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bold and original criticism of the authorities, and great lucidity of statement and arrangement, and is a mine of learning on all points connected with the creation of future interests in land or chattels personal. Mr. Gray's opinions have impressed themselves on the law of England in more cases than one. His views form part of the groundwork of the judgment of Byrne J. in Re Hollis's Hospital and Hague [1899] 2 Ch. 540, 552, and that of Farwell J. in Re Ashworth [1905] 1 Ch. 535, 546, though it must be admitted that in these particular instances there are some conveyancers who would question whether the learned judges were well advised in following Mr. Gray's lead. But although every conveyancer does not agree with Mr. Gray on these points, all must admit that he is one of the most learned and able living writers on the law of real property, that his work takes rank with the classical treatises on that branch of the law, and that he is a worthy successor to the 'men famous of old time'-to such authors as Mr. Fearne, Mr. Charles Butler, and Mr. Joshua Williams, A new edition of his book is most welcome,

The principal alteration in the second edition is the statement (p. 166, $ 201) of the rule against perpetuities itself in a new form. In the first edition the rule was stated thus :- No interest subject to a condition precedent is good unless the condition must be fulfilled, if at all, within twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." This, the author says, appears to be correct if we assume that condition' includes not only all uncertain future acts and events, but also all certain future events with the exception of preceding estates. But if we decline to make this assumption, and confine condition’ to uncertain future acts and events, then he propounds the rule against perpetuities in this shape: 'No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.' As an example of the kind of interest which has induced him so to alter his proposition, he cites an estate devised to A and his heirs to begin from a day fifty years after the testator's death-which is too remote, although the event on which it depends is certain to occur. It should be pointed out that the term 'vest' in the author's definition is used in a strict sense, denoting the moment when the future interest conferred emerges from the chrysalis state of 'possibility' into the butterfly existence of the true estate or interest which the common law would recognize as alienable property. It does not comprehend the kind (or spurious kind) of vesting which occurs when a gift is made of a transmissible contingent interest or even of a transmissible and indefeasible executory interest, such as a devise to A and his heirs from the end of ten years after the testator's death : see S$ 114, 118, pp. 87, 90; Fearne C. R. 559, 560.

Other interesting additions to the text of the first edition are the remarks (8$ 298 a—298 h, pp. 265-9) on the case of Whitby v. Mitchell, 44 Ch. D. 85, and on Mr. Charles Sweet's defence of the decision there given in the pages of this REVIEW (L. Q. R. xv. 71); and those dealing with the question of putting persons entitled in default of appointment to their election, where an appointment, void for remoteness, has been made to persons who are objects of the power (see $$ 561 a-f, pp. 432-6). On this point the learned author submits that the decision of Kekewich J. in Bradshaw v. Bradshaw (1902] 1 Ch. 436, is to be preferred to that of Farwell J. in Re Oliver's Settlement (1905] 1 Ch. 191, which was followed by Warrington J. in Re Beale's Settlement [1905] 1 Ch. 256. There is now added to the Appendix a reply to the criticisms of Sir Howard Elphinstone and the late Mr. Challis, published in this REVIEW (L. Q. R. ii. 394 ; iii. 403) on the author's statements in the first edition with respect to the effect of the statute of Quia Emptores in putting an end to determinable fees.

The Appendix also contains a reprint of the substance of the very interesting articles contributed by the author to the Harvard Law Review on Future Interests in Personal Property, General and Particular Intent in connexion with the Rule against Perpetuities, and Gifts to Indefinite Persons for Non-charitable Purposes. In the last of these he criticizes with considerable force the decision of North J. in Re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552. The first was originally prefaced by an amusing dialogue in Socratic form; and in the book this dialogue is happily preserved in a footnote for the delectation of all those who like, when they plunge into the stormy sea of remoteness of limitation, to hold fast on a saving sense of humour, In this context and with reference to the acuteness of the controversy waged in this REVIEW, and in Mr. Gray's book, over the origin and antiquity of the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, it may not be impertinent to relate the following anecdote, which the writer received from a very high authority, A learned counsel practising at the common law bar was retained (amongst others) to argue a case depending on the construction of a will of realty. A perusal of his brief had brought him little enlightenment as to the nature of the question involved. So at the consultation, with a laudable desire to increase his knowledge of the point at issue, he inquired, ‘But what do the other side say?' Oh!' said the instructing solicitor, 'they say that it isn't an executory devise at all; they maintain that it's a contingent remainder.' A look of horror and sadness overspread the inquirer's features, whilst he exclaimed, “Do they say that? The infernal scoundrels !'

