quidem adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes uoluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum 10 arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quamdam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.

XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut in quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores

Io arb. matrem esse: matrem esse arb. HBM ex GP. 12 in quattuor: codd. omn.; in omiserunt multi editores, etiam HBM. In ex IV corruptum putat M; uti pro ut in scr. B.

sensus et mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque gigneret, etiam mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dix- 5 erant, nec uero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur 2 ipsam: ipsam eam HB, auctore Christio; at non opus; cf. Madu. ad Fin. 2, 93 et adn. meam ad 2 § 84. quidque: quicquid Er.; Madu. (Orelli ed. 2,

vol.

4, p. 854) coni. quoique, cum putaret hic quidque dici perperam pro omnia et persuasit Baitero; Müll. autem rectius est interpretatus 'quae in singulis rebus quae gignerentur, ea esset natura quae gignerentur, ea esset natura quae gigneret', collato

some reason for supposing that in his later teaching (though not in his extant dialogues) he asserted the existence of alonp as a separate elemental substance; see Zeller, II 1, p. 809 n. ed 3 (E. T. P. 521).

The theory was originally Pythagorean (Zeller 1 p. 377 ed. 4) and as such recommended itself to Xenocrates and Speusippus. The πέμπτον σῶμα was made the subject of elaborate argument by Aristotle (though not invented by him, as Cic. erroneously says in Tusc. 1, 41); see Zeller, II 2, p. 434 sq. ed. 3, Grote, Aristotle II 391 sq.

I. sensus et mentem: in § 26 and also in Tusc. I 22, 41, 65; Fin. 4, 12 Cic. declares that Aristotle dérived mind from the fifth element. This assertion has exposed him to the undeserved contempt of many modern critics (among them Madvig in his n. on Fin. 4, 12) who have not troubled themselves to examine carefully the utterances of Aristotle himself on the subject. These are very various and contradictory. It seems clear that Aristotle, though he called his πέμπτον σώμα οι πέμπτη οὐσία by such names as ἀγένητον, ἄφθαρτον, ἀναυξὲς, ἀναλλοίωτον, yet intended it to be distinctly a material substance. On the other hand he often asserted the soul to be immaterial, as in De An. 15; cf. Zeller II 2, p. 482 sq. ed. 3. Yet the powers of the soul in his system have their existence so bound up with that of things which are material, that it is barely possible, when reading certain passages, to avoid attributing a material character to it also. Thus Zeller himself admits (p. 483) that Aristotle's words make it hard not to identify with the alonp or fifth element his animal warmth, with which yux is inextricably connected. Even in the case of pure intellect (vous) modern scholars have been

found to maintain, after careful examina-
tion, that Aristotle intended along to be
its substratum-the very doctrine which
Cic. is accused of having blundered into
through sheer ignorance and carelessness.
(See Zeller 569 n.) Trendelenburg (in his
ed. of the De Anima' pp. 146, 147)
complains that Ar. so closely linked his
νοῦς with the lower ψυχή that the two
can with difficulty be disentangled; and
we have seen how easy Ar. had made it
to confound this lower yuxh with a
material substance. The later Peripa-
tetics certainly maintained that the
came from aino: see Stob. Phys. 870.
So did the Stoics; only they considered
ai@hp to be not essentially different from
Tup. In Tusc. 1; 66 Cic. even derives
the gods from the fifth substance, which
Aristotle had called θεῖον and τὸ τῶν
ἄστρων στοιχεῖον, while designating the
stars as daiμoves: see Zeller, 423, 437,
439. [Cf. Pacuuius (Ribbeck 93) mater
est terra: ea parit corpus: aeter animam
adiugat.]

rebantur: see n. on 2, 88 reri.

