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fortified, that it was watched by only one or | take the road for Sudley's Springs-or, rather,

two companies; and, moreover, that the run above it was almost everywhere passable for wheeled vehicles.

Midway between the stone bridge and Sudley's Springs, maps indicated another ford which was said to be good.

it was provided that (if I mistake not) Hunter's division should proceed to Sudley's Springs, and Heintzelman to take the lower ford. These matters, however, to be regulated by circumstances.

It was intended that the head of Hunter's division should be at the turn off at early daylight, or about 4 A. M., and that it should reach Sudley by six or seven.

You are aware of the unexpected delay. The

the road for Hunter to this point until half-past five, and our guide, alleging that a nearer route to the ford would bring our column in sight of the enemy's batteries, led them by so circuitous a way that Hunter did not reach Sudley until half-past nine or thereabouts.

Notwithstanding our conviction of the practicability of these fords, no known road connected with them from any of the main roads on our side of Bull Run. We had information that a road branched from the Warrenton turn-two leading brigades of Tyler's had not cleared pike, a short distance beyond Cub Run, by which-opening gates and passing through private grounds-we might reach the fords. It was desirable to assure ourselves that this route was entirely practicable. In company with Capt. Woodbury (Engineers) and Gov. Sprague, and escorted by a company of cavalry, I, on Accompanying the commanding general, we, the 19th, followed up the valley of Cub Run as you are aware, after waiting two or three until we reached a point west ten degrees hours at the turn off, rode on to overtake the north, and about four miles in an air line from front of Hunter's division, when we emerged Centreville, near which we struck a road which from the woods, nearly northeast of Sudley, we believed to lead to the fords. Following it into the open country, from whence the course for a short distance we encountered the ene- of the run and the slopes of the opposite shore my's patrols. As we wêre most anxious to could be seen; we could perceive the enemy's avoid attracting the enemy's attention to our column in motion to meet us. The loss of time designs in this quarter, we did not care to pur-here, in a great measure, thwarted our plan. sue the reconnoissance further. We had seen We had hoped to pass the ford and reach the enough to be convinced of the perfect practi-rear of the enemy's forces at Warrenton stone cability of the route. To make more certain bridge before he could assemble in sufficient of the fords, however, Capt. Woodbury pro- force to cope with us. posed to return at night, and with a few Michigan woodsmen from Col. Sherman's brigade, to endeavor to find them. On returning to camp it was determined to send Capt. Wright and Lieut. Snyder (Engineers) with Capt. Woodbury. At the same time the commanding general directed Capt. Whipple (Topographical Engineers) and Lieut. Prime (Engineers) to make a night reconnoissance of the run between Warrenton Bridge and Blackburn's Ford. Both these night expeditions failed. It was found the enemy occupied the woods too strongly on our side of the run to permit the reconnoissance to be accomplished. It was not our policy to drive in his pickets until we were in motion to attack.

On laying before you the information obtained, the commanding general believed himself justified in adopting the following plan of attack, which was decided upon on the 20th:

First-A false attack to be made by Richardson's brigade (temporarily attached to Miles's division) on Blackburn's Ford, the rest of that division remaining in reserve at Centreville.

Second-Tyler's division to move from its camp at 3 A. M. (the 21st) towards the stone bridge of the Warrenton turnpike, to feign the main attack upon this point.

Third-The divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman (in the order named) to leave their camps at 23 A. M., (they were encamped about two or three miles behind Tyler,) and, following his movement, to diverge from the Warrenton turnpike at the by-road beyond Cub Run, and

It now became necessary to have Tyler's division force the passage of the bridge. It had always been intended that this division should pass at or near the bridge, but it was hoped, by taking its defences in rear, it could be passed without force. The commanding general promptly sent orders to Tyler to press his attack with all vigor.

I had yet much confidence that, though we had been anticipated, (owing to the delays mentioned,) the enemy was not yet assembled in numbers to oppose us in great force, (a confidence which I think the facts justified;) that we might successfully attack him in front, while the division of Tyler should fall upon his flank and rear.