T. C. W.

A Treatise on the Law of Evidence as administered in England and

Ireland, with Illustrations from Scotch, Indian, American, and other Legal Systems. By His Honour the late Judge PittTaylor. Tenth edition by W. E. HUME-WILLIAMS, K.C. Two volumes. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Lim. 1906. La. 8vo,

ccxlii and 1351 pp. (£3 38.) THE task of editing a famous textbook is not, perhaps, a very enheartening one, for, like the wine and bottles of Scripture, there seems to be some essential incongruity between new and old. Personally, we believe that whatever success is to be achieved in this direction must be sought, not in the English fashion of disguising the blend, but in the American of exbibiting it by brackets or otherwise as obviously as possible. The effect of the two methods is well exemplified in the present case, for whilst in the States the authority of Greenleaf on Evidence has been preserved intact through sixteen editions, here that of Taylor, whose work was taken almost bodily from it, runs the risk of gradually disappearing. We had hoped that some attempt to avert this might have been made in the present volumes, but from the numerous tests we have applied, it seems clear that they represent not the original Taylor restored and brought up to date, but merely the gth edition by Mr. Pitt-Lewis noted up, a very different thing. Thus s. 127 A of the present edition, copied verbatim from Mr. Pitt-Lewis, states, ' Another presumption of law is that arising from the possession of stolen property;' while s. 127 B states, “This presumption is in all cases one of fact,'—making nonsense of the rule. What Taylor wrote, however, was perfectly consistent, viz.: in s. 140 that • Possession of stolen property is prima facie evidence' of theft, &c., and in s. 141 that “This presumption is in all cases one of fact.' Another innovation which strikes us as by no means an improvement is the abolition of Taylor's headlines indicating the subject-matter of every page, and the substitution therefor of the bald title, “Taylor on Evidence,' somewhat copiously belied, it may be thought, throughout the work. It is not quite correct, therefore, to state, as is done in the preface, that • The original text has, as far as possible, been left untouched, and it is hoped, unspoiled.'

Apart from these features the general work of revision, no light task in a book of these dimensions, appears to have been very carefully and accurately done, as may be seen, e. g. in ss. 600 and 1691, where the views of Mr. Taylor as to the effect, respectively, of an acknowledgment by one of several partners, and of an unsatisfied judgment against joint and several debtors, have been duly corrected in the light of recent decisions. A commendable departure from Mr. Pitt-Lewis's scheme has also been made in abolishing the cumbrous double Table of Cases and reverting to the original and sensible plan of giving one set of casereferences in the footnotes. A great deal of fresh matter, accumulated since the last edition, has necessarily had to be added, notably that entailed by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898. Here, so far as we are aware, no important case has been omitted; but elsewhere this cannot truthfully be said. Thus, no reference appears to be made to Higgins v. Dawson (1902] A. C. 1, N. E. Ry. v. Hastings [1900] A. C. 260, Dashwood v. Magniac (1891) 3 Ch. 306, C. A., Olley v. Fisher, 34 Ch. D. 367, Re Seal (1894] 1 Ch. 316, or Cowen v. Truefitt (1899) 2 Ch. 309, as to the admission of parol evidence ; Allen v. Allen (1894) P. 248, as to cross-examination in divorce cases ; R. v. Gunnell, 16° Cox 154, C. C. R., as to evidence of knowledge; or Nash v. Ali Khan, 8 T. L. R. 444, as to oaths; while the recent decisions following Selwood v. Mildmay and Lindgren v. Lindgren might with advantage have been given under s. 122 2. R. v. Gloster, 16 Cox 471, is noticed, but for one only of the two points decided. The present editor doubts, apparently upon insufficient grounds, whether the rule against bastardizing offspring by statements as to non-access still exists (s. 637 n.); this rule, however, was expressly recognized both in the Aylesford Peerage case, 11 App. Cas. 1, and the Poulett Peerage case (1903] A. C. p. 399. He also queries the correctness of Johnson v. Lindsay, 53 J. P. 599, in which statements made by a workman after an accident were rejected as admissions against the master (s. 750 n.), remarking that it is difficult to see why the evidence was not admissible as part of the res gestae. But, the occurrence being over, the facts appear to fall directly within the authority of Agassiz v. Lond. Tram. Co., 27 L. T. 492, a case which, by the way, might usefully have been cited, where statements by a conductor were excluded on both grounds.

