incompetent or artful; it is quite certain he is not actuated by clemency or a generous pity. Engineers are hard at work strengthening the position on the south bank of the river; but forts do not constitute safety. Without stout hearts behind their lines and breastworks, abatis and redoubts avail nothing. A grand plan of attack on Washington mapped out -General Beauregard won't venture unless almost certain of success. the trenches and garrisons in the tête de pont and works. The cavalry of the Southern army and loss of many mounted "gentlemen." the South, have enlisted men to serve for the The Confederates, as you were informed from war, and take no others. The staple of their army will undergo no change, and as it grows older it ought to get better, unless it be beaten. You will pardon me for referring to a remark in one of my previous letters, that there might be fierce skirmishes and even sanguinary engagements, between the two armies, but that these would be followed by no decisive results, owing to the want of cavalry. Strange to say, though the panic and very discreditable rout was caused by alarms of, and might have been prevented by the presence of cavalry, no steps are taken to remedy that great deficiency. The volunteers who were at Manassas will never stand the man on horseback again, and I believe the Confederates are quite aware of their advantage, though they may have had to mourn the loss of many gentlemen who fell during the day. It must be that the Confederates are deficient in the means of transport, or in actual force to make an attack which is so obvious, if they desire to show the North it is not possible to subdue them. The corps which went from Winchester to Manassas under Johnson is put by the Federalists at 40,000. Let us take it at half that number. Beauregard and Lee are said to have had 60,000 at Manassas, including, I presume, the forces between it and Richmond. Divide that again. There were certainly 20,000 between Monroe, the Court () and Richmond, of whom 10,000 could be spared; and on the western side of the capital of the Confederate States there was available at least another corps of 10,000, which could have been readily strengthened by 10,000 or 15,000 more from the South in case of a supreme effort. There seems no reason, not connected with transport, equipment, or discipline, why the Confed-pear erates should not have been able last week to take the field with 75,000 men, in two corps; one quite strong enough to menace the force on the right bank of the Potomac, and to hold it in check, or to prevent it going over to the other side; the other to cross into Maryland, which is now in parts only kept quiet by force, and to advance down on Washington from the west and North. Military exaggerations North and South. The Northern papers are increasing the amount of butter in proportion as they decrease the losses of their loaves, and they do not apto perceive that the smaller the latter were, the less should be the layer of the former for it is no credit to an army to lose its guns, abandon its positions, throw away its muskets, leave its wounded in the hands of the enemy, and run some thirty and odd miles from front of Centreville, not merely to Arlington, but to Washington, without any cause at all; for without loss there was no cause of retreat, and therefore no excuse for panic and rout. Again, they say there was only a portion of their army engaged. The greater shame for those who were not engaged to run, then. But before the battle, when McDowell's force was enumerated in terrorem at 50,000, it was said fifteen regiments had subsequently joined. Now it is averred only 15,000, 18,000, or 20,000 were in action. What on earth were the rest about? declares the enemy were 35,000 strong, he astonishes us by asserting that of all his host only 15,000 took part in the battle. As to losses, of course it is beyond any thing but In the event of success, the political advantages would be very great at home and abroad, and there would be a new base of operations gained close to the enemy's lines, while the advantages of holding the Potomac and Chesapeake Bay would be much neutralized and finally destroyed. The navy yard would fall into the enemy's hands. Fort Washington would probably soon follow. Fortress Monroe would And I am obliged to say that Mr. Davis's be condemned to greater isolation. Philadel-statements are quite as startling; for, while he phia itself would be in imminent danger should the Confederates attempt greater aggression. But, for one, General Beauregard will consent to no plan of operations in which success is not rendered as certain as may be by all pos-imagination to give an estimate, Regiments sible precautions, and he might not favor a proposal which would lead to dividing an army into two parts, with a river between them and an enemy on each side. Monroe and Hampton, which are the true bases of operations against Richmond, have been weakened to reenforce the army covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, and yet I doubt if there are on the south bank of the Potomac at this moment 40,000 men all along the lines who could move out and offer an eneiny battle, leaving any adequate guards in reported to have been annihilated have turned up, quite hale and hearty, neat as imported, on the day of marching home; and fond parents, wives, and relatives will be spared many pangs and a great deal of mourning. I think my estimate of killed and wounded was nearly correct. The prisoners may amount to more than 900 or 1,000, but the Federalists have lost more heavily than the totals under these heads would