1865.

Having thus generously assumed responsibility CHAP. XI. for Weitzel's alleged neglect, the President's next thought was about what the Virginia rebel Legislature was doing, of which he had heard nothing since his return from City Point. He therefore included in this same telegram of April 12 the following inquiry and direction: "Is there any sign of the rebel Legislature coming together on the understanding of my letter to you? If there is any such sign, inform me what it is. If there is no such sign, you may withdraw the offer."

To this question General Weitzel answered briefly, "The passports have gone out for the legislature, and it is common talk that they will come together." It is probable that Mr. Lincoln thought that if after the lapse of five days the proposed meeting had progressed no farther than "common talk," nothing could be expected from it. It would also seem that at this time he must have received, either by telegraph or by mail, copies of the correspondence and call which Weitzel had authorized, and which had been published that morning. The President therefore immediately wrote and sent to General Weitzel a long telegram, in which he explained his course with such clearness that its mere perusal sets at rest all controversy respecting either his original intention of policy or the legal effect of his action and orders, and by a final revocation of the permission he had given brought the incident to its natural and appropriate termination:

I have just seen Judge Campbell's letter to you of the 7th. He assumes, it appears to me, that I have called the insurgent legislature of Virginia together, as the rightful

CHAP. XI. legislature of the State, to settle all differences with the United States. I have done no such thing.1 I spoke of Apl. 12,1865. them not as a legislature, but as "the gentlemen who have acted as the legislature of Virginia in support of the rebellion." I did this on purpose to exclude the assumption that I was recognizing them as a rightful body. I dealt with them as men having power de facto to do a specific thing, to wit: "to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government," for which, in the paper handed to Judge Campbell, I promised a special equivalent, to wit: a remission to the people of the State, except in certain cases, of the confiscation of their property. I meant this and no more. Inasmuch, however, as Judge Campbell misconstrues this, and is still pressing for an armistice, contrary to the explicit statement of the paper I gave him, and particularly as General Grant has since captured the Virginia troops, so that giving a consideration for their withdrawal is no longer applicable, let my letter to you and the paper to Judge Campbell both be withdrawn or countermanded, and he be notified of it. Do not now allow them to assemble, but if any have come allow them safe return to their homes.

Lincoln to

Weitzel,

Apl. 12, 1865.

Campbell, Pamphlet.

1 The account given by Admiral Porter of this transaction, in his "Naval History," p. 799, is evidently written from memory,

without consultation of dates or documents, and is wholly inaccurate as well in substance as in detail.

CHAPTER XII

JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER

HERMAN soon wearied of the civil administra- CHAP. XII.

tion of Savannah and of the adjacent region

1865.

of Georgia which had suddenly grown loyal. He received in January a visit from the Secretary of War, in which many matters pertaining to the care of captured property and the treatment of reclaimed territory were discussed and settled. But the business which lay nearest to Sherman's heart, and occupied most of his time, was the preparation for his march northward of five hundred miles which was to bring him in upon Grant's left wing to finish the war, either on the banks of the Roanoke or the James. He pushed forward, with his accustomed untiring zeal, the work required to put his magnificent army in position to traverse the wide pine barrens, the spreading swamps, and the deep rivers that lay between him and his goal; and so rapid was his progress that he would have found himself ready to start by the middle of January had it not been for the torrents of rain which fell during that month, swelling the Savannah River out of its bed and flooding the rice fields on its shore for miles around. He made a lodgment meanwhile "Memoirs." at Pocotaligo, where the railroad to Charleston

Sherman,

Vol. II.,

p. 255.

1865.

CHAP. XII. crosses the Combahee, meeting so little resistance as to convince him that there was a sensible diminution of the energy of the Confederates. The weather cleared away bright and cold at the end of January, and with the opening days of February the great march to the North was begun. Howard commanded the right wing, consisting of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps, under Logan and Blair; Slocum the left wing, the Fourteenth "Memoirs, Corps, under Jeff. C. Davis, and the Twentieth under A. S. Williams; the cavalry was led by Kilpatrick; a grand total of 60,000 men; added to this Grant had promised him important reënforcements on the way. He had abundant stores, with what he could collect on the march, of food and forage, and ammunition enough for a great battle. Fortunately, this last was never to be used.

Sherman,

Vol. II.,

p. 268.

The whole campaign in fact is mainly interesting to the military student as one of the most remarkable marches which history records. It amazed the Confederate commanders that Sherman should have thought of advancing before the waters subsided. There is no account of another such march. From Savannah to Goldsboro' is a distance of 425 miles. The country is for the most part low and at that season wet, intersected by innumerable rivers and streams, bordered by swamps, traversed by roads hardly deserving the name, mere quaking causeways in a sea of mud. The advance guard frequently waded through water waist deep. The country was almost as destitute of maps as the region of the Congo; every step forward was made gropingly. At the crossing of the Salkehatchie by Logan's corps, it was found the stream had fifteen channels,

66

Cox, "The

March to

all of which had to be bridged. The roads were CHAP. XII. impassable to artillery or train wagons until corduroyed; under the heavy weight the logs gradually sank till another layer was necessary, and this toilsome process had to be repeated indefinitely, 'bridging chaos for hundreds of miles," as General Cox calls it. There are few instances of equal energy and success in the conquest of physical conditions. General Sherman himself, when it was all over, compared the march northward with the march to the sea, in relative importance as ten to one.

the Sea,"

pp. 171, 172.

1865.

He had little except the forces of nature to fight with on the way. By skillfully feigning to right and left he produced the impression that both Charleston and Augusta were threatened, while he marched almost unopposed to Columbia. Charleston being thus turned fell like a ripe fruit into the hands of Dahlgren and Gillmore on the 18th of February; General Hardee hurrying northward to Cheraw, on the Great Peedee. There was nothing like organized resistance at the beginning of the march, even at points where it was expected. When Howard drew near the railroad between Charleston and Augusta, he paused to deploy his leading division to be ready for battle. While thus engaged, a man came galloping down the road, whom he recognized as one of his own foragers, on a white horse, with a rope bridle, shouting, "Hurry up, General, we've got the railroads." A vital line of communication had been captured by a squad of "Memoirs." "bummers," while the generals were preparing for a serious battle. Beauregard and Wade Hampton, who were both in Columbia, had neither the means

Sherman,

Vol. II.,

p. 274.