Mr. F. J. Coltman, and on Allotments and Small Holdings' by Mr. W. Addington Willis. This last contains an admirable and complete account of the various kinds of allotments under sundry Acts, ranging from the Poor Relief Act, 1601, to the Local Government Act, 1904. It contains a few slips, due to insufficiently following out the operation of the last-named Act upon the earlier Acts in transferring powers of the old authorities to the new, but these are not of a character to be seriously misleading. A work such as this is necessarily somewhat incomplete. So much of the law is statutory that no exposition of it can be quite satisfactory unless the statutes are set out in full. Paraphrases are in their nature unsatisfying. Moreover, in a branch of the law in which every year there are many new statutes and decisions a book must soon get out of date, and it can hardly be expected that new editions will be frequent. Nevertheless in the hands of a reader who will be content to use it only as a map directing him to the fountain heads of the law, and not as itself a source of knowledge, it will prove of great value. A Digest of Equity. By J. ANDREW STRAHAN and G. H. B. KENRICK. London: Butterworth & Co. 1905. 8vo. xliii and 541 pp. (158.) The THIS is a praiseworthy attempt to expound the main principles of Equity in a concise and somewhat original form, but the work strikes us as being less a digest of Equity than a summary of principles. work is divided into three books, the first dealing with Jurisdiction, the second with Equitable Rights, and the third with Equitable Remedies. The second book, which forms the bulk of the work, is divided into three parts, viz. Equities to protect confidences, Equities to promote fair dealing, and Equities to prevent oppression. This classification is, so far as we know, a novel one, but it is not altogether happy. To deal with trusts under the heading of 'Equities to protect confidences' is scarcely accurate. Confidences are not protected unless they are intended to be trusts. That was laid down by the Court of Appeal in In re Adams and Kensington Vestry, 27 Ch. D. 394. It is not therefore strictly correct to treat the protection of confidences as a branch of equitable rights, nor do we see that any useful purpose is served thereby, especially as the heading in question includes nothing but trusts. With regard to the other two divisions of the subject, they also seem to be somewhat arbitrary. To promote fair dealing is to prevent oppression, and vice versa. It is difficult to see any clear dividing line between the two, and this is shown by the fact that matters are placed in the second division which might, with at least equal propriety, have been placed in the third. If, however, the form and arrangement of the work do not appear to us to be quite satisfactory, we can at least heartily commend the substance. The principles are lucidly stated, the cases illustrating them are carefully chosen, and the effect of them is correctly given. The work is, in short, a concise and clear exposition of the leading principles of Equity, and as such it should be of great use to students, for whom no doubt it is principally intended. The book, however, would be all the better for a fuller index. The Rights and Liabilities of Husband and Wife. By JOHN FRASER MACQUEEN, Q.C. Fourth Edition by WYATT PAINE. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Lim. 1905. La. 8vo. lxxxviii and 579 pp. (258.) TWENTY years have passed since the publication of the last edition of this work, and, to use the words of the Editor, 'the nebulous and at that time indeterminate effect of the provisions of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, have (sic) to some considerable extent been crystallized.' Consequently, he goes on to say, 'the Act has introduced into domestic life those sound principles of limited liability which in business corporations have tended so materially to enhance the trade and aggrandize the wealth of the community in the larger sphere of public life.' We are not prepared to give an unqualified assent to this latter statement as to the effect of the Act, nor is it necessary for us to do so. It is enough to say that the Act has effected many and important changes in the law of husband and wife, all of which changes have been duly and carefully noted in the volume now before us. The work, however, is by no means exclusively or even mainly concerned with the Married Women's Property Acts. On the contrary it is exceedingly comprehensive, and deals not only with married women's property but also with divorce, breach of promise, criminal liability, summary jurisdiction, the custody and maintenance of children, et hoc genus omne. In fact it omits nothing germane to the subject which could be usefully included. That is, however, a general view of the book. Descending to detail, we notice the omission of some cases which we think might have been usefully cited. For instance, the case of In re Duke of Marlborough, Davis v. Whitehead [1894] 2 Ch. 133, might have been given as a modern illustration of a wife's equity of redemption. On another point In re Atkinson, Waller v. Atkinson [1898] 1 Ch. 637, might have been cited. Further we notice that the effect of some of the cases is insufficiently stated or not stated at all, as for instance Paget v. Paget [1898] 1 Ch. 470, the effect of which is in no way indicated, though it seems to us a decision of some importance. These, however, are matters of minor importance, and do not appreciably affect the merits of a book which should prove of great use to all those who have to consider any of the many difficult points which arise out of the relation of husband and wife, a subject which the author justly remarks is one peculiarly fertile in legal difficulties. A Handbook of Practical Forms. By H. MOORE. Fourth Edition by EDWARD MANSON. London: William Clowes & Sons, Lim. 1905. 