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rule. The authority which definitely decides the point, Syers v. Metropolitan Board of Works, is given on p. 672 in illustration of a sub-rule, but no special attention is drawn to the words which settle the main rule.
The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, fills the first volume. The second volume is occupied by other Acts dealing with compensation, and some useful appendices of forms, &c. The annotation of these Acts is not always so full as it might be, for instance, take the notes on the Parliamentary Deposits and Bonds Act, 1892. We have noticed one or two other peculiarities. Raleigh v. Goschen (1898) 1 Ch. 73 is dealt with on p. 1073. Not only is the reference wrong, but it cannot be said that the synopsis of the case there given conveys much idea of the decision. This is an instance where some of the abundant space bestowed elsewhere might usefully have been employed. The case of Blundell v. R.  1 K. B. 516 and the kindred cases should have been cited in the notes to the Defence Act, 1842, rather than in the notes to the Ranges Act, 1891. The only other reference which we looked up in the Index contained an error, Light Railways Costs Rules, 1898...856' instead of 956.
But the book is one of great labour and appears to be generally accurate. It will, no doubt, be of service to those persons to whom we have already referred.
Outlines of the Law of Torts. By RICHARD RINGWOOD. Fourth
Edition. London : Stevens & Haynes. 1906. 8vo. lii and
320 pp. (108. 6d.) MR. RINGWOOD has at least one qualification for writing for students, namely, the ability to eliminate relatively unimportant details from the exposition of general principles. Moreover Outlines of the Law of Torts' has not been spoiled in re-editing, as many textbooks are, by the anxiety of the editor to include references to all recent cases without con. sidering whether or not they help to elucidate general principles so as to come within the proper scope of an elementary work. Agreeably with his methods Mr. Ringwood has set forth the effect of the Allen v. Flood and Quinn v. Leathem group of cases with commendable clearness and caution. He might, however, have cited Tarleton v. McGawley (1 Peake, N. P.C. 270; 3 R. R. 689) and Garrett v. Taylor (Cro. Jac. 567) in support of a proposition which he deduces with some misgivings from dicta in Allen v. Flood.
It is to be regretted that he classes the group of wrongs illustrated by these cases with maintenance and malicious prosecution under the title of 'malicious injuries. Having done so he has to get rid of the basis of his classification by explaining that it is not necessary to prove 'malice in fact or actual malice. It is time we heard the last of 'malice in fact' and malice in law. But, if we are to have a group of malicious injuries,' it is bard to understand why libel and slander are not included in it. As to maintenance, the author leaves it to be in ferred, though he does not in words assert, that actual malice is a necessary part of the cause of action.
The chapter on Negligence is not satisfactory. The author begins by laying it down that just as each man must use his own property in such a way as not to do any damage to his neighbours, so it is the duty of every one to use such care in his daily life and in the conduct of his business as an ordinarily careful man would use in order to avoid doing harm to or bringing loss upon another person.' Surely this statement, made without indicating any kind of exception, is much too wide. It
makes the duty to take care universal and unqualified.
It is even worse than Lord Esher's famous dictum in Heaven v. Pender. There is a suggestion under the heading 'whom to sue’ that there are some circumstances in which negligence resulting in damage to another is not actionable : but no beginner reading the chapter would realize that the foundation of every action for negligence is a breach of a duty to take care and that such a duty is not universal. The law of negligence can never be made clear until the learner has grasped this elementary proposition. Nearly all recent cases on negligence and many of the older ones have turned upon the question whether in the particular circumstances there is a duty to take care.
The Annual Digest of Reported Decisions during the Year 1905. By John
Mews. 1906. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Lim.; Stevens
& Sons, Lim. 8vo. xvi and 396 pp. (158.) The Yearly Digest of Reported Cases for the Year 1905. Edited by
G. R. Hill. 1906. London: Butterworth & Co. 8vo. lxx
and 418 pp. (158.) THE Annual Digest is a digest of all the reported decisions of the Superior Courts, including a selection from the Scottish and Irish. It gives references to the Law Reports, the Law Journal Reports, the Law Times Reports, the Weekly Reporter, the Times Law Reports, Aspinall's Maritime Cases, Commercial Cases, Cox's Criminal Cases, Local Government Cases, Manson's Reports, Smith's Registration Cases-and also to Court of Justiciary Cases, Court of Session Cases, and Irish Reports. It is still thought necessary to continue the practice of placing the reference to the Law Journal before the reference to the Law Reports; but this practice is surely not justified by the fact that the publishing firms responsible for the digest, or one of them, have or has an interest in the Law Journal Reports. The Yearly Digest gives references to some other Scottish Reports, to all the English Reports referred to in the other digest, to the Irish Reports, to the Reports of Patent Cases and to M’Namara’s Railway and Canal Cases.
