it is usually the photographer who solicits a sitting, and when he does, and the 'celebrity' grants it, the copyright belongs-speaking generally-to the photographer: the popular actress tripping upstairs and dropping into a chair does not make the photograph one taken for or on behalf of' her for a good or valuable consideration' within the meaning of s. 1 of the Fine Art Copyright Act of 1882 (Ellis v. Horace Marshall & Son, 64 L. J., Q. B. 757). But a little more trouble taken may, as Stackemann v. Paton [1906] 1 Ch. 774 shows, turn the scale and constitute a 'good' consideration-'good' and 'valuable' in the section being, it seems, not synonymous-and give the copyright to the sitter. A travelling photographer calls at a school and offers to take photographs of the school' entirely at his own risk,' meaning thereby that the schoolmaster need not take any copies unless he likes. The schoolmaster, wishing to have photographs of the school, permits the photographer to go all over the premises, collects the boys for groups, indicates the points of view he wants taken, and generally renders every assistance he can, and when the photographs are finished he takes £15 worth. Afterwards the schoolmaster sends some of the photographs for reproduction in the well-known work-Paton's List of Schools.' The photographer registers the photograph and sues Paton for infringement of his copyright. Was it his, or was the photograph taken for or on behalf of the schoolmaster for a good or valuable consideration'? Farwell J. (now L. J.) has held that in such a case the schoolmaster permitting the photographer to go all over the house, and otherwise assisting and superintending the process, does constitute a 'good consideration.' Schoolmasters-and a fortiori schoolmistresses-might very well object to a photographer having the right to sell photographs of their school premises and domestic arrangements without their consent. At the same time they are not likely to withhold their consent to the photographer making a profit by the sale of photographs redounding to their credit. We have only to regret that the object of the Act was not attained by the use of language consistent with the ordinary usage of lawyers. Except in the one case, we believe, of a covenant to stand seised, the general law knows nothing of any difference between 'good' and ' valuable' consideration.

Dr. Gross has reprinted from the Quarterly Journal of Economics (Harvard) an interesting article on the Court of Piepowder, which seems to contain everything that is known. There is one small injustice to Spelman, and possibly to Cowell also. Spelman should not have been named among the writers who erroneously believed the

Court of Piepowder to be so called ' because justice was administered as speedily as the dust could fall or be removed from the feet of the litigants.' In fact Spelman correctly says that 'pieds pouldreux' 'transeuntes significat, et vagabundos, qui ideo pedes minus tersos habent sed pulvere squallentes.' Neither are we sure what Cowell's belief was, for his language is exceedingly confused, but we suspect that Coke's confident blunder may have arisen from a misunderstanding of Cowell. This, however, is of no importance. Dr. Gross plausibly suggests that the Courts of Piepowder, being many and frequently held, not only had much to do with the development of the law merchant in England, but were not without influence on the introduction of proof by witnesses in the superior

courts.

In the current Law List thirty-seven Mahometan members of the Bar are indexed under Khan': which is just as if an Indian clerk should index a number of English barristers under Esquire.' The fact that Moslems have no family names makes it, no doubt, rather troublesome to find the best index order for them; but surely it is not a reason for subordinating their names to a mere honorific affix which is not a name at all.

It seems convenient to repeat in a conspicuous place that it is not desirable to send MS. on approval without previous communication with the Editor, except in very special circumstances; and that the Editor, except as aforesaid, cannot be in any way answerable for MSS. so sent.

THE

THE KATHIAWAR JURISDICTION CASES1.

HE record of the arguments on which these two appeals were founded, and of the reasons upon which the Privy Council dismissed them, is of some interest, historically and politically. It illustrates the complicated relations still existing between the British Empire and the subordinate Native States in India, and the curious forms of divided sovereignty that have grown up out of the condition of certain parts of the country at the time when our dominion was established. Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century the Maratha power was still predominant in central and western India. The Maratha armies had overrun and brought into subjection a number of minor principalities, from which they were content to exact tribute, leaving the hereditary chiefs otherwise in possession. In Kathiawar they had found a group of very petty chiefships, which were made over to the special management of the Gaekwar, one of their principal military leaders, who collected the tribute, and, after reserving for himself a substantial share, accounted for the surplus to the Peshwa as the supreme head of, or at least the predominant partner in, the Maratha confederation.

