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horses-Mr. R.'s and our own-were watered, by a servant; but the reported conversation did not take place. A short distance from that inn, Mr. Russell put spurs to his animal, and, riding furiously, left us behind; he picked up ample material for misrepresentation, however, as he went. We point out the greatest falsehood, if one falsehood can be greater than another, in the columns that he has devoted to the vilification of our troops:

"Washington was still 18 miles away. The road was rough and uncertain, and again my poor steed was under way, but it was of no use trying to outstrip the runaways. Once or twice I imagined I heard guns in the rear, but I could not be sure, in consequence of the roar of the flight behind me. It was most surprising to see how far the foot soldiers had contrived to go on in advance."

It must have been surprising indeed! From the moment of meeting the First New Jersey regiment, of which we have spoken, not a soldier, unless one of a baggage, or a picket-guard, did we see on the road-not one. The wagons going in were few, and their progress was not such as to indicate that they were making a retreat. We faced train after train going out with supplies, without guard, and without suspicion that the army was beaten and in flight. The defeat was not known to any on the road, not even to Mr. Russell, who informed us that our army would fall back and encamp for the night, only to renew the battle the next day. The "roar of the flight behind me" is a stretch of the imagination. We were "behind me," and heard the guns, and marked the time as 7:15; but save our poor old thick-winded steed, there was not another horse on the road within our sight. A few carriages with wounded, a few retiring civilians-none making haste, none suspecting the finale that was reached-soon passed us; but not an armed man, trooper nor footman, was anywhere near. Mr. Russell in the next paragraph confesses as much:

"It was a strange ride, through a country now still as death, the white road shining like a river in the moonlight, the trees black as ebony in the shade; now and then a figure flitting by into the forest or across the road-frightened friend or lurking foe, who could say? Then the anxious pickets and sentries all asking, 'What's the news?' and evidently prepared for any amount of loss."

The truth is probably this: The imaginative correspondent left the battle-ground before any confusion occurred, and when the retrograde movement was ordered. Hearing the exaggerated stories of what came to be a flight, after he got into Washington, on Monday, while the excitement was at its height, he wove them into his letter as facts of his own observation. The rout was disgraceful enough to make any man's blood cold in his veins; but it was not what Mr. Russell describes. As we have asserted, he did not see it.

From the Providence Journal.

To the Editor of the Journal:

Mr. Russell, who occupies so large a space in the London Times in giving a description of "What he saw" at the repulse of "Bull Run," was at no time within three miles of the battle-field, and was at no time within sight or musket-shot of the enemy. He entered Centreville after the writer of this, and left before him. At the period of the hardest fighting, he was eating his lunch with a brother "John Bull," near Gen. Miles's head-quarters. When the officer arrived at Centreville, announcing the apparent success of the Federal forces, (of

which he gives a correct description,) it was 4 o'clock. The retreat commenced in Centreville at half-past four. During this half hour he went about one mile down the Warrenton road, and there met the teams returning, with some straggling soldiers and one reserve regiment, which were not in the fight. He did not wait to see the main portion of the army, which did not reach Centreville until about two hours after his flight.

His excuse for hurrying to Washington on account of mailing his letter that night, is inconsistent with his statement that he went to bed, and that the mail did not leave until 4 o'clock the next morning.

He probably dreamed of the statements which he furnishes the Times, that there were no batteries taken-no charges made; that the Union forces and no doubt reflected his own feelings when he lost five batteries, 8,000 stand of arms, &c., &c., calls the Union forces cowardly at being repulsed after marching twelve miles and fighting three or four hours an entrenched enemy which numbered more than three to one.

To the Editor of the Journal:

W. E. H.*

At last we have it. After two Atlantic voyages it is "salt" enough, all must admit, and more than that, we must admit that, what he saw of the affair at Bull Run he has described with graphic and painful truth.

