house till late in the morning, to see that the stragglers, and weary and worn-out soldiers, were not left behind. I transmit herewith the reports of the several division and brigade commanders, to which I refer for the conduct of particular regiments and corps, and a consolidated return of the killed, wounded, and missing. From the latter it will be seen that our killed amounted to nineteen officers and four hundred and sixtytwo non-commissioned officers and privates, and our wounded to sixty-four officers and nine hundred and forty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates. Many of the wounded will soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of killed and disabled from further service under one thousand. The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be missing having fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington-many of the Zonaves to New York. In one brigade the number originally reported at six hundred and sixteen was yesterday reduced to one hundred and seventy-four. These reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more correct return can be made. Of course, nothing accurate is known of the loss of the enemy. An officer of their forces, coming from them with a flag of truce, admitted eighteen hundred killed and wounded, and other information shows this to be much under the true number. The officer commanding the Eleventh New York Zouaves, and Colonel Heintzelman, say that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many of those reported among the casualties have absented themselves since their return and have gone to New York. Among the missing reported are many of our surgeons, who remained in attendance on our wounded, and were, against the rules of modern warfare, made prisoners. The issue of this hard-fought battle, in which certainly our troops lost no credit in their conflict on the field with an enemy ably commanded, superior in numbers, who had but a short distance to march, and who acted on his own ground, on the defensive, and always under cover, whilst our men were of necessity out on the open fields, should not prevent full credit being given to those officers and corps whose services merited success if they did not attain it. viding for them the best the circumstances permitted. They are as follows: First Lieutenant H. W. Kingsbury, Fifth Artillery, aide-de-camp. Major Clarence S. Brown, New York Militia Volunteers, aide-de-camp. Major James S. Wadsworth, New York Militia Volunteers, aide-de-camp; the latter, who does me the honor to be on my personal staff, had a horse shot under him in the hottest of the fight. Captain James B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant-General. Captain O. H. Tillinghast, Assistant Quartermaster, who discharged alone the important and burdensome duties of his department with the army, and who was mortally wounded while acting with the artillery, to which he formerly belonged, and in which he was deeply interested. Captain H. F. Clark, Chief of Subsistence Department. Major Meyer, Signal Officer, and Major Malcolm McDonnell, who acted as aides. Surgeon W. S. King, and Assistant Surgeon Magruder, Medical Department. Major J. G. Barnard, Engineer, and senior of his department with the army, gave most important aid. First Lieutenant Fred. S. Prime, Engineers. Captain A. W. Whipple. First Lieutenant H. L. Abbott, and Second Lieutenant H. S. Putnam, Topographical Engineers. Major W. F. Barry, Fifth Artillery, Chief of Artillery. Lieutenant George C. Strong, Ordnance Officer. Major W. H. Wood, First Infantry, Acting Inspector-General. Second Lieutenant Guy Henry, who joined me on the field, was of service as an aide-de-camp. The following officers commanded divisions and brigades, and in the several places their duty called them, did most effective service and behaved in the most gallant manner: Brigadier-General Tyler, Connecticut Volunteers. Colonel David Hunter, Third Cavalry, severely wounded at the head of his division. Colonel S. P. Heintzelman, Seventeenth Infantry, wounded in the arm while leading his division into action on the hill. Brigadier-General Schenck, Ohio Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, First Division. Colonel E. D. Keyes, Eleventh Infantry, commanding First Brigade, First Division. Colonel W. P. Franklin, Twelfth Infantry, First Brigade, Third Division. Colonel W. T. Sherman, Thirteenth Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, First Division. Colonel Andrew Porter, Sixteenth Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Second Division. Colonel A. E. Burnside, Rhode Island To avoid repetition, I will only mention here Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Secthe names of those not embraced in reports of ond Division. Colonel O. B. Wilcox, Michigan division and brigade commanders. I beg to Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Third refer to their reports for the names of those Division, who was wounded and taken prisonserving under their immediate orders, desiring er while on the hill, in the hottest of the fight. that on this subject they be considered as part Colonel O. O. Howard, Maine Volunteers, comof my own. I claim credit for the officers of manding Third Brigade, Third Division. Colmy staff, and for those acting as such during onel J. B. Richardson, Michigan Volunteers, the day. They did every thing in their power, commanding Fourth Brigade, First Division. exposing themselves freely when required, and Colonel Blenker, New York Volunteers, comding all that men could do; communicating manding First Brigade, Fifth Division. Coloorders, guiding the columns, exhorting the nel Davies, New York Volunteers, commandtroops, rallying them when broken, and pro-ing Second Brigade, Fifth Division. As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for some explanation of the causes, as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be out of place if I refer in a few words to the immediate antecedents of the battle. When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July, Monday. Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief, and the heads of the administrative departments, in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to a want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across till eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my even seeing them, and without having been together before in a brigade. The sending reinforcements to General Patterson, by drawing off the wagons, was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the Herculean efforts of the QuartermasterGeneral, and his favoring me in every way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and the artillery, did not arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move. I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. When I did set out, on the 16th, I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence. But I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly gathered together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon managers, all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday. I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th, instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court House, beyond Germantown, to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march further. