essential parts of the system. The senators represent the sovereignty of the states. They are in the quality of ambassadors of the states. . . . A consolidation of the states . . would subvert the constitution. Too much provision cannot be made against consolidation. The state governments represent the wishes and feelings and local interests of the people." He further said that they would "afford shelter against the abuse of federal power," and that "the system would be, in practice as in theory, a federal republic." [II. Ell. Deb. 46.] Though other extracts could be produced, these will suffice. I have piled up this mass of proof to make Massachusetts refute her own sons; to expose their offence in suppressing or garbling her record to get excuses for violating her sacred faith; and to prevent further confidence in them as to these subjects. But this is not all; for the record further shows the direct opposite of consolidation, to have been the solemn understanding on which Massachusetts ratified. Let us see.

The Severalty and Sovereignty of the States. Her wise men in the convention gave to her, many and most emphatic assurances on this point. I have just quoted Fisher Ames as saying, "the senators represent the sovereignty of the states." [II. Ell. Deb. 46.] JUDGE PARSONS said the senate was designed "to preserve the sovereignty of the states." [See his "Memoirs" by his son, p. 98.] CHRISTOPHER GORE, for many years one of her leading statesmen, said: "The senate represents the sovereignty of the states." [II. Ell. Deb. 18.] GovERNOR BOWDOIN said the states are "distinct sovereignties." [II. Ell. Deb. 129.] GEORGE CABOT, afterwards one of her federal senators, said the "senate is a representation of the sovereignty of the individual states." [II. Ell. Deb. 26.] MR. THACHER said: "The senate are elected by the legislatures of the different states, and represent their sovereignty." [II. Ell. Deb. 145.] SAMUEL ADAMS said that, under the new constitution, "each state retains her sovereignty." [II. Ell. Deb. 131.] Other similar quotations might be given, but it is not necessary, as none of the fathers dissented, and as the then existing federal compact, and the constitution of Massachusetts, both contained assertions of absolute state sovereignty, which the fathers neither sought to nor could go behind.

"We, the people," means Massachusetts. The phrase, "the people," was then used in a general sense, as it is now; for the people of all the states were alike in political condition, had common sentiments, and aimed at self-government, not only as societies, such as they then were, but as united societies, which they were then seeking to become. Their contemplated self-federalization was for convenience, economy, and united strength. "The people," then, only ex

isted, and had capacity for political action, as states; and, as these bodies were equal, they must have been respectively sovereign. Consistently with this idea, the organic laws of the states generally declared that "all power is inherent in the people,”- the state making the declaration referring to herself, of course, for she made it independently, and had no right or reason to make it for any other people. Wherefore, we shall find the phrase, when technically and constitutionally used, to mean the people of a state, or the people of the states, considered as sovereignties. The records of all the states show this, as will be seen. I now proceed to give the conclusive proof Massachusetts affords. Her own record shows her to be as autocratic as the Czar in decreeing her institutions, state and federal, as well as in her present political status. When her people, as a separately and thoroughly organized colony, assumed independence, and "by a social compact," to use their own words, formed themselves into a state, they solemnly preambled as follows: Thanking God for the opportunity of deliberately entering into "an original, explicit, and solemn compact with each other," and "forming a new constitution of civil government for themselves and posterity," they declare that "We, the people of Massachusetts, . . . do agree upon, ordain, and establish the following declaration of rights and frame of government as the constitution of the commonwealth of Massachusetts." And it in no wise qualifies the sovereign character of the said "We, the people" that they establish a federal government, for this must exist by their creation, hold their powers in trust, and hence remain subordinate to them. Indeed, the same fundamental law that I have just quoted from, declares that "the people of the commonwealth have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent state," and that they "forever hereafter shall exercise and enjoy every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not . . . by them expressly delegated to the united states in congress assembled." [See the present constitution of Massachusetts, Part I. Art. 5.]

We see,

What her Statesmen meant by "We, the People." from the above fundamental law, that her delegates, agents, and servants, whether in the federal or state convention, were absolutely bound to mean her alone, when they spoke or wrote the phrase, "We, the people;" for, collectively, they were her mouth-piece, and were only authorized to speak the voice of her power. Let us see what they say. I shall quote somewhat copiously, as the debate is very instructive, and as Massachusetts completely destroys the theory of "the Massachusetts school."

DR. CHARLES JARVIS, an able member of the convention, said: "Under what authority are we acting? . . . We are convened in

right of the people, as their immediate representatives, to execute the most important trust which it is possible to receive." "He considered the constitution as an elective democracy, in which the sovereignty still rested in the people," i.e. remained where it had been, in the state. He further spoke of the convention as "the whole people of Massachusetts assembled by their delegates," and said: We are "at liberty to resolve in what form this trust shall be executed." "We have a right to receive or reject the constitution." [II. Ell. Deb. 151.]

SAMUEL STILLMAN, a prominent member of the convention, after showing that the president, the senate, and the house of representatives are to be elected by or for "the people of the several states," continued: "It will be their own fault, then, if they [i.e. the people of a given state] do not choose the best men in the commonwealth. Who are congress, then? They are ourselves, the men of our choice, in whom we confide, whose interest is inseparably connected with our own." [II. Ell. Deb. 167.]

HON. CHARLES TURNER said: "I know great powers are necessary to be given to congress, but I wish they may be well guarded." I know not whether this convention will vote a ratification of this constitution or not. If they should do it, and have the concurrence of the other states," etc. II. Ell. Deb. 32, 171.]

