since enjoyed it undisturbed; and of late, by the assistance of Chili and Buenos Ayres, the revolution has extended to Peru. Of the movement of Mexico our information is less authentic, but it is, nevertheless, distinctly understood, that the new government has declared its independence, and that there is now no opposition to it there, nor a force to make any. For the last three years the government of Spain has not sent a single corps of troops to any part of that country; nor is there any reason to believe it will send any in future. Thus, it is manifest that all those provinces are not only in the full enjoyment of their independence, but, considering the state of the war and other circumstances, that there is not the most remote prospect of their being deprived of it.

When the result of such a contest is manifestly settled, the new gov ernments have a claim to recognition by other powers which ought not to be resisted. Civil wars too often excite feelings which the parties can not control. The opinion entertained by other powers as to the result, may assuage those feelings, and promote an accommodation between them, useful and honorable to both. The delay which has been observed in making a decision on this important subject, will, it is presumed, have afforded an unequivocal proof to Spain, as it must have done to other powers, of the high respect entertained by the United States for her rights, and of their determination not to interfere with them. The provinces belonging to this hemisphere are our neighbors, and have, successively, as each portion of the country acquired its independence, pressed their recognition by an appeal to facts not to be contested, and which they thought gave them a just title to it. To motives of interest, this government has invariably disclaimed all pretension, being resolved to take no part in the controversy, or other measure in regard to it, which should not merit the sanction of the civilized world. To other claims a just sensibility has been always felt and frankly acknowledged, but they, in themselves, could never become an adequate cause of action. It was incumbent on this government to look to every important fact and circumstance on which a sound opinion could be formed, which has been done. When we regard, then, the great length of time which this war has been prosecuted, the complete success which has attended it in favor of the prov inces, the present condition of the parties, and the utter inability of Spain to produce any change in it, we are compelled to conclude that its fate is settled, and that the provinces which have declared their independence, and are in the enjoyment of it, ought to be recognised.

Of the views of the Spanish government on this subject, no particular information has been recently received. It may be presumed that the successful progress of the revolution, through such a long series of years, gaining strength and extending annually in every direction, and embracing by the late important events, with little exception, all the dominions of Spain, south of the United States, on this continent, placing thereby the complete sovereignty over the whole in the hands of the people, will reconcile the parent-country to an accommodation with them on the basis of their unqualified independence. Nor has any authentic information been recently received of the disposition of other powers respecting it. A sincere desire has been cherished to act in concert with them in the proposed recognition, of which several were sometime past duly apprized; but it was understood that they were not prepared for it. The immense space between those powers, even those which border on the Atlantic, and these provinces, make the movement an affair of less interest and excite

ment to them, than to us. It is probable, therefore, that they have been less attentive to its progress than we have been. It may be presumed, however, that the late events will dispel all doubt of the result.

In proposing this measure, it is not contemplated to change thereby, in the slightest manner, our friendly relations with either of the parties, but to observe in all respects, as heretofore, should the war be continued, the most perfect neutrality between them. Of this friendly disposition, an assurance will be given to the government of Spain, to whom it is presumed it will be, as it ought to be, satisfactory. The measure is proposed under a thorough conviction that it is in strict accord with the law of nations; that it is just and right as to the parties; and that the United States owe it to their station and character in the world, as well as to their essential interests, to adopt it. Should Congress concur in the view herein presented, they will doubtless see the propriety of making the necessary appropriations for carrying it into effect.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

MARCH 26, 1822.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:CONGRESS having suspended the appropriation, at the last session, for the fortification at Dauphin island, in consequence of a doubt which was entertained of the propriety of that position, the further prosecution of the work was suspended, and an order given, as intimated in the message of the 3d of December, to the board of engineers and naval commissioners, to re-examine that part of the coast, and particularly that position, as also the position at Mobile point, with which it is connected, and to report their opinion thereon, which has been done, and which report is herewith communicated.

By this report it appears to be still the opinion of the board, that the construction of works at both these positions is of great importance to the defence of New Orleans, and of all that portion of our Union which is connected with, and dependent on, the Mississippi, and on the other waters which empty into the gulf of Mexico, between that river and Cape Florida. That the subject may be fully before Congress, I transmit, also, a copy of the former report of the board, being that on which the work was undertaken, and has been in part executed, Approving as I do the opinion of the board, I consider it my duty to state the reasons on which I adopted the first report, especially as they were in part suggested by the occurrences of the late war.

