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by a stranger not interested in the administration the conclusion may be different, but as between receiver and debentureholders the equity is all in favour of the receiver. It would be most unfortunate if, as Lord Halsbury said in Strapp v. Bull, 'those who take upon themselves the burden of receivership and management should be left to speculate whether or not they would ever be paid anything.'

The decision of Farwell J. in the case of Nisbet and Potts' Contract (see L. Q. R. xxi. 105) has been unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeal (1906] 1 Ch. 386, 75 L. J. Ch. 238. We may therefore take it as settled that an intruder on land of which the true owner is bound by restrictive covenants is no less subject to the burden of those covenants than if he were a purchaser from the owner with notice.

This is plain good sense. We are also to understand from the reasons of the Court that, whatever Lord Cottenham may have thought when he decided Pulk v. Moxhay, the effect of such covenants is to create a right in the nature of a negative easement binding, though it still seems we should not say running with, the land in equity. This may perhaps afford matter for discussion among equity lawyers in their spare moments.

To say that Urban cannot expect to enjoy the same repose as Sylvanus or the Bermondsey dweller the quiet of Belgravia is almost a truism. Persons living in a civilized community must have their rights conditioned by their surroundings. The real difficulty is in determining how much annoyance in the shape of smoke, smell, or noise must be put up with before it amounts to a legal nuisance. Rushmer v. Polsue & Alfieri, Lim. [1900] 1 Ch. 234, 75 L. J. Ch. 79, C. A., is a good illustration. It was at No. 10 Gough Square, Fleet Street—then probably one of the peacefullest retreats in London--that Dr. Johnson composed his Dictionary. To-day the Great Lexicographer,' as Miss Pinkerton used to call him, would find himself, like the innocent milkman at No. 8, hemmed in by printing works whirring, banging, and thumping with demonic energy all day, and some all night. The climax was reached when the defendants in the case set up a new machine next door which ran at night, driven by an electric motor, and turned out from 1,400 to 1,500 impressions per hour. But at what precise point-this is the difficulty—is the Court in such cases to say that the annoyance has culminated, and the reasonable limit of human endurance passed ? The plaintiff is surrounded by half a dozen printing works. Peradventure there shall be a seventh printing business set up, is that a nuisance? Peradventure there shall be an eighth, does that make a nuisance ? No doubt the true criterion is the old one of Knight Bruce L.J., the normal man of average susceptibility-not a Carlyle, driven to frenzy by the buzzing of a blue-bottle-not a Wellington or Marlborough with nerves of iron. But how are we to fix the normal type ?

In Re Bourne (1906] 1 Ch. 113, 75 L. J. Ch. 36, an ingenious attempt was made to limit the rule of Re Langmead's Trusts, 20 Beav. 20, 7 D. M. G. 353—namely, that a surviving partner is in the position of a trustee with power to sell and give receipts, and a purchaser from him may rely on his receipt unless he has actual notice of an intention to misapply the money-to dispositions of personal property. The Court rejected this distinction, for which no principle and a very slender show of authority was produced, and held that the rule included an equitable mortgage of partnership real estate by deposit of title-deeds. No reference was made to the language of the Partnership Act: there is certainly nothing in it to give countenance to the unsuccessful argument. It was also held without difficulty that the mortgagee has priority over the lien of the deceased partner's executors.

So many companies, besides those formally dissolved are under the present system summarily struck off the register as defunct for not making returns, that the practice as to getting in the legal estate often outstanding in such companies, ought to be well settled ; and so it would be but for the difficulty caused by the decision of Buckley J. in In re Taylor's Agreement Trusts (1904] 2 Ch. 737, 73 L. J. Ch.557. That learned judge could not bring himself to say that a dissolved company is a trustee who cannot be found.' Are not such companies, by the way, frequently found, resuscitated, and reinstated on the register under s. 7 of the Companies Act, 1880 ? In a recent case, In re No. 9 Bomore Road (1906] 1 Ch. 359, 75 L. J. Ch. 157, the point has again turned up, and Warrington J. has followed the two decisions of Farwell J., Re General Accident Assurance Corporation (1904] i Ch. 147, 73 L. J. Ch. 84, and Re Richard Mills 8. Co. [1905] W. N. 36, in preference to that of Buckley J., distinguishing the latter on the ground that what was vested in the dissolved company there was a patent which might well be considered to have disappeared altogether. No critic of Buckley J.'s decision seems to have noticed that the application made to him was simply for a vesting order under s. 35 of the Trustee Act, 1893: he was not asked to appoint a new trustee under s. 25. He had therefore only to deal with the language of s. 35, and on a strict construction of that language his

decision seems perfectly correct. When a new trustee is appointed

as expedient' under s. 25, as was done in the cases before Farwell and Warrington JJ., a vesting order is consequential, and no difficulty arises.

