear to any one who attentively considers the passages in which the 'lie' is mentioned. In all probability Philo argued that the solvent analysis which the New Academic leaders applied to the Stoic criterion of truth did not express their own views, but was merely a justifiable polemical expedient. He The sole ancient passage which can be stretched so as to favour this notion is Aug. contr. Ac. 3, 41 Philo coeperat ad Platonis auctoritatem Academiam legesque revocare; but the meaning of the passage is far from clear, and even if it meant what Hermann supposes it to mean, it must be remembered that the unsupported opinion of Augustine, who knew nothing of Philo but what he learned from Cicero, is worthless. 2 Phil. d. Griechen, III. 1, p. 595, n. I (ed. 3). 3 II. 34 where it is said that the Academics attempt to distinguish perspicua (ἐναργῆ) from percepta (κατάληπτα) and affirm that there is a kind of evapyès which may be called true, and is impressum in animo et mente.' Zeller thinks this goes beyond Carneades; I see no reason which compels us to suppose that it does. In II. 32 where Hermann supposes there is an especial reference to Philo, there is certainly nothing which is not Carneadean. 4 Sext. P. H. 1. 220. It is noticeable that Sextus there joins Charmadas with Philo. 5 Ac. II. II. 6 Ac. 1. 13. |