was 21,966, of which 19,766 belonged to the Army of the Potomac, and 2,200 to the Ninth Corps. The number I have given for the Army of the Potomac in those two battles is 19,923. The number reported by General Burnside for the Ninth Corps is, 3,123; total, 23,046, an excess of Surgeon McParlin's numbers of 1,080. But that excess is more than made up by the number of slightly wounded accompanying the army, and those left in the hands of the Confederates on the 10th of May.

The number of killed and wounded in the two battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania Court House is therefore 28,207. The number of missing 4,903, making a total of killed, wounded, and missing, of 33,110.

Surgeon McParlin further states that the number of sick sent to Washington from Fredericksburg at this period was 4,225. This would make a total of losses in this period of sixteen days of 37,335, the men discharged by expiration of their term of service not included.

The casualties at Spottsylvania Court House, according to Badeau, were 2,271 killed, 9,360 wounded, 1,970 missing; total, 13,601. The source of error in his figures has been already pointed out; his number of wounded is too small.

I have no means of presenting an accurate account of the casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia at Spottsylvania Court House. Excepting on those days and at those parts of the field noted in the narrative, they must have been much fewer in number than our own, since they remained on the defensive under the cover of intrenchments, entangled in their front in a manner unknown to European warfare, and, indeed, in a manner new to warfare in this country. Their losses were, however, severe.

This account of the operations shows in what manner the contest between the two armies was carried on. The marching was done chiefly at night, and the contact was so close

as to require constant vigilance day and night, and allow but little time for sleep. The firing was incessant. The fatigue, the loss of sleep, the watchfulness, taxed severely the powers of endurance of both officers and men. Usually, in military operations, the opposing armies come together, fight a battle and separate again, the strain lasting only a few days. In a siege it is only a small part of the opposing troops that are close together. But with these two armies it was different. From the 5th of May, 1864, to the 9th of April, 1865, they were in constant close contact, with rare intervals of brief comparative repose.

CHAPTER IV.

MOVEMENT TO THE NORTH ANNA RIVER-THE CAV

ALRY CORPS SENT AGAINST THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY, AND TO HAXALL'S LANDING ON JAMES RIVER.

Ir was supposed that, if one of the corps of the Army of the Potomac was sent some twenty miles distant on the road to Richmond, keeping the rest of the army ready to follow, Lee might endeavor to attack the corps, thus separated before it could be reinforced, and upon the first indication of such intention (or even before it, after allowing full time for the intention to disclose itself, if it should exist) the rest of the army following the corps might be able to attack before Lee could intrench. If Lee did not make this attempt on the isolated corps, then the movement would become simply a turning or flank operation.

With this view, General Grant, on the 18th, directed General Meade to move Hancock on the night of the 19th, with all his force, and as much cavalry as could be got together for him under General Torbert, as far toward Richmond on the line of the Fredericksburg Railroad as he could make, he fighting the enemy in whatever force he might find him. If the enemy made a general move to meet this, the three other corps of the army would follow and attack, if possible, before Lee had time to intrench.

The order for this was issued early in the afternoon of the 19th, but the encounter with Ewell caused the movement to be postponed. On the 20th, Hancock was directed by Gen

eral Meade to move as soon after dark as practicable, by way of Guinea Station and Bowling Green to Milford Station, about twenty miles distant by the route named, and take position on the right bank of the Mattapony, if practicable, and attack the enemy wherever found; he was to report progress constantly to headquarters.

General Warren was directed to make all preparations to move in the morning of the 21st to Massaponax Church, and thence south by the Telegraph road, crossing the Ny at Smith's mill, the Po at Stannard's mill, and thence southward by Mud tavern, Thornburg, Nancy Wright's, etc. Burnside was to follow Warren, and Wright, who was to concentrute in the vicinity of the commanding position of the Gayle house, was to withdraw on the night of the 21st, and follow Hancock's route.

General Hancock moved on the night of the 20th, arrived a Guinea Station (eight miles on the way), at daybreak of the 21st, where there was experienced a little opposition. About ten o'clock in the morning, Torbert, with the cavalry in advance, came upon some of Kemper's infantry brigade (Pickett's division) intrenched at Milford Station, and drove them out of their pits and across the Mattapony, captured some prisoners, and secured the wagon-road bridge as well as the railroad bridge there. By midday Barlow's division was across the river, in position and intrenched, the rest of the corps following.

Very early in the morning of the 21st, Burnside's, Warren's, and Wright's skirmishers were pressed close up against the enemy's intrenchments to ascertain if any part of their force had been withdrawn. A movement of troops toward their right was noted, for Lee, learning from his cavalry detachment at Guinea Station, and through his signal stations, that infantry and cavalry of our army had passed there at daybreak, brought Ewell at a very early hour to his right,

and posted him along the south bank of the Po, a part of his force holding the crossing of the Telegraph road at Stannard's mills.1

At ten o'clock General Warren began to withdraw. His instructions were modified so as to bring him to Guinea Station where he crossed the river (below the junction of the Po and the Ny) and moved out the road running southwest to Madison's store, halting for the night at Catlett's where the road from Mud tavern comes in, and sending forward detachments toward Mud tavern and to Madison's store; the latter place is about a mile from the telegraph road at Nancy Wright's. Detachments of the enemy's cavalry were at Guinea bridge when General Warren crossed and kept in front of his detachments on both roads. The modification of General Warren's route was made to bring him several miles nearer General Hancock. Wright's route was also modified, he to follow Burnside.

General Burnside, in accordance with his instructions, set his corps in motion as soon as the road was clear of the Fifth Corps, sending a brigade of Potter's division in advance to secure the crossing of the Po at Stannard's mill. The enemy's pickets were found on the north side of the river a mile in advance of it, and were driven to the south side, and dispositions were made by General Potter to carry the ford

1 "SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, 8.40 A.M., May 21, 1864.

HON. J. A. SEDDON, Secretary of War: "The enemy is apparently again changing his base. Three (3) gunboats came up to Port Royal two days since. This morning an infantry force appeared at Guinea's. His cavalry advance at Downer's bridge on Bowling Green road. He is apparently placing the Mattapony between us, and will probably open communication with Port Royal. I am extending on the Telegraph road, and will regulate my movements by the information of his route. I fear will R. E. LEE."

secure him from attack till he crosses Pamunkey.

This telegram was in cypher. The part apparently confidential is omitted in the translation. The last sentence should probably read, "I fear it will secure him," etc., etc. The underlining is mine.

A. A. H.