PART V.

CITIZENSHIP, ALLEGIANCE, AND TREASON IN

THE UNITED STATES.

TRE

CHAPTER I.

"THE PEOPLE" ARE SOVEREIGN STATES.

REATING the matter in the main historically, or rather by quoting the statements and opinions of the fathers, I shall maintain the following

Fundamental Principles. I. The people are the states, and, as such, they compose whatever nation there is; and the general government is the agency of the states, by and through which they exercise federal self-government.

II. The fathers contemplated, and tried to forefend, the danger of the federal delegative authority increasing, to the control and final destruction of the states.

III. Federal acts, outside of delegated powers, were to be treated as nullities, and, if attempted to be enforced, resisted as usurpations.

IV. The federal government is not only without authority, but is actually prohibited, to coerce the state with arms, by legislation, or even judicially.

V. The states in the union have the unlimited right of self-defence, even, if need be, against the federal agency.

VI. To defend the state with arms, in obedience to her will, is the duty of the member or citizen, and is not treason in any sense, but is true loyalty.

The reader will find the corollaries or considerations, involved in this last and most important point, stated at the beginning of Chapter VI., infra; and he should by all means read them now, for thereby he can see, and measurably appreciate, the scope, if not the pith, of the whole great argument. The last point (VI.) is the citadel of American institutional liberty!

The States are the People and Polity.

POINT I. The people are the states, and, as such, they compose whatever nation there is; and the general government is the agency of the states, by and through which they exercise federal self-government.

The people are states, and are sovereign, for they are republics, or self-governing bodies of people. They were never organized otherwise. Nor have they any capacity for political action, except as states; and it is they (and not their government, local or general), that hold, inherently and ab origine, the sovereign, exclusive, and unqualified right and power to govern all the people and territory within them. Just as they pre-existed, they were named and provided for in the federal constitution, as well as recognized as the sole parties to and actors under it; and the identical, original states now exist, unchanged in any particular.

And the general government is their agency, for it is made up personally of their subjects, and it only possesses and acts by derivative and delegative power.

All the foregoing parts of this work are devoted to the proof of the above proposition, so that I shall content myself here with two or three decisive quotations, fully covering the ground, simply to indicate this link of the chain, while emphasizing and reimpressing the vital truth it involves.

Said DANIEL WEBSTER, in his speech of 1833: "The sovereignty of government is an idea belonging to the other side of the Atlantic. No such thing is known in North America. . . . But with us, all power is with the people. They alone are sovereign, and they erect what governments they please, and confer on them such power as they please."

GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS states it as the American doctrine " that all supreme power resides originally in the people, and that all gov ernments are constituted by them as the agents and depositaries of that power.1

To the same effect, I quote from among numerous authorities before me, JAMES WILSON'S statement in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: "The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power is in the people, before they make a constitution, and remains in them

1 "Agents" do not act, or "depositaries" hold, for themselves. Hence, Mr. Curtis is solecistic in saying, as he does or seems to do, that they are the depositaries of sovereign authority, instead of "powers" delegated by the said authority. I accept his truth as an admission, and reject his mistake.

after it is made. . . . The sovereignty resides in the people, and it never leaves them." [II. Ell. Deb. 432, et seq.]

He meant the people as organized in societies or commonwealths, and not as a nation, for he spoke of "thirteen independent sovereignties" as the parties then deliberating and acting. [Mass. Centinel, Oct. 24, 1787; Am. Mus., Vol. I.]

I conclude this point by referring to the numerous quotations made heretofore from Hamilton, Madison, Washington, Franklin, Adams, and the rest of the fathers, especially in Chapter VII. of Part I., and by repeating that the people are the states, and, as such, they compose whatever nation there is; and the "general government" is the agency of the states, by and through which they exercise federal self-government. Q. E. D.

CHAPTER II.

FEDERAL USURPATION TO BE FEARED AND OPPOSED.

POINT II.—The fathers contemplated, and tried to forefend,

the control and final destruction of the states.

The use of undelegated power by the federal government, or the individuals thereof, involves their perjury and treason, for they are all sworn to support and obey the constitution, such oath being, in effect, to use granted, and not use ungranted, powers, the latter being "retained," or "reserved," by the sovereigns as their most precious treasures. And it was never dreamed of that federal officers

the elect of the people, and "the excellent of the earth" — could ever become such villains as to perjure themselves, and thus deprive the people of the great security against usurpation referred to by Webster when he said: "The constitution, to preserve itself, lays hold of individual conscience and individual duty." The tendency and end of such federal increment is necessarily to degrade, and finally to overthrow and destroy, the sovereigns of the country. Unfortunately, encroachments on reserved powers in a republic are insidious and unappreciated, until their sum amounts to revolution and the loss of liberty!

When the federalizing of the states was under discussion, the great fear was that the general government might transcend its granted powers, to nationalize or consolidate them. The vehement attacks of Henry, Mason, Martin, Lowndes, Yates, and others, were nearly fatal. Every advocate of the new plan insisted on federalizing the states, and disavowed and denounced the idea of consolidating or nationalizing them. For example, the great FISHER AMES said, in the Massachusetts ratifying convention: "No argument against the new plan has made a deeper impression than this, that it will produce a consolidation of the states. This is an effect which all good men deprecate. . . . The state governments are essential parts of the system. . . . The senators represent the sovereignty of the states . . . in the quality of ambassadors of states. . . . A consolidation of the states

would subvert the new constitution, against which this very article [that providing for senators to serve six years] is our best security. Too much provision cannot be made against consolidation." Said CHANCELLOR PENDLETON, in the convention of Virginia, in reference to this very objection: "If this be such a government, I will confess with my worthy friend [Patrick Henry] that it is inadmissible." Similarly spoke others, in all the principal ratifying and delegating states; and no friend of the constitution ever dissented. The advocates of the

plan, admitting that the federal functionaries were to be (not angels – but) men of average weakness and wickedness, showed the danger to be much overrated, and strove to ascertain it precisely, and forefend it. They argued, as will be hereafter seen, that there was no power whatever to coerce states in any manner; that the states had the right of self-defence, even against the federal government; that they only delegated power, or bound themselves in union, voluntarily, and could withdraw, or retract delegations at will; and, in short, that state integrity and sovereignty were secure.

Carefully Guarding against Consolidation. Nay, more, out of abundance of caution, the advocates, to prevent possible dangers, or, at all events, to remove doubts, proposed amendments. This overcaution was started in the Massachusetts convention, where, after long and animated debate, it was found that the opposition was likely to prevail. Thereupon a "conciliatory proposition" was made by the federalizers, through John Hancock, the president, to the effect that the convention should ratify, with the understanding that the states should speedily make amendments. Chief among those proposed was the following: That "all powers not expressly delegated, are reserved to the several states, to be by them exercised." But even then, though Samuel Adams, the great leader of the opposition, joined Hancock, and both expressed "full confidence" in the amendments being adopted, such were the fear and prejudice, that ratification was only carried by a majority of 19 in 355 votes. [II. Ell. Deb. 181.] And, indeed, so deep and widespread were the apprehension and doubt on this subject, that in several of the states the constitution was barely carried. And Hildreth, the Massachusetts historian, thinks, on a retrospect, that if a vote of the general people had been taken, the decision would have been adverse.

This amendment was a mere truism, and was to give emphasis to what already existed in the nature of things; for actual delegations only were put in the plan; and the powers not put in were kept out, and, of course, retained by the commonwealths of people. Hence the amendment was needed only to enable the said people "clearly to see the distinction," remove their fears, and give confidence and hope.