When we reached the front of Hunter's column the battle was just commencing. The events of the battle-field will be described in the reports you will receive from other quarters. I was near the commanding general until some time after the arrival of Sherman's brigade on our left. Being accidentally separated, I saw yourself on the right, and joining you, we observed for some time the action on the heights, where the enemy made his final and successful stand. As we were observing, the Zouave regiment of Heintzelman was driven back, leaving Rickett's battery, upon which we observed the enemy charge.

You left me here, and I remained a few minutes longer an anxious spectator, and for the first time beginning to anticipate a possible defeat. Two brigades of Tyler's division had

Capt. H. G. Wright and First Lieut. G. W. Snyder, to the Third Division, under Col. Heintzelman.

Capt. B. S. Alexander and First Lieut. D. C. Houston, to the First Division, under Gen. Tyler. First Lieut. F. E. Prime, to the First Division, under Col. Miles.

passed over the run, and I supposed (and I be- | Charles E. Cross, to the Second Division, unlieved the commanding general supposed) that der Col. Hunter. the entire division was over. If so, the stone bridge was unguarded, and if we were defeated our retreating columns might be cut off from Centreville by the detachments of the enemy crossing this bridge. I became so anxious on this point that I sought you again, and found you at some distance in the rear. After some consultation, you, on my assuming the responsibility, sent an order to Col. Miles to move up two of his brigades to the stone bridge, and to telegraph the Secretary of War to send up all the troops that could be spared from Washington.

While I was returning towards the front, intending to rejoin the commanding general, I saw our front give way, and it soon became evident that we were defeated.

They have all been most active and zealous in the discharge of the duties devolving upon them. A report from Capt. D. P. Woodbury is here, with annexed. Reports from Capts. Wright and Alexander and Lieut. Prime will be furnished when received.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient,
J. G. BARNARD, Major Engineers.

MAJOR BARRY'S REPORT.

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I have stated that it was a part of the plan ARLINGTON, VA., July 23, 1861. of the battle, that Tyler's division should pass Capt. J. B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant-General, at or near the stone bridge. Two of his bri- Head-quarters Department N. E. Virginia: gades actually did pass, not at the bridge, (they CAPTAIN: Having been appointed, by special finding fords a half mile higher up,) and con-orders No. 21, Headquarters Department Northnected themselves with our left. In anticipa- eastern Virginia, Centreville, July 19, 1861, tion that the stone bridge would be blown up, Chief of Artillery of the Corps d'Armée, comCapt. Alexander had been instructed to ob-manded by Brig. Gen. McDowell, and having tain a trestle bridge to replace it. This he had served in that capacity during the battle of the on the spot, but there appears to have been no 21st inst., I have the honor to submit the fol mine prepared under the bridge. Capt. Alex-lowing report: ander passed over his pioneers one by one, and set them to cutting away the abatis-two hundred yards in extent-obstructing the road. This task was accomplished, and the way was opened for Schenck's brigade to fall on the enemy's right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front.

It will be seen from the above that the combination, though thwarted by adverse circumstances, was actually successful in uniting three entire divisions, (excepting the brigade of Schenck, which had just opened its way to fall on the enemy's right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front,) upon the decisive point.

