ond Lieutenant, R. L. Knight. Co. E-Captain, | ment at Blackburn's Ford, on the 18th, Gen. August Heiss; First Lieutenant, C. E. Kleine; Beauregard was convinced that General McSecond Lieutenant, H. Scheikhaus. Co. F- Dowell's principal demonstration would be First Lieutenant, F. Pross; Second Lieutenant, made on our left wing, and he then formed the Louis H. Browne. Co. G-First Lieutenant, idea of throwing forward a sufficient force, by Oliver J. Rogers; Second Lieutenant, Win. D. converging roads, to attack the enemy's rePrentice. Co. H-Captain, David Lamb; First serves at Centreville so soon as the main body Lieutenant, Asa B. Gardner; Second Lieuten- of the latter became inextricably engaged on ant, Ferdinand F. Pfeiffer. Co. I-Captain, the left. Late in the day, finding that General John A. Rice; Chaplain, L. W. Waldron, Act- Ewell, who was posted on the extreme right of ing First Lieutenant; Second Lieutenant, our line, had not moved forward in accordance Hamilton Haire. Co. K-Captain, John H. with the programme and the special order Watts; First Lieutenant, Wm. Maitland; Sec- which had been sent him, General Beauregard ond Lieutenant, T. E. Waldron. despatched a courier to Gen. Ewell to inquire the reason why the latter had failed to advance, and received a reply from Gen. Ewell, stating that he had not received any such order. The enemy's attack having then become too strong on the left to warrant carrying out the original Ewell's brigade to reach Centreville, it became necessary to alter the plan, change front on the left, and bring up our reserves to that part of the field. This movement was superintended in person by General Johnston, General Beauregard remaining to direct the movements in front. Among those not soldiers who rendered effective and gallant service among the skirmishers was John M. Pierce, a servant to Lieut.-Col. Browne, who, with his rifle, killed a field-officer and one soldier of the advancing foe. To conclude, the non-commissioned offi-plan, as it would take three hours for General cers and soldiers of my command behaved with such gallantry, it were invidious to make distinction until the time for promotion shall have actually arrived. I have the honor to be, respectfully, &c., Col. Com. 31st regiment N. Y. V. BEAUREGARD'S OFFICIAL REPORT. A correspondent of the Richmond (Va.) Dispatch, Nov. 1, gives the following synopsis of Beauregard's official report of the battle of Bull Run.* "At the time when Gen. Kirby Smith and General Early came up with their divisions and appeared on the right of the enemy, our forces on the left occupied the chord of the arc of a circle, of which the arc itself was occupied by the enemy-the extremes of their line flanking The appearance of Smith's and Early's brigades, and their charge on the enemy's right, broke the lines of the latter and threw the rout became complete. them into confusion, when shortly afterwards ours. "I have been favored with a brief synopsis of portions of Gen. Beauregard's report of the battle of Manassas, which has been forwarded "General Beauregard acknowledges the great to the War Department, and which will doubt-generosity of General Johnston in fully accordless be published in a short time. Beauregarding to him (Gen. Beauregard) the right to carry opens with a statement of his position antece- this campaign, in yielding the command of the out the plans he had formed with relation to dent to the battle, and of the plan proposed by field after examining and cordially approving him to the Government of the junction of the the plan of battle, and in the effective coopeextended to him on that eventful day. ration which General Johnston so chivalrously armies of the Shenandoah and Potomac, with a view to the relief of Maryland, and the capture of the city of Washington, which plan was re"He remarks that the retreat of our forces jected by the President. Gen. Beauregard states that he telegraphed the War Department from Fairfax, immediately previous to the enon the 13th of July of the contemplated attack gagement of the 18th, is the first instance on by Gen. McDowell, urgently asking for a junc-ment, and with the object of giving battle in record of volunteers retiring before an engagetion of Gen. Johnston's forces with his own, another position. The number under his comand continued to make urgent requests for the same until the 17th of July, when the President mand on the 18th July is set down at 17,000 consented to order Gen. Johnston to his assist-effective men, and on the 21st to 27,000, which ance. Gen. Beauregard goes on to state that his plan of battle assigned to Gen. Johnston an attack on the enemy on the left, at or near Centreville, while he himself would command in front; but the condition of the roads pre vented this. "It was then decided to receive the attack of the enemy behind Bull Run. After the engage When Beauregard's report of this battle in full is made public, it will be given in the "Record."