fore when they are once come to believe it probable that there is another Life, there can be no Objection against believing it certain, if there be fufficient Evidence for it: For if the Fear of Damnation be the Objection, they should reject the Probability of a Future State, as well as the Certainty of it: For though there is a great Difference between Probability and Certainty; yet confidered as a Prejudice against believing, they are much the fame; for Men are almost as unwilling to believe the high Probability, as the Certainty of a State of Damnation; and find no great Relief in thinking, that it is only very probable that they fhall be damned. Nay, when Men are convinced of the Probability of a Future State; they naturally defire to know the Certainty of it, if it be to be known. Probabilities are very uneasy, they are fufficient to make us fear; but we defire better Evidence and Security for our Hopes; and this difpofes Men to an impartial Enquiry into the Reasons of the Chriftian Hope. And when Men are convinced of the great Probability of a Future State, this makes fuch a Revelation very credible; for nothing can be incredible, which is probable. And when Nature has furnished us with fuch probable Arguments of a Future State, which we may suppose were fufficient to create a Belief in the more innocent Ages of the World, it feems very becoming the Divine Goodnefs to give us a more fenfible and unquestionable Proof of it, when the Degeneracy of Mankind, and the eternal Difputes of Philofophers, had confounded thefe Natural Evidences. This is the Advantage, and the true Ufe of Natural and Moral Arguments of a Future State, to prove the great Probability of another Life; which will spoil the Triumphs of Infidelity, and difpofe Men to receive the Gospel. And here we ought to ftop, if we will difpute to any certain Ad vantage vantage. We may spoil good Arguments by pretending to prove too much by them; which has been a common Mifcarriage in our present Difpute. The certain Proofs of Immortality must be fetched from the Gospel; and those who belive the Gospel, need no other; and it is as much as we need defire of Natural and Moral Arguments, to turn the Scales, and give the Advantage of great Probabilities to another Life; which will give a great Check to Infidelity, and as it may reasonably be hoped, bring them to the School of Chrift, for more perfect Inftruction. CHA P. II. Concerning the Natural and Moral Arguments of a Future State. Shall begin with the Natural and Moral Arguments of a Future State: But muft defire you to remember what I have fo largely discoursed, That I do not alledge them as ftrict Demonftrations, or direct and pofitive Proofs, which exclude all Sufpicion or Poffibility of the Things being otherwife; but only as fuch high Probabilities, as are next in Degree to direct and pofitive Proofs. And therefore it will be no Objection against any Thing I fhall fay, though you could prove, that these Arguments do not give us an abfolute Certainty; unless you can prove, that they are not fo much as probable, or not fo probable, that they ought to move a wife Man. For in a Question of fuch vaft Concernment as this is, and when we must chufe one Side; if there be not fo much as the leaft Probability on one side of the Question, and very great Probabilities babilities on the other, this is fufficient to determine a wife Man which Side to chufe, when he can have no better Evidence. And therefore to lay this Matter plainly before you, I fhall 1. Confider what is faid against the Belief of another Life; and fhew you, That there is not the leaft Appearance of Reafon on that Side. And, 2. fhew you, What Natural Evidence we have for another Life, and answer the Objections against it: And I hope I may expect a fair Hearing, while I am pleading the. Caufe of Mankind, and of Human Nature, against those who would rob us of these glorious Hopes and Expectations of Immortality. SECT. I. That there is no Appearance of Reafon against the Belief of another Life. 1. To O confider what is faid against the Belief of another Life; and that there is not the leaft Appearance of Reason on that Side. 1. Now in the firft Place, it will not be amifs to confider what it is, that perfuades Men out of the Belief of Immortality, and makes them not only contented to be mortal, but very defirous to prove themselves fo. This is a Secret which our modern Infidels are not willing to own, but Lucretius has honestly confeffed the Truth. Et metus ille foras præceps Acherontis agendus That is, that the Fear of Punishment in the next World, which disturbs bad Men in the fecure Enjoyment of their Lufts, and spoils all the Pleasures and Comforts of Life, makes them very unwilling and afraid that there fhould be another World; and that easily perfuades them, that there is none. But I appeal to you all, whether this be not a very bad Foundation for Infidelity, and a reasonable Prejudice against the moft plaufible Arguments that can be urged for it; for it has all the Symptoms and Indications, that any Thing can have, of it's being unnatural. As 1. It is against the Natural Senfe of our Minds, that there is an effential Difference between Good and Evil, and that good Men deserve to be rewarded and the Wicked punished. This is the Cause of their Fear; this makes them tremble at the Thoughts of another World, where they fhall receive according to their Works. If their own Minds do not condemn them for their Wickedness, and threaten the Judgments of God against them, why do they fear another World? If they do, why do they not begin with the Caufes of their Fears, and confute thofe fuperftitious Notions of the Difference between Good and Evil, and their different Deferts? If there be no Difference between Good and Evil, there is no Pretence for Rewards and Punishments; and then there can be no occafion for their Fears. But they begin at the wrong End, when they endeavour to filence their natural Sense of Guilt, and natural Fears of Punishment, by denying another Life; This is to difpute against the Senfe of Nature, and to prove, that bad Men fhall not be punished, not because they don't deferve it, but because there is no other State to punish them in. But let any Man judge, whether it be not more reasonable and natural to conclude, that if Wickedness deserves to be punished, and natural Confci ence ence threatens bad Men with a juft Vengeance, there is another State, wherein they fhall receive their juft Rewards. I grant, that it is a very ef fectual Way to ftifle the Senfe of Good and Evil, if we can prove that there are no future Rewards or Punishments; but it will be impoffible to fatisfy any Man of this, who acknowledges a Difference between Good and Evil; for Men will fear Punishment, when they know they deserve it. It is the hardeft Thing in the World to get rid of the Natural Senfe of the Difference between Good and Evil; because every particular Man, when he has any Kindness or any Injury done him, feels the Difference; and all well governed Societies are forced, for their own Prefervation, to make a Difference between them: And it is a very hard Thing for any Man to perfuade himself that there are no Rewards or Punifhments for good or bad Men, when he is convinced that they deferve Rewards and Punishments. And this is the true Reafon why these Fears so often return upon Atheists and Infidels, after all the Care they can take to fortify themselves with Arguments againft the Belief of another World; efpecially when any great Sufferings overtake them in this World, or they have a near Profpect of Death and Judgment; becaufe the Natural Senfe of Good and Evil, and of the Rewards and Punishments due to good and bad Men, is against them. And indeed it is fo natural to think, that if there be any Difference between Good and Evil, good Men fhall be rewarded, and the wicked punished, that, till they can confute this, it is in vain for them to endeavour to perfuade themselves or others, that there are no Rewards or Punishments in the next World; for this is to confute the Senfe of Nature, which may be filenced for fome Time, but will never be confuted; and when Men pretend only to Reafon from Nature, fuch Argu ments |