ignem esse ipsam naturam: so Diog. 7, 156 δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ. To the Stoics, all the aspects of the universe are in one way or another manifestations of Fire, which is one of the names given to the universal God; see Zeller, Stoics, p. 141, and cf. Diog. 7, 136, 137, and Stob. Phys. 312, 314, where it is said that πῦρ is κατ' ἐξοχὴν στοιχεῖον, and is the first thing generated from the ἄποιος ὕλη: from it then comes air, from air water, from water earth. Fire is λoykoy and gives rise to the YeμOVIKOV in man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought. Cf. Zeller, III 1, 196 sq. or E. T. pp. 153, 187. The connexion of these doctrines with Heraclitus is obvious; for this see

posse esse non corpus. Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae 40 parte mutauit. In qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit noua, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione ob10 lata extrinsecus, quam ille pavтaoíav, nos uisum appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc quidem uerbum, erit enim utendum in Fin. 1, 18 quae uis sit quae quidque efficiat. etiam ita scripsi; codd. edd. et; om. Madu. apud Orelli, ed. 2, uol. 4, p. 854. 7 autem etiam GHBM.

9 iunctos: uinctos PVE; cunctos (ut coni. Ernesti, scripsit Huelsemann.); punctos
e quadam e om. E.
:
10 appellemus: P corr. ex appellamus,
quod habent cett.
11 hoc quidem uerbum : sic ex Halmii coniectura scripsi;
hoc uerb. quidem, codd.; uocem quidem obelisco notat M; B ut H.

с

reliquo sermone saepius; sed ad haec, quae uisa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus, adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse 41 uolt in nobis positam et uoluntariam. Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed eis solum, quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae uiderentur: id autem uisum, 5 cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile-feretis haec?' 'Nos uero', inquit. Quonam enim modo κатaληπтÒν diceres?''Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem 4 haberent: habebant G. 5 uiderentur: uidentur G. 6 comprehendibile: sic AP; comprendibile GHM; comprehendibilem E; comprehensibile V Harl. 2 U; conprensibile Harl. 1; comprensibile Burn. ; conprehendibile B. haec hoc cum Dauisio HBM; sed haec valet 'talia qualia 7 inquit: inquam post Man.

mihi quidem uidetur; see Madv. on Fin. 4, 43; also ib. 3, 28; Ac. 2, 101; Madv. Opusc. I 406; 11 315. In our passage the irregularity might perhaps be excused by the fact that teneamus comes before its object.

I. quasi accepta: here accepta is used to denote the mere experiencing of an impression, quite apart from any conclusion as to its truth or falsehood. The word acceptum in § 41 has a different sense; it implies that the impression has been considered and adopted as accurate; so 2, 29 accipi.

2.

adsensionem : συγκατάθεσιν, for

which see n. on 2, 37.

animorum: n. on § 20.

am:

3. in nobis positam et uoluntarias to the relation of the will to sensation, see n. on 2, 37 ea quae est in nostra potestate sita adsensio.

uisis non omnibus: a hint at Epicurus: see n. on 2, 79. Observe omnibus adiungebat, but above ad haec adiungit.

4. propriam: 'peculiar to itself', the force of this expression will be explained in n. on 2, 34 proprium.

5. declarationem: 'clear evidence concerning those objects from which the impressions come'. Ενάργεια is the characteristic of those impressions called καταλήψεις or καταληπτικαὶ φαντασίαι. This subject is reserved for the nn. on 2, 17.

6. ipsum per se: 'by its own inherent characteristics'.

hoc est'.

younger and Quintilian have incomprehensibilis. Nearly all the adjectives in -bilis are formed by joining the suffix to the stem of the verb; of the few in which the suffix is added to the stem of the passive participle, one only (flexibilis) occurs in Latin so early as Cicero's time. The words patibilis (N. D. 3, 29), impetibibilis (Fin. 2, 57) were also invented by Cic. The note of Goerenz on the forms incomprehendibile, incomprehensibile is worth reading as a philological curiosity. feretis for the omission of the interrogative ně cf. Draeger § 156 and below, 2, 69.

:

7. nos uero above, n. on § 35. inquit: sc. Atticus; cf. n. on § 33; Atticus answers also in §§ 14, 25.

KaтaληTTÓν: this should mean, strictly, the object which causes the impression; the impression itself should be κατάληψις not καταληπτόν; but, as we shall see in the Lucullus', words denoting the object and words denoting the impression are readily interchanged.

diceres: Draeger § 148; Roby §§ 1536 -1546.