S. L. P.

Roman Private Law. By R. W. LEAGE. London: Macmillan & Co.,

, Lim. 1906. 8vo. xi and 429 pp. (108. net.) THIS work purports to give, as simply as possible, the subject-matter of the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, following, in the main, the original order of treatment.' It follows the usual lines of a college tutor's lectures at one of our Universities and supplies a distinct want, for hitherto Roman law students have had to choose between the fuller and more ambitious works of writers like Girard, Sohm, Moyle, and Hunter, and manuals of a scrappy and meagre character which are bluntly described as 'cram-books.'

Mr. Leage embodies in his work almost every topic which comes properly within its scope, and his treatment of every branch of the subject is clear and adequate, particularly of the branch relating to Obligations, which from an educational point of view is the most important of all.

The work, however, is not altogether free from blemishes. On pp. 129 and 159 Mr. Leage appears to confuse the title to fructus by perceptio with that by separatio, and to draw not the slightest distinction between the respective titles of the usufructuarius, the colonus, the emphyteuta and the bona fide possessor. His description (p. 266) of the borrower's obligation in mutuum to restore not the thing itself, but its equivalent in value' is too loose; one would not gather from it that the borrower was bound to restore things of the same generic kind equal to those borrowed in quality and quantity. On p. 348 he speaks of mutuuin as not based in any sense on consideration,' whereas the whole causa which made it enforceable at all was the valuable consideration of performance on one side. Roman law, of course, has no general notion answering to the .consideration of the Common Law; but if this was in the author's mind he should have been more explicit. Fideicommissa owed their legal origin not to custom as a source, p. 4, but, as Justinian clearly tells us, to the express enactment of Augustus (Ins. ii. 23), as our author himself recognizes on p. 225.

The classification of Ius Publicum under the headings 'Libertas, «Civitas,' and 'Familia,' is due, not as implied on p. 44, to modern civilians,' but to classical jurists like Paulus (see Dig. 4. 5. 1).

The statement on p. 320 that an obligation was dissolved when its object became impossible without the fault of the debtor is probably too wide, the discharge of an obligation in Roman law 'interitu rei’ being apparently limited, as suggested in the recent case of Krell v. Henry (1903] 2 K. B. 748, “to cases where performance of the contract becomes impossible by the cessation of the existence of the thing which is the subjectmatter of the contract.'

The genitive in the expression ‘furtum usus eius possessionisve' is usually now regarded as a genitive of respect, and the phrase is not now translated as on p. 323 theft of its use or possession.'

We would criticize also certain faults of arrangement. We should expect the subject of privileged wills, including the soldier's will, to be referred to under the heading, 'How wills are made' and not banished, without even a cross-reference, to a note eighty-three pages further on.

