honestum: the usual translation of the Stoic τὸ καλόν. Sometimes Cic. has honestas, as in § 7 and 2, 140; sometimes rectum (above § 23; Fin. 3, 14); rarely pulchrum, which is a common rendering in other authors; e. g. Hor. ep. 1, 2, 3.

simplex etc. cf. § 7, § 30 n., also 2, 129, the note on Euclides.

I. cetera: before going to the ȧdiápopa Cic. ought to have specified that the only malum is vice; but this is taken for granted.

nec bona nec mala: a rendering of ádá popa, which Cic. translates in Fin. 3, 53 by indifferentia, without using the word again; and it does not reappear before the time of Seneca the younger, when it became common. The Stoics protested that such things as wealth poverty, honour dishonour, life death, were neither good nor bad, and could not affect happiness; yet they maintained that some of these things ought to be sought after, some avoided. Cic. marks his sense of the inconsistency by making Cato in Fin. 3, 50 talk of the differentia rerum (sc. indifferentium). On this subject see Zeller, III 1, pp. 214 sq. ed. 3 or Stoics, pp. 218 sq., E. Tr.

2.

=

secundum naturam.....naturae contraria: κατὰ φύσιν...παρὰ φύσιν. Α clear distinction must be made between τὰ κατὰ φύσιν which are identical with the προηγμένα mentioned below, and τὰ πρŵта ката þúow, for which see n. on 2, 131. As to the idea of conformity with nature, see Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 62.

3. his ipsis: many writers (Halm, Christ, Vaucher and others) have objected to these words, for very insufficient reasons. The three subdivisions of the class of ἀδιάφορα, viz. the προηγμένα, ἀποπροηγμένα and καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα are mentioned twice over in the words from cetera to momenti: then in the words from sed to quae minoris the first two

subdivisions are mentioned once more, the third being dropped. For the dative his ipsis dependent on interiecta cf. Opt. gen. d. 2 alios eis interiectos et tamquam medios; Liu. 21, 30, 11 campum interiacentem Tiberi ac moenibus; Tim. § 14 ea quibus esset interpositum; Quint. 11, 3, 18 his ipsis media interiacent multa. sumenda: Cicero's standing translation of Anтά, another name for the προηγμένα. Sumendum must be carefully distinguished from expetendum, which translates alperÓv: see n. on § 18. For sumendum and its opposite, Cic. in Fin. 1, 31 uses appetendum and aspernandum; cf. reicienda in Fin. 5, 78; ib. 4, 46 sumenda legenda optanda.

4.

5. aestimatione: aest. = ἀξία: see below, and cf. Catul. 12, 12.

contraria: put for 'ea quae contra naturam erant'; so Fin. 3, 58 neque in bonis neque in contrariis; cf. Leg. 1, 45 consequentia et contraria (for c. et repugnantia); De Or. 2, 330 caute an contra; Plin. ep. 8, 7, I tu magister, ego contra. In our passage Cic. feels the want of a word to express åmagia; Madv. on Fin. 3, 50 coins non-aestimatio; cf. Fin. 3, 20 inaestimabile = Tò dπažiav éxov whereas in 3, 50 Cic. says 'alia aestimabilia, alia contra'.

6. neutra: the absolutely indifferent circumstances (καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα) of which the stock example is ‘τὸ ἀρτίας ἔχειν τὰς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας ἢ περιτὰς ', given in Diog. 7, 104; Stob. 148. For the use of the word neutra cf. Tusc. 4, 28 bona, mala, neutra; Fin. 3, 50 alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum.

extimatione GE Harl. 3; estimatione A.

Ernesti.

A. Gellius 12, 5, 7 uoluptas et dolor...in mediis relicta, et neque in bonis neque in malis iudicata.

ponebat esse: cf. Ter. Phorm. 630 uerum pono esse uictum eum ; above, § 19; Att. 1, 20, 1 duco esse; Madv. on Fin. 5, 73. The inf. is however often omitted, as in 2, 2. So dico and dico esse (Fin. 2, 49); iudico and iudico esse etc.