show, perhaps. It would be rather ridiculous to call it either a hard fought, a bloody, or a glorious field; but it was an important one; it | impregnable to the enemy, for they have not was a most trying one to the Federalists, who the means of undertaking a regular siege. If were badly fed and hard worked in a waterless they get heavy guns and mortars, however, they country, on a July day, for twelve hours; they can certainly make the interior unpleasant, and were exposed to the demoralizing effects of long-should they open trenches the Americans may continued artillery fire. In spite of their want have a Sebastopol in petto near Old Point Comof discipline and the very unaccountable rout, fort. the Federalists at first showed alacrity, but after a time they became torpid and difficult to handle. No one questions the general bravery of Americans, native or adopted, on either side; but a defeat is rendered worse than ridiculous by attempts to turn it into a triumph. Let the unfortunate brave rest content with the sympathy they deserve, and shun the ovations which are the due of the conqueror. Praise and flattery cannot retake a gun, nor save a standard, nor win a battle-even if it be from tox populi in Broadway or Bowery. Army and Financial measures of the Washington Cabinet. The government in some measure let the world see what they think of the charges made against the officers of the army in reference to the late battle. Here is an order just published: [Mr. Russell here gives the order (July 25) of Adjutant-general Thomas, United States Army, directing that volunteer officers shall undergo an examination, as well as the reconstruction of the military districts in Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania-ED.] He then continues:-Yesterday a bill was passed by the House of Representatives imposing a tax on carriages of from $1 to $50; gold watches, $1; silver watches, 50c.; excise on spirituous liquors, 5c. per gallon; and on fermented liquors, 60c. per barrel, or 2c. a gallon. All incomes over $600 per annum, three per cent., including money at interest, &c. Every interest in the country is also taxed, including a tax on the net income of the banks; but not on their currency or bank circulation, Landed estates are likewise taxed, and if it be accepted by the other branches of the Legislature, the people of the North will begin to feel that fighting is an expensive luxury, particularly if it be unsuccessful, Generals Banks and Butler, and the fortifications of Fortress Monroe-The defences of James River. It will be weeks before we have done hearing and seeing accounts of Bull Run, or, as it may be better called, of Manassas, unless some other action intervenes, as is very likely indeed. Gen. Banks, not finding any advantage in occupying a point in front of Harper's Ferry, on the Virginia side, has, it is affirmed, withdrawn all his troops to a position in Maryland, which commands the passages from the Ferry; and Gen. Butler, at Fortress Monroe, feels himself compelled to abandon his advanced works at Hampton, which I described hurriedly the other day, and to retire to the cover of the guns of the place. Fortress Monroe is quite Meantime the command of Colonel Phelps, at Newport News, consisting of four regiments, is threatened by the enemy. His camp is intrenched and furnished with a few howitzers and field-pieces, and heavy guns on the river face. I heard him apply to General Butler, when I was there, for horses and harness for his guns, as if he wanted to move them. He is a grim, dour, stern soldier, of the old Puritan type, and if attacked he will defend his camp to the last. Should he be beaten, the Confederates will have both sides of James River. Relative value of the officers slain on both sidesSons of the First Families" a greater loss than mere Irish or Germans. The more closely the consequences of Manassas are investigated, the more serious they seem to be. It must be granted that the Confederates feel their losses more severely than the North does. Their colonels and officers are men of mark, and even of privates killed or wounded one sees notices implying that they belong to good families and are well known people. The O's and Macs and Vons (few of the latter), the Corcorans, Camerons, and Bruggers, prisoners, wounded, or killed, are of less consequence to the social system of the North than the Hamptons, Prestons, and Mannings are to the South. If Mr. Davis and a few of the leaders were to fall in battle there would be less chance of the South continuing its struggle with the same heart and confidence; but if all the cabinet were to go to-morrow from Washington, the spirit of the Northern States would not be diminished one iota. Announcements of the victory by the rebel chiefs. From the South, as yet, we have only a few scattered details of the fight and of its results; but it can be seen that there was no very great exultation over the victory. The following interesting extracts from the Richmond Enquirer, of July 23, will furnish a good idea of the manner in which the news was received: [Mr. Russell here gives the despatch of Jefferson Davis to Mrs. Davis, announcing the triumph; also his official report to Adjutant-General Cooper at Richmond, the speech of Mr. Memminger in the rebel Congress announcing the news, with the resolutions passed by that body on the occasion.-See Doc. 7.