In the first years of the nineteenth century the British and the Maratha powers came into decisive collision. The Maratha armies were defeated in the field; the Maratha confederation was dissolved, and the Peshwa, with the other leading confederates, acknowledged the British supremacy. The Peshwa ceded all his revenue rights in Kathiawar to the British Government, on whom devolved, in consequence, the duty of arranging the relations between the Gaek war and the tributary chiefships. It was impossible, if peace and order were to be preserved, to abandon them to the mercy of their Maratha overlord, with whom they were incessantly quarrelling over the revenue demands, which had always been levied on the general rule of taking as much as could be got. So in a series of transactions extending from 1807 to 1820 the British authorities interfered as arbitrators, fixed the payments to be made by each chief to the Gaekwar, withdrew all these domains from his jurisdiction, and placed them under the protection of the supreme British power, to whom all future disputes were to be referred. The process was the reverse of what was done in Germany

1 Hemchand Derchand v. Azam Sakarlal Chhotamlal and Taluka of Kotda-Sangani v. State of Gondal, L. R. 33 Ind. App. 1, [1906] A. C. 212.

at nearly the same period, after Napoleon's wars had broken up the ancient constitution of the Empire. There the petty jurisdictions and miscellaneous principalities of the lesser sort were mediatized— that is, they were absorbed into, and made subject to, the larger independent kingdoms and electorates; they were no longer directly under the superior sovereignty of the Emperor. In India we immediatized the chiefships, we set aside the intermediate domination of the Marathas; and we placed them directly under the British protectorate, liable only for the payment, through the Imperial treasury, of the sums which had been settled as the proper tribute due to the Gaekwar. Our policy was to safeguard and strengthen the independence of these subordinate States, securing them as our clients, and limiting at the same time the power of the Marathas.

But the management of this little cluster of States in Kathiawar was found to be particularly troublesome. They quarrelled interminably among themselves over boundaries and rights; the internal disputes about succession and the division of hereditary property were perpetual; they were often heavily in debt to money-lenders, the chiefs were incapable of administering the police or of doing justice tolerably. The supreme government was forced to interfere for the regulation of these matters up to a decent level of efficiency. To leave these patches of territory, which are mere spots on the broad enveloping area of British India, without any definite guidance or superior direction that might abate misrule and confusion, would have been to allow them to fall into ways that eventually lead a native State to destruction. Native opinion in India, which is inordinately suspicious, has more than once hinted that the British Government stands aside while a State's internal affairs go from bad to worse, until incurable dilapidation leaves no remedy but annexation. It was the object of the Government to preserve as well as to protect these chiefships. Political agents were appointed to act as judges, to hold courts, and to apply British law so far as it was applicable to the circumstances. They heard appeals, decided knotty legal points to the best of their ability, introduced regular procedure, and in criminal cases modified barbarous sentences and checked injustice and corrupt practices. They did their best, in fact, to shape litigation and judicial procedure after the model of the system prevailing in British India. The final appeals lay to the Governor in Council of Bombay, and ultimately to the Secretary of State for India in Council.

In the cases now reported the appellants were dissatisfied with the decisions of the Bombay Government, and claimed, as of right, that their appeals should be heard by the Privy Council. Their first plea was that Kathiawar was not foreign territory at all, that

certain acts, orders, and transactions on the part of the British authorities effectually proved that it had been regarded and dealt with as British territory. But this argument failed, because the evidence of formal declarations proved that the country was not included within the boundaries of British India. Secondly, they pleaded that the Courts of the Political Agents were British Courts exercising jurisdiction in Kathiawar, that they were set up by the King, like any other Courts, so that an appeal from their orders lay to the King's Council. Here again it was proved that these Courts had been established by a compact between the chiefs and the British political authorities, that they were introduced by a simple notification of the executive government, that this was no more than a measure of political expediency, by which the chiefs were induced to make over to the superior power certain departments of administration, reserving other departments equally important, such as the police, the collection of revenue, and the coinage. In short, we have here an example of divided sovereignty; and the Privy Council has rightly determined that the cession of some attributes by a ruler in no way involves his forfeiture of the whole.

It is fortunate that the judgment was delivered by a member of the Privy Council whose Indian experience enabled him to unravel and lay out the true character of these Kathiawar jurisdictions, their origin and historical evolution, because the decision is of real political importance, not so much to the British Government as to the native chiefs throughout India. The appellants contended that for many years past the British Government had interfered in these territories to an extent sufficient to show that it had practically assumed sovereignty in Kathiawar, whereby the chiefs had been reduced to the status of mere heads of villages entrusted with a limited jurisdiction under British supervision; that the GovernorGeneral had used his prerogative to bring the country by various acts and measures within British India, and had effectively done so.

This is indeed a doctrine fraught with peril to all the Native States of India. The British dominion has been extended by various methods, and on diverse principles of policy; but the process of annexing independent territory by the pacific penetration of British law and procedure has not hitherto been counted among them. The Courts were established in Kathiawar for the purpose of preserving the States from suicidal mismanagement. To use them as instruments of absorption, as evidence that the chiefs, by assigning to their political superior certain attributes of sovereignty, had virtually surrendered all the rest, would have been regarded by the chiefs as a flagrant breach of the original compact, and by all the Native States in India as an indefensible stratagem. It would