a politician. In these evil days, however, no occupation was long to his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn became unpleasant'. As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 he returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a letter written to Varro in that year, he says, 'I assure you I had no sooner returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my books.' These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear richer fruit than in his days of prosperity3. The tenor of all his letters at this time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to Sulpicius. The Partitiones Oratoriae, the Paradoxa, the Orator, and the Laudatio Catonis, to which Caesar replied by his Anticato, were all finished within the year. Before the end of the year the Hortensius and the De Finibus had probably both been planned and commenced. Early in the following year the Academica, the history of which I shall trace elsewhere, was written. I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero as the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion of his life which preceded the writing of the Academica. Even the evidence I have produced, which does not include such indirect indications of philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual philosophical works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at no time had he been divorced from philosophy. He was entitled to meet the charge made by some people on the publication of his first book of the later period-the Hortensius-that he was a mere tiro in philosophy, by the assertion that on the contrary nothing had more occupied his thoughts throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic life". His knowledge of philosophy must of course be estimated ultimately by his extant works. These have been severely judged by some leading scholars of recent times, but on wholly insufficient grounds. The tide must one day turn, indeed is even now turning, and due gratitude will again be felt and expressed for the man who has preserved to 1 Ad Att. IX. 10, § 2. 2 Ad Fam. IX. 1, § 2. De Rep. 1. § 7. T. D. v. § 5, etc. Cf. N. D. § 6. The following are some passages in which philosophy is spoken of or hinted at in the speeches: Sest. 47; Mur. 63; Pis. 37; Balb. 3; Cael. 39--42; Phil. XI, 28; Marc. 19; Deiot. 37; pro dom. 47; post red. in sen. 14. When, however, the ancient writers on rhetoric speak of philosophy being useful to the orator, they refer almost entirely to ethical commonplaces. Cf. for example, Sen. Contr. 1. 7, 17, hic philosophumenon locum introduxit, quo modo animi magnis calamitatibus euerterentur; ib. VII. 6, 18, Albucius et philosophatus est et dixit neminem natum liberum, etc. Cf. n. on Ac. I. § 8, intima philosophia. us so much of the later Greek speculation, which is of vast historical value and was doomed to perish in the original Greek. I shall speak hereafter of some causes which have contributed to produce a low estimate of Cicero's work. But there is one piece of unfairness which I shall have no better opportunity of mentioning than the present. is this. Cicero, the philosopher, is made to suffer for the shortcomings of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have learned to despise his political weakness, vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate his achievements in philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too closely into their intrinsic value. From political partisanship, and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in hand, I beg all students to free themselves in reading the Academica. § 2. The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero. In the time of Cicero students of philosophy nearly all belonged to one of two opposing camps. The Stoic and the Epicurean systems each had a large following. The Peripatetic sect numbered but a few adherents'. The New Academy had only at three periods in its history attracted to it any large number of disciples, once when it was founded by Arcesilas, again under the presidency of Carneades, and lastly when Philo was at its head. Philo himself at the end of his life ceased to preach the pure doctrine of Carneades, and when he died the New Academy practically became extinct. Meanwhile, Philo's pupil, Antiochus, had constructed a combination of Stoicism, Platonism, and Peripateticism, which he dignified by the name of the Old Academy, and for which he secured some support. Of this system it will be necessary to speak hereafter. In attempting to define Cicero's position with respect to the various contemporary schools of thought, it will be best to follow the division of philosophy (recognised by all the post-Aristotelian teachers), into the three branches of Logic, Ethics, Physics. For the moment we may put aside the last-named branch. The only post-Aristotelian school which possessed a system of physics in all respects peculiar to itself was the Epicurean', and physical arguments were not prominent in the controversies of the time. The two main tasks of the later 1 Cf. Epictetus, Diss. 1. 19, 20 cúpńσετε ὀλίγους τινὰς Περιπατητικοὺς καὶ τούτους ἐκλελυμένους. 2 See Ac. II. 11 ista philosophia quae nunc prope dimissa reuocatur and N. D. 1. 6 where the New Academy is spoken of as 'deserta et iam pridem relicta.' 3 Acad. I. 19, with my n. I pass by here the few individuals who still described themselves as Pythagoreans, like Cicero's friend, P. Nigidius Figulus (Cic. Tim. § 1). Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often insists, one dialectical, the establishment of a criterion, such as would suffice to distinguish the true from the false; and one ethical, the determination of the summum bonum, or moral standard'. It is convenient here to take the dialectical problem first (though in the eyes of the ancients it was infinitely the less important of the two). All that was distinctive of the New Academy was its dialectic. It proclaimed no peculiar views either in ethics or in physics. As the Sceptical school of Pyrrho was practically in abeyance, the New Academy had for its own especial property the doctrine that man is so constituted as to be incapable of reaching absolute and certain truth. It was by virtue of accepting this tenet that Cicero became and on all occasions declared himself a follower of the New Academy. It is easy to see what there was in this view to attract Cicero. His mind was open and unprejudiced, receptive and impressible, to an extraordinary degree, and utterly unfitted for a blind and deaf defence of any fixed dogma. His temperament also was gentle almost to softness, and he entirely lacked the robust confidence in self which distinguishes the dogmatic controversialist. His experience as an orator also inclined him towards the New Academy. He was accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both sides of a case. In other fields too it seemed to him arrogant to advance any proposition with a conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this arrogance. Philosophers of the highest repute for ability and sincerity had held the most opposite opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from all doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most probable, was the only prudent course'. The diversities of view which the most famous intellects exhibit, ought, said Cicero, to incline thinkers towards charity and toleration, and to repel them from the fury of dogmatism. Men ought to teach and enlighten one another in a spirit of gentleness and moderation". 1 Cf. Ac. II. 29. 2 Ac. 11. 70 with n. 8 See below, p. 54. For the more precise limitation and definition of this doctrine see below, p. 55. Diu. II. I quod genus philosophandi minime adrogans maximeque et constans et elegans arbitraremur quattuor Academicis libris ostendimus; also Ac. I. 45. 6 Cf. Varro, Eumenides XV (Riese), postremo nemo aegrotus quisquam somniat tam infandum quod non aliquis dicat philosophus; Seneca, ȧжокоλOKUVT. § 2 facilius inter philosophos quam inter horologia conueniet. 7 N. D. I. I quid est temeritate turpius aut quid tam temerarium atque indignum sapientis grauitate atque constantia quam aut falsum sentire aut quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum sine ulla dubitatione defendere? 8 Tusc. II. 5 nos ipsos redargui refellique patiamur; quod ei ferunt animo iniquo qui certis quibus quam destinatis In positiveness of assertion there seemed to Cicero to be something reckless and unseemly, and destructive of that dignity, balance, and control which distinguish the Roman ideal of character'. He frequently urges arguments also, which have had countless parallels in modern times, to show that the untrammelled conflict of opinion is necessary to the progress of thought. To freedom of speculation Greece owed the pre-eminence of her philosophers. Wherever authority had loudly raised its voice, there philosophy had pined. Pythagoras is quoted as a warning example, and the baneful effects of authority are often depicted. The true philosophic spirit, Cicero said, requires us not to maintain with obstinacy one view of a subject, but to study all views. It is a matter of duty to discuss all aspects of every question, after the example of the Old Academy (ie. the immediate successors of Plato and of Aristotle'). Those who demand strict dogmatic formulas are mere busybodies. The Academics glory in their freedom of judgment. They are not compelled to defend an opinion whether they will or no, merely because one of their predecessors has maintained it". So far does Cicero carry this freedom, that in the fifth book of the Tusculan Disputations he maintains a view entirely at variance with the whole of the fourth book of the De Finibus, and when the discrepancy is pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former statements, on the plea that he is an Academic and a free man". Modo hoc modo illud probabilius uidetur".' The Academic sips the best of every school. He roams in the wide field of philosophy, while the Stoic dares not stir a foot's breadth away from Chrysippus". The Academic is only anxious that people should combat his opinions, for he makes it his aim, with Socrates, to free himself and others from the mists of error". If he finds it easier to detect error iudicio, nulla eius modi astrictum necessitate, ut mihi uelim nolim sit certa quaedam tuenda sententia. Cf. Ac. 11. §§ 9, 120, 137. 8 Tusc. V. 33 tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum et testificaris quid dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. Cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus impositis disputant, nos in diem uiuimus; quodcumque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus; itaque soli sumus liberi. Cf. too ibid. § 83. 9 See Ac. II. 121 with my n. 12 Tusc. V. II ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios leuaremus. than to discover truth, the fault lies in the nature of things, and not in him'. The New Academy at all times dwelt much on the critical and destructive side of the Socratic and Platonic teachings". It interpreted the constructive dialogues of Plato by the light of the 'dialogues of search,' and maintained that the founder of the Academy never dreamed of setting forth his doctrines as anything more than attempts to find the truth. This view of Plato's dialogues seems to have been pretty widely accepted in Cicero's time, even by dogmatic teachers3. While rejoicing in this boundless freedom of thought, Cicero indignantly repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek for the truth, effaces the distinction between the true and the false, and can therefore find no truth to follow. Truth is identified with probability and not with certainty. Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy. Orators, politicians, and men of letters had ever found their best nourishment in the teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters', while the Stoics and Epicureans cared nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic tenets were those with which the common sense of the world was most in sympathy. The Academy moreover was the school which had the most respectable pedigree. Philo was the successor, in a direct line, of Socrates and Plato. All other systems, which could not trace their origin to these philosophers, had a plebeian appearance". The philosopher who best preserved the Socratic tradition was most estimable, ceteris paribus, and that philosopher was Carneades, whom Philo unhesitatingly followed at the time when Cicero heard him. Before we proceed to state the ethical views of Cicero, it will be convenient to discuss one or two matters which concern his entire attitude with regard to philosophy. Though he described himself as a New Academic, he has in modern times far oftener been named |