—ED.] He then adds:-It will be observed when Mr. Davis telegraphed to his wife he spoke of a dearly-bought victory and a close pursuit. Of the latter there are no evidences; many troops remained till next morning in Centreville, not four miles from the scene of the fight, and General Schenck's report states he withdrew his men in good order at his leisure. It will be seen, too, that all which has been said of the enemy outflanking the Federalists' left is rubbish, and that the main contest was, as I stated, on the right of the line. Mr. Davis returned by train to Richmond on the 23d a conqueror. His conduct is thus described: [Here he gives the account of Jeff. Davis's reception, with the report of his remarks, given in Doc. 7.-ED.] The medical appliances and surgeons of the army. The luxury of ambulances" is a new and curious ground of complaint, and I suspect that there were not many articles of the kind in the rear of the Confederate army. Apropos of this subject, I must remark that one class of officers in the Federal army did their duty nobly—the surgeons remained on the field when all others were retiring or had left. One is reported killed; six are prisoners in the hands of the enemy, engaged in attending the wounded of both sides an invaluable aid to the scanty medical staff of the Confederates. There is no reason to believe the treatment of wounded or prisoners was what it was reported to have been. There may have been some isolated acts of atrocity in the heat of battle or pursuit, and it is only too likely that a building in which wounded men were placed was set fire to by a shell, but it is only justice to the Confederate authorities to say that they seem to have done all they could for those who fell into their hands. Much irritation has been created by the false statements circulated on this subject, and the soldiers on guard over Confederate prisoners here would not permit them to receive some little luxuries which had been ordered by sympathizing inhabitants, on the ground that they did not deserve them after the treatment given by their friends to the Federalists. man did not also forward any little scraps of news he could collect I am in error. Again, a series of maps prepared with great care, for the use of General McDowell's staff, are given out to be photographed, and are so scarce that superior officers cannot get them. Nevertheless one is found in a tent of a Confederate officer, in the advance of Fairfax Court House, which must have been sent to him as soon as it was ready. It is also asserted that General Beauregard knew beforehand of McDowell's advanoe: but the Confederates left in such haste that much credence cannot be given to the statement that the enemy were fully informed of the fact any considerable length of time beforehand. The "On to Richmond" cry. The battle having been duly fought and lost, the Federalists are employing their minds to find out why it was fought at all. The convulsions into which the New York press have been thrown by the inquiry, resemble those produced on a dead frog by the wire of Galvani, "Who cried On to Richmond?'" "Not I, 'pon my honor. It was shouted out by some one in my house, but I don't know who. I never gave him authority. I won't shout any thing any more." "Who urged General Scott to fight the battle, and never gave anybody any peace till he was ordered to do it?" "Nobody!" "It was that other fellow." "Please, sir, it wasn't me." "I never approved it." "I'll never say a word to a soldier again.” "Mr. President knows I didn't." It is really a most curious study. I begin to thing that the best possible instructors may sometimes be in the wrong at this side of the Atlantic. The Tribune declares that General Scott, being absolute master of the situation, is re Treason exists in every department of the Federal sponsible for the battle. Government-What Mr. Russell saw in the United And as I have used the word "sympathizers," let me add the expression of my belief that there is scarcely a department, high or low, of the public service of the United States in which there is not "treason "I mean the aiding and abetting the enemy by information and advice. It is openly talked in society-its work is evident on all sides. I went into the private department of the Post Office the other day, and found there a gentleman busily engaged in sorting letters at a desk. The last time I saw him was at dinner with the Commissioners of the Confederate States at Washington, and I was rather surprised to see him now in the sanctum of the Post Office, within a few feet of Mr. Blair, of the sangre azul of abolitionism. Said he, "I am just lookiny over the letters here to pick out some for our Southern friends. and I forward them to their owners as I find them;" and if the excellent and acute gentle. But the New York Times gives a statement of what took place before the battle at the General's table, which, therefore, is probably published with his sanction, as it is impossible to suppose a gentleman would print it without express permission, from which it would certainly appear that the veteran commander was not, as I hinted, a free agent in the matter. Here is the statement: [Mr. Russell here furnishes Raymond's Washington letter to the New York Times, commencing with:-" General Scott, it is said, discussed the whole subject of this war, in all its parts, and with the utmost clearness and accuracy. He had a distinct and well-defined opinion on every point connected with it, and stated what his plan would be for bringing it to a close if the management of it had been left in his hands," &c.