flank. The instant the men were assigned their positions they went to work with instinctive alacrity to build such slight breastworks as the means at hand afforded. The roadway was left open to enable a double line of wagons and artillery to pass, and this opening was protected by a retrenchment a few rods further back. СНАР. І. Cox, "Franklin and Nashville," p. 84. Wagner's division, which had held the lines at Spring Hill all the day before, and which had brought up the rear in a long night march, came in about noon. Colonel Opdycke's brigade, which had formed the rear guard, and upon which had fallen the double duty of beating back Hood's advance, and driving forward the weary and limping recruits of Schofield's army, now came inside the lines, and was posted as a reserve in rear of the center. Wagner's other two brigades were left outside the principal line, about half a mile forward on the Columbia pike, with instructions to observe the enemy, and to retire as soon as the Confederates showed a disposition to advance in force. The weary soldiers threw themselves Ibid., p. 86. down for a little repose behind their breastworks; neither Schofield nor his corps commanders imagined that a great battle was to burst upon them in a few moments. The artillery and trains were nearly all across the river by the middle of the afternoon, and Schofield had issued orders for the Nov.30,1864. troops to pass over at six o'clock. But there was a state of things in the Confederate army which made any moderate or prudent measures impossible to Hood. His failure to destroy Schofield at Spring Hill had so embittered and exasperated him that he was ready for any enterprise, however desperate. VOL. X.-2 CHAP. I. Nov.30,1864. The irritation had communicated itself to his principal officers; his reproaches had stung them beyond endurance; and, therefore, on arriving in sight of Schofield's army, in position on the south bank of the Harpeth, there was no thought of anything among the Confederate commanders but immediate and furious attack. All the Confederate accounts agree in describing this spirit in Hood's army on the morning of the 30th of November, though Hood and his generals entirely disagree as to the cause of it.1 Generals Cheatham and John C. Brown, and, according to their account, General Cleburne also, ascribed it to Hood's unreasonable and angry censures of their conduct the day before, while Hood attributes the new spirit of the army to mortification for the great opportunity lost and a renewed access of admiration and confidence towards himself. The assault was made at about four o'clock. The Confederates never rushed forward to battle with more furious impetus, and by a strange accident it seemed for a moment as if this desperate assault of Hood was to succeed, and he was to gain the glory he so ardently longed for of a success like Stonewall Jackson's best. Wagner's two brigades, that had been left outside the line with instructions to retire before becoming actually engaged with the enemy, stayed too long. The wide and heavy lines of Cheatham and Stewart had enveloped them on both flanks and the bayonets of Hood's center were almost touching them when they 1 Hood's "Advance and Re- ing of Confederate officers at treat," p. 294 et seq. General Louisville-Southern HistoriCheatham's paper, read at a meet- cal Society Papers." Vol. IX. turned and ran for the Union lines. They rushed CHAP. I. over the parapets on either side of the pike, the Confederates following immediately after them, overwhelming and carrying to the rear the troops Nov.30,1864. who were defending the breast works. A gap of breastworks. about one thousand feet was instantly made in the Union lines; Hood's battalions were rapidly converging to this point. If the damage were not immediately repaired, it would be irreparable; with a superior force wedged into the Union center, short work would have been made of the two wings, and nothing but annihilation would have been left for Schofield's army. General D. S. Stanley, the commander of the Fourth Corps, seeing from the north side of the river the Confederate advance, started at the instant for his line. He reached it just as the breach was made and the confused mass of fugitives and Confederates came pouring to the rear. The only force available at the instant to meet them was Opdycke's brigade, which had fought all the day before at Spring Hill and afterwards had marched all night; but even while Stanley was galloping to order Opdycke to lead his men to the charge he saw that gallant commander taking position himself on the right of his line; seeing that no orders were necessary he gave none, but placed himself at the left of this heroic brigade. A shout rose among the veteran soldiers about him, "We can go where the general can"; and the brigade, supported on the right and left by Cox's men, who instantly rallied to the rescue, rushed forward and regained the lines. Opdycke's magnificent courage met its adequate reward. He fought on horseback СНАР. І. till his revolver was empty, then dealt about him with the butt of his pistol, and descending from his horse seized the musket of a fallen soldier, and fought like a private until the intrenchments were regained. Although four regimental commanders fell in this furious charge, Opdycke was unhurt. Stanley did not fare so well; his horse was killed under him and he received a serious wound in the neck and was carried to the rear. The battle did not cease with this fierce onset and repulse. All along the line the Confederates made attack after attack. Hood sitting on horseback, a little way behind his lines, sent them forward again and again with furious orders" to drive the Yankees into the river." To show with what desperate gallantry the Confederates were led, it need only be said that six generals were killed on or near the parapets, six were wounded, and one captured. Cleburne closed his brilliant career in front of the Union breast works. John Adams charged his horse over the ditch, leaped it, and horse and rider were killed upon the parapet. General O. F. Strahl fought with his men in the ditch until evening came; he was struck down; he turned over the command to Colonel F. E. P. Stafford, but while his men were carrying him to the rear he was struck twice more and killed. Stafford took up his fallen sword and carried on the fight with a courage which will form the theme of fable and legend in time to come. An eye witness says that his men were piled about him in such numbers that when at last he was shot dead he could not fall, but was found the next morning, partially upright, as if still commanding the gallant dead who surrounded him. CHAP. I. Hood, "Advance and Retreat," Along the whole line the attack and defense were carried on, until nothing but the flashes of the Nov.30,1864. muskets could be seen in the darkness, with the same furious gallantry on the one side and the same immovable determination on the other. Few battles so frightfully destructive are recorded in the wars of modern times. In the terrible fight at Ezra Church, a Union picket shouted across the lines to a Confederate with that friendly chaff common to both armies, "I say, Johnny, how many of you are there left?" To which the undaunted Confederate replied, “About enough for another killing." On this terrible afternoon at Franklin, Hood's army suffered the last killing it was able to endure. He admitted in his dispatch to Richmond a loss of "about 4500"; but Thomas in his careful report foots the Confederate loss at 6252, of which all but 700 were killed and wounded. Schofield's loss was very much less, amounting to 2326 in all, of which Wagner's unfortunate division lost 1200. Had it not been for the mistake made in those two advanced brigades, Schofield's army would have slaughtered Hood's at its leisure. Thomas, in his grave and sober manner, thus sums up the result of this signal victory: "It not only seriously checked the enemy's advance and gave General Schofield time to move his troops and all his property to Nashville, but it also caused deep depression among the men of Hood's army, making them doubly cautious in their subsequent movements." Schofield reported the day's work to Thomas and by his advice and direction fell back during the night to Nashville. His retreat was entirely unmolested; for Wilson, while the battle was going p. 330. Thomas, committee of the War. on Conduct Supplement, Part I., p. 372. Ibid. |