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and a half miles farther to Centreville-in all a march of twelve and a half miles; but the men were foot weary; not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road, and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carying even the load of light marching order. We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the fifth division (Miles's and Richardson's brigade) on the left, at Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, and Schenck's brigade of Tyler's division on the left of the road, near the stone bridge, not participating in the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been variously estimated. I may safely say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he could, which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th, and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had. It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas, I engaged not to have to do with the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by MajorGeneral Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major-General Butler, and I know every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that even if Johnston joined Beauregard, it would not be because he could be followed by General Patterson, but from causes not necessary for me to refer to, you knew them all. This was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling-stock and his supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from Richmond, to other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy en masse ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to, I cannot say-certainly much more than we attacked them with. I could not, as I have said, more early push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and the best part of my forces were three months' volunteers, whose term of service was about to expire, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition. On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania regiment of volunteers, and the battery of volunteer artillery of the New York Eighth militia, whose term of service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment, expressing a request for them to remain a short time, and the Hon. Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days. But in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted, and the next morning, when the army moved forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon. In the next few days, day by day, I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army. In other words, every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker. In conclusion, I desire to say, in reference to the events of the 21st ultimo, that the general order for the battle to which I referred was, and bridge approaches, on which both Ayers with slight modifications, literally conformed and Carlisle at different times tried the effect to; that the corps were brought over Bull Run of their guns without success; and a careful in the manner proposed, and put into action as examination of the banks of Bull Run satisfying before arranged, and that up to late in the me that they were impracticable for the purafternoon every movement ordered was carry-pose of artillery, these batteries had to remain ing us successfully to the object we had pro- comparatively useless until such time as Hunter's posed before starting-that of getting to the column might clear the approach by a moverailroad leading from Manassas to the valley of ment on the opposite bank. During this period Virginia, and going on it far enough to break of waiting the thirty-pounder was occasionally up and destroy the communication and inter- used with considerable effect against bodies of views between the forces under Beauregard infantry and cavalry, which could be seen from and those under Johnston. And could we have time to time moving in the direction of Hunter's fought a day or a few hours sooner, there is column, and out of the range of ordinary guns. every thing to show how we could have con- Using a high tree as an observatory, we could tinued successful even against the odds with constantly see the operations of Hunter's and which we contended. Heintzelman's column from the time they crossed Bull Run, and through one of my staff, Lieut. O'Rourke, of the engineers, I was promptly notified as to any change in the progress of their columns up to the time when it appeared that the heads of both were arrested, and the enemy seemed to be moving heavy reinforcements to support their troops. At this time I ordered Colonel Sherman, with his brigade, to cross Bull Run, and to support the two columns already in action. Colonel Sherman, as appears by his reports, crossed the run without opposition, and after encountering a party of the enemy flying before Hunter's forces, found General McDowell, and received his orders to join in the pursuit. The subsequent operations of this brigade and its able commander having been under your own eye and directions, I shall not follow its movements any further, but refer you to Colonel Sherman's report, which you will find herewith. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, FIRST DIVISION. GENERAL TYLER'S REPORT. GENERAL: In obedience to order No. 22, dated Centreville, July 20, Sherman's, Schenck's, and Keyes's brigades, of this division-Richardson's brigade having been left in front of Blackburn's Ford-moved at half-past two A. M., on the 21st inst., to threaten the passage of the Warrenton turnpike bridge, on Bull Run. I arrived in front of the bridge with Schenck's and Sherman's brigades, and Ayres's and Carlisle's batteries, about six A. M., Keyes's brigade having been halted by your order to watch the road coming up from Manassas, and about two So soon as it was discovered that Hunter's miles from the run. After examining the posi- division had been arrested, I ordered up Keyes's tion, and posting Sherman's and Schenck's bri- brigade, which arrived just as the left of Shergades and artillery, I fired the first gun at half-man's was crossing the run, and having satisfied past six A. M., as agreed upon, to show that we were in position. As my orders were to threaten the passage of the bridge, I caused Schenck's brigade to be formed into line, its left resting in the direction of the bridge, and the battery which the enemy had established to sweep the bridge and its approach, so as to threaten both. Sherman's brigade was posted to the right of the Warrenton turnpike, so as to be in position to sustain Schenck, or to move across Bull Run in the direction of Hunter's column. The thirty-pounder gun attached to the Carlisle battery was posted on the Warrenton turnpike, with Ayres's battery considerably in its rear, Carlisle's battery was posted on the left of Sherman's brigade. In this position we awaited the appearance of Hunter's and Heintzleman's columns as ordered, until such time as the approach to the bridge should be carried, and the bridge rebuilt by Capt. Alexander, of the engineers, who had on the spot the necessary structure for that purpose. Soon after getting into position we discovered that the enemy had a heavy battery, with infantry in support, commanding both the road myself that the enemy had not the force nor the purpose to cross Bull Run, I ordered Keyes's brigade to follow Sherman, accompanying the move in person, as I saw it must necessarily place me on the left of our line, and in the best possible position, when we should have driven the enemy off, to join Schenck's brigade and the two batteries left on the opposite side. I ordered Colonel Keyes to incline the head of his column a little to the right of the line of march taken by Sherman's brigade, to avoid the fire of a battery which the enemy had opened. This movement sheltered the men to a considerable degree, and resulted in closing on the rear of Sherman's brigade; and, on reaching the high ground, I ordered Colonel Keyes to form into line on the left of Sherman's brigade, which was done with great steadiness and regularity. After waiting a few moments the line was ordered to advance, and came into conflict on its right with the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which, after some severe struggles, it drove back, until the further march of the brigade was arrested by a severe fire of artillery and infantry, sheltered by some buildings |