out a certain applicability to the present mo- | terrible indeed if they do not shout over their ment: "Availing himself of fortuitous advan- successes to the very echo; and if, inspired by tages, our enemy is aiming with his undivided fresh hopes, they do not put forth renewed exforce a deadly blow at our growing prosperity, ertions to sustain their cause. perhaps at our national existence." "He has avowed his purpose of trampling on the usages of civilized warfare, and given earnest of it in the plunder and wanton destruction of private property." "He strikes with peculiar animosity at the progress of our navigation and our manufactures." "From such an adversary, hostility in its greatest force and worst forms may be looked for. The American people will face it with the undaunted spirit which, in our revolutionary struggle, defeated all the unrighteous projects aimed at them. His threats and his barbarities will kindle in every bosom, instead of dismay, an indignation not to be extinguished but by his disaster and expulsion." "In providing the means necessary, the national Legislature will not distrust the heroic and enlightend patriotism of its constituents. They will cheerfully and proudly bear every burden of every kind which the safety and honor of the nation demand. We see them rushing with enthusiasm to the scenes where danger and duty call. In offering their blood, they give the surest pledge that no other tribute will be withheld."

There is as much patriotism in the country now as in the Revolution, or in 1814. The traitors of the South are no more formidable than were the tories of the Revolution, who, at one time, aided by the British, had complete possession of the States of Georgia and the Carolinas, with an invading army in Virginia; while, in contrast to the war of 1812, the people of the North, and we may say of the Union, are united as one man.

-N. Y. Tribune.

But, as we have already said, this one battle will settle nothing. The closely-populated communities in the great States north of us are becoming newly stimulated by the pressure of events, and are pouring their thousands upon thousands toward the seat of war, so that probably in ten days or thereabouts an overwhelming force will be at the capital, and prepared anew to try the chances of the battlefield. How far the new general ordered to the command may be able to gain their confidence and inspirit them with fresh enthusiasm, remains to be seen; but it is evident enough, from proofs afforded on all hands, that in the late contest, the Federal troops may be said to have been without a general, in fact. One newspaper correspondent tells his readers that in the heat of one of the desperate conflicts, he met the ostensible general of the forces "three miles" from the scene of the combat, in a carriage, and that he had the honor of reporting to him how affairs were going. Another statement is made that in a whole day's conflict the general in command was not able to communicate with one brigade at all-of course, did not know where it was.

Without assuming any of that profound knowledge of strategy, and of military matters generally, which has made the New York major-generals of the printing-offices so famous, it strikes us that such leadership as has thus been exhibited is not what soldiers would expect who are sent under the fire of masked batteries, each corps to act, in truth, as a forlorn hope; nor is it such as the country will hold the Government responsible for when a deliberate verdict has to be rendered in the solemn inquest over the slain.

So far as the late reverses by the Federal troops in Virginia may give one an idea of the actual damage done the cause of the Union, perhaps Wall street affords as good an index as Disclaiming, as we have said, all knowledge, any thing else-when it is summed up at about as a military critic, that knowledge so abun "four per cent.," as indicated in our last issue. dant now amongst that numerous class who, as The material losses, the arms and munitions of Byron says, are "the prophets of the past," we war uselessly sacrificed, are, of course, but a yet should be glad to know wherein is the great mere tride when we take into consideration necessity of leading men, except they were the immense resources of the Government. made of wrought iron-cast-iron would not do That it will have a bad effect on the prestige-right up to the front of a net-work or checgained previously by the prompt action of the Government, cannot be doubted. But then, one battle gained, with whatever brilliant results, will not cause the great powers of Europe to take sides with the Confederates; nor will it cause any fears of such a result on the part of those sustaining the Government. That it will vastly inspirit the secession States is perfectly certain. Previous to the battle, the utterances of such papers as the Charleston Courier and Mercury, and the Delta of New Orleans, prove that they entertained gloomy apprehensions in view of the mighty preparations for the campaign put forth by the Government, and, naturally more excitable than their opponents, their losses will prove to be

quer-board of masked batteries, constructed months before, and awaiting the advance of the simple-hearted but brave thousands who were expected to present themselves as victims? With the whole of Virginia to outflank these batteries in, with a shorter base of operations by Fredericksburg or Yorktown to Richmond, why were the gallant thousands precipitated on this deadly trap, so carefully laid for them at Manassas? A sacred proverb says: "Vainly is the snare laid in the sight of any bird," but it was not so in this case.

