to put up after occupying his new position, and they must necessarily be imperfect. He had also learnt from the same source what force Beauregard actually had. This information was communicated to the corps commanders, but before any assault was made Anderson's corps, Field's and Kershaw's divisions, was in position, and before the assaults in the afternoon Hill's troops had begun to arrive.

General Birney was temporarily in command of the Second Corps, General Hancock being disabled by the opening of his wound in the evening of the 17th.

The Second Corps found itself sooner than the other troops close to the enemy's new intrenchments, being at the Hare house (near which were both the enemy's new and abandoned lines), only some three hundred yards distant. Its advance was in great part concealed by woods. The Ninth Corps, on the left of the Second, had to advance nearly a mile, when it found itself in contact with a force of the enemy occupying the Norfolk Railroad cut, and a ravine some four or five hundred yards in advance of and nearly parallel with their main line. The Fifth Corps, on the left of the Ninth, had a still greater distance to advance over, and had similar obstacles in its front interposed between it and the enemy's main line as the Ninth Corps, that is, deep ravines and the Norfolk Railroad cut, which was here very deep and difficult to cross, and was held by the enemy at its northern end. Its direction was such, curving to the north, as to embarrass troops advancing in line of battle. General Meade, finding that serious delays were occurring from the attempt to make a simultaneous attack, without fixing the hour, owing to the different conditions existing on the fronts of the several corps, fixed it himself and ordered all the corps to attack at twelve o'clock, with strong columns of assault. Birney carried out this order, making two assaults about midday, with Gibbon's division, on the right of the Prince George Court

House road, both of which were repulsed with severe loss, Brigadier-General Pierce and Colonel Ramsey, brigade commanders, being wounded.

General Burnside was occupied in endeavoring to drive the enemy out of the railroad cut in his front as a necessary preliminary to getting close enough to the intrenchments to assault. General Warren was similarly engaged. The ground he had to pass over was intricate and difficult to cross, and being chiefly in open ground, was exposed to the enemy's artillery fire for a long distance. General Meade again ordered assaults by all the corps, with their whole force at all hazards, as soon as possible, as he found it useless to appoint an hour to effect co-operation. All the corps assaulted late in the afternoon, and at hours not widely apart, General Birney with all his disposable force-Mott from the Hare house, on the left of the Prince George Court House road, supported by one of Gibbon's brigades, Barlow on Mott's left-but was repulsed with considerable loss.

General Burnside found the task of driving the enemy out of the railroad cut a formidable one, but succeeded, and, assaulting, established his corps within a hundred yards of the enemy's main line. He praises highly the manner in which Potter's and Willcox's divisions, under Major-General Parke's directions, accomplished this.

General Warren's assault was well made, some of Griffin's men being killed within twenty feet of the enemy's works, but it was no more successful than the others. His losses were very severe. Among the desperately wounded was Colonel Chamberlain, of the Twentieth Maine, who led his brigade under a destructive fire. On previous occasions he had been recommended for promotion for gallant conduct and efficient service.

On the right, Martindale advanced and gained some riflepits, but did not assault the main line.

The positions gained by the several corps close against the enemy were intrenched, and the two opposing lines in this part of the ground remained substantially the same in position to the close of the war.

Toward evening General Meade had reason to believe that General Beauregard had been reinforced by Lee's army, and that reinforcements were still arriving.

At the close of the day General Grant, expressing himself perfectly satisfied that all had been done that could be done, and that the assaults were called for by all the information that could be obtained, directed that the troops should be put under cover and have some rest, which, indeed, they greatly needed.

The Medical Director states that during this attempt to take Petersburg, from the 15th to the 18th of June, the number of wounded brought to the hospitals from the different corps was: from the Second Corps, 2,212; from the Fifth Corps, 1,145; from the Ninth Corps, 1,197; and, in addition, 1,656, the corps of which he does not note. This makes a total brought to the hospitals of 6,210. Taking the usual proportion for the killed, we have 1,240, and killed and wounded, 7,450. The number of killed and wounded of the Eighteenth Corps is not included. It was probably not less than 700.1

This makes the loss in killed and wounded to be 8,150. The Tabular Statement of the "Medical and Surgical History" has under the head of "Missing," 1,814. The total is then 9,964.

The figures of the Tabular Statement are: killed, 1,298; wounded, 7,474; killed and wounded, 8,772; missing, 1,814. Total loss, 10,586. The stragglers are probably included in these numbers.

1 The class the Medical Director designates as stragglers wounded, that is, who, slightly wounded, will not report to the hospitals, but try to straggle away, must have numbered five or six hundred; they are not included in the figures above.

I can find no official statement of the losses of Lee's and Beauregard's troops during these operations, but notwithstanding that they were intrenched, my own observation leads me to believe they were severe.

The incessant movements, day and night, for so long a period, the constant close contact with the enemy during all that time, the almost daily assaults upon intrenchments having entanglements in front, and defended by artillery and musketry in front and flank, exhausted officers and men. The larger part of the officers, who literally led their commands, were killed or wounded, and a large number of those that filled the ranks at the beginning of the campaign were absent. It is unreasonable to suppose that the troops were not, for a time, so exhausted as to need rest, and equally unreasonable to suppose that their opponents were not in a similar condition, though to a less degree, since they had not marched so much at night nor attacked intrenchments.

10*

CHAPTER VIII.

MOVEMENT AGAINST THE WELDON AND SOUTH SIDE RAILROADS-THE CAVALRY ENGAGEMENTS IN THE VICINITY OF TREVYLIAN STATION ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD, AND REAMS'S STATION ON THE WELDON RAILROAD-THE CASUALTIES IN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN UNTIL THE 30TH OF JUNE-THE DEMONSTRATION AGAINST WASHINGTON.

Ir was now determined to invest Petersburg partially by a line of intrenchments directed toward the Lynchburg (South Side) Railroad. These intrenchments were to consist of redoubts connected by lines of infantry parapets, with ditches and entanglements of slashing or abatis, which the army might be withdrawn from at any time, leaving a sufficient force to hold them, and move to intercept the railroads and attack Lee's army in unexpected quarters south, or even north, of the James. The work of intrenching went on on both sides, at first with constant picket and artillery firing. The Confederate intrenchments were similar to ours except that their works were not closed in the rear.

General Kautz had returned to General Butler in the night of the 16th and 17th, and a small cavalry force watched the left of the army. The two divisions of the Sixth Corps were returned to the Army of the Potomac on the evening of the 19th.

On the 21st the Ninth Corps extended its right to the