8vo. xxix and 591 pp. (208.) 'MOORE's Practical Forms' is a book too well known to require a lengthy notice. It consists of a number of miscellaneous forms needed in the every-day routine of a solicitor's office. The editor has preserved the original scheme, and has made only such additions and alterations as seemed to him necessary to bring the edition up to date. He has added new forms relating to Death Duties, Land Registration, Bankruptcy, and other matters. Many of these are official forms, which the solicitor obtains ready printed from the proper authority, and they might well have been omitted. Under Apprenticeship' we find the form of apprenticeship to the Sea Service issued by the Board of Trade, but for some reason the prescribed form of apprenticeship to the Sea Fishing Service is omitted without comA form of apprenticeship by Guardians of the Poor would have been more useful, as there is no official form in use. ment. In the notes to the ordinary deed of apprenticeship we are surprised to find it stated that the consideration must be truly stated in words at length.' The authority is Jackson v. Warwick, 7 T. R. 121, decided on a long obsolete Stamp Act, 8 Anne c. 9. We think also that the forms might be better arranged by being grouped according to their subject-matter. Thus all arbitration forms should be under that heading, instead of appearing under the several headings 'Arbitration,' 'Appointment,' 'Declaration,' and 'Notice'; and the page headings should indicate the subject-matter of the page. They are merely 'Practical Forms' throughout. The Law and Practice relating to Solicitors' Liens and Charging Orders. By FREDERICK WALTON ATKINSON. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Lim. 1905. 8vo. xxxvii and 224 pp. (78. 6d. net.) MR. ATKINSON is well qualified to write on solicitors' liens, not only by his experience as a solicitor, but by his diligence in collecting authorities and his mastery of principles; and he has produced an excellent and wellordered treatise on a somewhat intricate topic. The author treats severally of 'liens on paper, deeds, and other documents,' 'liens on funds and other property,' and charging orders under section 28 of the Solicitors Act, 1860. To each of these topics he devotes a chapter in which he sets out what property may be the subject of the lien or charge, by and against whom and in respect of what claims it may be asserted or obtained, how it may be resisted, and what are the remedies and procedure. An appendix contains a number of useful forms and precedents. Whilst the book has been on our table for review we have had occasion to refer to it on several points, and have in each case readily found a correct solution of the problem before us. The work might be made more useful by the inclusion of the details of practice, or at least references to the Orders and Rules applicable thereto, and the appendix of forms might be improved by appending to each form a note showing what stamp the document requires. In some matters of detail the book has imperfections, which indicate want of final revision. There is an unusually large number of Addenda, consisting of matter which might well have been incorporated in the text: the dates of cases and duplicate reports are given in many instances, and in others are omitted: usually, but not always, cases in the Court of Appeal are distinguished by the addition of the syllable App.'; and there are some loose or doubtful expressions used, such as 'a solicitor has ... a right of property in the lien' and a general lien is a lien to secure. . . all other debts and the balance of account.' These are faults which may be, and, we confidently expect, will be, remedied in future editions. A Manual of the Law of Principal and Agent. By JAMES BIGGS PORTER. Handbook of Commercial Law. By FREDERICK xii and 160 pp. GEORGE NEAVE. vii and 260 pp. MR. PORTER has managed to include a great deal of information in a small space. This is in a measure due to his ability to compress much information within a few words. He has also adopted the wise course of limiting the number of cases cited by referring, as a general rule, to the latest and most authoritative only. For instance he cites the decision of the Exchequer Chamber in Sharman v. Brandt (1871) L. R. 6 Q. B. 720, and omits the earlier ruling at Nisi Prius in Wright v. Dannah (1809) 2 Camp. 203, 11 R. R. 693; and the intermediate decision of the Court in Banc in Farebrother v. Simmons (1822) 5 B. & Ald. 333, 24 R. R. 399. But he does not require us to sever old friendships. Whitehead v. Tuckett, Paterson v. Gandasequi and Thomson v. Davenport, and other well-known cases, appear in their proper place. We should like to interpose here the suggestion that in future editions of this book, the reference to the original report of any leading case should be supplemented by a reference to the volume and page of the then current edition of leading cases in which it is to be also found. We have no option but to point out now the one serious mistake in the book. At p. 31 it is stated that if an agent appointed by parol to purchase land for his principal has made the purchase in his own name, and has obtained a conveyance of the legal estate to himself, thus becoming no longer simply an agent but a trustee, then it seems that sect. 7 of the Statute of Frauds which requires a trust to be declared in writing, would constitute a good defence to an action by the principal against the agent claiming a conveyance to himself.' This is asserted on the authority of James v. Smith [1891] 1 Ch. 384. But on turning to the report, it will be found that it is only a dictum, for both in the court of first instance and in the Court of Appeal it was held that