unimpaired. But, sir, its honest and enlightened advocates, the writers of the 'Federalist,' attempted no such imposition on the good sense of the people. They told them distinctly that sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in the members, are things repugnant and irreconcilable.'-Federalist, No. 15. . .. . In rapidly glancing over this celebrated collection, I find the expression, 'residuary sovereignty of the states,' as distinguished from a complete and undiminished sovereignty, used in three several numbers (Nos. 39, 43, and 62), all written by Mr. Madison, whose guidance, I confess, I always follow with peculiar confidence, for no man, from the relation in which he stands to the Constitution, can be supposed to be more thoroughly imbued with its true philosophy. It is a remarkable circumstance, as evincing the unvarying fidelity of Mr. Madison's mind to this fundamental truth of a partial surrender of sovereignty by the states, that, at the distance. of more than ten years from the publication of the Feder alist,' in his celebrated report of the Virginia Legislature of 1799, he again uses the same form of expression-'the residuary sovereignty of the states.' Sir, that report, in recognizing, as it does, in express terms, the sovereignty of the United States,' as well as in attributing to the several states a residuary sovereignty only, shows that the idea of an absolute and undiminished sovereignty still remaining in the states was as little entertained by the fathers of the political church, from which the senator from South Carolina professes to derive his tenets, as by the founders and original advocates of the Constitution. . . . . The Republicans of '98 and '99, Mr. President, never contended that the states retained, under the Constitution, an absolute and undiminished sovereignty; that they still possessed what they had given up; that the whole was not diminished by the sub

traction of a part. But they contended that all the sovereignty which had not been voluntarily surrendered to the Union was inviolably reserved to the states; that the states are sovereign within their several spheres as the Union is in the sphere marked out to it, and that the harmony of the whole system is only to be preserved by each power revolving in its proper orbit. It was reserved for modern times to assert that eccentric and lawless state sovereignty which 'shoots madly from its sphere' to arrest the movements and to nullify the acts of the federal authority. . . . . Sir, this argument is plainly founded on a total misconception of the nature of our present political system, and of the characteristic differences between it and the Articles of Confederation. From the moment of the adoption of the present Constitution, a direct relation is created between the government of the United States and the citizen. The authorities of the Union no longer act through the states by requisition, as under the Articles of Confederation, but directly, on persons and things, by its own laws. The great object of the change of system was to render the government of the Union entirely independent of the action of states in the performance of its high constitutional functions. For this purpose it was not only invested with the power of making laws, but of executing them by regular, judicial, and executive organs, and by the physical force of the country also, if need be; for it will not be forgotten that among the powers vested in Congress is that of 'providing for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union.' To mark still more unequivocally the intention of the new Constitution to place the government of the Union, in the exercise of its powers, above the control of individual states, it is expressly declared that the Constitution and law of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thercof,

etc., shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary nothwithstanding.'. . . . That the interposition of a state acting in her sovereign capacity through a convention of the people, as in the case of South Carolina, is of no more avail to arrest the execution of the laws of the United States than an interposition in her ordinary political capacity, is apparent from the language of that clause of the Constitution which asserts the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the United States, 'any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.' The Constitution of a state is always the act of a state in her highest sovereign capacity; and if it can oppose no obstacle to the laws of the Union, as is here declared, it follows that neither the sovereign nor the legislative interposition of a state is sufficient, under the Constitution, to defeat a law of the United States. If any thing farther were wanting to show that the interposition of a state can not, under the Constitution, absolve the citizen from his obligations to the Union, conclusive proof is furnished by the rejection of the amendment proposed in the Convention by Mr. Luther Martin, which was brought to the view of the Senate a few days since by the honorable senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton). Mr. Martin, with the express view, as he told us, of securing the citizens of the respective states against the effects of their responsibility to the United States, where, in obedience to the authority of their own state, they should oppose the laws of the Union, submitted a proposition in the following words, as an amendment to the article in the Constitution concerning treason: 'Provided that no act or acts done by one or more of the states against the United States, or by any citizen of any one of the United States, under the authority of any one or more of the said states, shall be

deemed treason, or punished as such, etc.' This proposition, sir, was rejected; and the inference drawn from the fact by Mr. Martin is irresistible, that it was intended to preserve the constitutional authority of the Union over the citizens of the United States in full force and effect, whatever might be done or enjoined by a state to the contrary, . . . . Sir, proud as I am of the title of citizen of Virginia, grateful as I am for the unmerited favor which that honored mother has shown to me, I yet feel, with the Father of the country, that the just pride of patriotism is exalted' by the more comprehensive title of citizen of the United States; that title which gives me a share in the common inheritance of glory which has descended to us from our revolutionary sages, patriots, and heroes; that title which enables me to claim the names of the Rutledges, the Pinckneys, and the Sumters of South Carolina, and the Hancocks, the Adams's, and Otis's of Massachusetts, and all the other proud names which have illustrated the annals of each and all of these states as compatriot with my own. I have thus, Mr. President, reviewed the fundamental tenets of that new school of constitutional law which has sprung up within the last four or five eventful years of our political history. I have endeavored to show that they have no foundation whatever in any just view of the Constitution, that they are directly at war with contemporary understanding and expositions of its founders, and that they derive no countenance whatever from the principles of that genuine republican school which re-established the Constitution in its purity after the temporary perversion to which it had been subjected. These modern doctrines, I do firmly believe, are in their tendency utterly subversive of that happy system of government, the preservation of which is not only the sole security for liberty with us, but the last hope of freedom

But one thing is certain, a

throughout the world. state can never, as South Carolina has done, directly and formally annul a law of the United States, without an open departure from the Constitution and a total renunciation of all its obligations. . . . . What, then, was the conduct. of Virginia in the memorable era of '98 and '99? She solemnly protested against the Alien and Sedition Acts as 'palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution;' she communicated that protest to the other states of the Union, and earnestly appealed to them to unite with her in a like. declaration that this deliberate and solemn expression of the opinions of the states, as parties to the constitutional compact, should have its proper effect upon the councils of the nation in procuring a revision and repeal of the obnoxious act. This was 'the head and front of her offending, nothing more.' The whole object of the proceeding was, by the peaceful force of public opinion, embodied through the organ of the state Legislatures, to obtain a repeal of the laws in question, not to oppose or arrest their execution while they remained unrepealed. That this was the true spirit and real purpose of the proceeding is abundantly manifested by the whole of the able debate which took place in the Legislature of the state on the occasion. All the speakers who advocated the resolutions, which were finally adopted, distinctly placed them on that legitimate constitutional ground. I need only refer to the emphatic declaration of John Taylor, of Caroline, the distinguished mover and able champion of the resolutions. He said, 'the appeal was to public opinion-if that is against us we must yield.' The same sentiment was avowed and maintained by every friend of the resolutions throughout the debate. . . . . There is no proceeding whatever, in any part of this affair, against South Carolina. The government of the United States, in