8. sed: resumptive after a break, as above, § 40; below, 2, 30. A good ex. will be found in Att. 3, 23, 2; cf. too Draeger § 333, 5; also n. on igitur in § 26 and sed tamen in 2, 17.

comprehensionem: strictly, this ought to denote the process of perception in the abstract, not the individual perception. In Greek however kаTáλnis and καταληπτικὴ φαντασία are constantly interchanged. Cf. n. on scientiam below. 9. manu: see 2, 145 with n.

IO. cum eo uerbo etc. cf. N. D. 1, 44 sunt rebus nouis noua ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse póλnyʊ appel

appellabat, similem eis rebus, quae manu prehenderentur: ex Io quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo uerbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem nouis verbis-noua enim dicebatusus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut conuelli ratione non posset, scientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat: 15 ex qua exsisteret etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso

tione.

HBM; inquit Atticus coni. Goer., ad sensum recte; sed non opus est correcmodo: alio modo GHBM. KαтаληπтÓν: captaleton A Harl. 2; catalempton P; captalempton &V; captalepton Harl. 1, Burn.; cathalepton E. duxerat cum duxerat at (ac G) cum MSS; corr. Man. in re: iure AVE Harl. Burn. 15 exsisteret: exstiterat G; existerat P.

lauit, quam antea nemo eo uerbo nominarat. The word καταλαμβάνειν οι καταλαμβάνεσθαι is not uncommon in Greek before Zeno's time with the sense 'to mentally apprehend'. The real sense of Karáλns is often missed. Thus Zeller, throughout his account of the Stoics, assumes that the word is used because certain impressions seize on the mind of the percipient, and irresistibly compel him to believe in their truth. But in the process of perception the mind is by the Stoics regarded as active, not passive, and κατάληψις is rather the process by which the mind seizes on the nature of external things.

II.

noua...dicebat: an admission not often made by Cic. who usually contends, like Antiochus, that Zeno merely gave new names to old doctrines; see §§ 35, 43; above, however, § 40 quaedam dixit noua.

12. sensu...sensum: here we have the two meanings of αἴσθησις, as applied to (1) the organs of sense, (2) the impressions received by them. In the Greek sources the words φαντασία and αἴσθησις are often interchanged. Cf. Sen. ep. 124, 6 aliquid manifestum sensuque compre

hensum.

13. ita...posset: in the belief of Zeno and the earlier Stoics every perception of sense which brought with it, at the moment of perceiving it, an irresistible conviction of its accuracy, was sure to prove incapable of being upset by subsequent examination or reasoning. Later Stoics admitted, however, that the irresistible conviction might accompany an inaccurate impression; hence every impression must be tested by reasoning before acceptance. Cf. Sext. A. M. 7,

14. scientiam: èπiorýμn is usually defined as σύστημα ἐκ καταληψεων συγγεγυμvaoμévwv (Sext. P. H. 3, 188); see n. on 2 § 22. But the constituent parts of this Torun were themselves called ἐπιστῆμαι, so that ἐπιστήμη and κατάληψις οι καταληπτικὴ φαντασία become convertible terms. Cf. Stob. Eth. 128 εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιουτῶν: Sext. Α. Μ. 7, 151 ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βεβαίαν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ὑπὸ λόγου κατάληψιν: Diog. 7, 47 ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἡ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ Moyou (with the last words cf. the sequel of Stob. Eth. 128 quoted above; also a definition of TISTηun quoted by Arist. Top. 5, 2, 130 b, 16 = υπόληψις ἀμετάTELOTOS UTÒ Xóyou). In Fin. 3, 17 Cic. translates ἐπιστῆμαι = καταλήψεις by rerum cognitiones: in his n. there Madvig falls into some serious errors. Cf. also n. on 2, 31 cognitionem.

inscientiam: ayvoar, which word the Stoics generally used as the opposite of ἐπιστήμη.

15. exsisteret: the infinitive exsistere might have been expected here, as to all