The edictum perpetuum of each Praetor was made up of edictum tralaticium and edictum novum, while there might be many edicta repentina. It is surely, therefore, a cross-division to divide the edicts of earlier times into (a) the edictum Perpetuum, (b) the edictum Repentinum, (c) the edictum Tralaticium, (d) the edictum Provinciale, &c. (p. 12).

So, too, we think the method of discharging an obligation 'ope exceptionis' should be contrasted rather than co-ordinated with the several methods of discharge ipso iure.

Oligation,' p. 274, should be added to the errata '; and the words ' is good without notice' (p. 315) should refer not to a negotiable instrument but to its assignment.

Notwithstanding, however, occasional inaccuracies and terminological inexactitudes, we think the work before us possesses considerable educational value, and sets forth in clear and simple language an excellent bird's-eye view of the whole field of Private Roman Law.

It will be gratefully welcomed by students who wish to acquire from an English textbook, contained within a reasonable compass, a sound and rational knowledge of the elements of the subject.

S. II. L.

Compotus Vicecomitis. Die Rechenschaftslegung des Sheriffs unter Heinrich II. von England. Von Prof. Dr. PAROW,

Berlin. 1906. 8vo. 62 pp. DR. Parow has founded his essay upon good materials. He has read with apparent care the Pipe Rolls of Henry II as printed by the Pipe Roll Society. He has made himself familiar with the Dialogus de Scaccario in its latest edition and with the classical work of Thomas Madox. The various essays of Mr. J. H. Round have not escaped him, and he has perused the Constitutional History of Bishop Stubbs. If he had added to his reading Mr. G. J. Turner's paper on the Sheriff's farm published in the 12th volume of the Transactions of the Royal Historical Society and certain portions of the Red Book of the Exchequer, he would have saved himself a good deal of work and avoided some errors. But with due allowance for the circumstances under which Dr. Parow has worked, it may be affirmed that he has used his materials well. His tract contains a clear and sufficient account of the constitution and working of the Excbequer of Henry II, and is a sure guide among the arithmetical intricacies of the audit of the sheriff's account. Here and there indeed an error may be noted, but in the main his results stand the test of comparison with those of other students. For instance in Dr. Parow's list of the farms of the counties only two amounts differ from those arrived at by Mr. Turner in the paper already mentioned. In one case Dr. Parow expresses a doubt of his own result; in the other (Essex and Hertfordshire) he has certainly fallen into an error; and no one who has tried the same path will wonder at it. The portion of the essay devoted to an attempt to extract from the Pipe Rolls evidence as to the financial condition of King Henry II is interesting, and has clearly cost much labour. Dr, Parow is so thoroughly aware that his results are only true within limits and do not afford a basis for comparison with modern times, that it is not necessary to discuss how far his results justify the labour expended upon them.

While the essay may be commended as a good general introduction to the subject, it must be allowed that it contains too many small errors, English mediaeval law and institutions outside the special subject of the paper seem unfamiliar to the author. Some of the following corrigenda will illustrate this characteristic. P, 8, it is impossible to accept the suggestion that the Treasurer and Chancellor were paid by the revenues of estates appropriated for that purpose. P. 24, Dr. Parow's printer, who has not served him well, has made nonsense of the arithmetic. P. 30, 'Perreton' is in Somerset, not in Dorset. P. 32, It is not essential to an honour that it should extend over several counties; instances to the contrary could be given. P. 43 n.: There is nothing romantic in the transaction described. Comitissa, a Jewess of Cambridge, married her son to an unnamed Jewess of Lincoln without the King's licence; and all the parties to the transaction made fine for their share in it. Possibly Dr. Parow had been misled by the unusual name. P. 51: Cambitores are the king's moneyers, not exchangers as Dr. Parow suggests. P. 54, the phrase "das nicht verteilte folcland' was written by one who had not known Dr. Vinogradoff; but it is fair to say that the ager publicus? theory persists in some quite recent English publications whose authors or editors should have known better. On the same page socage is defined as tenure by labour services; and in several places we read of two kinds of serjeanties great and little, On consideration Dr. Parow would probably

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