7. momenti: cf. momenta in 2, 130. quae essent sumenda...quae minoris : this passage contains two main difficulties; (1) in place of sumenda =λŋñтà = προηγμένα, some phrase corresponding to the term αδιάφορα should have been used; (2) minor aestimatio · ἐλάττων αξία is treated as equivalent to πολλὴ απαξία. We may at once dismiss the insinuation of Madvig (on Fin. 3, 50) that these difficulties arise from ignorance of Stoicism on the part of Cic. or his authorities or both. Cicero, by a large number of other references to the Stoic doctrine of ἀδιάφορα, has proved that he thoroughly understood it. With regard to the former of the two difficulties he may fairly be charged with careless writing; for he has first mentioned the Пponyμéva alone, and then has gone on to speak as though he had previously indicated both προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα. The carelessness is of a kind which he often allowed himself to commit. We have a striking parallel in Fin. 3, 52 quae secundum locum obtinent, pony

éva, id est producta nominentur, quae uel ita appellemus, uel promota et remota. If this language be closely pressed the ἀποπροηγμένα are made a subdivision of the ponyμéva, though no sensible reader could suppose Cic. to have had any such arrangement in his mind. So if his words in Fin. 5, 90 are to be taken literally, the sumenda are there made to include both producta and reducta (as in our passage); in Fin. 3, 16 appeterent includes fugerent. In Fin. 2, 86 beate uiuere is mentioned, then its opposite is

R. C.

introduced with the utmost abruptness; in Fin. 2, 88 frui dolore must be construed together, and ib. 73 pudor modestia pudicitia are said coerceri, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices which are the opposites of these virtues. A similar error is in Fin. 3, 61 prima illa naturae, siue secunda siue contraria; since strictly pr. nat. only correspond to sccunda; cf. too ib. 4, 47.

But

With regard to the second difficulty, Cic. is no doubt careless in treating απαξία as a lesser degree of ἀξία, the difference between the two being one of kind and not of degree, since día is positive and dragia negative value. that Cic. (or rather Antiochus) followed the Stoic writers themselves in this inaccuracy is clear from Stobaeus Eth. 144 τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν πλείω ἀξίαν ἔχειν, τὰ δ ̓ ἐλάττω and from Sextus, who after defining (in A. M. 11, 62— 64)

ἀποπροηγμένα to be τὰ ἱκανὴν ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα, again speaks of them (Ρ. Η. 3, 191) as τὰ μὴ ἱκανὴν ἔχοντα asiav. [The word magno in Fin. 5, 90 involves the same error.] By a similar inconsistency, the Stoics declared duty (κaTópowμa) to differ in kind from appropriate action (καθήκον) and then defined κατόρθωμα to be καθήκον τέλειον, as though the two differed only in degree. It should be observed that Cicero's minoris conveys a much stronger negative idea than Stobaeus' MáTTv: the comparative minus is often as strong a negative as non; cf. § 8 n. [Neither the violent textual remedies that have been proposed, nor the device of Goerenz, who distorts the Stoic tenets to suit our passage, need be discussed.]

quae pluris...quae minoris: observe the chiasmus.

8. praeposita...reiecta: the most common rendering of προηγμένα...ἀποπροηγο μéva so in Fin. 3, 15. In other passages alternative renderings are proposed, as promota, producta, praecipua, commoda, eligenda on the one hand, and remota,

IO

Dau.

5 seruata: nearly always παρὰ τὸ καλὸν for the opposite of τὸ καλόν, αἰσχρὸν being of rare occurrence in this sense.] Atticus found fault with this rendering when the 'De Officiis' appeared; see Att. 16, 14, 3 and cf. ib. 16, 11, 4. For the expression contra officium cf. n. on § 39 non corpus.

2. rebus...uocabulis: for the expression cf. § 17 rebus...nominibus. Varro here gives a very loudly and constantly expressed opinion of Antiochus, who, when stealing the clothes of the Stoics, convinced himself that they had never properly belonged to the Stoics at all. Cic. often adopts similar language when speaking in his own person. Cf. Fin. IV passim, but esp. §§ 72, 73; ib. 3, 5 Zeno non tam rerum inuentor fuit quam uerborum; ib. 5, 74 atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum, quas ceperunt signa commutant, sic illi (Stoici), ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur nomina tamquam rerum notas mutauerunt; Tusc. 5, 34 Zeno ignobilis uerborum opifex; Leg. 1, 38; Rep. 3, 12 Chrysippo qui omnia uerborum momentis non rerum ponderibus examinet. Cf. Introd. p. 17. Diog. 7, 25 has a story about Polemo accusing Zeno of stealing Academic doctrines. Cf. 2 § 15, below.

recte factum...peccatum: so Cic. usually translates the Stoie κατορθώμα (virtuous action) and duaprýμa (sin); sometimes rectum stands for recte factum (Fin. 4, 15). Cf. Plin. ep. 8, 2, 2 peccata... laudes; succeeding Latin writers usually follow Cicero. In Sen. Rh. contr. 9, 24 13 άuáprnua is rendered by 'non recte factum'. For the Stoic doctrine on this subject see Zeller, Stoics, E.T. pp. 238 -248, 268-272; R. and P. §§ 419-424.

