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tion;" and thus the compensation becomes, as it was doubtless intended to be, an acknowledgment of its National character. By the first draft of the Constitution, each State must have paid its own members, in accordance with the old rule of the "Confederation;" but, for the reason we have now given, a large majority of the States ultimately decided upon payment from the National treasury.

"The compensation," says Story, "is fixed with a liberal view to the National duties, and is paid from the National purse. If the compensation had been left to be fixed by the State Legislatures, the General Government would have become dependent upon the Governments of the States; and the latter could almost at their own pleasure have dissolved it. Serious evils were felt from this source under the Confederation, by which each State was to maintain its own delegates in Congress; for it was found that the States too often were operated upon by local considerations, as contradistinguished from general and National interests."

1 STORY'S Comm. Abridgment, 306.

ARTICLE I.

SECTION VII.-1. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.

Under the Confederation, the revenue was raised by requisitions upon each State. But the Constitution acts upon individuals, and not States. Its power, as De Tocqueville says, "is not borrowed, but self-derived." The right of orginating taxation rests therefore, as in our own House of Commons, exclusively with the representatives of the people.1

THE EXECUTIVE.

ARTICLE II.

SECTION 1.-1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows:

2. Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress. But no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.

An amendment of the Constitution, very exactly worded, provides that there must be a

1 Democracy in America, American edition, i. 137.

clear majority of the whole body of electors to constitute an election; and if this fail, the choice from among the three highest candidates is to fall upon the House of Representatives, where the votes are to be taken by States-one vote from each State; so that in this case the election would be more Federal than National-Rhode Island having the same power as the Empire State.

We see, then, that in the United States the choice of President is left, in the first instance, to the people in every State, voting in proportion to the population, by means of a double election. Our own Crown is at once elective and hereditary, for it is subject, by the Act of Settlement, to the consent of Parliament. The office of President differs from it principally in this, that it is vacated every four years, and that its occupant is chosen by the People, and its power controlled by their representatives. In all other respects the power of the President is not less than that of the English Crown; in one respect it is practically greater, because the legislative veto, being subject to reversal by the votes of

two-thirds of each House, has not fallen into desuetude, and its use becomes a sort of appeal to public opinion: thus, the very limit to its authority is an excuse for its exercise.

Under the old Confederation there was no President; and no part of the present Constitution more clearly marks the intentions of its framers to unite the American People as one Nation, than this appointment.1

There is no doubt that many of these arrangements were the result of compromise between

"They (the Convention) have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any pre-existing bodies of men who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. ** Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favour was ne

cessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice. All these advantages will be happily combined in the plan devised by the Convention, which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the National Government, who shall assemble within the State and vote for some fit person as President."-Federalist, No. 68.

the smaller and larger States, and yet they might have been the suggestion of the highest political wisdom. Complicated as they appear, they have been most efficient in their results. Take, for example, the mode of senatorial election. It forms the true conservative element in the Constitution. We quite agree with Mr. Spence in his approval of Mr. Seward's declaration, "That the Republic has been successful only by reason of the stability, strength, and greatness of the individual States." 1 We could say much the same for our own monarchy, inasmuch as our freedom, as a Nation, undoubtedly rests upon the broad basis of our municipal institutions. The constitution of the Senate satisfied the smaller States of the North, and the larger but less populous States of the South; and all have felt that in one branch of the Legislature, at least, they were upon an equality. necessity of vesting the legislative power in two Houses was rendered painfully evident by the experience of the Confederation. A resort to the same sources for both would

The American Union, 230.

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