Again: There is an incident in the life of the great Napoleon, that life so fruitful of suggestions, that would seem to have a bearing upon the matter in question. It is long since

we saw the account alluded to, but we do re- | bers of Congress, sitting in grand council, and member that in his first essay with the army yet commanders of regiments in the field—if it of Egypt he was invited by the Turks to walk does not likewise silence in some way the newsup to a deliberately constructed range of bat-paper school, who cause impatience, and conteries and be slaughtered; but that-in a cow- sequent insubordination in the camp, as well as ardly sort of manner, perhaps-he chose to go untimely precipitancy at head-quarters, it will around the spot where they were planted with prolong a struggle awful to contemplate in the so much care, and the result was, that he slew far future. Some steps, it is true, have been some thousands of the Turks, and broke their taken toward reforms in high places, in view power completely for all time. Valor is a very of the lesson of the other day; but there must good thing, doubtless, but we greatly prefer the be a clean sweep of the blundering and incomRich Mountain" sort-the McClellan and petent civilians, in the new levies especially, if Rosecranz school of tacticians-to that which the country at large is to expect success in the is in vogue lower down on the Potomac, es- reconstruction of the Government. pecially where the purpose of those on the line -Baltimore American, July 26. of the advance is to disorganize and conquernot slay-with the remembrance that those who are opposed to them are people of the same country.

That a more overwhelming disaster has not been the consequence of all this management this helter-skelter rush to "Richmond "-is rather remarkable than otherwise. Nearly two hundred miles to advance through hostile territory is an exceedingly long distance, comparatively, as those have found, doubtless, who have penetrated about one-eighth as far, to retrace their footsteps under these untoward results. And suppose here comes a lesson from history again-suppose, we say, that Beauregard and his advisers had adopted the tactics of the Parthians toward the Roman consul, Crassussuppose they had coaxed along toward Richmond the brave but inadequate force lately defeated, and then turned upon and suddenly and completely destroyed them, what then would have been the condition of the questions at issue to-day? They might have done it. "Onward to Richmond!" has been the senseless battle-cry which has stunned the ears of the nation for weeks past, and the authorities at Washington may consider themselves fortunate that the case for them is no worse.

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1861.-The public mind, painfully but reasonably excited, is entitled to be informed of what so deeply and vitally concerns the general welfare. When the rebellion broke out into open war upon Fort Sumter, the people rose with a unanimity unexampled in the world's history, offering themselves and their possessions to the Government, asking only in return that a war thus wantonly and wickedly provoked, should be vigorously prosecuted.

Passing over an interval of three months, we come to the disastrous battle of Manassas, Who is responsible for this great national disaster? Officials cannot answer-individuals may speak-their answers passing for what they are worth, according to the estimate which the public put upon the judgment and means of information.

Lieutenant-General Scott, in the discharge of his duty as commander-in-chief of the army, conceived and perfected a plan or programme, by means of which he confidently, as the results of a summer and fall campaign, anticipated the overthrow of the Confederate army, and thus virtually to end the rebellion.

This plan, primarily, contemplated camps of instruction, where raw levies might, during the months of June, July, aud August, be subject to discipline and inured to service, sending the regiments as they became fit for duty, into the field, making room, as they departed, for green organizations.

With this disposable force (after the safety of the Capital was assured) Gen. Scott commenced operations at Fortress Monroe, near Harper's Ferry, and in Western Virginia, the latter point being most favorable, profiting, as no other section did, by the cooperation and sympathies of loyal inhabitants. With Washington for his base of operations, the western wings of his army were to feel and fight their way southward; until at the appointed time, having reached their designated positions, all his columns were to move sinultaneously, Richmond falling as Mexico fell, before an irresistible

It is not our special business either to censure or defend those attempting, with varied success, to preserve those free institutions, that unequalled fabric of free government so nearly suffered to go to ruin mainly by default of the head of the late Administration. We cannot defend the palpable blunders of our present rulers, but when we behold them reeling under the heavy burdens cast upon them by the faults of others, we would be as charitable as possible toward their shortcomings. Not their partisans, we yet hope they may, with as little suffering to the nation as possible, restore the country to its wonted condition of prosperity; but to do this, that terrible evil-political brawling-inust not be recognized as a qualification for military position, or for the places of military counsellors. If there is one rock which more than any other endangers the safety of the Government in this frightful crisis it is this. And if the Government does not remorselessly, idea. Prominent individuals, whose counsels But this plan did not accord with the popular and at once, throw overboard the whole phalanx and clamors precipitated the outbreak, demandof these insane brawlers-some of them mem-ed precipitate action. These demands were

army.

more and more clamorous. Exciting appeals to popular feeling were soon followed by open aspersions and denunciations of Gen. Scott. And finally, with a presumption and insolence unheard of, a leading journal, assuming command of the army, issued and reiterated the order, "On to Richmond."