3. officium...contra officium: the phrases almost exclusively used by Cic. to render τὸ καθῆκον, παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. [The Stoics always used παρὰ τὸ και θῆκον for the opposite of τὸ καθῆκον: so

media: this does not allude to any doctrine that the κа0коvта, as distinguished from the κατορθώματα, have no moral character, are neither good nor bad, but rather implies that the road from vice to virtue, from folly to wisdom, lies through the κа0ýkovтa: so Stob. Eth. 142 speaks οἱ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας : cf. Diog. 6, 105, and 7, 165; Sext. A. M. XI, 64. To the strict Stoics an action must be either entirely virtuous or entirely vicious; wholly vicious if done by the fool, wholly virtuous if done by the wise man. In this sense Diogenes says (7, 127) undèv μéoov εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας : so too Stob. Eth. 116 ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν εἶναι μεταξύ. Hence Diog. (1. 1.) lays stress on the fact that the Peripatetics (not the Stoics) consider pokoh (see n. on § 20 progressio) to be a middle state between virtue and vice, having no definite moral character. In the eyes of the strict Stoic, even though a man be within a hair's breadth of possessing complete virtue, his every act is as immoral as it is possible for any act to be (see Fin. 3, 48). When therefore the Stoics call кα@ýкovтα and their opposites by the name μέσαι πράξεις (25 they constantly do), the word μéσai must not be taken to import that these actions are not sinful; cf. Stob. 158 where wapd τὸ καθῆκον is identified with ἁμάρτημα.

4. bonis actionibus: καλαῖς πράξεσι. For the expression recte facta sola in bonis actionibus ponens' see n. on $ 35 nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis.

5. seruata praetermissaque: instead of que a disjunctive particle might have been expected; 'whether maintained or neglected'; or at least et...et. As to

the inadmissibility of the MSS reading et before seruata see n. on § 43 breuiter minimeque.

6. cumque: the quadruple repetition is inelegant; cf. § 28 et cum...et cum.

7. natura aut more: in § 20 the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ were said to owe their developement to nature, and the kal åperal theirs to practice; here we seem to have the true Aristotelian view given, that the intellectual virtues, as well as the moral, required practice. See n. on § 20.

8. omnis in ratione: both Plato and Aristotle divided the mind of man into a rational and governing part, and an emotional and governable part (in Plato still further subdivided). For Plato see Zeller, II 1, pp. 713 sq. ed. 3 (E. Tr. pp. 419 sq.); as to Aristotle, II, 2 pp. 587 sq. ed. 3. Zeno, however, made the mind of man, or yeμovikov, to be entirely Reason (Zeller, III 1, 199 ed. 3 or Stoics p. 203 sq.). When the Reason was in a healthy state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice or false emotion, which is a form of vice. The battle between the virtuous and vicious inclinations in the soul did not resemble a struggle between two separate powers, as in the systems of Plato and Aristotle, but rather a civil war. [This is well illustrated in Plutarch's tract 'de uirtute morali' an analysis of which is given by Volkmann II 94.] In the strict Stoic creed, ȧpern has no subdivisions; see Zeller, III 1, p. 242 sq. ed. 3 or p. 247 E. Tr., and cf. Galen, De Plac. v § 468 ed. Müller.

9. selungi: cf. Eth. Eud. 6, 13, 6 χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταὶ (a passage in which a close approach is made to the Stoic view).

10. usum... habitum : so Xpnois and KTños are often contrasted, as in Ar. Eth. Nic. 1, 8, 9; cf. Xpĥσðaɩ and κεκτῆσθαι in Rhet. 1, 5.

usum : throughout the Aristotelian ethics great stress is laid on practice;

natura: quasi natura 9 hic...dis

uirtutum: uirtutis E.

cf. esp. Eth. Νic. I, 8, 9 ὥσπερ Ολυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι, τούτων γάρ τινες νικώσιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίγνονται: Fin. 2, 19 Aristoteles uirtutis usum cum uitae perfectae prosperitate coniunxit; Off. 1, 19 uirtutis laus omnis in actione consistit; N. D. 1, 110 uirtus actuosa; Rep. 1, 2 nec habere uirtutem satis est quasi artem aliquam, nisi utare; etsi ars quidem, cum ea non utare, scientia tamen ipsa teneri potest, uirtus in usu sui tota posita est; Sen. ep. 109, 2 uirtutum agitatione sapienti opus est; ib. 117, 16 sapientiam, si sine usu detur, accipiendam non esse. In the Platonic ethics action is characteristic of the lower or popular virtue; reflexion and contemplation belong to the higher or philosophic virtue; cf. Phaedo 82 Α οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους καὶ μελέτης γεγονυίαν, ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας καὶ νοῦ.

ut superiores: n. on 2, 124 ut Xeno

crates.