The Artillery of the Corps d'Armée consisted of the following named batteries: Rickett's (Light Company I, 1st Artillery) six 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns; Hunt's (Light Company M, 2d Artillery) four light 12-pounders; Carlisle's (Company E, 2d Artillery) two James's 18pounder rifle guns, two 6-pounder guns; Tid. ball's (Light Company A, 2d Artillery) two 6pounder guns, two 12-pounder howitzers; Green's (Company G, 2d Artillery) four 10pounder Parrott rifle guns; Arnold's (Company D, 2d Artillery) two 13-pounder James's rifle guns, two 6-pounder guns; Ayres's (Light Company E, 3d Artillery) two 10-pounder Par rott rifle guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, two 6-pounder guns; Griffin's (Battery D, 5th Artillery) four 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns, two 12-pounder howitzers; Edwards's (Company &, 5th Artillery) two 20-pounders and one 30pounder Parrott rifle guns. The 2d Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers had with it a battery of six 13-pounder James's rifle guns; the 71st Regiment New York Militia, two of Dahlgren's On retiring to Centreville my opinion was boat howitzers, and the 8th Regiment New asked as to maintaining our position, and I York Militia a battery of six 6-pounder guns. gave it in favor of a prompt retreat; for I be- The men of this last-named battery having lieved the enemy was far superior in numbers, claimed their discharge on the day before the and that, elated by his victory, he would pur- battle, because their term of service had exsue, and I believed that a defeated army, actu-pired, the battery was thrown out of service. ally driven back on Washington before a pur- The whole force of artillery, of all calibres, suing enemy, would endanger the safety of the Capital.

A fault, perhaps it was, that it did not provide earlier for bringing the two brigades of Miles's (in reserve at Centreville) into action. One of his brigades (Richardson's) actually did participate, (though not on the battle-field,) and in its affair at Blackburn's Ford probably neutralized at least an equal number of the enemy.

The engineer officers under my command and attached to the different divisions were as follows:

Capt. D. P. Woodbury and Second Lieut.

was therefore 49 pieces, of which 28 were rifled guns. All of these batteries were fully horsed and equipped, with the exception of the two hewitzers of the 71st regiment New York Militia, which were without horses, and were drawn by drag-ropes manned by detachments from

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the regiment. Gen. McDowell's disposition for ron of United States Cavalry, under Captain the march from Centreville on the morning of Colburn, 1st Cavalry, was subsequently ordered the 21st inst., placed Tidball's and Green's bat- as additional support. We were soon upon the teries (8 pieces) in reserve with the division of ground designated, and the two batteries at Col. Miles, to remain at Centreville; Hunt's once opened a very effective fire upon the eneand Edwards's (6 pieces) with the brigade of my's left. The new position had scarcely been Col. Richardson, at Blackburn's Ford; and occupied, when a troop of the enemy's cavalry, Carlisle's, Ayres's, and the 30-pounder (11 debouching from a piece of woods close upon pieces) with the division of Gen. Tyler, at the our right flank, charged down upon the New stone bridge; Rickett's, Griffin's, Arnold's, the York 11th. The Zouaves catching sight of the Rhode Island, and the 71st regiment batteries cavalry a few moments before they were upon (24 pieces) accompanied the main column, them, broke ranks to such a degree that the which crossed Bull Run at Sudley's Springs. As cavalry dashed through without doing them soon as the column came in presence of the much harm. The Zouaves gave them a scatterenemy after crossing Bull Run, I received from ing fire as they passed, which emptied five sadGen. McDowell, in person, directions to super- dles and killed three horses. A few minutes intend the posting of the batteries as they sever-afterward a regiment of the enemy's infantry, ally debouched from the road and arrived from covered by a high fence, presented itself in line the field. The Rhode Island battery came first on the left and front of the two batteries, at upon the ground, and took up at a gallop the not more than 60 or 70 yards' distance, and position assigned it. It was immediately ex- delivered a volley full upon the batteries and posed to a sharp fire from the enemy's skir- their supports. Lieut. Ramsay, 1st Artillery, was mishers and infantry, posted on the declivity killed, and Capt. Ricketts, 1st Artillery, was of the hill and in the valley in its immediate wounded, and a number of men and horses front, and to a well-sustained fire of shot and were killed or disabled by this close and wellshell from the enemy's batteries, posted behind directed volley. The 11th and 14th regiments the crest of the range of hills, about 1,000 yards instantly broke, and fled in confusion to the listant. This battery sustained, in a very gal- rear, and, in spite of the repeated and earnest hant manner, the whole force of this fire for efforts of Col. Heintzelman with the latter, and nearly half an hour, when the howitzers of the myself with the former, refused to rally and 71st New York Militia came up, and went into return to the support of the batteries. The battery on its left. A few minutes afterward, enemy, seeing the guns thus abandoned by their Griffin brought up his pieces at a gallop, and supports, rushed upon them, and driving off came into battery about 500 yards to the left the cannoneers, who with their officers stood of the Rhode Island and New York batteries. bravely at their posts until the last moment, Rickett's battery came up in less than half an captured them, ten in number. These were hour afterward, and was posted to the left of the only guns taken by the enemy on the field. and immediately adjoining Griffin's. The ene- Arnold's battery came upon the field after Ricmy's right, which had been wavering from the kett's, and was posted on our left centre, where moment Griffin opened fire upon it, now began it performed good service throughout the day, to give way throughout its whole extent, and and by its continual and well-directed fire asretire steadily, his batteries limbering up rapid- sisted materially in breaking and driving back ly, and at a gallop taking up successively two the enemy's right and centre. new positions further to his rear. The foot troops on our left, following up the enemy's retiring right, soon left our batteries so far in our rear that their fire was over the heads of our own men. I therefore directed the Rhode Island battery to advance about 500 yards in front of its first position, accompanied it myself, and saw it open fire with increased effect upon the enemy's still retiring right. Returning to the position occupied by Rickett's and Griffin's batteries, I received an order from Gen. McDowell to advance two batteries to an eminence, specially designated by him, about 800 yards in front of the line previously occupied by the enemy's batteries. I therefore ordered these two batteries to move forward at once, and, as soon as they were in motion, went for and secured as supports the 11th (Fire Zouaves) and the 14th (Brooklyn) New York regiments. I accompanied the former regiment to guide it to its proper position, and Col. Heintzelman, 17th United States Infantry, performed the same service for the 14th on the right of the 11th. A squad