While widely spread newspapers were thus weakening the Administration by assaults upon its Commanding-General, his embarrassments were aggravated by the persistent hostility and every-day aspersions of the Postmaster General, whose brother, a prominent member of Congress, assailed him from the stump.

It is not true, however, as has been averred, that General Scott was constrained to hazard this battle by the President. Between the President and, with one exception, the Cabinet and General Scott, there have been a mutual regard and confidence.

I will not now stop to consider details or criticize acts. The major blunder includes all the minor ones. There should have been no general engagement until we were in the field with an army strong enough to overwhelm and crush out rebellion. There are other points at which we could be advantageously and successfully occupied.

army of Manassas was reinforced by that from Winchester. Then, surely, the conflict was too unequal. With all the conditions and circumstances so changed, General McDowell should have taken the responsibility of disobeying his orders. The reason would have justified him in the judgment of the Government and people.

Meanwhile Congress assembled. Senators But even if it were excusable to assault an and representatives, with more zeal than army equal in numbers to our own, in its knowledge, caught up and reiterated the cry, chosen position behind its intrenchments, the "On to Richmond." The impatient Congress-purpose should have been abandoned when the men were leading and influential. They waited upon the President to complain of the inactivity of the army, and upon General Scott, urging him "On to Richmond." Army bills, prepared with deliberation by Senator Wilson, (in accordance with the views of the Government,) were emasculated by the House Military Committee, of which Mr. Blair is Chairman. The President and his Cabinet had reason to apBut the order of "On to Richmond" was prehend-if not the censures of Congress-the obeyed, and where does it leave us? Where failure of measures essential to the prosecution we were three months ago, with a harder conof the war, unless the Tribune order of "Onflict on our hands, and a dismal, if not doubtto Richmond" was obeyed.

ful future. The "On to Richmond" dictators have added another year to the war, an hundred millions of dollars to its cost, and opened graves for fifteen or twenty thousand more soldiers.

And now the sensation journals began to disparage the strength and courage of the rebel army. "The rebels will not fight!" "The cowards will run!" &c., &c., appeared in flaming capitals over flash paragraphs. The whole And what have we gained? Alas, too little popular mind was swayed by these frenzied ap- for such a fearful expenditure of time, treasure, peals. A movement upon Manassas was uni- | blood, and reputation. We have learned, what versally and blindly demanded. Passions and few doubted, that our army is all that is expectanimosities, kindred to those which once del-ed of it; that our men fought with the courage nged France in blood, were being excited. The tyranny of the press, the denunciations of a Cabinet minister, and the impetuosity of a dozen members of Congress excited the masses, "moved" Gen. Scott "from his proprieties." For once in his life his purposes were thwarted -for once "his mind becaine the mind of other men."

The result has shown that it was a fatal weakness. And yet who knows what would have been the effect of an adherence to his plan? The New York Tribune was educating millions to distrust the wisdom of the Administration and the fidelity of the commanding generals. Every day emboldened its audacity every rail and wire disseminated its treason -and every hour augmented the popular discontent. Congress, though its session opened auspicionsly, began to falter. The Blairs, one in the Cabinet and the other in Congress, were organizing the "On to Richmond" faction. To have resisted these demands would have overthrown the Administration, and might have destroyed the Government. "Madness ruled the hour," and a battle at Manassas, right or wrong, became, not a military but a political "necessity." VOL. II.-Doc. 32

of veterans; that we may always, and under all circumstances, rely on them. We have learned, what was also too well known, that the army was in many instances indifferently officered. We have learned, too, the importance and necessity of discipline. Effective troops, however excellent the material, cannot be found in workshops, the cornfields, or the cities. They must have military training, without which every "On to Richmond" movement will prove a failure.

Though we have encountered a great and disastrous chock-though we are pained and humiliated-we possess the means and the energy to retrieve all, if these means henceforth are wisely employed. I may in a future letter indicate how, in my judgment, these means should be employed. -Albany Evening Journal.

SOUTHERN PRESS ON THE BATTLE.