But, as your correspondent, W. E. H., who knew more of his personal movements than I did, says, "He was at no time within three miles of the battle-field," and consequently was no better informed upon the subject than you were, Mr. Editor, sitting in your sanctum. Therefore the earlier struggles of the day-the hard won successes of the Union troops-receive but passing notice, because he did not see them-he only saw the rout.

Yet in another letter, from which I have only seen extracts, he arrives at various conclusions, "from further information acquired." One is that "there was not a charge of any kind made by the confederate cavalry upon any regiment of the enemy until they broke." If this be true, the Fire Zouaves are all liars, and thousands of spectators were deceived, including Major Barry, of the artillery, who states expressly in his report that the cavalry charged upon the Fire Zouaves.

Mr Russell says, "there were no masked batteries at play on the side of the Confederates." Either he was grossly misinformed, or he purposely distorts the truth by quibbling on the word masked. If a masked battery is absolutely one concealed by carefully constructed abatis, or elaborate mantelets, such as Mr. Russell has perhaps seen in India or the Crimea, and nothing else, then it is very possible there were none upon the field; but if it is a battery of siege or light artillery, with or without entrenchments, so placed that it is entirely concealed by woods, underbrush, or artificial screens until the attacking force is close upon it, then I am one of thousands who can bear witness to the existence of several such upon the hill east of our (Rhode cations or cannon; but when a puff of smoke is Island) field of action. I did not see either fortifiseen to issue from a piece of woods, followed by a heavy report and a heavier ball-when this goes on for hours, the missiles ploughing up the earth in every direction, and sowing it broadcast with the

* Mr. William E. Hamlin, of Providence, R. L

dead, one is likely to conclude that there is something behind that screen of trees, and that something is my idea of a masked battery.

Finally, he says, "There were no desperate struggles except by those who wanted to get away." Of course not. He did not see them, and he is too truthful to relate any thing he did not see. His account of the retreat is no worse than the truth-what he saw of it. But be it remembered that he was with the very advance of the flying column, the most panic-stricken portion of the crowd-that he was in Washington at 11 P. M. of Sunday, about the hour when our regiments and many others camped in the vicinity of Centreville, having regained our quarters, were lighting fires, drying our clothes, or talking over the prospect of a renewed attack on Manassas next day. Many of us lay down to sleep, from which we woke, more astonished than Mr. Russell himself, at the idea of continuing our retreat to Washington; but the order came from head-quarters, and we obeyed. Of this, or of the good order preserved by several regiments, including ours, all the way from the battle-field to Cub Run, and again resumed after three or four miles, Mr. Russell says nothing-he

did not see it-he wasn't there.

Yet his story will be received as Times' gospel, not to be gainsayed, by hundreds of thousands in England, while the contradiction, if it ever reaches there, will come as a stale American apology, unworthy of belief.

DE W.*

RUSSELL'S SECOND LETTER ON BULL RUN.
WASHINGTON, July 24, 1861.

"What will

as it will give the North another insult to
avenge, and inspire the South with additional
confidence. The Confederates will accept it as
proof demonstrative of their faith that the
North cannot conquer them, and may take it
into their heads to corroborate it by an at-
tempt to inflict on the North that with which
they have been menaced by the Cabinet of
Washington and its supporters.
England and France think of it?" is the ques-
tion which is asked over and over again. The
news must go forth in its most unfavorable
form, and it will be weeks, if ever, before the
North can set a great victory to the credit side
of its books against the Confederates. In thirty
days or so the question will be answered-not
hastily or angrily, in spite of provocation and
offence, but in the spirit of honorable neutral-
ity. In the States one thing is certain-the
Cabinet will resist the pressure of the mob, or
be hurled out of office. If they yield to the
fanatics and fight battles against the advice of
their officers, they must be beaten; and the
tone of New York indicates that a second de-