The Columbia Law Review for March contains a vigorous and acute criticism of the Free Church of Scotland case by Francis B. Lowell. He charges, in effect, that the House of Lords discussed at large every dogmatic and historical question at all connected with the case except the true construction of the actual governing documents, and every kind of opinion except that of the persons who were the actual donors of the funds in question. We extract a few sentences. To ascertain the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland concerning predestination, Lord Halsbury had recourse to the so-called Synod of Jerusalem in 1672. This Synod represented the Eastern Church in whole or in part, and the Council of Constantinople of 1642, upon which also he relied, appears to have been a similar body. To deduce the doctrine of Scotch Presbyterians from the pronouncement of a Synod of the Orthodox Greek Church, is as extraordinary as would be an ascertainment of the Anglican doctrine of the Eucharist from the decrees of the Council of Trent or from the Institutes of Calvin. With these somewhat unusual notions of ecclesiastical authority in the Church of Scotland, it is not surprising that Lord Halsbury should find differences of opinion where a theologian of training more occidental would fail to discover them.'

It seems convenient to repeat in a conspicuous place that it is not desirable to send MS. on approval without previous communication with the Editor, except in very special circumstances ; and that the Editor, except as aforesaid, cannot be in any way answerable for MSS. 80 sent.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE HIGH COURT

AND THE COUNTY COURTS.

THE
THE County Courts Act, 1903—the sixteenth of its kind-

extends the jurisdiction of these Courts from £50 to £100. Progressives would bave preferred to remodel upon a broad and liberal scale an institution which, in spite of many drawbacks and much ill-treatment, has proved itself of inestimable value. They would have thrown its doors wide open. Authority was content that things should remain as they were. The result was a compromise, and its doors were opened a few additional inches.

Those who would study in detail the interesting story of the origin and development of these Courts should consult the excellent pamphlet on the Evolution of the County Court by His Honour Judge Sir Thomas Snagge, LL.D., which gives the fullest information on this subject in the clearest and most concise form.

For the purpose of this article it is not necessary to do more than glance at their early history.

In 1842–6 the cry for simple, speedy, and cheap justice, long heard had become troublesome, and something had to be done.

Each age has its limitations. It was impossible in those days (it was very difficult twenty-five years later) to remodel the elaborate machinery by which the superior Courts of Westminster and Lincoln's Inn majestically settled the disputes of the wellto-do. The numerous interests, whose pleasant pasture-grounds would probably have been disturbed by any change, were far too powerful to be rashly interfered with. So the line of least resistance was taken, and few persons of importance were found to object to a vast addition being made to the existing official patronage—for, from such an overflowing table, crumbs of various sizes might be reasonably expected to fall.

So the old County Courts and Courts of Request went their way, and in 1847 the County Courts' of our time came into existence with the not unforeseen result that the Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, was given a profusion of immediate patronage, including sixty County Court Judgeships, such as has not fallen to the lot of any Lord Chancellor before or since' (Evolution of the County Court, p. 12).

From then until now two systems, each striving with more or less success to accomplish the same end—the prompt and cheap administration of justice, have been at work side by side throughout the kingdom. Two administrative machines, differing in name, design, and countless details. One labelled 'superior,' a brand conspicuously stamped on itself, its officials, and its procedure; the other marked 'inferior,' and that distinction carefully maintained and emphasized in every way.

Each machine thoroughly equipped, the former lavishly, the latter with a thriftier hand. Each doing its allotted work well, with abundant zeal, skill, and care, and with as much speed as its intricate construction permits.

Looking back from the standpoint of 1906, the handiwork of 1847 seems open to criticism. But it was the best that was then possible. It was never universally admired. Some thought it was conceived and founded in error. What connexion, they asked, was there between a money limit and justice? Is there a ratio between money values and legal difficulties ? A claim for £5 or £20 might, and frequently does, give rise to points as subtle and difficult of solution as one involving millions. Moreover to all suitors their own special 'law business' is of paramount interest and importance. Have not all an equal right to claim that whether the contest be for little or much—for £10 or £11ồ-the same care and skill shall be applied to its determination ? Half a loaf may be better than no bread, but 'inferior' justice is, or may be, injustice.

Then why these labels and this double machinery? In connexion with this matter the Times, in an article on November 17, 1897, wrote as follows:

'Here arises a question that cannot fail to come to the front. The whole theory of the separation between the jurisdictions of the High Court and the County Courts is founded on the assumption that there is a remarkable difference between the qualifications of the judges of the two tribunals--all the fine wheat being collected in London, the coarser grain sent to the provinces. In the best days of the Common Law Bar few excellent lawyers could be got to retire, perhaps to some remote county, for £1,500 a year. Things are now somewhat different. Among the County Court judges are men of great legal attainments and experience, who would be fit to sit in any tribunal. ... It is not clear why, to name one case out of several in point, the judge of the Westminster County Court should be unfit to be entrusted with original jurisdiction for the trial of libel, or slander, or title to land, or claims over £50, if other judges not more able have jurisdiction as to these matters.'

These questions are indeed coming very much to the front.

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