JAMES BOWDOIN, afterwards governor, said: "All power is derived mediately or immediately from the people, in all the constitutions. This is the case with the federal constitution. The electors of representatives to the state governments are electors of representatives to the federal government." Speaking of the power of imposing taxes, duties, etc., he said: "The states empower congress to raise money." He further said: "Shall we, then, we of this state, who are so much interested in this matter, deny them that power, -a power so essential to our political happiness? . . . Whether such power be given by the proposed constitution, it is left with the conventions of the several states, and with us, who compose one of them, to determine." [II. Ell. Deb. 81; see also Ibid. 125, et seq.]

THEOPHILUS PARSONS, afterwards the noted Chief Justice, characterized the new political arrangement as "a government, to be administered for the common good, by the servants of the people, vested with delegated powers, by popular elections at stated periods. The federal constitution establishes a government of this description, and in this case the people divest themselves of nothing; the government and the powers which congress can administer, are the mere result of a compact made by the people with each other for their common defence and general welfare." He speaks of the powers of government being

taken by the people from their state governments, and put in the federal one. Of course the people of the state alone could do this. [See II. Ell. Deb. 88, et seq.]

JOHN HANCOCK, the president of the convention, as well as governor of the state, spoke of "the people of this commonwealth" as having the absolute right to reject or ratify "the proposed form of government." And he considered the federal constitution as "the delegating" of power by "the people to men who were dependent on them frequently for election." [II. Ell. Deb. 175.]

We see, then, that by "We, the people," in the preamble of the federal compact, the Massachusetts fathers meant, and could but mean, the people of the states, as commonwealths; and that they recognized the said states as the sole sources of power, and as the compacting and ordaining parties to a "union of states," formed for "the common defence and general welfare." They unquestionably considered the states as sovereign republics, or self-governing peoples, forming a federal system, or republic of republics.

The Fear of losing Statehood. The advocates of the new plan conclusively showed that the precious integrity and sovereignty of the states were untouched by it; but the public fear could not be thus allayed. The fact was unappreciated, even if known, that the federal convention had repudiated and excluded from the constitution all ideas of controlling and coercing states; and had only given the federal agency legal jurisdiction and power of coercion over citizens, such power, of course, coming from, belonging to, and being exercised for, the states. It was owing to the aforesaid vague and general fear, that a bill of rights, and other limitations of, and safeguards against, federal power were generally demanded, — with what result on Massachusetts, we shall now see.

She proposes the Tenth Amendment. SAMUEL ADAMS, one of the great revolutionary leaders of Massachusetts, had, with many others, gone into the convention evidently determined to defeat the constitution, his unfavorable first impression of that instrument being indicated by the following extract from a letter to Richard Henry Lee, dated December 3, 1787: "I stumble at the threshold. I meet with a national government, instead of a federal union of sovereign states. . . . If the several states are to become one entire nation, under one legislature, its powers to extend to all legislation, and its laws to be supreme and control the whole, the idea of sovereignty in these states must be lost." If he and other leading men had remained under this impression, the federal plan would have been spurned with unanimity, for the ideas, which subsequently became Websterian dogmas, had in those days no friends and advocates;

and the people of the country were all determined that there should be no consolidation of the states, and that state integrity and sovereignty should be absolutely preserved.

Late in the session, when everything foretokened overwhelming defeat, Gov. HANCOCK, representing the leading advocates of the system, came forward with "conciliatory propositions," the substance of which was, that Massachusetts should, at the time of her ratification, propose to her sisters several amendments, to secure the integrity of the states and the subordination of the new government, — the most important of them being the one which, on her motion, as it were, subsequently became the tenth. When he proposed these amendments, he gave his assent to the constitution, "in full confidence that the said amendments would soon become a part of the system;" and said that, as they were "calculated to give security and ease alike to all the states, he thought all would agree to them." [II. Ell. Deb. 175.] The effect of these "conciliatory propositions" can be best seen from the response of Samuel Adams. Said he: "Your Excellency's first proposition is that it be explicitly declared that all powers not expressly delegated to Congress, are reserved to the several states to be by them exercised.' This appears to my mind to be a summary of a bill of rights, which gentlemen are anxious to obtain. . . . It is consonant with the second article in the present confederation, that each state retains its sovereignty . . . and every power. . . which is not . . . expressly delegated to the united states in congress assembled." [II. Ell. Deb. 131.] Confidence (afterwards justified by the event) being felt that these amendments would be adopted; and the great opposition leader expressing himself satisfied, and determined to vote yes, the opponents yielded sufficiently to allow ratification by the very small majority of 19, in a membership of 355 votes, the firm and formidable minority still vaguely fearing that the instrument might be susceptible of the very meaning that Dane, Story, and Webster afterwards, by perversion, put upon it.

The Amendment a Truism, though Useful. But for the understanding that this amendment at least would be added to the compact, the system would certainly have been defeated, though in reality the said amendment could make no change, it being a mere truism, or, at best, a gloss, and only tantamount to the declaration that all powers not given are reserved, a self-evident proposition. Still the general understanding that such an amendment was to be made, bore a large and useful part in satisfying the people of several of the states that their sovereignty was preserved in the system, while "powers" only were delegated or trusted to agents. Unquestionably