-Ed. R. R. includes 6,200 of Johnston's army, and 1,700 brought up by Gen. Holmes from Fredericksmemorable battle are stated in the report to burg. The killed on our side in this everhave been in number 393, and the wounded 1,200. The enemy's killed, wounded, and prisoners are estimated by General Beauregard at 4,500, which does not include the missing." NEW YORK "TIMES" NARRATIVE. EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE. with his command taking the southern, which leads to Bull Run, and Gen. Tyler the northern-running parallel to it at a distance of about a mile and a half. The movement comse-menced at about 3 o'clock. I got up at a little before 4, and found the long line of troops extended far out on either road. I took the road by which Colonel Hunter, with his command, and General McDowell and staff, had gone, and pushed on directly for the front. After going out about two miles, Colonel Hunter turned to the right-marching oblique toward the run, which he was to cross some four miles higher up, and then come down upon the intrenched positions of the enemy on the other side. Col. Miles was left at Centreville and on the road, WASHINGTON, Sunday night, July 22, 1861. The battle yesterday was one of the most vere and sanguinary ever fought on this continent, and it ended in the failure of the Union troops to hold all the positions which they sought to carry, and which they actually did carry, and in their retreat to Centreville, where they have made a stand, and where Gen. McDowell believes that they are able to maintain themselves. ever they might be needed. Gen. Tyler went directly forward, to engage the enemy in front, and send reinforcements to Col. Hunter whenever it should be seen that he was engaged. I went out, as I have already stated, upon what is marked as the northern road. It is hilly, like all the surface of this section. After going out about three miles, you come to a point down which the road, leading through a forest, descends; then it proceeds by a succession of rising and falling knolls for a quarter of a mile, when it crosses a stone bridge, and then rises by a steady slope to the heights beyond. As I telegraphed you yesterday, the attack was made in three columns, two of which, however, were mainly feints, intended to amuse and occupy the enemy, while the sub-with reserves which he was to bring up whenstantial work was done by the third. It has been known for a long time that the range of hills which border the small swampy stream known as Bull Run, had been very thoroughly and extensively fortified by the rebels-that batteries had been planted at every available point, usually concealed in the woods and bushes which abound in that vicinity, and covering every way of approach to the region beyond. These are the advanced defences of Manassas Junction, which is some three miles further off. Until these were carried, no approach could be made to that place; and after they should be carried, others of a similar char-At the top of that slope the rebels had planted acter would have to be overcome at every point where they could be erected. The utmost that military skill and ingenuity could accomplish for the defence of this point was done. Gen. McDowell was unwilling to make an attack directly in face of these batteries, as they would be of doubtful issue, and must inevitably result in a very serious loss of life. After an attack had been resolved upon, therefore, he endeavored to find some way of turning the position. His first intention was to do this on the southern side-to throw a strong column into the place from that direction, while a feigned attack should be made in front. On Thursday, when the troops were advanced to Centreville, it was found that the roads on the south side of these positions were almost impracticable-that they were narrow, crooked, and stony, and that it would be almost impossible to bring up enough artillery to be effective in the time required. This original plan was, therefore, abandoned; and Friday was devoted to an examination by the topographical engineers of the northern side of the position. Maj. Barnard and Capt. Whipple reconnoitred the place for miles around, and reported that the position could be entered by a path coming from the north, though it was somewhat long and circuitous. This was selected, therefore, as the mode and point of attack. On Saturday the troops were all brought closely up to Centreville, and all needful preparations were made for the attack which was made this