The batteries of Hunt, Carlisle, Ayres, Tidball, Edwards, and Green (21 pieces) being detached from the main body, and not being under my immediate notice during the greater portion of the day, I respectfully refer you to the reports of their brigade and division commanders for the record of their services.

The army having retired upon Centreville, I was ordered by Gen. McDowell in person to post the artillery in position to cover the retreat. The batteries of Hunt, Ayres, Tidball, Edwards, Green, and the New York 8th regi ment, (the latter served by volunteers from Wilcox's brigade,) 20 pieces in all, were at once placed in position; and thus remained until 12 o'clock P. M., when orders having been received to retire upon the Potomac, the batteries were put in march, and, covered by Richardson's brigade, retired in good order and without haste, and early next inorning reoccupied their former camps on the Potomac.

In conclusion, it gives me great satisfaction to state that the conduct of the officers and en

listed men of the several batteries was most | lances, they can then return to their proper exemplary. Exposed throughout the day to positions. a galling fire of artillery and small-arms, sev- As the general commanding visited almost eral times charged by cavalry, and more than every part of the ground during the conflict, once abandoned by their infantry supports, with a view to encourage or direct the moveboth officers and enlisted men manfully stood ments of the troops, my position as a member by their guns with a courage and devotion of his staff gave me every opportunity of seeworthy of the highest commendation. Where ing the results of the action. I therefore emall did so well, it would be invidious to make braced the opportunity thus offered to give didistinction, and I therefore simply give the rections when needed to the drivers of the amnames of all the officers engaged viz.: Major bulances where to find the dead and wounded; Hunt; Captains Carlisle, Ayres, Griffin, Tid- and also to those carrying off the wounded ball, and Arnold; Lieutenants Platt, Ransom, where they could find the needed conveyances. Thompson, Webb, Barriga, Green, Edwards, The stretchers were found very useful and comDresser, Wilson, Throckmorton, Cushing, Har- fortable to the wounded, and were in constant ris, Butler, Fuller, Lyford, Will, Benjamin, Bab-requisition, conveying them to the nearest ambitt, Haines, Ames, Hasbrouck, Kensel, Harri-bulances. son, Reed, Barlow, Noyes, Kirby, Elderkin, Ramsay, and Craig. The two latter were killed. I am, sir, very respectfully your obedient servant,

WM. F. BARRY, Major 5th Artillery.