-ED.] Can the Government meet a reaction? — General McClellan at work. It remains to be seen if the plans of General Scott can now be followed. The reaction along | Gen. Tyler's action, and of these it will be pos the Mississippi will be great, and Major-General Fremont, with great respect for his courage and enterprise, is not the man, I fear, to conduct large columns successfully. Missouri is any thing but safe. Cairo is menaced, and my friends at Memphis seem to be stirring from their rest under their General. I regret that I cannot give any more interesting or important intelligence, but I have not been able to go out for the last two days to the camps, as in common with many people in Washington, I was suffering a little from the weather -thunderstorms, rains, bad odors, which produce the usual results in garrisons and ill-drained cities. However, it is some consolation that there is nothing of consequence doing. There was an alarm the night before last. Some foolish people got the loan of a steamer and a big gun, and went down the river with them. When they were opposite one of the enemy's batteries, some three or four miles away, they fired their big gun, and "Oh'd," no doubt, at the shot as it plashed short in the water, the enemy treating them with a proper silent contempt all the while. Having done this, they returned in the evening and amused themselves by firing away as hard as they could just below the Long Bridge-I believe without ball-and it may be imagined there was some commotion, as the reports shook doors and windows. General McClellan is doing his best to get things into order, and the outskirts of the city and the streets are quieter at night; but there is rough work with Zouaves and others in Alexandria-houses burnt, people shot, and such like sports of certain sorts of "citizen soldiery." They will soon be shouting "money or blood," if not kept in order and paid. These men form a marked exception to the general behavior of many regiments. Doc. 4. N. Y. TRIBUNE NARRATIVE. A CORRESPONDENT of the New York Tribune writing from Washington, under date of July 23, gives the following account of the battle: My narrative of this extraordinary battle can accurately embrace most of what occurred with the division under Gen. Tyler, which opened the attack, which was, with the exception of one brigade, desperately engaged from the beginning to the end, and which, so far as I can judge from the course in which events ran, was the last to yield before the panic which spread through the army. It is well understood that the conflict extended over a space of many miles, and that the experience of a single observer could grasp only those details which The general immediately surrounded him. progress and effects of the entire engagement were apparent from the advanced positions of sible for me to speak safely; but the particular movement of the divisions under Col. Hunter and Col. Heintzelman should be told of by others who accompanied them. For the clear understanding of this record, the plan of battle, although often given, must be once more briefly set down. The enemy's strength had been tested and affirmed by the hot skirmish of Thursday, the result of which did not justify a second serious attempt upon the same ground. There was, moreover, abundant evidence that the entire line of defences along Bull Run was equally formidable, and that any attack upon a single point would be extremely hazardous. It was therefore determined to open the assault in two directions simultaneously, and to offer a feint of a third onset, to divert attention, and if possible, confuse the enemy's defence. Accordingly, Col. Richardson was left with a considerable battery of artillery and one brigade the fourth of Gen. Tyler's division-at the scene of the skirmish of Thursday, with directions to open heavily with cannon at about the moment of the real attack elsewhere. The remainder of Gen. Tyler's division, his 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades, with powerful artillery, but withont cavalry, was sent to cross Bull Run at a point a mile and a half or more to the right, upon a A road known as the Stone Bridge road. stronger wing, comprising the divisions of Col. Hunter and Col. Heintzelman, was carried around a good distance to the right, with the purpose of breaking upon the enemy in flank and rear, and driving them towards Gen. Tyler, by whom their regular retreat should be cut off. Col. Miles's division remained at Centreville in reserve, and had no part in the action. Long before dawn, the three divisions which sustained the battle moved from Centreville to the attack. The march was slow, and, to a certain degree, irregular. Even at that hour, there seemed a lack of unity and direct purpose among the officers, which sometimes was made too evdent to the troops not to affect their spirit and demeanor. I believe it just to say that, at the very opening of the day, it was plain to all that real and sound discipline was abandoned. I do not mean that this was the case with separate regiments, many of which were always prompt, sure, and perfectly at the disposal of their commanders, but with the brigades, the divisions, even the army, as a whole. The march was continued until, at 54 o'clock, Gen. Tyler's division had reached the place of its attack. His Second and Third brigades, under Gen. Schenck and Col. Sherman, were arrayed in lines of battle, the former taking the left, and the latter, after some changes, the right of the road. Skirmishers were pushed forward, who, when close upon Bull Run, encountered the pickets of the enemy, and presently exchanged irregular shots with them, by which slight injuries were caused on both sides. Nothing further was attempted by the infantry for hours. A heavy 32-pound rifled cannon | action by artillery must have extended over was brought well forward on the road, and five or six miles, from Richardson's position