day. This morning, therefore, the army marched, by two roads, Col. Richardson heavy batteries, and the woods below were filled with their troops, and with concealed cannon. We advanced down the road to the first of the small knolls mentioned, when the whole column halted. The 30-pounder Parrott gun, which has a longer range than any other in the army, was planted directly in the road. Capt. Ayres' battery was stationed in the woods a little to the right. The First Ohio and Second New York regiments were thrown into the woods in advance on the left. The Sixtyninth New York, the First, Second, and Third Connecticut regiments were ranged behind them, and the Second Wisconsin was thrown into the woods on the right. At about half-past six o'clock the 30-pounder threw two shells directly into the battery at the summit of the slope, on the opposite height, one of which, as I learned afterward, struck and exploded directly in the midst of the battery, and occasioned the utmost havoc and confusion. After about half an hour, Capt. Ayres threw ten or fifteen shot or shell from his battery into the same place. But both failed to elicit any reply. Men could be seen moving about the opposite slope, but the batteries were silent. An hour or so afterward we heard three or four guns from Col. Richardson's column at Bull Run, and these were continued at intervals for two or three hours, but they were not answered, even by a single gun. It was very clear that the enemy intended to take his own time for paying his respects to us, and that he meant, moreover, to do it in his own way. Meantime we could hear in the distance the sound of Col. Hunter's axemen clearing his way, and awaited with some impatience the sound of his cannon on the opposite heights. Time wore along, with occasional shots from our guns, as well as those of Col. Richardson's column, but without, in a single instance, receiving any reply. At a little before 11 o'clock, the First Ohio and Second New York, which were lying in the wood on the left, were ordered to advance. They did so-passing out of the road and climbing a fence into a wood opposite, which they | had barely approached, however, when they were met by a tremendous discharge of a fourgun battery, planted at the left in the woods, mainly for the purpose of sweeping the road perpendicularly and the open field on its right, by which alone troops could pass forward to the opposite bank. They were staggered for a moment, and received orders to retire. Capt. Ayres' battery (formerly Sherman's) was advanced a little, so as to command this battery, and, by twenty minutes of vigorous play upon it, silenced it completely. At half-past 11 we heard Hunter's guns on the opposite height, over a mile to the right. He was answered by batteries there, and then followed the sharp, rattling volleys of musketry, as their infantry became engaged. The firing now became incessant. Hunter had come upon them suddenly, and formed his line of battle in an open field, at the right of the road. The enemy drew up to oppose him, but he speedily drove them to retreat, and followed them up with the greatest vigor and rapidity. Meantime, for some three hours previous, we had seen long lines of dense dust rising from the roads leading from Manassas, and, with the glass, we could very clearly perceive that they were raised by the constant and steady stream of reinforcements, which continued to pour in nearly the whole day. The Sixty-ninth, Seventy-ninth, Second, and Eighth New York; the First, Second, and Third Connecticut, and the Second Wisconsin were brought forward in advance of the wood and marched across the field to the right, to go to Col. Hunter's support. They crossed the intervening stream and drew up in a small open field, separated from Col. Hunter's column by a dense wood, which was filled with batteries and infantry. Our guns continued to play upon the woods which thus concealed the enemy, and aided materially in clearing for the advance. Going down to the extreme front of the column, I could watch the progress of Col. Hunter, marked by the constant roar of artillery and the roll of musketry, as he pushed the rebels back from point to point. At 1 o'clock he had driven them out of the woods and across the road which was the prolongation of that on which we stood. Here, by the side of their batteries, the rebels made a stand. They planted their flag directly in the road, and twice charged across it upon our men, but without moving them an inch. They were met by a destructive fire, and were compelled to fall still further back. Gradually the point of fire passed further and further to the left, until the dense clouds of smoke which marked the progress of the combat were at least half a mile to