the evidence did not establish agency in fact: W. N. [1891] p. 175. But the question was set at rest by the Court of Appeal in Rochefoucauld v. Boustead [1897] 1 Ch. 196, which has unfortunately escaped the learned author's researches. As was said by Lindley L.J. in that case 'notwithstanding the statute, it is competent for a person claiming land conveyed to another to prove by parol evidence that it was so conveyed upon trust for the claimant, and that the grantee knowing the facts, is denying the trust and relying upon the form of conveyance and the statute, in order to keep the land for himself.' Indeed, if it be admitted that the agent cannot enter into a contract to purchase the land in his own name, except as a trustee for his principal, which is what Heard v. Pilley (1869) L. R. 4 Ch. 548, decided, then it seems clear that the trust is one arising by implication or construction of law, and expressly excepted out of the Statute of Frauds by sect. 8. One or two small matters to which exception might be taken have not escaped us, but we forbear to refer to them in detail, as they are either unimportant, or unlikely to mislead any but the careless. We think that Mr. Porter has succeeded in writing a book, in which the main points relating to the law of principal and agent are to be found in an accessible form. Mr. Neave's book is accurate and covers much ground, but we venture to doubt if it will be found of much assistance to the practitioner or legal student. We should infer that it is intended for laymen only. If this be so, it will probably find a place among current legal literature. L'Ius Papirianum da Glück ad Hirschfeld. DI ANTONIO ZOCCO-ROSA. Torino: Fratelli Bocca. 1905. THIS pamphlet has been called forth by the recently propounded theory of Hirschfeld that the work entitled Monumenta, published by the Republican jurist Manilius and mentioned by Pomponius in his Enchiridion (Dig. 1. 2. 2. 39), is identical with the Monumenta which Cicero makes Scipio cite in the De Republica (ii. 14. 26) as containing certain laws of Numa. The author disbelieves in this identification, perhaps with justice. At least he scores a point when he remarks that the very fact that Manilius is an interlocutor in the Dialogue makes it improbable that Scipio's very impersonal reference (Propositis legibus his quas in monumentis habemus') should be a reference to Manilius's collection. This, however, is one of those very delicate questions of probability which form such a slippery path for the critic. A collection of documents (Monumenta) formed by a jurist is not exactly a work of his. It is conceivable that one might at the present day speak of inscriptions to great epigraphists without deeming it necessary to acknowledge their labours. The theory of Hirschfeld, however, if it be accepted as correct, makes the leading difficulty about the Ius Papirianum almost greater than it was before. It postulates a collection of the Leges Regiae about two generations earlier than that of Granius Flaccus. But why should the mysterious Papirius, with his varying praenomina, appear only at the later date? He is not mentioned by Cicero and first springs into existence with Dionysius. That Papirius was an invention of the post-Ciceronian period seems impossible; the problem resolves itself into one of nomenclature. It is not capable of solution; but the conjecture may be hazarded that even in Cicero's time the vitality of the Leges Regiae was not impaired by the prominence of the name of the supposed ancient redactor; whereas the commentary of Granius Flaccus may have professed to be but the renewal of the work of the Pontiff who had preserved these ancient ordinances. Although Hirschfeld's theory has been the stimulus for the production of this monograph, the author has made this renewal of an old question merely the occasion for a thorough-going review of the literature of the subject since Glück, towards the end of the eighteenth century, wrote his De iure Papiriano liber singularis. He is not, however, content even with this upward limit; for he makes occasional reference to the opinions of earlier students. As a bibliography of opinions on the form and character of the compilation known as lus Papirianum this pamphlet is very valuable. It is also very readable. The style is lively, and the mode in which fantastic theories are negatived is amusing. But it is too short to be more than a critical summary of opinions; and the grounds on which the author negatives the successive theories are too briefly and uncompromisingly stated. He is too exigent in his demand for proof. If we waited for proof (in the sense of documentary evidence or distinct historical allusion) there could be no such thing as a reasoned history of early Roman law. The function of the historian, like that of the philosopher, is to wonder and conjecture. Every thinker, who is not content to leave his material in the chaos in which he finds it, is bound to create some unity of his own; and the combination deserves consideration unless it is clearly inconsistent with admitted facts, or until it is replaced by a wider synthesis. There are, of course, limits to the legitimacy of the exercise of such imaginative reconstruction; and the author is justified in his strictures of the attempts made to get at the actual headings of the Papirian work. The subjects treated are fairly well known; but to argue from subjects to arrangement in a work known only from casual citations is a task beyond the powers of the most penetrating criticism. There is one controversy presented in the course of this review of literary theories, which is remarkable because unnecessary. It is the controversy that has gathered round the very simple and natural title Ius civile Papirianum. One would suppose from the language of the controversialists |