feat would cost them their political existence. They can resist such pressure in future as has been brought on them hitherto by pointing to Bull Run, and by saying, "See the result of forcing Gen. Scott against his wishes." Of the Cabinet, Mr. Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, is perhaps the only man who bore up against the disheartening intelligence of MonAs no one can say what a day or a night recovering their spirits as they find that their day morning; but Mr. Seward and others are may bring forth, particularly in time of war, army was more frightened than hurt, and that I avail myself of a chance of probable quiet, the Confederates did not advance on the Capsuch as it is, amid the rolling of drums, the ital immediately after the success. It was a braying of trumpets and bands, the noise of sad, rude sweep of the broom to the cobwebmarching men, rolling of wagons, and general spinners; to the spider politicians, who have life and activity in the streets, to write some been laying out warps in all directions, and are remarks on the action at Manassas or Bull now lying in frowsy heaps among the ruins of Run. Of its general effects abroad, and on the their curious artifices. Nothing can restore North and South, a larger and perhaps a better them to their places in the popular estimation; view can be taken from Europe than on this nothing could have kept them there but the side of the Atlantic. There is a natural and rapid and complete success of their policy, and intense anxiety to learn what impression will the speedy fulfilment of their prophecies. The be made abroad by the battle-for, notwith-sword they have drawn is held over their heads standing the vulgar and insolent arrogance of the least reputable portion of the press in the United States, generally conducted by aliens or persons who have left Great Britain from cause it is felt that the result of the action must have very strong influences over the fortunes of the contending parties, particularly in the money-market, to which recourse must be had in fear and trembling. It would be well not to arrive at hasty conclusions in reference to the bearing of the defeat on the actual struggle. Those who are persuaded that the North must and will subjugate the South, see in the disaster merely a prolongation of the war, a certain loss of material, or even an increment of hope in the spirit it will arouse, as they think, among the Unionists. Others regard it as an evil omen for the compromise they desire to effect,

* Winthrop De Wolf.

by the hands of some coming man whose face
and the ground shakes beneath his tread. If
no one can see yet, but his footsteps are audible,
Mr. Lincoln were indeed a despot, with the
genius to lead or direct an army, now would
be his time. All the odium which could be
heaped upon him by his enemies, all the accu-
sations that could have been preferred, North
and South, have been fully urged, and he could
not add to them by leading his army to vic-
tory, while with victory would certainly come
the most unexampled popularity, and perhaps
an extraordinary and prosperous tenure of
power. The campaign would be one worthy
of a Napoleon, nor could it be determined by
even $500,000,000 and 500,000 men, unless
they were skilfully handled and well econo-
mized. If popular passion be excited by dema-
gogues, and if it be permitted to affect the

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councils of the State, it is easy to foresee the | end, though it is not so easy to predict by what steps ruin will be reached at last. The Ministers are already ordered to resign by the masters of the mob, and suffer a just punishment for their temporary submission to the clamor of the crownless monarchs of the NorthEast. The Secretary at War, Mr. Cameron, whose brother fell at the head of his regiment in the field, is accused of making the very submission-which was, indeed, a crime if ever it occurred-by the very people who urged it upon him, and there are few Ministers who escape invective and insinuation.

The great question to be decided just now is the value of the Union sentiment in the North. Will the men and the money be forthcoming, and that soon enough to continue the war of aggression or recuperation against the seceded States? The troops here complain of want of money, and say they are not paid. If that be so, there is proof of want of funds, which, if it lasts, will prevent the reorganization of another army, and I think it would not be safe to rely on the present army, or to depend on many of the regiments until they have been thoroughly reorganized. It must be remembered that the United States is about to lose the services of some 80,000 men, many of whom have already gone home. These are "three months' men," called out under the President's proclamation. Whether they will enlist for the term of three years, now proposed, cannot be determined; but, judging from their words they will not do so if their present officers are continued or recommissioned. At all events, they will nearly all go home to be "mustered out of the service," as it is called, at the expense of the Government. It is reported in Washington that steps were taken long ago to supply the places of the retiring battalions, and that there were also offers of 83 battalions, which have been accepted by the Government, sent in as soon as the news of the disaster at Bull Run was communicated to the North. How the regiments about to leave in a day or two were sent into the field at all is one of the mysteries of the War Department.

so bad as it might have been." The eye of faith is turned to the future, the eye of speculation is directed on the hoards of capital, and there is a firm belief that some clever person or another will succeed in inducing John Bull to part with a little of his surplus cash, for which he will receive egregious percentage.