the left of what had been the central position of the rebels. It was now half-past 2 o'clock. I was at the advanced point of the front of our column, some hundred rods beyond the woods, in which the few troops then there were drawn up, when I decided to drive back to the town for the purpose of sending you my despatch. As I passed up the road, the balls and shells from the enemy began to fall with more rapidity. I did not see the point from which they came; but meeting Capt. Ayres, he said he was about to bring up his battery, supported by the Ohio brigade, under Gen. Schenck, to repel a rumored attempt of cavalry to outflank this column. As I passed forward he passed down. General Schenck's brigade was at once drawn up across the road, and Capt. Ayres' guns were planted in a knoll at the left, when a powerful body of rebels, with a heavy battery, came down from the direction of Bull Run, and engaged this force with tremendous effect. I went to Centreville, sent off my despatch, and started with all speed to return, intending to go with our troops upon what had been the hotly contested field, never doubting for a moment that it would remain in their hands. I had gone but a quarter of a mile when we met a great number of fugitives, and our carriage soon became entangled in a mass of baggage-wagons, the officer in charge of which told me it was useless to go in that direction, as our troops were retreating. Not crediting the story, which was utterly inconsistent with what I had seen but a little while before, I continued to push on. I soon met Quartermaster Stetson, of the Fire Zouaves, who told me, bursting into tears, that his regiment had been utterly cut to pieces, that the colonel and lieutenant-colonel were both killed, and that our troops had actually been repulsed. I still tried to go on, but the advancing columns rendered it impossible, and I turned about. Leaving my carriage, I went to a high point of ground, and saw, by the dense cloud of dust which rose over each of the three roads by which the three columus had advanced, that they were all on the retreat. Sharp discharges of cannon in their rear indicated that they were being pursued. I waited half an hour or so to observe the troops and batteries as they arrived, and then started for Washington, to send my despatch, and write this letter. As I came past the hill on which the secessionists had their intrenchments less than a week ago, I saw our forces taking up positions for a defence, if they should be assailed. Such is a very rapid and general history of this day's engagement. I am unable to be precise or profuse in matters of detail, and must leave these to a future letter. I hear nothing, on every side, but the warm est and heartiest commendation of our troops. They fought like veterans. The rebels did not, in a single instance, stand before them in a charge, and were shaken by every volley of their musketry. I do not mean to praise any one at the expense of another. The 69th fought with splendid and tenacious courage. They charged batteries two or three times, and would have taken and held them but for the reinforcements which were constantly and steadily poured in. Indeed it was to this fact alone that the comparative success of the rebels is due. We had not over 26,000 tnen in action, the rest being held as reserves at Centreville; while the enemy must have numbered at least 60,000. The Fire Zouaves, before they had fairly got into action, were terribly cut up by a battery and by musketry, which opened on their flank. They lost a great many of their officers and men. Col. Hunter, who led the main column of attack, received a severe wound in his throat. He was brought to this city, but I understand that he cannot recover, if indeed he is not already dead. I have heard the names of many others reported killed or wounded, but deem it best not to mention them now, as the rumors may prove to be unfounded. About a mile this side of Centreville a stampede took place among the teamsters and others, which threw every thing into the utmost confusion, and inflicted very serious injuries. Mr. Eaton, of Michigan, in trying to arrest the flight of some of these men, was shot by one of them, the ball taking effect in his hand. Quite a number of Senators and members of the House, were present at the battle. I shall be able to ascertain to-morrow the cause of the retreat of Col. Hunter's column after the splendid success it achieved. I am quite inclined, though ' in the face of evidence undeniable, to believe what is rumored here, that the column did hold its ground, and that the retreat was confined to the other columns. I fear this will not prove to be the fact. H. J. B. ATLANTA "CONFEDERACY" NARRATIVE. The special correspondent