MEDICAL AND SURGICAL REPORT. ARLINGTON, Department N. E. Va., July 26, 1861. Being chief of the Medical Staff with the Army in the Department of N. E. Virginia, I have the honor to make the following report of so much of the results of the action on the 21st at Bull Run, as came within my charge. As the officers of the Medical Staff were attached to the different regiments and on duty with them, I deemed it proper to remain with and accompany the general commanding and staff from the beginning to the termination of the battle, in order that I might be present if any were wounded; and, also, that I might be enabled to visit in this way every part of the feld where the killed and wounded might be found.

So far as I am informed, the medical staff belonging to the different volunteer regiments discharged their duties satisfactorily. I observed Acting Assistant-Surgeon Miles busily engaged in dressing wounded men under the shade of a tree, in a part of the field where the fire from the enemy was very hot. He addressed me a brief inquiry as I passed relative to the safety of his father, and then resumed his occupation.

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geons Grey and Steinburg of the Regular Army, and Drs. Honiston and Swan of the New York 14th, also preferred to remain rather than abandon their charge. The conduct of these officers is worthy of all commendation.

Surgeon C. C. Keeney of Col. Hunter's division, and Assistant-Surgeon D. L. Magruder, attached to the commanding general's staff, did good service in the hospital church I have mentioned, and also in two houses near the church, where the wounded were placed after the church had been filled. These officers remained busily engaged in the discharge of their duties till the enemy's cavalry made their appearance, and but narrowly escaped capture, when they left. Drs. Swift and Winston, attached to the New York 8th regiment, remained with their sick sacrificing all selfish considAfter the action had fairly commenced, and erations for their own safety, in order that the the wounded and the dead were lying on the wounded might not be neglected, and are now field in every direction, I despatched Assistant-prisoners. I am informed that Assistant-SurSurgeon D. L. Magruder to the rear, with directions to prepare a church (which I had observed as we passed before arriving at the scene of action) for the reception of the wounded, and also to send the ambulances forward as rapidly as possible to pick up the wounded It would be premature in me, in the aband dead. In a very few minutes the ambu-sence of sufficient data-the reports of the reglances made their appearance, and contrived imental surgeons not yet being received-to throughout the day to visit every part of the express a positive opinion as to the number ground which was accessible, so as to be with- killed and wounded in the action on the 21st. in reach of those parts of the field where the There were, no doubt, many concealed from fighting was going on, and wounded were to observation under cover of the woods and be found. It is due to the ambulance drivers bushes, but, judging from the number that I to say that they performed their duties effi- saw in various parts of the field, and allowing ciently, and the result of their operations also a wide margin for those unobserved, I should shows how absolutely necessary these means think that the killed and wounded on our side of conveyance are to the comfort and relief of did not exceed from 800 to 1,000. the wounded in giving them shelter and water when ready to perish with heat and thirst. By means of the ambulances, also, the men who go to the relief of their wounded comrades are separated but a short time from their companies, as, having deposited them in their ambu

The impossibility of making a careful survey of the field after the battle had ceased, must be my apology for the briefness and want of detail in this report.

W. S. KING, Sur. and Med. Direc'r, U. S. A.
Capt. J. B. FRY, Asst. Adjt.-Gen., U. S. A.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT REPORT.

ARLINGTON, Va., Aug. 2, 1861. CAPTAIN: For the information of the general commanding the Department, I have the honor to submit the following report in reference to the subsistence of the army under his command during its recent operations in front. On the 15th ult., the commanders of divisions were directed to see that all the troops of their respective commands have cooked and in their haversacks by 3 P. M. the next day three days' rations; and orders were given that five days' additional subsistence should be loaded into wagon-trains on the day of march, and follow the army on the day succeeding, and that a specified number of beef cattle should be driven forward with each train.