If the bulk of the capital and population of the North is thrown into this struggle, there can be but one hope for the Confederatesbrilliant victories on the battle-field, which must lead to recognition from foreign powers. The fight cannot go on forever, and if the Confederate States meet with reverses-if their capital is occupied, their Congress dispersed, their territory (that which they claim as theirs) occupied, they must submit to the consequences of defeat. Is not that equally true of their opponents? On what ground can the United States, which were founded on successful rebellion, claim exemption from the universal law which they did so much to establish? Whatever the feelings of the North may be now, there can be no doubt that the reverse of Manassas caused deep mortification and despondency in Washington. Gen. Scott, whether he disapproved, as it is said, the movement onward or not, was certain that the Confederates would be defeated. Every hour messengers were hurried off from the field to the end of the wire some miles away, with reports of the progress made by the troops, and every hour the telegrams brought good tidings up to 4 o'clock or so, when the victory seemed decided in favor of the Federalists; at least, the impression was that they had gained the day by driving the enemy before them. Then came the news of the necessary retirement of the troops; nevertheless, it is affirmed that up to 8 o'clock in the evening Gen. Scott believed in the ultimate success of the United States troops, who under his own immediate orders had never met with a reverse. The President, the Secretary of War, and other members of the Government, were assembled in the room where the telegraph operator was at work far into the night, and as the oracles of fate uncoiled from the wires gloom gathered on their faces, and at last, grave and silent, While Congress has been passing bills of they retired, leaving hope behind them. It pains and penalties, confiscating rebel property, must have been to them a time of anxiety beand amending sundry laches in the penal code, yond words; but of old the highest honors as well as filling up rat-holes, through which were given to him who in calamity and disaster conquered and run-away secessionists might did not despair of the republic. And it is to the escape, in the laws and body of the Constitu- credit of the president and his advisers that they tion, the conquest is suddenly deferred, and have recovered their faith in the ultimate sucCotton stands king on the battle-field. "We cess of their cause, and think they can subjugate are glad of it," cry the extreme Abolitionists, the South after all. If the Confederates have suf"actually delighted, because now slavery is fered heavily in the battle, as is believed to be doomed." The extreme depression which fol- the case, they may be disheartened in spite of lowed after the joy and delight caused by the their victory, and the news of a second uprising erroneous statements of victory, complete and and levée en masse in the North may not be brilliant, has been gradually disappearing, in without an unfavorable effect on their ardor. proportion to the inactivity of the enemy or to Such men as Wade Hampton, who is reported their inability to take advantage of their suc- killed, leave gaps in their ranks not readily cess by immediate action. The funds have re-filled, and the number of colonels reported to covered, and men are saying, "Well, it's not be hors de combat would indicate a considerable

VOL. II.-Doc. 5

loss. But the raw levies are not likely to be fit for much for months to come, and it is difficult to see how they will be fit for any thing until they get proper officers. Some of the so-called regiments which have recently come in are mere mobs, without proper equipments, uniform, or arms; others are in these respects much better, marching well and looking like soldiers, but still no better than the troops who were beaten. It is not courage (need it be said?) which is wanting-it is officers; and without them men are worth little or nothing. The men of some regiments fought well; others did not. There was little or no difference between the privates of the one and those of the other; there was probably a marked distinction between the officers. The West Point cadets will all be used up by the increase of the regular army of the United States to 40,000 men, just agreed upon by Congress, after some disputes between the Senate and the House of Representatives; and the bulk of the officers with military experience and education are provided for already.