The policy which induced Congress to decide on and provide for the defence of the coast, immediately after the war, was founded on the marked events of that interesting epoch. The vast body of men which it was found necessary to call into the field, through the whole extent of our maritime frontier, and the number who perished by exposure, with the immense expenditure of money and waste of property which followed, were to be traced in an eminent degree to the defenceless condition of the coast. It was to mitigate these evils in future wars, and even for the higher purpose of preventing war itself, that the decision was formed to make the coast, so far as it might be practicable, impregnable, and that the

measures necessary to that great object have been pursued with so much

zeal since.

It is known that no part of our Union is more exposed to invasion by the numerous avenues leading to it, or more defenceless by the thinness of the neighboring population, or offers a greater temptation to invasion, either as a permanent acquisition or as a prize to the cupidity of grasping invaders, from the immense amount of produce deposited there, than the city of New Orleans. It is known, also, that the seizure of no part of our Union could affect so deeply and vitally the immediate interests of so many states, and of so many of our fellow-citizens, comprising all that extensive territory and numerous population which are connected with, and dependent on, the Mississippi, as the seizure of that city. Strong works, well posted, were therefore deemed absolutely necessary for its protection.

It is not, however, by the Mississippi only, or the waters which communicate directly with, or approach nearest to, New Orleans, that the town is assailable. It will be recollected that, in the late war, the public solicitude was excited, not so much by the danger which menaced it in those directions, as by the apprehension that, while a feint might be made there, the main force, landing either in the bay of Mobile, or other waters between that bay and the Rigolets, would be thrown above the town, in the rear of the army which had been collected there for its defence. Full confidence was entertained that that gallant army, led by the gallant and able chief who commanded it, would repel any attack to which it might be exposed in front. But had such a force been thrown above the town, and a position taken on the banks of the river, the disadvantage to which our troops would have been subjected, attacked in front and rear as they might have been, may easily be conceived. As their supplies would have been cut off, they could not long have remained in the city, and withdrawing from it, it must have fallen immediately into the hands of the force below. In ascending the river, to attack the force above, the attack must have been made to great disadvantage, since it must have been on such ground, and at such a time, as the enemy preferred. These considerations show that defences, other than such as are immediately connected with the city, are of great importance to its safety.

An attempt to seize New Orleans and the lower part of the Mississippi, will be made only by a great power, or a combination of several powers, with a strong naval and land force, the latter of which must be brought in transports which may sail in shallow water. If the defences around New Orleans are well posted, and of sufficient strength to repel any attack which may be made on them, the city can be assailed only by a land force, which must pass in the direction above suggested, between the Rigolets and the bay of Mobile. It becomes, therefore, an object of high importance to present such an obstacle to such an attempt as would defeat it should it be made. Fortifications are useful for the defence of posts, to prevent the approach to cities, and the passage of rivers; but as works, their effect can not be felt beyond the reach of their cannon. They are formidable in other respects, by the body of men with them, which may be removed and applied to other purposes.

Between the Rigolets and the bay of Mobile, there is a chain of islands, at the extremity of which is Dauphin island, which forms, with Mobile point, from which it is distant about three and a quarter miles, the entrance into the bay of Mobile, which leads through that part of the state of Ala

bama to the towns of Mobile and Blakeley. The distance between Dauphin island and the Rigolets is ninety miles. The principal islands be tween them are Massacre, Horn, Ship, and Cat islands, near to which there is an anchorage for large ships-of-war. The first object is to prevent the landing of any force, for the purposes above stated, between the Rigolets and the bay of Mobile; the second, to defeat that force in case it should be landed. When the distance from one point to the other is considered, it is believed that it would be impossible to establish works so near to each other as to prevent the landing of such a force. Its defeat, therefore, should be effectually provided for. If the arrangement should be such as to make that result evident, it might be fairly concluded that the attempt would not be made, and thus we should accomplish in the best mode possible, and with the least expense, the complete security of this important part of our Union, the great object of our system of defence for the whole.