Owing to the necessary number of wagons not being furnished in season, to uninstructed and many worthless teamsters and green teams, and to some of the roads being bad, only one of the trains, that in charge of First Lieut. J. P. Hawkins, 2d Infantry, Ă. A. C. S., was able to overtake the army on the morning of the 18th. It, with 90 head of beef cattle, by travelling all the previous night, arrived at Fairfax Court House on the morning stated, before the army had taken up its march.

culties arose, and I may not have succeeded in my object.

Making due allowance for all losses on the march, according to the reports of the officers conducting the trains, and my own observation, at least (160,000) one hundred and sixty thousand complete rations were received by the army at and in the vicinity of Centreville-sufficient for its subsistence for five days.

In a circular from Department Head-quarters, dated at Centreville, July 20, 1861, commanders of divisions were directed to give the necessary orders that an equal distribution of the subsistence stores on hand might be made immediately to the different companies in their respective commands, so that they should be provided with the same number of days' subsistence and that the same be cooked and put into the haversacks of the men, and they were informed that the subsistence stores there in possession of each division, with the fresh beef that could be drawn from the chief commissary, must last to include the 23d inst.

The three days' subsistence it was directed the troops should have in their haversacks by 3 P. M., on the 16th of July, should have lasted them to the afternoon of the 19th. After the distribution made in compliance with the circuDuring the morning, while the army was lars above referred to, I know of several inmoving forward to Centreville, it was thought stances in which subsistence stores remained in the other subsistence trains, in charge of First possession of division and brigade commissaLieutenants G. Bell, 1st Artillery, James Cur-ries, and of others in which provisions were tis, 15th Infantry, intended for Col. Heintzelman's and Gen. Tyler's divisions, respectively, would not reach the army in season, and I was directed to distribute the subsistence in the train present as equally as possible among the several divisions.

left on the ground of the encampments on the morning of the 21st of July.

From personal observation on the march, on the morning of the 21st of July, I know that, generally, the haversacks of the men were filled-whether properly or not, I do not know. Fourteen wagons, containing about 17,000 Regimental officers should be held accountable rations, were sent in charge of Lieut. Hawkins for that. During the battle, and following it, I to the 5th division; the remaining wagons noticed many filled haversacks, canteens, blanwere directed to immediately proceed to Cen-kets, and other property, lying on the ground, treville, and I had made the best arrangements in my power to distribute the provisions they contained among the other three divisions.

Shortly after our arrival at Centreville I was officially informed that the train, with 65 head of beef cattle, in charge of Lieut. Curtis, was in the vicinity, and the train, with 70 head of beef cattle, in charge of Lieut. Bell, was at Fairfax Court House. I then directed the first of these trains to come forward to Centreville and encamp for the night, and the second to come forward with as little delay as possible, and myself conducted the remaining wagons of Lieut. Hawkins's train, and turned them over to the officer (Lieut. Merrill) directed by Gen. Tyler to receive and distribute to the 1st division the subsistence stores they contained.

I endeavored to distribute the subsistence stores equally among the several divisions, according to the strength of each; but in consequence of the necessity of breaking up the train in charge of Lieut. Hawkins, which was intended for the divisions of Colonels Miles and Hunter, and the late arrival of the others, diffi

their owners having doubtless thrown them away to get rid of the labor of carrying them on so hot a day, and under such trying circumstances.

I beg leave to call your attention to the reports of Lieutenants Bell, Hawkins, and Curtis. The duties they performed were highly important, and all who are acquainted with the difficulties under which they labored and overcame, will know that they acted with judgment and energy, and for the best interests of the Government.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

H. F. CLARKE, Capt. and Com. Subs. Capt. JAMES B. FRY, Ass't Adj.-Gen.

Doo. 2.

SECESSION REPORTS.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL ARNOLD ELZEY.
HEAD-QUARTERS 4TH BRIGADE, CAMP AT
FAIRFAX STATION, July 25, 1861.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to make the following report

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