The tone in which some officers speak of being "whipped" is almost boastful and exultant. Last night I heard one declaring he thought it was a good thing they were beaten, as it would put an end to the fighting; "he was quite sure none of his men would ever face the Confederates again." Another was of opinion that it was lucky they had not advanced much further, as in that case they could not have escaped so well. And so on. It would be, I am certain, as unjust to the bulk of the officers to suppose they entertain such sentiments as these, as it would be in the last degree untrue to say that their men were destitute of courage, and were not ready to fight any enemy, if fairly disciplined and properly led; but the expression of these things is indicative of the want of proper esprit militaire, and it should be reprehended by those who wish to establish the loyalty of the volunteer army. No doubt the American papers will furnish detailed lists of killed and wounded, if you have any fancy to publish them, and columns of letters from the soldiers, and pages of incidents of the battle which may be The President is not exempt from the fate of consulted by the curious; but there is a concurthe unfortunate in all republics, but he has yet rence of testimony to the good conduct of a good deal of the future to draw upon, and the Blenker's Germans, the 69th Irish, and the 79th people are amused by changes among the mili- Scotch. Capt. Meagher, indeed, I am told, tary commanders and by threats and promises, yielded to the universal panic, and was seen on for which they will all have to pay before the foot at Centreville making the best of his way quarrel is adjusted. It is so generally asserted towards Fort Corcoran, with exclamations which that Gen. Scott did not approve the advance, implied that for the moment he recognized for which his plans were not matured, (and it the Southern Confederacy as highly belligerent. is so probable, too,) that it may be believed by Col. Corcoran, conspicuous by his great stature, those who have not the greatest faith in the being a man of 6 feet in height, was an object firmness of his character, and who think he of attraction to the enemy, and is lying dangermight be induced to give orders for the execu-ously, if not mortally, wounded. The Rhode tion of ill-conceived and hasty projects, or at all events, to precipitate operations without the necessary conditions of success. It is certain the country was becoming fretful and impatient, and that men like Mr. Wilson, Chairman of the There are various statements in reference to Military Committee of the Senate, were loud the conduct of the regular cavalry and infantry. in their complaints of the delays and inactivity The regular officers admit that at one time the of the army and of its chief, and of the preten- cavalry gave way, but they did not break or sions of the regular officers. The schism which fly; they were rallied, drew up in line again, must always exist between professionals and and showed front to the enemy. The regular quacks, between regular soldiers and volun-officers declare that it was the infantry which teers, has been greatly widened by the action on Sunday. The volunteers indulge in severe reflections on the generalship of the commanders, the regulars speak with contemptuous bitterness of the inefficiency and cowardice of the volunteer officers. The former talk learnedly of the art of war, and of the cruelty of being led like sheep to the slaughter. The latter, without detracting from the courage of the men, inveigh against those who directed their regiments on the field; and the volunteer privates are glad to add their testimony against many of the officers, whose pride in uniforms and gold lace did not permit them to soil them in the smoke of gunpowder. It is remarkable that so much hankering after military reputation should be accompanied, in some instances at least, by an absence of any military spirit.

Island regiment has been, however, the most favored by the voice of praise, though many competitors are now putting in claims for at least equal honor.

saved the retreat, covering it steadily in conjunction with the Germans; and the losses of the United States Marines argue that they had a large share of the enemy's fire. The artillery who lost their guns speak, as artillery will do under the circumstances, of the infantry which deserted them; and the general officers, who must after all be the best judges, bear strong testimony to the good services and general steadiness of the regulars engaged in the action. When the statements in the American papers are compared with the facts, I am aware it will be necessary to rely a little on "character," in asking faith for what I report. There was not a bayonet charge made by the Federalist infantry during the day; there was not a charge of any kind made by the Confederate cavalry upon any regiment of their enemy until the