There are some other views of this subject which it is thought will merit particular attention in deciding the point in question. Not being able to establish a chain of posts, at least for the present, along the whole coast, from the Rigolets to Dauphin island, or on all the islands between them, at which point shall we begin? Should an attack on the city be anticipated, it can not be doubted that an adequate force would immediately be ordered there for its defence. If the enemy should despair of making an impression on the works near the town, it may be presumed that they would promptly decide to make the attempt in the manner, and in the line above suggested, between the Rigolets and the bay of Mobile. It will be obvious that the nearer the fortification is erected to the Rigolets, with a view to this subject, should it be on Cat or Ship island, for example, the wider would the passage be left open between that work and the bay of Mobile, for such an enterprise. The main army being drawn to New Orleans, would be ready to meet such an attempt near the Rigolets, or any other point not distant from the city. It is probable, therefore, that the enemy, profiting of a fair wind, would make his attempt at the greatest distance compatible with his object from that point, and at the bay of Mobile, should there not be works there of sufficient strength to prevent it. Should, however, strong works be erected there, such as were sufficient not only for their own defence against any attack which might be made on them, but to hold a force connected with that which might be drawn from the neighboring country, capable of co-operating with the force at the city, and which would doubtless be ordered to those works in the event of war, it would be dangerous for the invading force to land anywhere between the Rigolets and the bay of Mobile, and to pass toward the Mississippi above the city, lest such a body might be thrown in its rear as to cut off its retreat. These considerations show the great advantage of establishing, at the mouth of the bay of Mobile, very strong works, such as would be adequate to all the purposes suggested.

If fortifications were necessary only to protect our country and cities against the entry of large ships-of-war into our bays and rivers, they would be of little use for the defence of New Orleans, since that city can not be approached so near, either by the Mississippi or in any other direction, by such vessels, for them to make an attack on it. In the gulf, within our limits west of Florida, which has been acquired since these works were ⚫ decided on and commenced, there is no bay or river into which large shipsof-war can enter. As a defence, therefore, against an attack from such

vessels, extensive works would be altogether unnecessary, either at Mobile point or Dauphin island, since sloops-of-war only can navigate the deepest channel. But it is not for that purpose alone that these works are intended. It is to provide, also, against a formidable invasion, both by land and sea, the object of which may be to shake the foundation of our system. Should such small works be erected, and such an invasion take place, they would be sure to fall at once into the hands of the invaders, and to be turned against us.

Whether the acquisition of Florida may be considered as affording an inducement to make any change in the position or strength of these works, is a circumstance which also merits attention. From the view which I have taken of the subject, I am of opinion that it should not. The defence of New Orleans and of the river Mississippi, against a powerful invasion, being one of the great objects of such extensive works, that object would be essentially abandoned if they should be established eastward of the bay of Mobile, since the force to be collected in them would be placed at too great a distance to allow the co-operation necessary for those purposes, between it and that at the city. In addition to which, it may be observed, that by carrying them to Pensacola, or further to the east, that bay would fall immediately, in case of such invasion, into the hands of the enemy, whereby such co-operation would be rendered utterly impossible, and the state of Alabama would also be left wholly unprotected.

With a view to such formidable invasion, of which we should never lose sight, and of the great objects to which it would be directed, I think that very strong works at some point within the gulf of Mexico will be found indispensable. I think, also, that those works ought to be established at the bay of Mobile, one at Mobile point, and the other on Dauphin island, whereby the enemy would be excluded, and the complete command of that bay, with all the advantages attending it, be secured to ourselves. In the case of such invasion, it will, it is presumed, be deemed necessary to collect, at some point other than at New Orleans, a strong force, capable of moving in any direction, and affording aid to any part which may be attacked; and, in my judgment, no position presents so many advantages as a point of rendezvous for such force, as the mouth of that bay. The fortification at the Rigolets will defend the entrance by one passage into Lake Pontchartrain, and also into Pearl river, which empties into the gulf at that point. Between the Rigolets and Mobile bay, there are but two inlets which deserve the name, those at St. Louis and Pascagola, the entrance into which is too shallow even for the smallest vessels; and from the Rigolets to Mobile bay, the whole coast is equally shallow, affording the depth of a few feet of water only. Cat island, which is nearest the Rigolets, is about seven and a half miles distant from the coast, and thirty from the Rigolets. Ship island is distant about ten miles from Cat island, and twelve from the coast. Between these islands and the coast, the water

is very shallow.

As to the precise depth of water, in approaching those islands from the gulf, the report of the topographical engineers not having yet been received, it is impossible to speak with precision; but admitting it to be such as for frigates, and even ships-of-the-line to enter, the anchorage at both is unsafe, being much exposed to northwest winds. Along the coast, therefore, there is no motive for such strong works on our part; no town to guard; no inlet into the country to defend; and, if placed on the islands,