It would be a very difficult task to review the various accounts current in this city and along the railroad to Manassas, of the great battle which was fought on the 21st inst., in the vicinity of Manassas Junction and Centreville,

and to reduce them to an orderly and con- to administer a signal repulse to the entire sistent shape. Indeed, the rationale of few of mass of the largest army which General Scott the world's memorable battles has been fully was able to send against him from Washington. comprehended or stated, except after years of But it would have been by a victory bought at calm reflection and diligent investigation by the a terrible sacrifice of what the South should historian, the statesman, and the strategist. It most assiduously economize, the precious lives was sixteen years before the Romans acquired of her noble defenders. As it was, one of the a wholesome knowledge of the strategy of Han- most brilliant victories of the age was achieved nibal. The same period was scarcely adequate with a loss of life almost incredible, when the to instruct the Generals of Austria, Russia, weight of the enemy's column and the length England, and Prussia in regard to the secret of of the battle are considered. The enemy Napoleon's success. It need not be surprising seemed to stake the issue of the day on turning then if the Confederate victory of the 21st shall our flank on the left. It was then that Johnlong remain a dark, dreadful mystery to our ston, after having baffled Patterson, as Blucher enemies, and if numbers of our own people shall baffled Grouchy, did more than was done by for some time entertain most fantastic and il-Blucher at Waterloo. The centre led by Davis, logical notions concerning it. To one, how-the right commanded by Beauregard, did the ever, who has been closely observing military operations on the Potomac for two months past, there is no reason why such a result, though so full of glory and so profoundly gratifying, should appear either surprising or mysterious.

I will not here recapitulate details which have been given you by telegraphic correspondents. I possess no facts of importance touching the actual battle beyond those which have been communicated to you through the telegraph. But information from that source is confined almost exclusively to a brief statement of results, leaving the reader to get at causes and consequences as best he may. The preliminaries of the present battle as well as its probable consequences are of the utmost interest, and to them I shall mainly address myself.

Two weeks ago it was evident that both Johnston and Patterson were influenced, in their manœuvres, by considerations connected with the line of Manassas. Jolinston desired to occupy Patterson in the Shenandoah valley, and Patterson desired to occupy Johnston in the same region. Each aimed to force the other into a position from which it would be impossible to extricate himself and participate in operations between Washington and Manassas Junction. In this game Patterson was out-generalled. Johnston excelled his antagonist alike in boldness and caution, in vigilance and activity. Keeping his communication with the Manassas line intact, he could not be deceived by Patterson's feint demonstrations, but just so soon as the latter had fallen back toward the Potomac, he set out at once, from Winchester, to join Gen. Beauregard's column near Manassas Junction, marching 18 miles to Strasburg, and proceeding thence, about 50 miles, by railroad. He arrived not an hour too soon, with 20 regiments. His men had one night to rest before waking to meet the bloodiest fury of the battle on the left of Stone Bridge.

I will not say that Gen. Johnston's presence was absolutely necessary to turn the scale in our favor. I firmly believe that General Beauregard's force was considerable enough, its disposition skilful enough, its defences strong enough, its men and officers determined enough,

rest. The enemy was exhausted, appalled, tumultuously routed by the inflexible resistance, the deadly fire, the terrible charges with which their attack was met. And yet but a small portion of our forces at and near Manassas Junction were actually engaged. Perhaps there were at no time as many as twenty thousand of them under fire or in sight of the enemy, while it is possible that double that number of the enemy's total army of about seventy thousand were brought into action.

It is rumored, and believed by many persons, that General Patterson and General Scott were on the field of battle. But neither, in my opinion, was present. It would certainly have been very strange in General Patterson to come upon the field without any portion of his command, and there is no reason for believing that any portion of his command was engaged in the battle or near at hand. As for General Scott, though the movement against General Beauregard may have been made according to his order, I doubt whether that order was given in accordance with his deliberate views of policy. Precipitated into the measure, as I believe, by the clamor of the politicians at Washington, and by the blood-thirsty rage of the Black Republican Press, he was quite willing to remain at a distance, and leave the immediate responsibility of failure, if the measure should fail, with his subordinate officers, while ready to appropriate the credit of success to himself if the measure should succeed.

It is not easy to believe that General Scott, if left to pursue his own plans, would stake the issue of a campaign on a battle fought under the circumstances of that of the 21st. Two months ago he committed a mistake in halting at Alexandria, after crossing the Potomac, instead of pushing forward briskly toward Richmond. But that mistake sprang from excess of prudence, and it is not reasonable to deduce from such a mistake another arising from the opposite fault of rashness. For rash it certainly was to attack General Beauregard on ground which he himself had selected and elaborately fortified. Political considerations must have prevailed over military considerations when General Scott consented to the attack, without

the support of McClellan from the West and of Patterson from the North. It was a fatal departure from the anaconda policy which he had previously been pursuing. The consequence is the backbone of the serpent is broken. The advance of McClellan's column in Western Virginia is rendered inconsequential, and if it advance far into the mountains its destruction is inevitable; while Butler at Fort Monroe is constrained to moderate his exorbitant military ambition to the humble office of performing garrison duty.