at threw a couple of shell among the rebel lines, the extreme left around to Hunter's at the which were indistinctly seen formed and form-right. The roar and rattle were incessant, and ing a mile before us. These were not answer- the air above the vast field soon became thick ed, and, for a while, the cannonade was dis- with smoke. continued from our side. Our position was less commanding and less clear than that we had occupied on Thursday. We were still before the valley of Bull Run, but the descent from our side was more gradual, and we were surrounded by thick woods down almost to the ravine through which the stream flows. The enemy, on the contrary, had cleared away all obstructing foliage, and bared the earth in every direction over which they could bring their artillery upon us. Clumps of trees and bushes remained wherever their earthworks and other concealed defences could be advantageously planted among them. The ground on their side was vastly superior to ours. It rose in regular slopes to great heights, but was broken into knolls and terraces in numberless places, upon which strong earthworks were successively planted, some openly, but the greater part concealed. The long interval between our first discharge of artillery and the positive attack afforded abundant opportunity to overlook the ground. In no spot did the enemy seem weak. Nature had supplied positions of defence which needed but little labor to render them desperately formidable. How thoroughly these advantages had been improved we know by the enormous efforts which were required to dislodge the troops, and by the obstinate opposition which they displayed before retiring from point to point. While our division waited, quiet and alert, Gen. McDowell led the columns of Hunter and Heintzelman far around by the right, to the enemy's flank and rear. The march was long and doubtless slow, for it was not until about 11 o'clock that we were able to discover indications of their having met the rebels. From Richardson's position, to the left, however, we heard, at 8 o'clock, the commencement of vigorous cannonading. The deep, sullen sound from his distant batteries was all that broke the silence for nearly an hour. Then the hurrying of our officers up and down the hill, and through the woods, told us that our assault was about to open. The skirmishers had detected a thick and tangled abatis at the banks of the run, into which, before advancing, a few shell were thrown. As these burst, the rebels swarmed out from their hiding-places, and took up their next fortified post beyond. Gen. Schenck's brigade was moved forward at the left, but, before reaching the run, received the full fire of a battery masked with bushes, before which they retired to their first line. Again all operations were suspended by our division, and until 11 o'clock the contest was carried on by the artillery, which, indeed, at that hour, resounded from every point of the field. The Suddenly a line of troops was seen moving over the open hill-slope precisely in advance of us and within a mile-the least distance at which the rebel infantry had been seen. The 3d brigade under Col. Sherman was now drawn from its shelter among the woods and led rapidly around by the right across the run and towards one of the enemy's best positions. Brisk volleys of musketry were soon after heard, but the smoke hung like a veil before us and it was impossible to discover by whom, or against whom, they were directed. A puff of wind afterwards cleared the view, and we saw the brigade still in firm line, and advancing with great speed. A few shots, and a round or two of artillery, next came from the right upon the 2d brigade, which had not yet moved forward, and which, as a whole, held its post squarely, although some squads broke and ran into the open road. Orders were given to the men to lie upon their faces when not in motion, and menaced by artillery. However proper this precaution may have been at this time, it afterwards turned out to be one of the most fatal causes of the demoralization of the division. It was so frequently repeated that some regiments at last could not be made to stand at any point whatever, the least report of cannon or musketry sending them instantly upon their knees; and I saw an entire company of the New York 2d grovel in the dust at the accidental snapping of a percussion cap of one of their own rifles. At 114 o'clock the cannonading was lighter from our side, and the attention of the enemy seemed to be distracted from us. We were then able to descry great volumes of smoke arising in front, in the precise spot at which Hunter's column should have arrived. This gloomy signal of the battle waved slowly to the left, assuring us that Hunter and Heintzelman were pushing forward, and driving the enemy before them. At the same time, our right brigade disappeared over the eminence for which they had been contending, and the distant cheers, which evidently came from them, proved that the present triumph was their own. To sustain and re-enforce them, the reserve brigade of Colonel Keyes was then brought down, and marched forward, in spite of a tremendous cannonade which opened upon them from the left, in the same line as that which Colonel Sherman had followed. The left brigade, under General Schenck, did not advance, but still remained on the ground where it had formed at the very outset. The result of this inaction was, that our left was at the close of the battle assailed and successfully turned; and although the enemy did not pursue this final triumph, it was not the fault of the commander of that brigade that great mischief was not |