The Yearly Digest properly gives the first reference to the Law Reports. In the Table of Cases the Annual gives only the plaintiff's name alphabetically; the Yearly gives alphabetically the names of both plaintiffs and defendants. There are many points of similarity in the two digests. Each has a table of cases overruled, considered, &c. The Annual alone refers to the Statutes passed in the year 1905, but the Yearly, on the other hand, has lists of the statutes, rules and orders referred to in the digested cases.
There is in fact little to choose between the two digests. Each of them ignores the cases which only appear in the Weekly Notes, the Law Journal's Notes of Cases, the Law Times' Notes of Cases not reported, and the Solicitor's Journal.
If in England there are cases, not reported or noted in the Law Reports or Weekly Notes, which are worthy of notice, one might as well have the whole lot, and to the editors and publishers of both digests we offer the suggestion that references should be given at any rate to those cases which appear in the Weekly Notes and Solicitors' Journal, but are not reported in, say, the Law Reports or Law Journal.
Company Precedents, for use in relation to Companies subject to the
Companies Acts 1862 to 1900. Part I, with Copious Notes and
Stevens & Sons, Lim. cii and 1708 pp.
• Doth bestride the world
Like a colossus.' We are all shareholders or debentureholders, if we are not directors, of companies. Our Law Reports are full of company cases, our newspapers, financial and other, are ceaselessly recording the doings of companies and announcements of new issues ; in fact, nothing short of a volume of the magnitude of this latest edition of Company Precedents suffices to cope with all the varied developments and activities of joint-stock enterprise at home and abroad. It is instructive to compare it with the modest volume which Mr. Palmer first offered to the public on the subject, nearly thirty years ago now. This new edition fully sustains its author's reputation. We never look for guidance without finding it. Forms and cases and notes-the fruits of unique knowledge and ripe experience-all combine to smooth the practitioner's path.
The Care of Ancient Monuments ; an Account of the Legislation and
other Measures adopted in European Countries for protecting Ancient Monuments and Objects and Scenes of Natural Beauty, and for Preserving the Aspect of Historical Cities. By BALDWIN Brown. Cambridge: University Press. 1905. 8vo. xii and Chelsea, a row of picturesque old-world cottages which recently attracted public attention, furnishes a case in point. Every one must regret their disappearance; but no one would advocate that they should be the subject of legislation, and few would be ready to acquire them at the price which the value of the site would dictate. For the purpose of legislation ‘monument' must obviously bave a restricted sense; but for the purpose of describing the outcome, in all forms, of the interest recently aroused in the evidences of the historic continuity of a country, Professor Baldwin Brown is right in giving the more extended meaning to the term.
It will be seen from Professor Baldwin Brown's title that he covers wide ground. The term monument,' as he uses it,'embraces all old buildings and other memorials of bygone days.' He admits that attempts to find an exact definition of the expression for the purposes of such conservative movements as those he describes have failed, and for a very obvious reason. The impulse to protect such monuments as Stonehenge derives its force not so much from analytical antiquarianism as from the desire to preserve the interesting features of a country, however produced. The effect on the mind of a scene of natural sublimity is similar to the effect of one of the grand monuments of antiquity. Thus the movement tends to embrace purely natural objects,-as exemplified by The National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty,'—while on the other hand it must logically extend to movable objects, such as are preserved in museums, and cannot wholly ignore the large class of 'humble domestic relics,' 'town houses, country cottages, street fountains, rustic bridges, and the like,' which though beneath the notice of any official inventory go to maintain the character of a scene,—that general aspect, which in relation to a town the Germans have christened ‘das Stadtbild. As one descends in the scale of importance, the difficulty of preservation naturally increases. A country must be adapted to the needs of its inhabitants from time to time; and many things which have a charm, perhaps as interesting specimens of construction, perhaps purely from age, must go, unless the proprietor of his own free will chooses to keep them. Paradise Row,
There can be no question that in this work we have the most complete statement that has yet appeared, both of legislative, of executive, and of purely voluntary action, in relation to the care of monuments. The movement is indeed so alive that every year furnishes new matter for the chronicler. Some eight years ago, at the instance of the National Trust, the Foreign Office obtained information as to the position of the question in the principal European countries. Since then Ancient Monument Acts, giving definite powers of compulsory acquisition, have been passed in Italy and Hesse-Darmstadt, the whole German movement has, in a definite shape, taken its rise, and, in our own country, legislation has been greatly extended and local action authorized. Prof. Baldwin Brown, after discussing the various questions which arise in connexion with his subject, gives a careful and detailed account not only of the state of the law, but of the expressions of organized public opinion, in each European State. And in this connexion he makes the pregnant remark, that while the historic sense finds more vivid expression as countries become more highly civilized, legislation at the same time becomes more difficult. Side by side with the desire to preserve the country's monuments grows the jealousy of interference with private property, and that restraint on iconoclasm which is accomplished by a stroke of the pen in a despotic State is only provided in a free country after infinite exertion, to a limited extent, and in a modified form. If we read Prof. Baldwin Brown aright, the only countries in which a clear right of expropriation-the key of the position-exists are France, Italy, Hungary and Hesse-Darmstadt; but on the other hand there are farreaching • Decrees' in other places, and in Germany there are local regulations of some stringency in particular towns, such as Hildesheim, Nuremberg, Rothenburg, and Bamberg. In point of State expenditure, France still shows the way, its average budget allowing for some £50,000; while in one year no less than £120,000 were voted. Our own Estimates for this year contain an item of £12,500 for the Maintenance and Protection of Ancient Monuments,' but it may be suspected that the major part of this sum is expended on the care and management of actual State buildings such as the Tower. The salary of the Inspector of Ancient Monuments seems to have disappeared and we fear that the office is not filled.