latter broke. There was not a hand to-hand | Monday morning, there was no reason on earth encounter between any regiments. There was why they should not have either got into not a single "battery charged" or taken by Washington or compelled the whole of the the Federalists. There were no masked bat- Federalist army that kept together and could teries in play by the former.* There was no not escape, as it was all on one road, to surannihilation of rebel horse by Zouaves, Fire or render themselves prisoners, with all they posother. A volley fired by one battalion emptied sessed. If the statements in the Federalist three saddles among a body of horse who ap- papers as to their strength be correct, the peared at some distance, and the infantry which rebels could have easily spared 30,000 men for performed the execution then retired. There that purpose, with a reserve of 10,000 or 15,000 were no desperate struggles except by those in their rear. The Chain Bridge, the fords who wanted to get away. The whole matter above the Falls, were open to them—at least, in plain English amounts to this: The Federal- there could be but little or no opposition from ists advanced slowly, but steadily, under the the disorganized forces. The columns moving fire of their artillery, driving the enemy, who round from Fairfax to their left by Vienna rarely showed out of cover, in line before them, would have been able certainly to cross at and gradually forced them back on the right Matildaville; others could have got over at the and the centre for a mile and a half towards Falls, and still there would have been enough Manassas. As the enemy fell back they used to permit Beauregard to occupy Manassas, and their artillery also, and there was a good deal to send on a heavy column to cover Alexandria of pounding at long ranges with light field- and to shut up the Federalists in the earthguns, and some heavier rifled ordnance, the works and tête de pont, if not to wrest them line on both sides being rarely within 500 from troops deeply affected by the rout they yards of each other. On one occasion the regi- were witnessing. If the Confederates had the ments on the right were received by a mus- cavalry of which so much has been said, they ketry fire from the enemy, which induced them were scandalously handled. A detour by a to fall back, but they were rallied and led for- cross road from Centreville to the Germantown ward towards the front. The Confederates road would have placed the horse in the rear again gave way, and the Federalists advanced of the retreating mass in half an hour, and it is once more. Again the line of the enemy ap- not too much to say that mass would have peared in front, and delivered fire. The Zou- thrown itself on the mercy of the pursuers. If aves, as they are called, and the 11th New Beauregard's or Lee's force was small, as they York, which were on the flank, fell into confu- say, and suffered as much as the Federalists sion not to be rallied, and eventually retired aver, the flight is the more incomprehensible. from the field in disorder, to use the mildest But still it is very strange that the victors term, with a contagious effect on their com- should not have been aware of their victoryrades, and with the loss of the guns which they that is, of the utter rout which followed their were supporting. Nothing would, or could, or repulse. The attempt to form line on the top did stop them. In vain they were reminded of Centreville, only partially successful as it of their oaths to "avenge Ellsworth's death." was, might have imposed on the enemy, and Their flag was displayed to the winds-it had saved McDowell from the pursuit which he did lost its attractions. They ran in all directions his best to avert. The journals, which at first with a speed which their fortune favored. "I boasted of the grand Union army of 45,000 tell the tale as it was told to me" by one who men, are now anxious to show that only 20,000 had more to do with them, and had better op- were engaged. Why did the other 25,000 run portunity of witnessing their conduct than I away? The German regiment, under Col. had; for, as I have already stated in a previous Blenker, and perhaps some other corps, may letter, I was late on the ground, and had not have retired in good order, but eventually few been able to see much ere the retreat was or- withstood the ceaseless alarms. dered. Though I was well mounted, and had left Washington with the intention of returning early that night, I found fugitives had preceded me in masses all the way, and when I crossed the Long Bridge, about 11 o'clock, I was told that the city was full of those who had returned from the fight. But if the miserable rout and panic of the Federalists have produced such deplorable results to their cause, they have still much to be thankful for. Had the Confederates been aware of their success, and followed up their advantage early on

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The rain, which commenced on Monday morning early, may have had much to do with the undisturbed retreat of the Federalists, as the enterprise and activity of the enemy would be much diminished in consequence, and as for the beaten army, it has been always observed that troops hold together and march well in rain. But with all allowances and excuses, it is still mysterious inactivity Johnston, whose junction with 40,000 men is said to have taken place (if he had half the number it is more than I give him credit for) on the morning of the battle, must have swelled the force under Lee and Beauregard to 70,000 men at the least. He is the best officer in the Confederate army, and it is believed here that he is already away operating in Western Virginia. There is a sus

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