of the Atlanta, Ga., Confederacy, furnishes the following direct description of the plans and progress of the great battle: ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, MANASSAS, July 22, 1861. Yesterday, the 21st day of July, 1861, a great battle was fought, and a great victory won by the Confederate troops. Heaven smiled on our arms, and the God of battles crowned our banners with laurels of glory. Let every patriotic heart give thanks to the Lord of Hosts for the victory He has given His people on His own holy day, the blessed Sabbath. Gen. Johnston had arrived the preceding day with about half of the force he had, detailed from Winchester, and was the senior officer in command. He magnanimously insisted, however, that Gen. Beauregard's previous plan should be carried out, and he was | guided entirely by the judgment and superior local knowledge of the latter. While, therefore, Gen. Johnston was nominally in command, Beauregard was really the officer and hero of the day. You will be glad to learn that he was this day advanced from a Brigadier to the rank of a full General. At half-past six in the morning, the enemy opened fire from a battery planted on a hill beyond Bull Run, and nearly opposite the centre of our lines. The battery was intended merely to "beat the bush," and to occupy our attention, while he moved a heavy column toward the Stone Bridge, over the same creek, upon our left. At 10 o'clock, another battery was pushed forward, and opened fire a short distance to the left of the other, and near the road leading north to Centreville. This was a battery of rifled guns, and the object of its fire was the same as that of the other. They fired promiscuously into the woods and gorges on this, the southern side of Bull Run, seeking to create the impression thereby, that our centre would be attacked, and thus prevent us from sending reinforcements to our left, where the real attack was to be made. Beauregard was not deceived by the manœuvre. It might not be amiss to say, that Bull Run, or creek, is north of this place, and runs nearly due east, slightly curving around the Junction, the nearest part of which is about three and a half miles. The Stone Bridge is some seven miles distant, in a north-aresterly direction, upon which our left wing rested. Mitchell's ford is directly north, and distant four miles, by the road leading to Centreville, which is seven miles from the Junction. On our right is Union Mills, on the same stream, where the Alexandria and Manassas railroad crosses the Run, and distant four miles. Proceeding from Fairfax Court House, by Centreville, to Stone Bridge, the enemy passed in front of our entire line, but a distance ranging from five to two miles. At 9 o'clock, I reached an eminence nearly opposite the two batteries mentioned above, and which commanded a full view of the country for miles around, except on the right. From this point I could trace the movements of the approaching hosts by the clouds of dust that rose high above the surrounding hills. Our left, under Brigadier-Generals Evans, Jackson, and Cocke, and Col. Bartow, with the Georgia Brigade, composed of the Seventh and Eighth regiments, had been put in motion, and was advancing upon the enemy with a force of about 15,000, while the enemy himself was advancing upon our left with a compact column of at least 50,000. His entire force on this side of the Potomac is estimated at 75,000. These approaching columns encountered each other at 11 o'clock. Meanwhile, the two batteries in front kept up their fire upon the wooded hill where they supposed our centre lay. They sent occasional balls, from their rifled cannon, to the eminence where your correspondent stood. Gens. Beau- | Gen. Ewell been received and carried out, and regard, Johnston, and Bonham reached this point at 12, and one of these balls passed directly over and very near them, and plunged into the ground a few paces from where I stood. At a quarter past 12, Johnston and Beauregard galloped rapidly forward in the direction of Stone Bridge, where the ball had now fully opened. The artillery were the first to open fire, precisely at 11 o'clock. By half-past 11, the infantry had engaged, and there it was that the battle began to rage. The dusky columns which had thus far marked the approach of the two armies, now mingled with great clouds of smoke, as it rose from flashing guns below, and the two shot up together like a huge pyramid of red and blue. The shock was as tremendous as were the odds between the two forces. With what anxious hearts did we watch that pyramid of smoke and dust! When it moved to the right, we knew the enemy were giving way; and when it moved to the left, we knew that our friends were receding. Twice