CHAP. I. 1864. on at Franklin, had met and checked Forrest, holding him at the river and driving some of his detachments back. Schofield's army, on arriving at Nashville, occupied a position selected for it in advance by General Thomas. General Schofield held the left extending to the Nolensville pike; the Fourth Corps, under the command of General Wood, held the center, and the Sixteenth Corps under General A. J. Smith, who had just arrived in time to assist in the defense of Tennessee, occupied the right, his flank resting on the Cumberland River below the city. Wilson, with his cavalry, was stationed first at Schofield's left, but Steedman's provisional command having arrived at Nashville on the evening of the 1st of December Wilson was moved to the north side of the river and Steedman occupied the space from Schofield's left to the Cumberland. Hood, as if driven by his evil genius, followed rapidly after Schofield and sat down before Nashville. He was aware, he said, of the reënforcements which had reached Thomas, and which had brought the strength of the National army above his own, but he was in the position of a desperate gamester who has so little to lose that he feels it better policy to stake all than to leave the game. He knew that Mr. Davis was urgent in his orders for the reënforcement of the Army of Tennessee from Texas; he hoped that with this expected accession he might still realize the roseate dreams with which he had started out on this ill-starred campaign. He trusted to the chapter of accidents to give him some dazzling successes which would draw the Tennesseeans and Kentuckians to his standard. He formed his line of battle in front of Nashville on the 2d of December. Lee's corps took the center, astride the Franklin pike, Stewart occupied the left, and Cheatham the right, their flanks widely extending towards the Cumberland River, and Forrest's cavalry filling the gap. But no sooner had he established himself there than, as if determined to give himself no chance in the impending battle, he detached Forrest on the 5th with W. B. Bate's division of infantry to invest and capture, if possible, the garrison of Murfreesboro', commanded by General Rousseau. This expedition totally failed. A sally was made on the 7th by some of Rousseau's troops under General Milroy, who won that day a merited consolation for his disaster at Winchester, and inflicted a sharp defeat upon Bate's infantry, which was thereupon recalled to Nashville; while Forrest, in this useless adventure, remained away from Hood too far to be recalled when he was most needed. While General Hood was strengthening his intrenchments and waiting in vain for good news from Forrest, and the arrival of reënforcements from across the Mississippi, which were never to come, Thomas upon his side was completing in his unhurried and patient manner his preparations for a crushing blow. He would have been ready to strike in about a week after Hood's arrival. Nothing exhibits more vividly the tension of spirit which had come with four years of terrible war, than the fact that the Administration at Washington, which had patiently allowed McClellan to sit motionless in front of Johnston from July to February, began to urge Thomas to move against CHAP. I. 1864. Van Horne, "History of the Army Cum of the Cam Vol. II., p. 253. CHAP. I. Hood within twenty-four hours of the victory at Franklin. General Grant felt and exhibited this impatience in a much stronger degree. He not only sent out daily messages urging immediate action, but betrayed an irritation which reads strangely in the light of Thomas's career. He carried this feeling much further than the civil authorities at Washington, though it is true that Mr. Stanton, in a strain of whimsical exaggeration, wrote to Grant on the 7th of December, "If he [Thomas] waits for Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his last horn." Grant the next day telegraphed to Halleck, "If Thomas has not struck yet he ought to be ordered to hand over his command to Schofield." Halleck replied, showing that the Government at Washington, impatient as they felt for immediate action, cherished a higher regard for Thomas than that felt by the General-in-Chief. "If you wish General Thomas relieved," he said, "give the order. No one here will, I think, interfere. The responsibility, however, will be yours, as no one here, so far as I am informed, wishes General Thomas removed." Ibid. Halleck to This dispatch saved General Thomas his command for a few days longer; but Grant refused to be placated. Thomas telegraphed him on the 8th in extenuation of his not having attacked Hood that he could not concentrate his troops and get their transportation in order in shorter time than it had been done. Halleck answered, expressing the deep dissatisfaction of Grant at Thomas's delay, and Grant, on the 9th, with growing indignation, requested Halleck to telegraph orders reIbid., p. 255. lieving Thomas at once and placing Schofield in |