On the whole, Prof. Baldwin Brown's wide survey of the subject shows a . steady growth of public opinion, and is encouraging both from the artistic and from the historic point of view.
The Law of Money-lending, Past and Present. By JOSEPH BRIDGES
MATTHEWS. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Lim. 1906. 8vo.
xvi and 141 pp. (58.) This is a good little book, scholarly in the historical part and workmanlike in the practical. Mr. J. B. Matthews is, naturally enough, exercised by
the difficulty of knowing what is the criterion of terms being “harsh and unconscionable.' He would find it instructive to consult the line of Indian cases which we have more than once mentioned here: Mackintosh v. Hunt (1877) I. L. R. 2 Cal. 202, and Mackintosh v. Wingrove (1878) I. L. R. 4 Cal. 137, show precisely the difference between a fraudulent bargain in which there is disguise and oppression, and a hard but open bargain which is fully understood and accepted : and see the references collected in the notes to the Indian Contract Act, ed. Pollock and Mulla, pp. 74–76.
At p. 61 Mr. Matthews cites an unreported case from his own practice; the statement, as he vouches for it, is of course quotable in Court. The burden of counsel and solicitors would be rather seriously increased if statements of this kind became common in textbooks. We are far from saying that, having regard to the present scantiness and uncertainty of authority on the Money-lenders Act, Mr. Matthews was not justified in the present instance.
The Law of Repairs and Improvements, including Ecclesiastical Dilapida
tions. By J. H. JACKSON. London: Butterworth & Co. 1905.
8vo. xlix and 318 pp. Index 56 pp. (158.) This book, as may be judged by its title, covers a wide ground. It is very well done as a whole, and the cases are collected under convenient heads. The few signs of lack of care in revision are no doubt due to Mr. Jackson's business engagements. Perhaps the most curious sentence is the following: 'A delay in reinstating disrepair due to fire, .may be waste : on the other hand, no responsibility attaches for acts of God, such as lightning.' As a general rule, however, the result of the cases is stated with clearness and accuracy. We should like to add that we do not read Woodhouse v. Walker (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 404 as laying down that an omission to repair by a tenant for life is a tort, but that a devisee for life, upon whom an express obligation to repair is imposed by the will, commits a breach of the statutory duty created by the statutes of Marlbridge and of Gloucester under the circumstances. The view that an action at the common law must rest in contract or in tort can not now be treated as correct. It is clear that Kay J. in In re Cartwright, Avis v. Newman (1889) 41 Ch. D. 532, read the language used in Woodhouse v. Walker as referring to a breach of a statutory duty.
We have also received:
The Arbiter in Council. London: Macmillan & Co., Lim. 8vo. vi and 567 pp.—This is not a law-book, and not much of it is directly within our scope. But it contains the work of some one who is obviously learned and more than commonly learned in the law. We doubt whether the dialogue form in which the book is cast represents any real plurality; but, assuming the existence of cultivated laymen A. B. and C. D., more or less like some of the fictitious persons, there is an E. F. who knows not only Selden but West's 'Symboleography,' and who has made a special study of the Reformation controversies, the early Puritans and Quakers, and international law and arbitration. Lawyers, therefore, will find here some very pretty and scholarly recreation. The only defect we have noted is that in the chapter on 'Private War and the Duel 'Mr. George Neilson's *Trial by Combat,' the very best monograph, is omitted from the list of authorities, with the result of making the exposition less clear than might be wished as to the fundamental distinction between the earlier trial by