the pyramid moved to the right, and as often returned. At last, about two o'clock, it began to move slowly to the left, and thus it continued to move for two mortal hours. The enemy was seeking to turn our left flank, and to reach the railroad leading hence in the direction of Winchester. To do this, he extended his lines, which he was enabled to do by reason of his great numbers. This was unfortunate for us, as it required a corresponding extension of our own lines to prevent his extreme right from outflanking us --a movement on our part which weakened the force of our resistance along the whole line of battle, which finally extended over a space of two miles. It also rendered it the more difficult to bring up reinforcements, as the further the enemy extended his right, the greater the distance our reserve forces had to travel to counteract the movement. This effort to turn our flank was pressed with great determination for five long, weary hours, during which the tide of battle ebbed and flowed along the entire line with alternate fortunes. The enemy's column continued to stretch away to the left, like a huge anaconda, seeking to envelope us within its mighty folds and crush us to death; and at one time it really looked as if he would succeed. our entire force brought upon the field, we should have destroyed the enemy's army almost literally. Attacked in front, on the flank and in the rear, he could not possibly have escaped, except at the loss of thousands of prisoners and all his batteries, while the field would have been strewed with his dead. Finding that his orders had in some way failed to be executed, Gen. Beauregard at last ordered up a portion of the forces which were intended to cooperate with Gen. Ewell. It was late, however, before these reinforcements came up. Only one brigade reached the field before the battle was won. This was led by Gen. E. K. Smith, of Florida, formerly of the United States army, and was a part of Gen. Johnston's column from Winchester. They should have reached here the day before, but were prevented by an accident on the railroad. They dashed on the charge with loud shouts and in the most gallant style. About the same time Major Elzey coming down the railroad from Winchester with the last of Johnston's brigades, and hearing the firing, immediately quit the train and struck across the country, encountered the extreme right of the enemy as he was feeling his way around our flank, and with his brigade struck him like a thunderbolt, full in the face. Finding he was about to be outflanked himself, the enemy gave way after the second fire. Meanwhile Beauregard rallied the centre and dashed into the very thickest of the fight, and after him rushed our own brave boys, with a shout that seemed to shake the very earth. The result of this movement from three distinct points, was to force back the enemy, who began to retreat, first in good order and finally in much confusion. At this point the cavalry were ordered on the pursuit. The retreat now became a perfect rout, and it is reported that the flying legions rushed passed Centerville in the direction of Fairfax, as if the earth had been opening behind them. It was when Gen. Beauregard led the final charge, that his horse was killed by a shell. We captured thirty-four guns, including Sherman's famous battery, a large number of small arins, thirty wagons loaded with provisions, &c., and about seven hundred prisoners. Among the latter were Gen. Burnside, of the Rhode Island brigade, Col. Corcoran, of the New York Irish 69th regiment, Hon. Mr. Ely, member of Congress from New York, Mr. Carrington,* of this State, a nephew of the late William C. Preston, who had gone over to the enemy, and thirty-two captains, lieutenants, &c. We came near bagging the Hon. Mr. Foster, Senator from Connecticut. The moment he discovered the enemy's order of battle, General Beauregard, it is said, despatched orders to Gen. Ewell, on our extreme right, to move forward and turn his left or rear. At the same time he ordered Generals Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham, occupying the centre of our lines, to coöperate in this move- The official reports of the casualties of the ment, but not to move until Gen. Ewell had day have not yet come in, and consequently it made the attack. The order to Gen. Ewell un- is impossible to say what our loss is. I can fortunately miscarried. The others were deliv-only venture an opinion, and that is, that we ered, but as the movements of the centre were lost in killed, wounded, and missing, about 1,500 to be regulated entirely by those on the right, *These are errors. Gen. Burnside and Mr. Carrington nothing was done at all. Had the orders to were not captured.-Ed. R. R. |