II. ipsum habitum: 'the mere state or condition of virtue'. So uirtutis habitus in Fin. 3, 48; rationis habitus ib. 4, 37; cf. Inu. 2, 30. Habitus is probably used here to render diabeσis, not, as is usually the case, eis, since to the Stoics virtue was not a is but a did0eois, the difference being that according to them the dades is incapable of increase or decrease, while is admits of degree. See Simplicius Cat. 61 8 sq. qu. by Zeller III 1, p. 246 n. ed. 3 or Stoics p. 249 n. (E. Tr.), also cf. Stob. Eth. 98, 104; Diog. 7, 89. The last-named writer sometimes uses is loosely, as in 7, 93. For the Aristotelian view of the terms

is and diá0eois see Met. 4, cc. 19, 20. [In ed. 1 I took habitus in the sense of 'possession', supposing it to be a translation of is used as in Plat. Theaet.

Cumque perturba

4 ea: eas HB cum 7 alia: in alia (cum Lambino) HBM.

167 Α πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἕξις, and not in the later Aristotelian sense. This view is abandoned because habitus thus used would be without parallel. In Tusc. 2, 43 diabéσes is rendered by 'animi affectiones'.]

nec...uteretur: cf. Stob. Eth. 198 δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις: Diog. 7, 128 ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ διὰ παντὸς χρῆσθαι τῇ aper. To the same effect is the assertion πάντα κατορθοῦν τὸν ἀστεῖον (Plut. Aud. Poet. 7) and Távrа TOLEÎV TÒV σοφὸν κατὰ πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς (Stob. 116; Sen. Dial. 8, 1, 4).

I.

perturbationem: here used in the abstract = emotion in general. There is no need to read perturbationes, since the change to ea (from the general to the particular) has many parallels, as Tusc. III 23, 24; IV 59, 60, and 65; V 43, where however the particular sense of the word occurs in the plural. Pertur batio often elsewhere has the general sense, e.g. in Tusc. IV 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. See Wesenberg on Tusc. 4, 65 and cf. n. on 2, 22 quam.

2. natura...condolescere etc.: this is the Peripatetic view of the emotions, for which see n. on 2, 135 naturalem modum.

condolescere etc.: we here have the Stoic division of wά0ŋ (irrational emotions) into four classes, Xúπη èжOvμía poßos hoový: see Diog. 7, 110; Stob. 166, 168; Zeller III 1, 230 ed. 3 or E. Tr. p. 233. In Tusc. 4, 11 and elsewhere these terms are rendered by aegritudo, libido, metus, laetitia gestiens or nimia. The Stoic classification appears in Verg. Aen. 6, 733 (qu. as an imitation of the Stoics by Aug. c. d. 14, 3) hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque; Hor. ep.

1, 6, 12 gaudeat an doleat, cupiat metuatne, quid ad rem? Cf. Plato qu. below, n. on carere sapientem.

3. efferri: Cic. always uses this verb (not ferri) with laetitia, as in Tusc. III 23; IV 12, 14, 37, 39, 66, 68. The Stoic definition of ἡδονὴ was ἄλογος ἔπαρσις (Diog. 7, 114).

4. in angustumque: n. on § 24 ex eaque. For angustum used as noun cf. n. on 2, 83 quam in paruo.

5. quasi morbis: morbus is proposed as a translation of ráðos in Fin. 3, 35, but rejected in favour of perturbatio; objections are raised to morbus also in Tusc. 3, 7 and 4, 10, though it is adopted ib. 4, 23; also Fin. 1, 59 and by Hor. s. 2, 3, 80 and ep. I, 1, 35 and by Seneca ep. 75, 10; ben. 7, 16, 6. The rendering perturbatio is generally adopted by Cic. and is often described as peculiarly his, e.g. by Aug. c. d. 9, 4 and 14, 5. Other representations of rá@os are 'animi affectio' in Tusc. 3, 10; 'turbati animi motus' in Off. 2, 18; animi uitium' in Hor. s. 2, 3, 307; 'animi affectus' in Sen. ep. 75 and 85; sometimes too 'permotio' and often simply 'motus'. The literal rendering passio was first used by the ecclesiastical writers; cf. Aug. c. d. 9, 4; also Macrob. Somn. 1, 8, 11; 2, 15, 17. The Stoics sometimes drew a distinction between mere emotion and mental disease (see next n.), but did not use it consistently; see Zeller III 1, 233 ed. 3 or E. T. p. 235 n. 2; and cf. Tusc. 4, 23; Sen. ep. 75, 10-12.

carere sapientem: cf. the following passage of Plato, where a very close approximation is made to the Stoic position, viz. Phaedo 83 B n tài s ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων, but the saving clause καθ' ὅσον δύναται is added. For the freedom of the Stoic wise man from the wán, see