Opinions differ here materially as to what will or should be the war policy of the Confederate Government after the Manassas victory. Many think that the victory should be instantly followed up by a dash upon Washington and a rush into Maryland. They say that we have forborne from the aggressive long enough to convince the most stupid and most deluded of the Northern people that we did not aim at conquest; that we had no wish to destroy the National Capital, or to overturn the Government which they were supporting, but that our only desire was to be let alone and to live under a government of our own choice. It is time now, they think, to set about conquering a peace by carrying the war into the enemy's country, since it is evident we cannot secure peace by scrupulously remaining within our own. There are others, however, who argue that it is best to prove at once our forbearance and our invincibility, by pausing after every victory and giving the enemy an opportunity to profit by the "sober second thought." These last are for letting Washington alone, and advancing no further than the Potomac, from the belief that an attack upon the National Capital and an invasion of territory beyond the limits of the Confederate States would cause the same universal outburst and uprising in the North as was witnessed on the capture of Sumter. Such views are plausible, but they are totally without practical value.

were but striplings; on the 21st thousands of them were heroes; and another battle will find thousands of them hardy and invincible veterans. Nor need we fear that our Generals will fail us. Davis, Beauregard, Johnston-it cannot be said of them, to-morrow or the next day, that their spirit has abated and their vision dulled-that they have

-hearts worn out with many wars, And eyes grown dim with gazing on the pilot stars. -New Orleans Delta, July 28.

THE MORAL OF MANASSAS.

There is a danger we fear that the Southern mind, intoxicated with its exultations over the recent great victory of our arms at Manassas, may over-estimate the present advantage as well as the ultimate consequences of that brilliant achievement.

Certainly there can be no difference of opinion as to its having proved a God-send to the cause of Southern independence and true constitutional liberty. It has greatly strengthened the confidence of our people in the ability of their government to maintain itself, even at the point of the bayonet, against the marauding legions of Hessian soldiery who have been precipitated by the enemy upon our sacred soil. It has impaired the energies of the "old wreck" of the Federal Government, and has so far annihilated the confidence of its subjects in the final success of its boasted scheme of subjugation, as to work the most serious detriment to the national credit-which, according to the recent acknowledgment of a congressman, has already failed. It has given a prestige to the young republic of the South, just emerging, like Venus, in all the perfection of her beauty, from the foaming sea of political convulsion, which will put to naught the vaunting assertion of Northern superiority, and perlaps decide the question of foreign recognition which now trembles in the hesitating balance held by the hands of European powers. In addition to these there may be even other, though less important results flowing from it.

The North has explicitly, in word and act, challenged to a fight to the death, and forced us But to suppose that our independence is an to the deadly issue. It has shown no repent-accomplished fact, without other like desperate ance under frequent failures to overpower us struggles, is palpable absurdity, the entertainin battle; and much less has it exhibited mag- ment of which will prove a delusion and a nanimity under the encouragement of partial snare. It is true that the forces of the enemy, success. We must disable it from harm, or put outnumbering our own more than two to one, our power to do so beyond question, before it were utterly routed, and driven into a retreat will be ready either to tender or accept the styled by themselves both disgraceful and cowolive branch. The enemy's people, in my opin- ardly. But the defeat is not such as to turn ion, will be far from satisfied with their trial the reckless politicians, who manage this moveof strength on the 21st. They will impute the ment, from the attempted execution of their defeat to any thing but intrinsic superiority direful purpose. Their pride has been sorely in our army. They call Scott a dotard, wounded, and their passion of revenge stimaMcDowell an incapable, Patterson a coward, lated to the performance of new deeds of inand distributing the responsibility for the defeat famy. At any sacrifice of life or of the people's among the three, confidently predict a different money, they will rally their routed forces and result under the generalship of McClellan. Be attempt with still greater desperation to reit so. Let them bring their highest military trieve their lost fortunes. Relying upon the genius, their choicest soldierly prowess against brute force of mere numbers, the enemy are us, and we need have no misgivings of the final evidently determined to risk other engageevent. Yesterday thousands of our soldiersments, perhaps of greater magnitude, if for